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This study examines  the discourse of a one-state  solution and the Palestinian
intellectuals who produce it.  It draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and uses
a discourse analytic methodology to address the following questions.  What is the
function of the discourse of a one-state solution in Palestinian politics and why
has it taken certain forms? Why do intellectuals intervene in political struggles,
an intervention that in this instance has occurred at a transnational level? How is
it that the contentious practice of these intellectuals remains largely abstract and
not otherwise? And finally, what role can these intellectuals play in converting
their critique into an actual generalised historical form?  The central thesis of this
study  is  that  the  discourse  of  a  one-state  solution  is  a  competing  vision  of
Palestinian social  reality which opposes the dominant discourse in Palestinian
politics and which incorporates the particular standpoints of those intellectuals
who produce it.  These intellectuals seek to impose this vision on the Palestinian
political  field  through  challenging  the  authority  of  established  elites  and  so
claiming a position of symbolic power for themselves.  They do this primarily
through  claims  to  possess  politically  indispensable  knowledge  and  through
claims to be the legitimate spokespersons of the Palestinian people.  The precise
manner  in  which  this  bid  for  symbolic  power  is  performed  has  effects  that
contingently deny the possibility of these intellectuals  playing a political  role
beyond  their  present  mode  of  engagement.   This  study  contends  that  it  is
important politically to reflect on the limits of critical thought and knowledge
production, though how one does this is problematised and taken as a starting
point for future research on reflexive practice.  In addition, this study suggests
2
that  different  perspectives  in  a  given  social  structure  are  necessary  for  the
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The Palestinian national movement is at an impasse and is suffering a crisis of
political legitimacy and direction.  Despite retaining its official title as the sole
legitimate  representative  of  the  Palestinian  people,  the  Palestine  Liberation
Organisation  (PLO)  barely  functions.   Much  of  what  had  previously  bound
disparate Palestinian trajectories into a relatively coherent political  framework
has  long  since  been  undermined,  with  this  process  occurring  through  a
combination  of  military  defeat,  neglect,  marginalisation  and  the  co-option  of
national institutions by increasingly unaccountable and authoritarian elites.  The
creation  of  the  Palestinian  Authority  (PA)  in  1994  contributed  to  this
marginalisation of the PLO, as the former effectively replaced the latter as the
main national institution in the Palestinian arena.1  Though the establishment of
the PA was widely regarded as a final step towards the Palestinians’ official goal
of independent statehood in the context of a negotiated two-state solution to their
conflict with Israel, it too at present is in a critical condition.2  It is economically
dependent on external sources of funding, divided geographically and politically
between  the  rival  factions  of  Fateh  and  Hamas,  and  likewise  is  increasingly
authoritarian in its mode of governance over aspects of Palestinian society in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.3  
1 Doumani, Beshara, Palestine versus the Palestinians? The Iron Laws and the Ironies of a People 
Denied, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No.4, Summer 2007, pp. 49-64, pp. 54-60; Frisch, 
Hillel, The Death of the PLO, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, March 2009, pp. 243-261; 
Rubinstein, Danny, One State/Two States: Rethinking Israel and Palestine, Dissent, Summer 
2010, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/one-statetwo-states-rethinking-israel-and-palestine,
accessed 31/04/2013; Sayigh, Yezid, Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 
3, Autumn 2001, pp. 47-60, pp. 51-2; Sayigh, Yezid, The Palestinian Strategic Impasse, Survival,
Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002-03, pp. 7-21, p. 15 
2 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, Oneworld,
Oxford, 2009 (2007), pp. 150-1
3 Brown, Nathan J., Gaza Five Years On: Hamas Settles In, The Carnegie Papers, The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, June 2012; Le More, Anne, International Assistance to the 
Palestinians after Oslo: Political guilt, wasted money, Routledge, London and New York, 2008; 
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    Moreover, the relative paralysis of the Palestinian political field, and growing
authoritarian  trends,  has  taken  place  within  the  context  of  Israel’s  ongoing
occupation  of  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip  and  East  Jerusalem,  which  by
implication has prevented the realisation of an independent Palestinian state and
a two-state solution to the conflict.  For many analysts the current ‘prospects for
a two-state solution are as dim as ever’.4  Bodies such as the European Union
(EU) have warned that  the extensiveness  of Israel’s  occupation,  including its
continuing practices of dispossession and land expropriation, is threatening ‘to
make  a  two-state  solution  impossible’.5  The Oslo peace  process,  which was
initiated by the PLO and Israel in the early 1990s, appears to be moribund and
effectively has been since the collapse of the Camp David Summit in July 2000
and the start of the second Palestinian intifada shortly afterwards.  According to
authoritative  accounts,  Palestinians  generally  are  disillusioned and disaffected
with the ‘peace process as they have grown to know it’.6  Popular resistance
among Palestinians to Israel’s structural violence against them is ongoing, but
this  remains  heavily  localised  or  tactical.7  There  is,  in  short,  currently  no
strategic  and programmatic  alternative  in  the  Palestinian  political  field.   The
‘strategic impasse’ continues.8 
Le More, Anne, Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a Palestinian state, International 
Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, 2005, pp. 981-999, pp. 986-94; Parsons, Nigel, The Politics of the 
Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, Routledge, New York and London, 2005; Sayigh, 
Yezid, Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian Transformation in the West Bank 
and Gaza, The Carnegie Papers, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 
2011. 
4 International Crisis Group, The Emperor has no Clothes: Palestinians and the End of the Peace 
Process, Middle East Report, No. 122, 7 May 2012, p. i (executive summary)
5 Sherwood, Harriet, “Israel putting any two-state peace deal at risk, says EU”, The Guardian, 
Monday 14 May, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/14/israel-two-state-risk-eu?
INTCMP=SRCH, accessed 17/05/2012.           
6 International Crisis Group, Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy, 
Middle East Report, No. 95, 26 April 2010, p. i (executive summary)
7 Ibid., pp. 25-30.  See also, Hammami, Rema, and, Tamari, Salim, Anatomy of Another 
Rebellion, Middle East Report, Vol. 30, No. 217, Winter 2000, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/anatomy-another-rebellion, accessed 20/01/2013
8 Sayigh, Yezid, The Palestinian Strategic Impasse, Survival, pp. 7-21
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    It is within this context that certain intellectuals have articulated a discourse
calling for a one-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  This discourse,
which will be labelled the discourse of one-state,9 has polarised debate on the
Palestine  issue  largely  around  ‘a  two-state  versus  one-state  solution’
dichotomy.10  From the point of view of these intellectuals, the one-state solution
would entail establishing a single state on all of Mandate Palestine – present day
Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem – in which Israeli Jews and
Palestinians would coexist  on an equal basis.  Equality is conceived as equal
‘civil,  political,  social  and  cultural  rights  for  all  citizens’  of  the  state;  this
includes all those who currently live within the boundaries of what was Mandate
Palestine, as well as all those who have been ‘expelled or exiled from it since
1948’.11 The  actual  institutional  structure  and  identity  of  this  state  remains
unclear,  with  various  and  often  contradictory  ideas  of  unitary  statehood,
binationalism,  federalism  and  so  on  being  proposed,  but  the  underlying
principles of coexistence, equality and inclusion are articulated consistently.12
    The vision of coexistence and equality informing the discourse of one-state
distinguishes  it  from  other  versions  of  a  one-state  solution,  and  it  is  this
distinction that warrants it  being analysed separately from these.   Hamas,  for
example, maintains that its ultimate objective is to establish a single state on all
9 The phrase “one-state solution” is typically used interchangeably with terms such as “binational 
state”, “secular, democratic state”, “unitary state”, and “single state” in the discourse of one-state.
There are differences between all these terms.  However, unless stated otherwise they will be 
taken to denote the generic “one-state solution” when used in this study. 
10 Roy, Sara, quoted, in, Le More, Anne, Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a 
Palestinian state, International Affairs, p. 998
11 Abunimah, Ali, Aruri, Naseer, Barghouti, Omar, Ben-Dor, Oren, Bisharat, George, Bresheeth, 
Haim, Cook, Jonathan, Falah, Ghazi, Farsakh, Leila, Jad, Islah, Massad, Joseph, Pappé, Ilan, 
Prieto del Campo, Carlos, Rouhana, Nadim, and, The London One-State Group, The One-State 
Declaration, 29 November, 2007,   http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article9134.shtml, accessed 
25/02/2010.  This will be cited as The One State Declaration from now on.
12 Adam, Heribert, and, Moodley, Kogila, Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis and 
Palestinians, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005, p. 179; Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-
State Solution Dead?, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 
669, January 2004, pp. 37-43, p. 37 
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the territory of what was Mandate Palestine.  Yet, in contrast to the discourse of
one-state, its vision of a one-state solution is  imagined  'in terms of an Islamic
state in which non-Muslims would be tolerated minorities'.13  Non-Muslims are
thus conceived of as occupants of a subordinate status in this vision of the future;
they are not to be included on an equal basis. Therefore, as such versions of a
one-state solution are clearly different from the one incorporated in the discourse
of one-state, they are not going to be explored any further in this study.
    Furthermore, though the intellectuals producing the discourse of one-state do
at times discuss the modalities, institutional design and identity of the state they
envision, a close reading of their texts reveals that these issues are not taken to be
as important as contesting hegemonic discourse and established elites.  The two
most common models of a one-state solution promoted in the discourse of one-
state are the binational approach and the unitary democratic state approach.  The
former is predicated on recognising the 'collective entitlements' of two national
communities  'within  one  political  entity',  while  the  latter  is  a  formula  for
recognising individual rights only and is premised on the principle of one person,
one  vote.14  Occasionally  this  discourse  speculates  more  specifically  on
federalist,  consociationalist,  and  cantonalist  models  as  suitable  formulas  for
implementing  a  single  state  in  Palestine-Israel,  but  again  these  ideas  remain
undeveloped.15  Indeed, all these models remain rather nebulous in this discourse
and are typically framed as potential blueprints to be decided upon at a later date.
According to the intellectuals advocating a one-state solution, what is crucial at
13Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, p. 209
14Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-State Solution Dead?, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary 
World Affairs, p. 37.  See also, Dumper, Mick, A false dichotomy? The binationalism debate and 
the future of divided Jerusalem, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3, 2011, pp. 671-685, pp. 673-
75
15See, for example, Abunimah, Ali, A Curious Case of Exceptionalism: Non-partitionist 
Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Regulation and the Question of Palestine, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 10, 
Nos. 3-4, September-November 2011, pp. 431-444.
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this stage is not whether a single state is modelled as a 'binational solution, a
federal system or a cantonal system',16 but rather the struggle against political
orthodoxy and the provision of 'an alternative vision … based on equality and
inclusion'.17  It  is  because  of  this  prioritisation,  and  resultant  deferral  of
discussion of  what  a  one-state  solution  would actually  entail,  that  analysis  is
limited here to an in depth exploration of the alternative political stance adopted
by these  intellectuals  and  their  present  mode  of  contestation.   It  is  on  these
grounds, that is to say, that the decision has been made not to consider the issue
of models of a one-state solution any further.         
    Most of the intellectuals who are publicly intervening with the discourse of
one-state are Palestinian; and while the target of their discursive practice clearly
includes Israelis,  it  is at present primarily directed at other Palestinians.   It is
principally  concerned  with  the  issue  of  renewing  the  Palestinian  national
movement following its effective collapse over the last twenty years.  It is due to
this concern, along with the fact that most proponents of a one-state solution are
Palestinian,  that  analysis  is  restricted  here  to  the  Palestinian  context.   This
restriction should not be read as implying that non-Palestinian advocates of a
one-state  solution are insignificant,  or that  the Palestinian context  is  the only
important one.18  Rather, it simply reflects the decision to prioritise depth over
breadth and engage with a major aspect of the discourse of one-state in detail
instead of dealing with all aspects of it superficially.  A lengthier study would
hope to redress this imbalance, and this limitation should be kept in mind by the
reader.
16Aruri, Naseer H., The incidental fruit of Oslo, Al-Ahram Weekly, 13-19 August, 1998, Issue No.
390, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/390/pal1.htm, accessed 30/04/2009
17Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, Bloomsbury, London, 2004, p. 56
18 For an example of non-Palestinian advocacy of a one-state solution see: Tilley, Virginia, The 
one-state solution: A breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2005 
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    More  specifically,  within  the  Palestinian  context,  the  intellectuals  who
construct the discourse of one-state tend to be university-based academics.  The
most prominent Palestinian exponent of this position, Edward Said, was, before
his untimely death in 2003, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at
Columbia  University.   Lama  Abu-Odeh  is  Professor  of  Law  at  Georgetown
University;  Naseer  Aruri  is  Emeritus  Professor  of  Political  Science  at  the
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth.  George Bisharat is Professor of Law at
the  University  of  California's  Hastings  Law School;  Seif  Da'Na  is  Associate
Professor of Sociology and International Studies at the University of Wisconsin,
Parkside;  Haidar  Eid  is  Associate  Professor  of  Postcolonial  and  Postmodern
Literature at Al Aqsa University, Gaza; Sharif Elmusa is Associate Professor of
Political Science at the American University in Cairo; Noura Erakat is Adjunct
Assistant  Professor  of  International  Human  Rights  Law  at  Georgetown
University  and Abraham L.  Freedman Teaching Fellow at  Beasley School  of
Law,  Temple  University;  Ghazi  Falah  is  Professor  of  Geography  at  the
University of Akron; Leila Farsakh is Associate Professor of Political Science at
the University of Massachusetts, Boston; As'ad Ghanem is Professor of Political
Science  at  Haifa  University;  Islah  Jad  is  Assistant  Professor  of  Gender  and
Development at Birzeit University; Ghada Karmi is Honorary Research Fellow
and Assistant Lecturer at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of
Exeter;  Saree  Makdisi  is  Professor  of  English  and Comparative  Literature  at
University of California,  Los Angeles;  Nur Masalha is  Professor of Religion,
Politics and Conflict Resolution at St Mary's University College, London; Joseph
Massad is Associate Professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History
at Columbia University; Karma Nabulsi is Fellow in Politics at St Edmund Hall,
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Oxford  University,  and  is  Lecturer  in  Politics  and  International  Relations  at
Oxford University; Mazin Qumsiyeh is Adjunct Professor of Molecular Genetics
at Birzeit University,  Professor of Biotechnology at Bethlehem University and
Professor  of  Biology,  Environmental  Science  and Human  Rights  at  Al  Quds
University;  and Nadim Rouhana is  Professor of International  Negotiation and
Conflict Studies at Tufts University.
    Further, a number of proponents of a one-state solution have held professional
academic positions in the past, and presently are employed in occupations that
are typically regarded as having an intellectualist orientation.  Ali Abunimah was
previously  a  Researcher  in  Social  Policy  at  the  University  of  Chicago  and
currently  is  a  writer  and  journalist.   Salman  Abu  Sitta  was  a  Professor  of
Engineering  and now is  President  of  the Palestine  Land Society,  a  'scholarly
society  devoted  to  research  an  information  on  Palestine  land  and  people'.19
Ramzy  Baroud  used  to  teach  Mass  Communication  at  Australia's  Curtin
University of Technology and is a journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of the
Palestine Chronicle.  Azmi Bishara was Professor of Philosophy and  History of
Political  Thought  at  Birzeit  University  and  is  General  Director  of  the  Arab
Center  (sic)  for  Research  and  Policy  Studies  in  Doha,  Qatar.   Jamil  Hilal
previously  lectured  at  the  University  of  Durham,  was  a  Research  Fellow  at
Oxford University, was a Non-Resident Senior Researcher at the Development
Studies Programme, the Institute of Women's Studies, and the Law Institute at
Birzeit University, was Associate Research Fellow at Muwatin, the Palestinian
Institute for the Study of Democracy, and is currently an independent sociologist.
    Other Palestinian intellectuals producing the discourse of one-state include:
Susan Abulhawa,  who is  a  novelist;  Omar  Barghouti,  who is  an independent
19Palestine Land Society, http://www.plands.org/, accessed, 08/01/2014
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researcher  and  commentator;  Farid  Farid,  who  is  a  PhD  Candidate  at  the
University  of  Western  Sydney  and  freelance  writer;  Nadia  Hijab,  who  is  a
political analyst, journalist, and Senior Fellow at the Institute of Palestine Studies
in Washington D.C.;  Ahmed Moor, who is a PhD Candidate in the Kennedy
School  of  Government,  Harvard  University,  and  freelance  journalist;  Samah
Sabawi, who is a playwright, poet and political analyst; and Michael Tarazi, who
is a lawyer and currently Senior Financial Sector Specialist for the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) – a consultancy that seeks to 'improve the lives
of poor people' through increasing their access to financial services.20       
    As these professional occupations imply,  the Palestinian intellectuals who
construct the discourse of one-state are typically holders of advanced educational
qualifications.   These,  moreover,  have  been  often  gained  from  universities
widely recognised as prestigious.  
    Edward Said held of PhD in English Literature from Harvard University, as
well as a MA from Harvard University and a BA from Princeton University.
Susan Abulhawa holds a MSc in Neuroscience from the University of Southern
California; Ali Abunimah holds a BA from Princeton University and a MA from
Chicago  University;  Lama  Abu-Oden  has  a  SJD  from  Harvard  University;
Salman Abu Sitta  holds a  PhD in Civil  Engineering  from University College
London;  Naseer  Aruri  holds  a  PhD  from  the  University  of  Massachusetts
Amherst;  Omar Barghouti holds a MSc and BSc in Electrical Engineering from
Columbia University,  as well  as a MA in Philosophy (Ethics) from Tel Aviv
University;  Azmi  Bishara  has  a  PhD and MA in Philosophy from Humboldt
University in Berlin; George Bisharat  holds a PhD in Anthropology and Middle
East Studies from Harvard University, is a Graduate cum laude of Harvard Law
20Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, http://www.cgap.org/about, accessed, 08/01/2014
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School,  and  has  a  MA  from  Georgetown  University  and  a  BA  from  the
University of California, Berkeley;  Seif Da'Na holds a PhD from Kansas State
University; Haidar Eid holds a PhD in English Literature and Philosophy from
Rand's  Afrikaan  University  in  Johannesburg;  Sharif  Elmusa  has  a  PhD  in
Interdisciplinary  Regional  Development  from  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of
Technology; Noura Erakat holds a JD in International Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law from Berkeley Law School, as well as a LLM in National Security
from Georgetown University Law Center and a BA in International Development
from  the  University  of  California,  Berkeley;  Ghazi  Falah  has  a  PhD  in
Geography from Durham University;  Leila  Farsakh has  a  PhD in  Economics
from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (SOAS),
a MPhil in Politics and Sociology of Development from Cambridge University,
and a BA in Politics and Society from the University of Exeter;  Nadia Hijab
holds  a  MA and BA in  English  Literature  from the  American  University  of
Beirut; Jamil Hilal has a MPhil in Political Sociology from Durham University;
Islah Jad has a PhD in Gender and Development Studies from SOAS; Ghada
Karmi has a PhD in Medieval Islamic Medicine from SOAS and a MD from
Bristol University; Saree Makdisi holds a PhD in English Literature from Duke
University;  Nur Masalha holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Politics from SOAS;
Joseph  Massad  holds  a  PhD in  Political  Science  from Columbia  University;
Karma Nabulsi  holds a DPhil  and MPhil in Politics  from Oxford University;
Mazin Qumsiyeh has a PhD in Zoology and Genetics from Texas Technological
University and did a Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Clinical Molecular Genetics at
Duke  University;  Nadim  Rouhana  holds  a  PhD  in  Social  Psychology  from
Wayne  State  University  and  did  a  Post-Doctoral  Fellowship  at  Harvard
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University; Samah Sabawi holds a Bachelor's degree from Monash University;
and Michael Tarazi has a Bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a Law
Degree from Harvard Law School.
    The above information indicates that the number of Palestinian intellectuals
involved in formulating and publicly articulating the discourse of one-state is
small.  Indeed, as one of these intellectuals declares, only a 'very small number of
proponents' are engaged  in this specific practice of public articulation.  Yet, as
this same figure further comments, these proponents have managed to  put the
'one-state option … on the world's agenda', even if, as noted above, this has been
so far only achieved at the level of debate, and not as an actual political agenda. 21
Though the context of impasse and crisis of legitimacy has contributed to this
discursive intervention, the agency enabling  this conduct is bound up with the
institutional  position  of  those  engaged  in  it  and  the  advanced  educational
qualifications they hold.   It is primarily as  intellectuals that they are publicly
intervening  with  the  discourse  of  one-state;  and  the  legitimacy  of  their
intervention  largely  rests  on  and  is  sought  through  the  mobilisation  of  their
specific  claims  to  sophisticated  knowledge  and  competence.   Though  these
figures  might  not  always  be  part  of  a  cultural  elite  within  the  particular
intellectual settings in which they are occupied, it is their possession of cultural
capital that is crucial to their engagement in the Palestinian political field.  
    As this information also suggests, most of the Palestinian intellectuals calling
for a one-state solution are located outside the geographical boundaries of what
was Mandate Palestine.   They tend to reside in North America or the United
Kingdom (UK).   Edward Said lived in  New York;  Susan Abulhawa lives  in
21Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, W. W. Norton & Company, 
New York and London, 2010 (2008), pp. xxvi (author's note) 
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Pennsylvania;  Ali  Abunimah  lives  in  Chicago;  Lama  Abu-Odeh  lives  in
Washington  D.C.;  Salman  Abu  Sitta  lives  in  London;  Naseer  Aruri  lives  in
Boston; Ramzy Baroud lives in Seattle,  Washington; George Bisharat lives in
San Francisco; Seifa Da'NA is based in Wisconsin; Sharif Elmusa lives in Cairo
and Washington D.C.; Noura Erakat lives in Washington D.C.; Ghazi Falah lives
in Ohio and Toronto; Leila Farsakh lives in Boston; Nadia Hijab lives in New
York; Ghada Karmi lives in London; Saree Makdisi lives in Los Angeles; Nur
Masalha lives in London; Joseph Massad lives in New York; Karma Nabulsi
lives in Oxford; Nadim Rouhana lives in Medford, Massachusetts; and Michael
Tarazi lives in New York.  Other intellectuals who do not live in either North
America, the UK, or within the geographical boundaries of what was Mandate
Palestine include Azmi Bishara and Sama Sabawi.  Bishara lives in Doha, Qatar,
though was until 2007 a citizen of Israel who lived in Nazareth.  Sabawi lives in
Sydney, Australia, and previously lived in Canada.
    The remaining intellectuals  looked at  here currently live within either  the
occupied territories or Israel, though it should be stressed that they too usually
have experienced living in a number of different locations.  Omar Barghouti lives
in Ramallah, but was born in Qatar, grew up in Egypt and studied in the United
States of America (USA); Haidar Eid lives in Gaza, and studied in South Africa
and Turkish Cyprus;  As'ad Ghanem lives  in Tamra,  Haifa;  Islah Jad lives  in
Birzeit, and studied in Egypt, France and Britain; and Mazin Qumsiyeh lives in
Bethlehem, and is an American citizen who lived and studied in the USA for
twenty four years.
    It is because most advocates of a one-state solution relate to the Palestinian
struggle from outside the geographic location of what was Mandate Palestine that
16
this study deploys the concept of diaspora, a term that will be developed in more
detail below.  As this “outside” location is primarily based in North America and
Europe,  the discourse of one-state  will  be at  times  more  specifically  focused
upon  as  a  diasporic  discourse  enunciated  from  these  geo-political  regions.
Again, this is not meant to imply that the discourse of one-state is reducible to a
North  American  and  European  diasporic  discourse,  or  that  it  is  only North
American and European Palestinian diasporans who are articulating it. Rather,
this focus is justified on the grounds that this particular diasporic aspect of the
discourse of one-state is designated as significant in terms of accounting for both
the specific content of this discourse, the factors driving the political intervention
of these intellectuals, and the precise mode of their political contestation.    
    Indeed, what is the function of the discourse of one-state in Palestinian politics
and why has it taken certain forms? Why do intellectuals intervene in political
struggles, an intervention that in this instance has been undertaken predominantly
from the position of diaspora and so at a transnational level?  Given that these
particular intellectuals frequently insist on the need to translate their ideas into a
programmatic  agenda  for  action,  how  is  it  that  the  practice  of  their  critical
engagement remains largely abstract and not otherwise?  Finally, what role can
these  intellectuals  play  in  converting  their  critique  into  an  actual  generalised
historical form?
    The main argument of this study is that the discourse of one-state functions as
a competing vision of Palestinian social reality which is articulated in opposition
to  the  officially  dominant  discourse  in  Palestinian  politics,  and  which
incorporates  the  particular  standpoints  of  those  intellectuals  who  produce  it.
These intellectuals seek to impose this vision on the Palestinian political field
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through challenging the authority of established elites and so claiming a position
of symbolic power for themselves.   They do this  primarily through claims to
possess  politically  indispensable  knowledge  and  through  claims  to  be  the
legitimate spokespersons of the Palestinian people.  The precise manner in which
this bid for symbolic power is performed has effects that contingently deny the
possibility  of  these  intellectuals  playing  a  political  role  beyond  their  present
mode  of  engagement.   The  logic  of  their  contentious  practice  prioritises
philosophical interpretation over practical transformation.  In addition, it works
to symbolically efface different points of view in the Palestinian political field,
so  limiting  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  the  formation  of  a  mobilised
collective subject.  Consequently, so long as the hegemonic discursive frames of
this discourse are reiterated, these agents cannot possibly convert their vision into
an actual generalised historical form.   
    The broader focus of this analysis is on the role of intellectuals in politics and
on the relation between critical thought and political struggle (by which is meant
thought,  or  knowledge,  that  is  overtly  interested  in  changing  a  given  social
configuration  and the political  possibilities/impossibilities  temporarily  enacted
within  it).   The  critical  practice  of  intellectuals,  and  more  specifically  the
production and political effects of counter-knowledge, are the general concerns
of this text.  The question of how such political possibilities/impossibilities are
enacted is considered especially important, not least because awareness of limits
might raise the prospect of going beyond them.  Indeed, this study contends that
reflection on the limits of critical thought and knowledge production is highly
significant politically.  Yet it also contends that engaging in reflection is far from
being straightforward.   How does  one  do  this  and to  what  extent  is  it  even
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possible?  This thesis is significant because it enables a starting point for future
research on reflexive practice.             
    Furthermore, this study engages with other theoretical perspectives including,
most  importantly,  post-representationalism  and  deliberative  democracy.   The
general arguments made in relation to these theories are twofold.  Firstly, that
difference  is  the  condition  of  possibility  for  politics  as  the  constitution  of  a
mobilised collective subject.  Secondly, that the imposition of a prior unity on a
given social structure works to prefigure identity as always already present and
so effaces the possibilities for its active formation.  Both these contentions and
their demonstration through the analysis of the discourse of one-state seem to add
support to certain theoretical criticisms of post-representation and deliberation,22
which in turn appear to prioritise  a conception of politics  in which ‘practical
groups’ have to be made through struggles for legitimate domination and the
constitutive generalising of the particular.23  These points will be developed in
more detail at the theoretical level in the first chapter of this research.
Significance and Review of Literature   
The significance of this research is in part determined by it focus on important
intellectual debates and reconceptualisations taking place within the Palestinian
national movement regarding its historic purpose and future direction.   Given
22 Thomassen, Lasse, Beyond Representation?, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2007, pp. 
111-126; Kioupkiolis, Alexandros, Radicalizing Democracy, Constellations, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
2010, pp. 137-154; Kohn, Margaret, Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of 
Deliberative Democracy, Constellations, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2000, pp. 408-429, pp. 423-4; Wedeen, 
Lisa, Concepts and commitments in the Study of demoracy, in, Shapiro, Ian, Smith, Rogers M., 
and Masoud, Tarek E. (eds.), Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004,  pp. 274-306, p. 298; Young, Iris Marion, Communication 
and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in, Benhabib, Seyla (ed.), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1996, pp. 120-135
23 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, 1987, pp. 1-17, pp. 7-8
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that the Palestinian-Israeli  conflict  is a major issue in world politics, it  would
seem reasonable to suggest that research generating knowledge on such issues is
a  worthwhile  and  significant  endeavour.   However,  the  significance  of  this
research is not limited to this point.  It is also derived from very specific political
and scholarly concerns.
    As will be discussed in more detail shortly, the philosophical perspective used
in this study rejects the notion of knowledge that is neutral.  It rejects, in short,
positivist  epistemology.   This  does  not  mean  that  scholarly  research  is
necessarily  the  equivalent  of  political  advocacy.   Yet  it  does  mean  that  it  is
inevitably  bound  up  with  specific  historical  and  social  circumstances  and  is
undertaken  from a  particular  normative  standpoint.   It  will  be  invariably  for
something and against something else.  
    As noted above, the dominant paradigm for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict – that is, the two-state solution – is widely regarded as being in crisis and
is increasingly looked upon as passé.  This is so despite this approach retaining
its official dominance in local, regional, and international politics.  While this
study does not advocate a specific stance on what the resolution of this conflict
ought  to  look  like  (and  as  a  white  British  citizen  with  no  formal  political
affiliation and who became interested in this issue via academic books, it would
be  somewhat  offensive  for  this  author  to  do  so),  it  does  take  seriously  the
problems  facing  the  two-state  approach  and  by  extension  the  need  to  think
critically about alternatives.  These include, of course, a one-state solution; and
in this sense this study is shaped by particular circumstances and is undertaken
from a standpoint which does not necessarily oppose expanding debate on this
issue beyond the boundaries of political orthodoxy.  In the absence of a two-state
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solution it is Palestinians who suffer the most as an occupied, dispossessed and
discriminated against people.  Therefore, with this in mind, there would appear to
be  a  political  significance  attached  to  critically  engaging  with  alternative
formations to the struggle against such conditions.
    The more scholarly significance of this research stems from its engagement
with the existing literature on this topic.  A prevailing position in this literature is
that the discourse of one-state functions as a response to material conditions in
the occupied territories – that is, Jewish settlements or ‘facts on the ground’24 –
that have undermined the territorial basis for a viable Palestinian state.  Rashid
Khalidi sums this point up well when he states that 
the inexorable cementing of Israel’s hold over the occupied West Bank
and East Jerusalem have rendered moot  the possibility of establishing
what could legitimately be called a Palestinian state, and consequently
have called into question whether a two-state solution is still possible ….
This realization in turn has instigated renewed consideration of the old
idea of a one-state solution.25  
     
This view is problematic not only because it ignores a much more fundamental
and  indeed  important  epistemological  critique  of  the  two-state  paradigm
underway in the discourse of one-state; but also because it takes as a given what
needs to be explained.  Why should disillusionment with the two-state approach
necessarily translate into advocacy of a one-state solution?  The two points are
not causally linked, and while it is understandable that a perceived failure in one
approach will result in it losing support, it is not clear why this ought to result in
24 Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-State Solution Dead?, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary
World Affairs, p. 39
25 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, pp. 206-7;
See also, Hermann, Tamar, The bi-national idea in Israel/Palestine: past and present, Nations and
Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, pp. 381-401; and, Sussman, Gary, The Challenge to the Two-
state Solution, Middle East Report, Vol. 34, No. 231, Summer 2004, pp. 8-15, pp. 11-12
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the  promotion  of  one  particular  approach  and  not  others.26  Debate  on  the
Palestinian-Israeli  conflict  may  have  polarised  around  a  two-state-one-state
binary,  but this  division has been socially constructed and as such cannot  be
considered inevitable.  There are other possibilities available and discourse is not
necessarily limited to an either/or dichotomy.27
    Another problem with the literature on the discourse of one-state relates to its
engagement  with  those  who produce  it.   As  Tamar  Hermann  comments,  the
Palestinian  individuals  who construct  this  standpoint  are  ‘mostly  intellectuals
living in the Diaspora’.28  This is a fairly accurate observation (though it should
be  stressed that  advocacy of  this  position  is  not  solely carried  out  from this
point).  Yet it is one that for the most part is simply stated without any efforts to
account for this specificity or explain why such intellectuals are engaged in this
critical  practice.   Moreover,  those  analyses  that  do  attempt  to  offer  an
explanation for these issues either produce overly reductive and unsubstantiated
claims  regarding  the  opposition  of  leftist  intellectuals  and  diaspora  to
nationalism, which even if true does not explain why such individuals become
26 Heribert Adam makes in passing a similar criticism to the one made here.  However, he does 
not pursue it any further and so the issue remains.  Adam, Heribert, Neither a Two State nor a 
One State Solution, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 10, No. 3-4. 
September-November 2011, pp. 451-455, p. 452   
27 For a discussion of alternatives to both a two-state and a one-state solution see: Mossberg, 
Mathias, One Land, Two States? Parallel States as an Example of “Out of the Box” Thinking on 
Israel/Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 2010, pp. 39-45; and, 
Grinberg, Lev, The Israeli-Palestinian Union: The “1-2-7 States” Vision of the Future, Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 2010, pp. 46-53.  It is also worthwhile mentioning here 
that, in some of the earlier writings promoting a one-state solution, the intellectuals analysed in 
this study did occasionally raise the idea of a confederation/federation with Jordan as an 
alternative to the two-state solution framework.  This is not the first time that such an idea has 
been raised in Palestinian political discourse, but it does at least indicate that it was far from 
inevitable that these figures would adopt a one-state approach.  See, for instance, Usher, Graham,
Bantustanisation or bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara, Race & Class, Vol. 37, No.
2, 1995, pp. 43-49, p. 48; and, Karmi, Ghada, After Oslo: A single state in Israel/Palestine?, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 212-226, pp. 216-17
28 Hermann, Tamar, The bi-national idea in Israel/Palestine: past and present, Nations and 
Nationalism, p. 390; see also, Ibish, Hussein, What’s wrong with the One-State Agenda? Why 
Ending the Occupation and Peace with Israel is still the Palestinian National Goal, American 
Task Force on Palestine, Washington D. C., 2009, pp. 17-18
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more  forcefully  engaged  in  political  struggle;29 or  they  effectively  take  an
Orientalist  stance  that  lumps  all  Palestinians  together  and  sees  their  actions
always as the result of an ‘implacable’ and irrational hostility to Israel.30  These
points  clearly  have  a  limited  analytical  purchase  (and  in  the  latter  case  are
dehistoricizing  and  essentializing  in  the  extreme),  so  leaving  significant
questions on this topic unaddressed and inadequately answered.
        Further gaps in the literature arise when one looks closely at some of the
criticisms of those who promote a one-state solution.  These include a pejorative
classification of their  critical  engagement  as a practice of sloganeering which
lacks  a  programmatic  content.31  Others  criticise  them  for  engaging  in
‘declarative’32 or ‘discursive strategies’ and ‘not real ones’.33  Noam Chomsky, in
a particularly scathing critique,  argues that  without developing ‘some kind of
feasible  program (sic)  of action’  those who promote  a one-state  solution will
continue to be engaged in ‘rhetoric and posturing’.  He further contends that so
long as such figures are not taking ‘responsibility’ for such a development they
‘are choosing, in effect, to take part in an academic seminar among disengaged
29 Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-State Solution Dead?, Current History, pp. 37-8; Sussman, Gary, 
The Challenge to the Two-state Solution, Middle East Report, p. 11 
30 Karsh, Efraim, A Trojan Horse? A Response to “The Case for Binationalism”, Boston Review, 
Vol.26, No.6, December 2001-January 2002, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR26.6/karsh.html, 
accessed 03/01/2008; Morris, Benny, One-State, Two-State: Resolving the Israel/Palestine 
Conflict, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2009, pp. 1-2
31 Tamari, Salim, The Dubious Lure of Binationalism, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 
1, Autumn 2000, pp. 83-87, pp. 84-5; also see, Ibish, Hussein, What’s wrong with the One-State 
Agenda? Why Ending the Occupation and Peace with Israel is still the Palestinian National 
Goal, p. 23; Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood,
p. 209 
32 Peled, Yoav, Zionist Realities: Debating Israel-Palestine, New Left Review, Vol. 38, 
March/April 2006, pp. 21-36, p. 27.  It should be noted that Peled is engaging with the one-state 
issue generally through the process of reviewing Virginia Tilley’s book, The one-state solution: 
A breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2005
33 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New 
Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 2008, http://newpol.org/print/content/question-palestine, accessed
11/12/2008 
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intellectuals on Mars’; which he additionally calls ‘harmful’34 and which other
critics call ‘utopian’.35  According to Yoav Peled, the most significant problem
facing the discourse of one-state is its ‘divorce from social reality’.36
    It is certainly true that proponents of a one-state solution are engaged in what
for simplicities sake may be called an abstract mode of critical action.  They in
fact  tacitly  acknowledge  this  when  stating  that  they  are  criticised  for  not
‘translating the idea [of a one-state solution] into a programme’ and that this ‘is a
valid, though not insurmountable, charge’.37  Yet, as this language suggests, the
notion of converting their theory into a collective programme of action is not
alien to the stance adopted by these intellectuals; and as later stages of this work
will show, they routinely declare that such an object is essential to the realisation
of their  goal.   Moreover,  as is  further suggested by the language used in the
above statement, such a process of conversion is not considered an impossible
outcome within the discourse of one-state, even if it is certainly recognised as
‘difficult’  to  achieve.38  So  while  critics  of  those  who  advocate  a  one-state
solution are right in defining their mode of action as abstract, they fail to see this
form of practice as a contradiction to what these intellectuals otherwise profess
as politically essential.  They simply lambast such agents for being utopian and
detached.   Even  without  this  contradiction  it  seems  somewhat  spurious
theoretically to take specific modes of action for granted or regard them as the
product of pure choice.   It is in addressing these issues, along with the other
34 Chomsky, Noam, Advocacy and Realism, Znet, Thursday, 24 August, 2004, 
http://www.zcommunications.org/advocacy-and-realism-by-noam-chomsky, accessed 11/12/2008
35 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New 
Politics
36 Peled, Yoav, Zionist Realities: Debating Israel-Palestine, New Left Review, p. 35
37 Elmusa, Sharif S., Searching for a solution, in, Hilal, Jamil (ed.), Where Now for Palestine: 
The Demise of the Two-State Solution, Zed Books, London./New York, 2007, pp. 211-232, p. 220
38 Aruri, Naseer H., The incidental fruit of Oslo, Al-Ahram Weekly, 13-19 August, 1998, Issue 
No. 390, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/390/pal1.htm, accessed 30/04/2009
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problems and gaps mentioned in this section, that this study claims to make a
significant contribution to scholarship on this topic.
    More  generally,  the  significance  of  this  research  primarily  lies  in  its
contribution  to  scholarship  on  the  role  of  intellectuals  in  politics  and  the
relationship  between  the  practice  of  critical  thought  and  the  possibilities  of
political action.  By situating the discourse of one-state and those who produce it
within this broader field of inquiry, this study advances specific hypotheses in
the sociology of intellectuals as well as configuring their critical role in a much
more structured, limited, and less normative fashion than is often presented in the
academic  literature  on  this  issue.39  It  advances  a  conceptualisation  of
intellectuals  that  sees  them as  occupants  of a  social  position that  is  certainly
different, but that is not necessarily special.40  In so doing it problematises the
relation  between  critical  thought  and  political  action  as  one  of  competing
interests, broader social antagonisms and specific constraints.  In this sense, then,
the  contribution  of  this  research  is  significant  in  that  it  furthers  a  better
understanding  of  the  intellectual’s  political  role.   It  moves  away  from
longstanding  debates  on  what  an  intellectual  ought  to  do  in  this  regard  and
furthers knowledge on what they can do in terms of the contingent possibilities
enacted within their social practice.41
39 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, Vol. 25, 
No. 2, April 1996, pp. 205-233, pp. 205-10; Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The 
Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of Sociology, Vol. 28, 2002, pp. 63-90; Talshir, 
Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models of Theory/Praxis, Critical Review of 
Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 209-224; Verdery, Katherine, 
Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, Rereading The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, Vol. 34, No. 1, February 2005, pp. 
1-36, pp. 2-3
40 Pels, Dick, Knowledge Politics and Anti-Politics: Toward a Critical Appraisal of Bourdieu’s 
Concept of Intellectual Autonomy, Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 1995, pp. 79-
104, p. 98
41 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 82
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    As noted, furthermore, this study would seem to offer support to theoretical
critiques of post-representationalism and deliberative democracy.   It  is in this
sense too that it  may be regarded as significant,  as it makes a contribution to
general debates on these issues.            
Conceptual Framework                   
This  study  draws  on  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  theory  of  the  “field”,  which  will  be
reconstructed in detail in Chapter One and as such will be only briefly introduced
in this section.  Bourdieu's theory of the field as a social space of contention is
especially suitable for thinking about the discourse of one-state as its theoretical
apparatus incorporates both discursive and objective dimensions.  In Bourdieu's
view, social contest is primarily over the legitimate definition of reality, but these
classificatory struggles and their effectiveness remain oriented by the material
conditions  in  which  they  are  embedded.   It  is  this  double  structure  of  the
Bourdieusian  field  that  has  resulted  in  it  being  deployed  to  understand  the
discourse of one-state and the contentious practice of those who produce it ahead
of other frameworks considered for this research, which were nationalism and
(counter)hegemony.   While  theories of nationalism42 and (counter)hegemony43
42Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso, London, New York, 1989 (1983); Brubaker, Rogers, and, Cooper, Frederick,
Beyond “Identity”, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 1-47; Brubaker, 
Rogers, Ethnicity without Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2006; 
Calhoun, Craig, Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream, Routledge, 
Oxon, 2007; Calhoun, Craig, Nationalism, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997; Ozkirimli,
Umut, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, St Martin's Press, New York, 2000, pp. 
217-30; Sutherland, Claire, Nation-building through discourse theory, Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol.11, No.2, April 2005, pp. 185-202
43Adamson, Walter L., Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and 
Cultural Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983 (1980); Butler, Judith, Laclau, 
Ernesto, and, Zizek, Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on 
the Left, Verso, London, New York, 2000; Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (edited and translate by Quitin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 2005 (1971); Laclau, Ernesto, Democracy and the Question of Power, 
Constellations, Vol. 8, No.1, 2001, pp. 3-14; Laclau, Ernesto, and, Mouffe, Chantal, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (second edition), Verso, London, 
2001 (1985);  and, Jackson Lears, T.J., The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and 
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certainly emphasise the contested and contingent nature of social categories, and
thus the possibility of their reimagining, they tend to lack theoretical tools for
thinking  systematically  about  the  temporal-spatial  logics  and  resources
structuring such contests and the political limitations enacted within them.  The
Bourdieusian field has the scope to think about all of these dimensions rigorously
and it is principally for this reason that it has been preferred to frameworks such
as nationalism and (counter)hegemony in this particular instance. In addition, it
has been deployed because it allows the delineation of the terms “intellectuals”
and “diaspora” for the purpose of this thesis.
    The Bourdieusian field is a temporal-spatial framework.  It is a social structure
that is produced historically through the actions – that is, the words and other
deeds  –  of  human  agents.   More  specifically,  the  field  is  a  social  space  of
contention  that  is  constituted  and  organised  relationally  through  ongoing
struggles between differentiated and (always potentially) antagonistic positions.
The precise  morphology of the field,  in  terms  of  its  discursive  and objective
structure,  is  temporarily and  contingently determined  through  battles  for
domination  between  differently  positioned  agents.   These  agents  struggle  to
impose as legitimate a particular definition of reality on a certain social world
(by which is meant a distinct world of human relations).  They try to do this
through mobilising and converting the specific resources that they have at their
disposal (which have been accumulated through prior struggles) into symbolic
power.  This is the power to utter words and have them recognised as legitimate
beyond the point  of  their  initial  utterance,  so enabling  constitutive  effects  of
discourse across social space.  Power is central to Bourdieu’s notion of the field,
and  as  a  relation  it  is  fundamentally  unstable  and  contestable.   Relations  of
Possibilities, The American Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 3, June 1985, pp. 567-593
27
domination necessarily imply relations  of resistance.   Hence the field being a
social space of ongoing struggles.
    The centrality of power to Bourdieu’s visualisation of the field is determined
by certain ontological assumptions, which in turn have specific epistemological
implications.  The social world in Bourdieu’s view lacks absolute foundations.
There is no essential human condition and there is no essential Truth.  There are
only partial understandings and conceptions of the social world and as such only
“truths” and different points of view.  The reality in which human agents are
positioned – that is, social reality – can be expressed differently and it is by no
means inevitable or necessary that it is expressed in a certain way.  Whatever
conceptions and expressions of social  reality that prevail  in a given historical
context are therefore in this sense arbitrary; they are not natural and could have
been otherwise.  Consequently, it follows that their social efficacy is an effect of
power;  it  is  determined  by  the  momentary  outcomes  of  temporal-spatial
struggles, and is not determined by an abstract and transcendental force.  What
this means for knowledge of the social world, furthermore, is that it cannot be
neutral or simply revelatory; it is produced in specific historical circumstances
and  so  is  not  only  implicated  in  relations  of  power,  but  may  indeed  be
constitutive of them. 44
    So, for Bourdieu, knowledge and more broadly discourse is conceptualised as
possessing  considerably  more  than  a  constative  function.   Within  the  field,
discourse is not simply a reflective device that describes “reality” with greater or
lesser degrees of accuracy.   It is,  rather,  a social  practice – a distinct way of
speaking and acting that is repeated over time with a high degree of regularity –
44 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power (translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew 
Adamson), Polity Press, Cambridge, 2012 (1992), pp. 229-51
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that is central to the production of the social world.45  Discourse for Bourdieu is
conceived in performative terms.  The performance of certain words and other
deeds  by  a  particular  agent  may  have  the  effect of  bringing  into  being  and
therefore  establishing  a  specific  social  reality;  and  this  process  may  be
successfully enacted irrespective of whatever “truth” is involved in such patterns
of  enunciation.   For  instance,  it  may  matter  little  whether  someone  who
pronounces the words “I promise” is speaking truthfully or not for the effect of
promising to be accomplished.46  The practice of words and other deeds may
have certain effects and possess a constitutive force, and it is in this sense that
Bourdieu  spoke of  discourse  as  a  ‘structuring  structure’;  its  component  parts
contain certain logics of thought and action and these work to delimit and so
structure the possibilities for thinking and doing.47  As a social practice, discourse
is inherently unstable and open to change.
    In  addition  to  being  a  ‘structuring  structure’,  discourse  is  at  the  same
envisaged  from  this  standpoint  as  a  ‘structured  structure’.48  The  logics  of
intelligibility that are contingently inscribed within a particular discourse may
delimit certain boundaries of thought and action, but these limits themselves are
concomitantly  the  product  of  social  space;  they  are  oriented  by  the  specific
position  in  the  field  from  which  the  particular  practices  of  discourse  are
enunciated.  As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is crucial for the
45 Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2008, p. 15; Phillips, Louise, and, Jørgensen, Marianne W.,
Discourse Analysis: as Theory and Method, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New
Delhi, 2004 (2002), p. 1; Gill, Rosalind, Discourse Analysis, in, Bauer, Martin W., and, Gaskell,
George (eds.),  Qualitative Researching With Text,  Image and Sound: A Practical  Handbook,
Sage Publications, London, 2000, pp. 172-190, pp.172-5 
46 Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, p. 15
47 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 




Bourdieusian  conceptual  lense  that  the  social  practice  of  the  agent  and  the
position from which it is performed are ‘analyzed together’.49  It was for this
reason that Bourdieu often referred to himself as a structuralist constructivist50
and  opposed  what  scholars  such  as  Didier  Bigo  call  idealist  constructivism;
which from this point of view is perceived as being often guilty of detaching
social practices from their ‘objective positions’ and inscribing a high degree of
voluntarism and ‘free will’ into both their formation and performance.51
    Bourdieu’s notion of objective position is also important in another way to
understanding discourse as a structured structure.   Unlike other theorists  who
adopt a performative approach to words and other deeds, Bourdieu envisions the
constitutive power of such practices as being derived from the position of those
who perform them.  The power of words and other deeds is not integral to such
actions themselves, as some theorists of performativity contend.52  Rather, it is
the  objective  power  of  those  who  perform such  actions  that  is  concentrated
within them during the process of their enunciation; and to a large degree it is
this that determines the extent of their social effectiveness at a given moment in
time.53  This  objective  power  is  not  fixed,  of  course;  but  what  this
conceptualisation of performativity means is that the battles to define the social
world,  and so maintain  or change dominant  discourses,  are  at  the  same time
battles  to  conserve  or  modify  the  objective  structure  of  the  field  and  the
49 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1989, pp. 26-63, p. 40
50 Bourdieu, Pierre, Social Space and Symbolic Power, Sociological Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring
1989, pp. 14-25, p. 14
51 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 226-34
52 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 107-16.  See Jacque Derrida’s Signature 
Event Context for an example of a performative approach to discourse that sees its constitutive 
force as being located in the ‘very structure of the written text’.   Derrida, Jacque, Limited Inc 
(translated by Samuel Webber and Jeffrey Mehlman), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 
1988, pp. 1-21    
53 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 107-16
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principles of hierarchy that momentarily determine this.  There is then a double
struggle that is at stake in the field, and from this point of view, this is how a
given social reality is approached.54
    The discourse analysed in this research is produced primarily by individuals
who can be considered intellectuals, and this category is conceptualised in this
study in a manner that is not only consistent with Bourdieu’s field theory, but is
in fact inspired by it.55  What this means exactly is that unlike dominant trends in
the scholarly literature  on intellectuals,  which tend to  define  this  category in
terms  of  special  qualities  and  roles  it  ought  to  play  in  society,  this  study
approaches such figures structurally as the occupants of a discrete position in
social  space.56  To be sure this  position is  not  fixed and its  relative  strength
within  a  given  temporal-spatial  framework  is,  like  any  other,  subject  to
fluctuations depending on the precise historical  trajectory of the field and the
contingent social struggles that determine this.  Nonetheless, it is a position that
is, generally speaking, relatively ‘privileged’57 and especially so in what Jerome
Karabel calls the ‘cultural sphere – the symbolic realm of knowledge, values, and
meaning’.58  It is within this sphere that those who occupy this position are most
likely to be able to act and have their practices socially recognised – at least to
some degree – as authoritative.  In this sense, then, as Katherine Verdery has
argued, an intellectual is someone who occupies a position that holds, even if
54 Ibid., pp. 165-84
55 Indeed, given that Bourdieu was strongly interested in the relation between discourse, 
knowledge and political struggle, it is perhaps unsurprising that he focused a lot of his research 
on intellectuals.  Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre 
Bourdieu, Sociological Theory, p. 26    
56 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 205-7.
See also: Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity and 
Intellectuals, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989 (1987), pp. 18-19; and, Verdery, Katherine, National
Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1995 (1991), pp. 16-18
57 Verdery, Katherine, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceauşescu’s Romania, pp. 17-18
58 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 208
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only unstably, a ‘relative monopoly of complex knowledge’ and who engages in
social relations on this basis.59  
    This does not mean of course that the social effectiveness of those who occupy
this  position  is  necessarily  limited  to  the  cultural  sphere,  or  that  they  are
incapable of moving beyond this field and engaging forcefully in other domains,
such as politics.  The underlying premises and arguments of this research would
not make much sense if this was so, and in any case these various spheres are to a
significant extent interrelated with the boundaries between them being fluid and
permeable and only drawn so clearly on paper for analytical purposes.  
    What this conception of the intellectual does mean, however, is that their
specific  practices  (in  this  instance  in  terms  of  political  engagement)  remain
socially  grounded  and analysed  as  such.   It  avoids  an  excessively  ‘moralist’
approach that is found in and still tends to dominate the literature on intellectuals.
This ‘grand moralist tradition’, as Karabel calls it, has a strong tendency towards
thinking about and defining intellectuals in relation to idealised ethical standards,
and judging their practices accordingly.  In this regard, such literature has been
not  so  much  interested  in  explaining  why  or  how  intellectuals  act,  but  in
delimiting  what  they  ought  to  do  and  by  implication  what  makes  a  “real”
intellectual.60  These debates may be interesting, but they are somewhat fruitless
analytically unless they are themselves grounded and placed in their appropriate
historical and social context.  When this occurs it may be possible to discern such
debates as part of broader social conflicts and interests derived from their social
59 Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, 
Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3
60 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 205-7.
Also see, Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity and 
Intellectuals, pp. 8-9
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position.61  As  will  be  shown,  this  study,  like  others  adopting  this  analytical
perspective, would seem to support this proposition.
    As noted, the literature on the discourse of one-state has tended to speak of the
intellectuals  who  construct  it  as  being  mostly  from the  Palestinian  diaspora.
While this observation is true on a certain level, the specific way it is formulated
is problematic and assumes far too much.  The dispersal of individuals across
state borders is a key criterion of diaspora.  Yet, it is no longer permissible to
understand  this  term as  simply  referring  to  ‘that  segment  of  a  people  living
outside the homeland’.62  Indeed, scholars like John Armstrong have argued since
as early as the 1970s that diaspora is ‘something more than, say, a collection of
persons distinguished by some secondary characteristic such as … all persons
with Scottish names in Wisconsin’.63  This study builds on this approach and as
such  it  does  not  take  diaspora  to  be  a  ‘sociological  fact’,64 or  what  Rogers
Brubaker calls ‘an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact’.65  It does not regard
diaspora as a substantiated  or bounded group with membership  determined  a
priori by ‘ancestry’.   Such a view is not only perceived here as being overly
reductionist,  but  is  also  seen  as  having  very  little  analytical  value.   To  a
considerable  extent,  by  assuming  diaspora  to  be  a  ‘tangible’  entity,  such
perspectives eliminate important questions concerning their formation.66
    In contrast, diaspora is precisely conceived in this study as being a process of
social  formation  which  is  temporarily  and  contingently  constituted  in  and
61 Ibid.
62 Connor, Walker, The Impact of Homelands on Diasporas, in, Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.), Modern 
Diasporas in International Politics, Croom Helm, London, pp. 16-46, p. 16
63 Armstrong, John, Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, June 1976, pp. 393-408, pp. 393-4
64 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, May 2008, pp. 742-765, p. p. 746
65 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 
2005, pp. 1-19, p. 13
66 Ibid., p. 11
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through diasporic practices.   These practices  have specific qualities which,  as
Brubaker argues, ‘enables one to speak of diaspora as a distinctive’ category of
action.67  Yet, before these are delineated, it is important to emphasise that by
conceiving of diaspora as an active stance and a process of enactment, significant
questions about when and why such practices are engaged in and how they are
performed exactly are brought into the equation.  This allows, so this study hopes
to show, a much richer analytical engagement with diaspora that does not risk
reducing  politics  from  this  position  to  just ‘ethnic  linkages’  or  even  more
archaically ancestral ties.68  Therefore, unless specified to the contrary, whenever
diaspora is used in this study it is meant in this active and temporal sense.
    This visualisation does not discount the prospect of those practices constitutive
of diaspora being shaped by the position from which they are undertaken, which,
as mentioned above, must in some way be transnational; it must entail a sense of
dispersal  across  state  borders.   One  of  the  typically  distinctive  features  of
diasporic practices is an active orientation to a putative “homeland”, which as
Brubaker suggests is often configured in such stances as an ‘authoritative source
of value, identity and loyalty’.69  Directly related to this point is the additional
diasporic practice of ‘boundary-maintenance’.  This aspect of diaspora formation
refers  to  those  practices  which  bring  into  being  and reproduce  ‘a  distinctive
identity’  vis-à-vis  the  “hostland”  societies  in  which  those  who  perform such
actions  are  physically  positioned.   It  is  this  demarcation  that  enables  the
67 Ibid., p. 6
68 See, for example, King, Charles, and, Melvin, Neil J., Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, 
Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 1999-
2000, pp. 108-138
69 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 5-6
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production and maintenance of a distinct ‘transnational community’,70 or what in
Bourdieusian terms might be reconceptualised as a transnational field.71
    This conceptualisation of transnational social space will be undertaken in the
next chapter.  However, it is important to mention at this stage that while such a
field is  in part  (re)produced from the position of diaspora through distinctive
practices  of  boundary-maintenance,  it  also  incorporates  what  is  sometimes
referred to as an interstitial or ‘hybrid’ structure.72  By ‘dwelling here’ and at the
same time being ‘connected  there’,  diasporic practices are often conceived as
being disposed towards ‘multiple attachments’.73  They are frequently portrayed
as  being  oriented  towards  ‘regimes  of  multiplicity’74 and  incorporating  a
‘necessary heterogeneity’ within the stances that they adopt.75  In this respect, it
is not only boundary-maintenance that is a constitutive criterion of diaspora (and
by extension the transnational field), but ‘boundary-erosion’ too,76 which means
the  formation  of  an  identity  ‘which  lives  with  and  through,  not  despite,
difference’.77  Within the literature on diaspora, these two aspects of diasporic
practice are occasionally viewed as being in tension with one another.78  This
issue will be explored in this research, albeit at a subsidiary level.  
70 Ibid., pp. 6-7; Armstrong, John, Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas, The American Political 
Science Review, pp. 394-7
71 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 743-8; Adamson, Fiona B., Mobilizing for the transformation of 
home: political identities and transnational practices, in, Al-Ali, Nadje, and, Khoser, Khalid 
(eds.), New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of 
Home, Routledge, Oxon, 2002, pp. 155-68
72 Vauchez, Antoine, Interstitial Power in Fields of Limited Statehood: Introducing a “Weak 
Field” Approach to the Study of Transnational Settings, International Political Sociology, Vol. 5,
No. 3, September 2011, pp. 340-345, pp. 341-2
73 Clifford, James, Diasporas, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, August 1994, pp. 302-338, 
pp 307-22
74 Tölölyan, Khachig, Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment, 
Diaspora, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3-36, p. 7 
75 Hall, Stuart, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in, Rutherford, Jonathan (ed.), Identity: 
Community, Culture, Difference, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1990, 222-237, p. 235
76 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, p. 6
77 Hall, Stuart, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in, Rutherford, Jonathan (ed.), Identity: 
Community, Culture, Difference, p. 235
78 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, p. 6
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Method and Sources
While it is crucial to the Bourdieusian conceptual framework that the ‘structuring
structure’  and the ‘structured  structure’79 of  discourse be ‘analyzed  together’,
Bourdieu did not specify a particular method for doing this.80  His insistence on
such a double reading was a conceptual principle, rather than a fully formulated
method of analysis.  In order to try and fulfil this principle, this research has used
a method that blends two specific approaches to discourse analysis.  These may
be called an action-oriented and a critical approach to the analysis of discourse.
The particular sources to which this method is applied will be detailed below.
    Both the action-oriented and critical methods of discourse analysis are broadly
consistent  with the Bourdieusian framework outlined  above.   This is  because
they each assume that discourse is centrally ‘involved in establishing one version
of the [social] world in the face of competing versions’.81  Therefore, they insist
on looking at discourse as a social practice that is constitutive of the social world
and as such issues of veracity are either ignored or are considered at a secondary
level  in  each  method  of  analysis.82  They  both,  then,  have  similar  starting
assumptions.  
    Differences emerge, however, when it comes to the actual process of closely
reading the particular words and other deeds that comprise a particular discourse.
The primary focus of analysis  for an action-oriented stance is on the specific
logics of intelligibility contained within a specific discursive formation.   This
79 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations, International Political Sociology, pp. 302-4
80 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 40
81 Gill, Rosalind, Discourse Analysis, in, Bauer, Martin W., and, Gaskell, George (eds.), 
Qualitative Researching With Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook, p. 176
82 Ibid., pp. 174-6; van Dijk, Teun A., Principle of Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse and 
Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 249-283, pp. 249-59
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approach  is  concerned  with  comprehending  such  logics  and  providing  an
interpretation of how they work and what they do specifically within a given
historical and social context.  This of course means that the particular sources
which comprise a discourse are read contextually and, as they are assumed to be
in  competition  with  other  discourses,  are  read  relationally.83  In  contrast,  the
principal focus of analysis  for a critical  approach to discourse is on its social
conditioning.  A critical discourse analysis is concerned with undertaking a close
reading of  the particular  practices  that  constitute  a  discursive framework and
providing an interpretation of how social structure is implicated in their precise
formation; it seeks to interpret the consequences of such structural implication.84
So the discourse analytic  method used here blends two approaches to reading
that,  individually,  focus  on the structuring  or  structured  aspects  of  discourse.
Therefore, their combining will result in a double reading of the constitutive texts
of the discourse of one-state.
    The sources upon which this double reading is performed are primarily written
texts, including various books, articles, declarations and so on.  The practice of
writing is by the far the most common action through which the discourse of
one-state is produced and socially transmitted, and consequently it seems fitting
that this is the main source used in this study.  Given the objects of this research
and its  specific  framework of analysis,  moreover,  it  is  clear  that  the issue of
triangulation is not especially pertinent.  The goal is not to corroborate and so
verify  specific  accounts,  but  to  understand  why  certain  practices  are  being
performed  and  what  they  do in  specific  contexts.   Whether  what  the  agents
83 Gill, Rosalind, Discourse Analysis, in, Bauer, Martin W., and, Gaskell, George (eds.), 
Qualitative Researching With Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook, pp. 172-6; 
Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, pp. 14-17
84 Blommaert, Jan, and, Bulcaen, Chris, Critical Discourse Analysis, Annual Review of 
Anthropology, Vol. 29, 2000, pp. 447-466, p. 452; van Dijk, Teun A., Principle of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, Discourse and Society, pp. 249-283
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analysed in this study say or do is “true” or “false” is not really at stake.  Rather,
what  is  at  stake  is  that  these  agents  are  engaged  in  a  social  practice  of
enunciation that constructs the social world in a particular way and that iterates
certain logics and effects.  It is this process that this study seeks to understand
through  a  close  reading  of  the  main  practice  –  or  source  –  in  which  it  is
performed.  
    The writings chosen to be read for this study were initially selected on the
grounds  that  they  were  produced  by  Palestinian  intellectuals  and  focused
substantively on the idea of a one-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
These  texts  included,  for  instance,  Ali  Abunimah's  One  Country:  A  Bold
Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse,85 Ghada Karmi's  Married to
Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine,86 Saree Makdisi's Palestine Inside
Out:  An  Everyday  Occupation,87 Mazin  Qumsiyeh's  Sharing  the  Land  of
Canaan: Human Rights and the Israeli-Palestinian Struggle,88 and Edward Said's
From Oslo to  Iraq and the Roadmap.89  Also included were articles  such as
Naseer Aruri's  “US Policy and a Single State in Palestine/Israel”,90 newspaper
opinion pieces such as Ahmad Samih Khalidi's “A One State Solution”,91 and
conference declarations such as The One State Declaration.92  
    After  making and then coding extensive  notes  on these various  types  of
publications, it became apparent that the idea of a one-state solution in itself was
85Abunimah, Ali, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, 
Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York
86Karmi, Ghada, Married to Another Man: Israel’s Dilemma in Palestine, Pluto Press, London, 
New York, 2007
87See footnote 21
88Qumsiyeh, Mazin B., Sharing the Land of Canaan: Human Rights and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Struggle, Pluto Press, London, Ann Arbor, 2004
89See footnote 17
90Aruri, Naseer A., US Policy and a Single State in Palestine/Israel, The Arab World Geographer,
Vol. 8, No. 3, 2005, pp. 133-139




not  as  pertinent  an  element  in  these  writings  as  the  issues  of  contesting  the
dominant definition of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, criticising elite positions in
the Palestinian arena, and reformulating Palestinian politics.  At this stage in the
research, therefore, the type of writings selected for reading were expanded to
include those published by these intellectuals that had the appearance of being
concerned with these issues of struggle and redefinition.  So texts such as Azmi
Bishara's  Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process,93 Haidar Eid's “The
Zionist-Palestinian  Conflict:  An Alternative  Story”,94 Noura  Erakat's  “Beyond
Sterile  Negotiations:  Looking  for  a  Leadership  with  a  Strategy”,95 Saree
Makdisi's ““Intellectual Warfare” and the Question of Palestine”,96 and Joseph
Massad's “Political realists or comprador intelligentsia: Palestinian intellectuals
and  the  national  struggle”  were  now  read  in  conjunction  with  those  more
explicitly  focused on the  idea  of  a  one-state  solution.97  It  was  at  this  point,
moreover,  that  the  search  for  an analytical  framework  that  incorporated  both
discursive  and  objective  dimension  was  initiated,  resulting  in  the  use  of
Bourdieusian field theory and the method of discourse analysis delineated above.
From this time onwards, then, the texts selected for this study were (re)read with
increasing  rigour  through these  analytical  frames.   The writings  cited  in  this
study  were  primarily  included  because,  from  the  point  of  view  this  thesis'
research  questions  and framework,  they  have  been deemed  to  illustrate  most
93Bishara, Azmi, Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process, in, Giacaman, George, and, 
Lønning, Dag J. (eds.), After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems, Pluto Press, London, 1998
94Eid, Haidar, The Zionist-Palestinian Conflict: An Alternative Story, Nebula, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
September 2008, pp. 122-139
95Erakat, Noura, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, 
Jadaliyya, 6 February 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4259/beyond-sterile-
negotiations_looking-for-a-leadersh, accessed 20/06/2012
96Makdisi, Saree, “Intellectual Warfare” and the Question of Palestine, in, Bisharat, George, and, 
Doumani, Beshara, Open Forum: Strategizing Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 35, 
No. 3, Spring 2006, pp. 37-82
97Joseph A., Political realists or comprador intelligentsia: Palestinian intellectuals and the national
struggle, Middle East Critique, Vol. 6, No. 11, Fall 1997, pp. 21-35
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effectively the central themes, functions and political limitations of the discourse
of one-state.   
   Written words have been by far the main source used to compile this study, but
various forms of spoken words uttered by proponents of a one-state solution have
been analysed as well.  These include: the presentations of these intellectuals at
conferences; their speaking at public events such as lectures; their appearance on
various  news  channels  such  as  Al  Jazeera;  and  their  participation  in  public
debates.  The criteria by which these spoken utterances were selected for analysis
were broadly the same as those underpinning the selection of written utterances.  
    For  example,  the  presentations  of  many  of  these  intellectuals  at  the
Conference on the One State for Palestine/Israel: A Country for All its Citizens  –
held at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, on 28 and 29 March, 2009 – are
available for viewing online through the Trans-Arab Research Institute website.98
These videos were closely read because they are recordings of public utterances
by Palestinian  intellectuals  dealing  substantively  with  the  idea  of  a  one-state
solution – though, it should be noted that the ease of their accessibility was also a
factor in their being consulted.  However, just as with the written texts used in
this study, certain conferences were selected for attendance by this author on the
basis  that,  one,  Palestinian  intellectuals  promoting  a  one-state  solution  were
designated speakers at  them and, two, the themes of the conferences strongly
suggested  that  issues  relating  to  the  contestation  of  meaning,  authority  and
political practices in the Palestinian field would be extensively discussed.  It was
on these grounds that conferences such as Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in
Palestine and Palestine and the Uprisings – held at SOAS in 2011 and in 2012 –
98http://tari.org/
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were attended by this author and the talks transcribed and subsequently closely
read.  
    Furthermore,  serendipity often played a  role  in determining which public
events  and  meetings  were  attended  by this  author  and thus  used  as  data  for
analysis in this study.  During the period in which research for this thesis was
carried out, both Ali Abumimah and Ghada Karmi gave public lectures at King's
College London.  This author was fortunate enough to be present at these talks
and record notes on what was being expressed.  Moreover, this author was kindly
invited to attend a meeting held by the Palestine Land Society in Westminster in
November 2010.  At this meeting, the speaker – Salman Abu Sitta – spoke to the
audience  about  the  relation  between  “truth”  and  political  struggle,  and  so
provided this author with further material from which to work and develop his
thinking on discourse of one-state.  Again, citation of these spoken utterances in
the final text of this thesis was primarily determined by the extent to which they
were  considered  as  illuminating  the  structuring  and structured  effects  of  this
discourse.
    The sources used in this study have been all read in English.  This is not so
much  a  of  problem for  the  discourse  of  one-state,  as  while  it  is  frequently
disseminated through Arab media outlets, English is the language in which it is
usually written or spoken and in which the challenge of these intellectuals to the
established order of the Palestinian political  field is launched.  However, it is
certainly  curious  that  their  oppositional  practice  is  ordinarily  performed  in
English and, as will be shown, it is perhaps telling of the political limitations
enacted within their stance.  In part it is symptomatic of their interest in speaking
the “truth” – which they “recite” as the genuine Palestinian position – to a wide
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an audience as possible.99  It is this practice, and their privileged ability to do it,
that  is  valorised  by  these  intellectuals  as  politically  indispensable  to  the
Palestinian  cause.   Yet,  it  also  underlies  their  rather  oblique  mode  of
contestation, which is certainly concerned with ‘impacting the present Palestinian
leadership’100 and  forcing  it  to  ‘adopt  changes’,101 but  is  less  able  to  ponder
questions of how beyond insisting that others ought to listen to what they say and
modify their actions accordingly.102
    The use of English language sources is more problematic when it comes to this
study’s use of historical Palestinian documents, which include here texts from the
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), the PLO, Fateh, the Popular Front for the
Liberation  of  Palestine  (PFLP),  the  Democratic  Front  for  the  Liberation  of
Palestine (DFLP), Hamas, and others.  These are used in order to assist with and
substantiate  the  historical  reconstruction  of  context  and  particular  discursive
structures  within the Palestinian  political  field,  and as  such they operate  at  a
secondary level in this research.  Nevertheless, as transliterations from originals
produced in Arabic, or as first hand English accounts from the period in question,
they offer only a selective image of historic Palestinian discourse.  This is of
course  true  of  any  historical  documentation,  and  efforts  have  been  made  to
reduce this selectivity by reading such texts in conjunction with scholarly sources
on the history of the Palestinian national movement.  Even still, the reader ought
99 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, pp. 88-9
100 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 55-71, p. 
71
101 Audeh, Ida, Envisioning a better future: Activist Mazin Qumsiyeh interviewed, The Electronic
Intifada, 10 May, 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/content/envisioning-better-future-activist-
mazin-qumsiyeh-interviewed/8222, accessed 18/10/2010
102 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 51.  For a more general analysis of 
this attitude among “left” intellectuals see, Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Where is Now? Critical Inquiry,
Vol. 30, No. 2, Winter 2004, pp. 458-462
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to  bear  these  significant  limitations  in  mind  when  approaching  the  more
historically based arguments in this text.
                    
Structure
The first chapter of this text, as mentioned, produces a detailed reconstruction of
Bourdieu’s field theory.  This includes an explication of the Bourdieusian field as
a meta-theory in  which  various  sub-concepts  are  mobilised  in  order  to  grasp
social reality.  In addition to being a social space constituted through ineradicable
plurality  and relations  of  power,  the  field  incorporates  the  concepts  of  doxa,
habitus, capital and political work.  
    Chapter Two of this study looks at how the discourse of one-state ought to be
interpreted and seeks to explain why this specific stance has been adopted by
these intellectuals in the context of political crisis and weakened authority.  This
chapter includes a section in which a history of the Palestinian political field is
delineated in terms of a conflict between competing positions.  Specifically the
main political  contest in this field is constructed as a battle between what are
called  here  “maximalist”  and  “pragmatist”  perspectives.   This  battle  was
temporarily settled in the late 1980s in favour of “pragmatism” but is now being
reopened by these intellectuals, albeit in a way that is heavily incorporative of the
particular historical circumstances in which their discourse is articulated, as well
as their own objective position in the field.  
    The third chapter is concerned with examining the more forceful engagement
of predominantly diasporic intellectuals  in political  struggle.   It  is within this
chapter  that  their  intervention  is  conceptualised  as  a  bid for  power in  which
principles  of  hierarchy are at  stake and contested.   Knowledge – or  rather  a
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privileged access to “truth” – is itself mobilised in this dispute and advanced in
relation to “other” elites in the Palestinian political field.  So too is the site of
diaspora, which is configured in the discourse of one-state as the position for the
“proper” performance of citizenship in the Palestinian context; and so too is a
claim to identity with “the people”, which not only emerges in relation to “other”
elites,  but  is  also  asserted  through the  articulation  of  a  counter-narrative  that
positions the particular standpoint of these intellectuals as historically authentic.  
    The final chapter examines the effects of this bid for domination in terms of
the  political  possibilities/impossibilities  it  enacts.   It  finds  that  the  reiterative
logics that are constitutive of it are highly restrictive in terms of permitting a
political role for these intellectuals beyond principled critique and their position
of enunciation.  
44
Chapter One: Thinking Tools
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the Bourdieusian field theory approach
used in this study.  For Bourdieu, a field is a social space of contestation which is
produced historically in and through the actions of human agents.1  While this
trajectory is open and contingent in terms of its specific form and content, the
field  will  necessarily  develop  ‘into  a  matrix  of  objective  relations  between
positions’.2  Indeed,  this  is  what  a  Bourdieusian  field  is:  a  set  of  individual
positions occupied by agents who, in their relations to one another, constitute a
collective social structure.  This structure is not fixed, irrespective of what some
critics might say.3  The word “objective” is used in this context to draw attention
to the precise morphology of the relations between positions that constitute the
field at any one time.4  This configuration remains unstable, and specifically it
will evolve ‘around particular battles over domination’.5  What is at stake in the
field is an ongoing struggle to legitimately define a particular social universe,
which entails contest to impose as legitimate specific discourses on the social
world.  Discourse is therefore considered as being potentially constitutive of the
social world from this perspective, though its performative
1 Shapiro, Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and method, Review of International Political Economy,
Vol. 9, No. 4, November 2002, pp. 610-618, p. 615
2 Bigo, Didier, and, Madsen, Mikael Rask, Introduction to Symposium: “A Different Reading of 
the International”: Pierre Bourdieu and International Studies, International Political Sociology, 
Vol. 5,No. 3, September 2011, pp. 219-224, p. 221
3 See, for example, Butler, Judith, Performativity’s Social Magic, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), 
Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, pp. 113-128, pp. 117-22 
4 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations, International Political Sociology, p. 298
5 Bigo, Didier, and, Madsen, Mikael Rask, Introduction to Symposium: “A Different Reading of 
the International”: Pierre Bourdieu and International Studies, International Political Sociology, p.
221
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force  is  primarily  determined  by  the  objective  position  from  which  it  is
enunciated.6  
    In attempting to reconstruct the Bourdieusian field this chapter is divided into
four sections.  The first section seeks to explicate the fundamental components of
field theory in terms of why struggles to define the social world are ongoing and
never settled once and for all.  It highlights the ineradicable plurality of the field,
its inherent partiality, and the ongoing relationality of social distinction in terms
of discourse and stance.  All of these features of the field combine to make power
a central aspect of the social world.  There can be no totality and as such those
discourses and visions of social reality which are constituted as legitimate must
be an effect of power.  Specifically, Bourdieu called this form of legitimate force
symbolic power, which if constituted broadly across social space could take on
the features of  doxa,  or what can be otherwise called unthinking knowledge.7
Even at its most effective, however, power remains unstable in the Bourdieusian
field and open to resistance and possible subversion.
    The next section is concerned with delineating structure in Bourdieusian social
space, both in terms of accounting for the structuring effects of discourse as well
as conceptualising how it is structured.  This entails looking at issues of context,
habitus,  and what Bourdieu referred to as forms of capital.8  Section three is
concerned with conceptualising how specifically agents obtain symbolic power,
which  for  Bourdieu  required  a  specific  process  of  accumulation  that  he
sometimes termed ‘political work’.9  In order to more precisely delimit what is
6 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations, International Political Sociology, p. 296
7 Ibid., pp. 303-4
8 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Forms of Capital, in, Richardson, John G. (ed.), Handbook of Theory and
Research for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood Press, New York, 1986, pp. 241-58
9 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, pp. 7-8
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meant  by Bourdieu’s notion of political  work it  will  be contrasted with ideas
from  post-representationalist  theory  and  deliberative  democracy  (these
perspectives themselves will be engaged with at later stages of this research in
relation to the discourse of one-state). A final section in this chapter undertakes a
reconceptualisation  of  the  Bourdieusian  field  that  transposes  it  to  the
transnational level.      
    Bourdieu’s work is complex and it is important specify from the outset that not
all of his key ideas are included within this reconstruction of his field theory.
Most crucially, his idea of social scientific reflexivity is dropped, which as Loic
Waquant  explains,  sought  to  make  possible  ‘the  historical  emergence of
something like a rational  (or a reasonable) subject [emphasis added]’.10  This
notion of scientific reflexivity is dropped not because it is deemed unimportant;
as this  research will  ultimately show, such a notion would appear  to be  very
important  to  ‘liberating’  the  practice  of  critical  thought  from  the  social
‘determinisms  that  weigh  on  it’  and  enabling  the  possibility  of  inventing,
‘concretely, futures other than the one inscribed in the order of things’.  Indeed, a
number  of  Bourdieu-inspired  scholars  forefront  this  reflexive  aspect  of  his
sociology precisely for this reason.11  Rather,  it  is dropped because it appears
irreconcilable with much of his theoretical stance; which in a significant way is
10 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 31
11 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Critical Thought as a Solvent of Doxa, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
2004, pp. 97-101, p. 97; Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of 
Practices, Practices of Power, International Political Sociology, p. 232; Lovell, Terry, Resisting 
with Authority: Historical Specificity, Agency and the Performative Self, Theory, Culture & 
Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-17, p. 5.  From a more poststructuralist standpoint see: 
Campbell, David, Beyond Choice: The Onto-Politics of Critique, International Relations, Vol. 
19, No. 1, 2005, pp. 127-134, p. 133; Jabri, Vivienne, Critical Thought and Political Agency in  
Time of War, International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2005, pp. 70-78, p. 73
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inclined towards the rejection of the Cartesian subject  and by implication the
possibility of a transcendental, cogitating self.12  
    To be sure a limited reflexivity is a possibility for individuals within the field
– as will be shown below.  But this insistence on social scientific reflexivity and
the  emergence  of  a  rational  subject  appears,  as  Hubert  Dreyfus  and  Paul
Rabinow have suggested, to be premised on an ontology that is ‘antithetical’ to
that which determines Bourdieu’s arguably most important concepts of field and
habitus.   Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  in  fact  hypothesise  that  this  apparently
contradictory  insistence  on  the  theoretical  possibility  of  some  form  of
metaphysical knowledge in Bourdieu’s work is tied to the type of struggles for
power that his notion of field sought to shed light upon.13  They are not alone in
this regard; and it certainly would not be the first time that claims to power are
masked as claims to universality – as indeed this research will  demonstrate.14
However, this debate will have to be explored at a later date, and in any case it
has been principally raised here in order to specify how Bourdieu’s thinking tools
will  be  developed  below.   That  is  to  say,  they  will  be  deployed  selectively
without inclusion of his notion of social scientific reflexivity, and in this sense
they  will  be  used  in  a  way  that  embellishes  his  more  anti-Cartesian  and
poststructuralist inclination.        
12 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 31.  By Cartesian subject this study means a conception of the individual 
which places ‘the rational, cogitative and conscious subject at the centre of knowledge’.  This is 
problematic for much of Bourdieu’s work as the field through habitus structures the knowledge 
and thought of the particular subject in question.  There is no pure spot of conscious reflection 
and reason.  Hall, Stuart, The Question of Cultural Identity, in, Hall, Stuart, Held, David, and, 
McGrew, Tony (eds.), Modernity and its Futures, Open University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 273-
326, pp. 282-3   
13 Dreyfus, Hubert, Rabinow, Paul, Can there be a Science of Existential Structure and Social 
Meaning?, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford, 1999, pp. 84-93, pp. 92-3
14 See, for example, Bohman, James, Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint: Agency in 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, pp. 
129-152; and, Pels, Dick, Knowledge Politics and Anti-Politics: Toward a Critical Appraisal of 
Bourdieu’s Concept of Intellectual Autonomy, Theory and Society, pp. 88-95
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The Field: Relations between Positions as Struggles to Classify Social Space 
The  field  is  a  social  space  of  ongoing  struggles  for  domination.   These  are
enunciated from particular positions in the field and are carried out in relation to
others.   What  they  involve  specifically  is  battles  to  impose  as  legitimate
particular versions of reality on the social world, so constituting social reality in a
particular way.15  The reason for these ongoing classificatory struggles in social
space stem from certain assumptions on which the Bourdieusian field is based
and  which  are  essential  to  understanding  some  of  his  more  specific  ideas.
Because the field is a matrix of relations between individual positions, there will
be necessarily a ‘plurality of points of view’ existing within the field at any one
time.16  Moreover,  as  this  plurality  is  ineradicable  there  are  no  absolute
foundations on which to base legitimate classifications of social reality.  In this
sense  whatever  definitions  of  the  social  world  that  do  persist  are  entirely
unnecessary and so are open to rupture.17  In addition, while different points of
view are immanent to the field, they only acquire meaning socially in relation to
other points.18  That is, they require an “other” in order to exist socially, though
this  engagement  will  be  shaped  by  the  relative  structure  of  social  space.
Therefore, both the agent and the field cannot be fully constituted.  The field,
consequently, cannot be transformed into an absolute whole.19
15 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 242
16 Ibid., pp. 229-35
17 Shapiro, Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and method, Review of International Political 
Economy, p. 615
18 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 177; Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and 
International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power, International Political Sociology,
pp. 236-7 
19 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 40
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    Due to these ontological conditions it is necessary that the field is temporarily
constituted through relations of power.  The structure of social space, in regards
to its  particular  symbolic  order  and meaning,  will  be  a  result  of  relations  of
domination and subordination, and more precisely what Bourdieu referred to as
symbolic power.20  In some instances such power may acquire the status of doxa
and be taken for granted and assumed inevitable.21   Nevertheless, doxa remains
fundamentally unstable owing to the ongoing plurality of the field, as well as its
contingent trajectory and relational force.22  There will always be those who have
an interest in maintaining the extant order of the field and those who have an
interest in modifying it to some degree.  To speak of power as a relation is to
imply the prospect  of resistance and possible  subversion.23  Indeed, Bourdieu
sought to capture all these points by applying the metaphor of “game” to this
notion of the field.            
    The prominence  and persistence  of  social  antagonism and conflict  in  the
Bourdieusian  field  stems  from certain  ontological  assumptions  on  which  this
concept  rests.   From  this  perspective  reality  is  essentially  pluralistic.   By
visualising the field as a matrix  of objective relations  between positions,  it  is
clear that Bourdieu refuses to oppose social structure to individual agency.  As
Didier Bigo argues, a ‘field is collective, but it is a field of individuals’.  It ‘will
not exist independently of human action’.24  Thus, the field is a social structure
20 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 209-10
21 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations, International Political Sociology, p. 304
22 Ibid., p. 298; see also: Bigo, Didier, and, R. B. J. Walker, Political Sociology and the Problem 
of the International, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2007, pp. 725-
739, p. 726
23 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice (Translated by Richard Nice), Polity Press, Cambridge,
1990, pp. 140-1
24 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 238-9
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constituted  in  and  through  the  relations  of  individual  positions,  which  are
occupied by agents.    
    In conceptualising the field in this way, it is important to note that individual
positions  mean  precisely  that  –  individual.   Bourdieu  contends  that  each
individual agent who contributes to the (re)production of the field is ‘confined to
a position’ in social space.  This is not meant to denote fixity to the positions
occupied by agents.   Instead,  it  refers to  Bourdieu’s understanding of human
agency as embodied.  Due to the materiality of the human agent, its bodily form,
a singular position cannot simultaneously occupy two (or more) exact points in
social  space.25  As such,  the position  an agent  occupies,  both in  terms  of  its
historical trajectory and spatial location, will necessarily be distinct from other
points in the field (even if this distinction only amounts to a slight deviation).
Bourdieu argues that there is ‘a relativity that is by definition inherent in every
point of view’.   That  is,  it  is  ‘a  view taken from a particular  point  in social
space’.26  Consequently, an essential condition of the field is that it will be a site
with multiple points of view.27  What this means, therefore, is that difference is
immanent to the field.  
    Within the field,  moreover,  plurality  is  ineradicable in  an absolute  sense,
which makes it the condition of possibility for the latter’s ‘uncertainty’28 (though,
to be clear, this is not to argue that it is difference in itself which accounts for
social  antagonism and conflict;  such an  approach would  be  suggestive  of  an
essential  clash  between  different  positions,  reminiscent  of  the  simplistic  and
dangerous thinking deployed by figures like Samuel Huntington29).  Difference is
25 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 229-35
26 Bourdieu, Pierre, Social Space and Symbolic Power, Sociological Theory, p. 22
27 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 234-5
28 Ibid.
29 Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, The Free 
Press, London, 2002 
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preserved in the Bourdieusian field owing to the absence of essential foundations
on which to base, and thus universalise, classifications of the social world.  It is
because of this foundational lack, as will be discussed below, that the practice of
constituting and reproducing a particular version of social reality is necessarily a
practice of power.
    “Truth” and “universal” discourses are always partial in Bourdieu’s view, as
they are unavoidably positioned and enunciated from particular points in social
space.30    They will necessarily incorporate particular temporal-spatial limits, as
there is no purely objective outside with a transcendental subject from which to
comprehend and so determine the social world as an absolute reality.  Everybody
is  inside  the  field,  though  of  course  some  positions  are  more  powerful  than
others.  In this sense, then, those definitions of social reality which have been
successfully  established,  so constituting  the boundaries  of  intelligible  thought
and action in a particular social universe, are entirely arbitrary.  There is nothing
fundamentally necessary about them.31  Visions and forms of conduct which do
emerge  and  are  constitutive  of  a  particular  social  reality  are  the  product  of
specific historical circumstances and struggles.  To borrow Ian Hacking’s phrase,
they could have been ‘very different’ and thus could be different again.32  The
temporal-spatial trajectory of the field is not characterised by linear progression
and grand narrative, but by ‘rupture’ and ‘discarded possibilities’.33    
30 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 203-36
31 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 52
32 Hacking, Ian, What is social construction? The teenage pregnancy example, in, Delanty, 
Gerard, and, Strydom, Piet (eds.), Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary
Readings, Open University Press, Maidenhead, 2003, pp. 421-427, p. 423.  See also, Shapiro, 
Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and method, Review of International Political Economy, p. 615
33 Bourdieu, Pierre, quoted in, Shapiro, Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and method, Review of 
International Political Economy, p. 615
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    Accordingly, along with there being no Archimedean point of view in social
space, there is no purely autonomous individual.  This applies to the temporal-
spatial limits which are incorporated in the bodies of agents – which Bourdieu
calls  habitus (to be discussed in the next section).   But it  also applies  to the
relationality of the agent, their inability to exist socially without some exterior
alterity  through  which  to  determine  the  distinctiveness  of  their  stance  and
discursive  positions.   Though  plurality  is  immanent  to  the  field,  for  reasons
explained  above,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  particular  points  of  view  and
definitions  of  social  space  only  ‘exist  socially’  when  they  are  ‘perceived  as
distinct’.34  What this indicates is that the particular stances and positions adopted
by agents are not pre-given in social space, though they may be structured in a
particular  direction.   Rather they have to be socially constituted as ‘points in
relation to other points’.35  Such moves will be shaped by the relative position
from which they are enunciated as the field is characterised by ‘interests at stake’
manifest  as  battles  for  domination.36  Yet,  they  will  only  acquire  ‘meaning
relationally,  in and through difference’.  The position of an agent, in terms of
discourse and stance, relies on an “other” in order to emerge as a distinct vision
of the social world;37 it emerges in relation to what it ‘is not’.38  The paradox of
this  process  is  that  the  construction  of  social  distinction  emerges  through  a
relational practice that binds certain points ‘together’ in order to distinguish them
a part.39
34 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 224
35 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 236-7
36 Ibid., p. 231
37 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, Ibid., p. 177
38 Triandafyllidou, Anna, National identity and the “other”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, 
No. 4, July 1998, pp. 593-612, pp. 602-9
39 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, p. 236
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    The individual points which constitute the field at a given moment in time are,
therefore, never fully constituted.  They emerge only ‘in relation to others’ and as
this  externality of difference  is  vital  to the social  production of distinction,  a
particular agent who acts in the social world can never be complete.  This of
course  renders  the  field  fundamentally  unstable  as  the  incompleteness  of  the
agent equates to the incompleteness of social space – the field is a field of agents,
after all.40  In order for a specific configuration and meaning of social space to
retain  its  saliency over  time  it  is  in  need of  ‘continually  being  performed’.41
Discourses and particular definitions of the social world are not settled once and
for all, but have to be repeatedly produced.  The fact of plurality, along with the
need  of  social  meaning  to  be  continually  reconstituted  in  processes  of
enunciation, results in the field being always open to dispute and contestation.  It
is fundamentally unstable and open to change. 
    In historical terms, furthermore, this means that the field cannot emerge as an
absolute whole.  Its trajectory is ongoing and contingent.  The notion of some
unfolding  narrative  being  actually  inscribed  in  the  structure  of  the  field  is
anathema to the Bourdieusian approach, though this does not mean that social
reality cannot be represented in this way by agents who are engaged in battles for
domination.42  For Bourdieu, there is ‘history only as long as people revolt, resist,
act’; and as this possibility is necessarily retained in the field there can be no
‘end to history’.43       
    With these ontological presuppositions in mind, therefore, it becomes apparent
that  relations  of  power are  a  central  component  of  Bourdieu’s  conception  of
40 Ibid., pp. 236-40
41 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 236
42 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice, p. 41
43 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 40
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social  space.   In  order  for  a  particular  version  of  social  reality  to  be
(re)constituted through discourse, and established across a given field, there must
be a process of dominating others.  Given that there is no fundamental sameness,
no  universal  perspective,  no  fully  constituted  self,  and  no  absolute  whole,
whatever conceptions of the social world that are established beyond the point of
their initial articulation must be an effect of power.44  The successful construction
of a social consensus on the ‘meaning of the social world’ will necessarily entail
the subordination of certain points of view.45  These will be temporarily elided or
marginalised through the process of establishing a wider social identity,  which
entails what Bourdieu termed symbolic violence.46  The production of a social
“whole”  is  not  the  result  of  amalgamation  or  dialecticism  in  this  view,  as
plurality is ineradicable and history is ongoing.  Rather, it is affected through the
generalisation  of  a  particular  point  of  view  over  others,  which  are  thus
subordinated.  The most effective form of power in this regard is what Bourdieu
termed symbolic power.47  
    Symbolic power is power when it is ‘perceived and recognised as legitimate’,
which  for  Bourdieu  is  more  accurately  understood  as  a  process  of
misrecognition.  A particular discourse is socially at its most effective when the
‘violence that is exercised through it’ is misrecognised ‘by those on whom that
violence is exercised’.48  Words and other signs construct the social world, and
44 Foucauldian scholars see power as being essential to social life for similar reasons.  For 
example, Gideon Baker states, ‘what else, other than a struggle of power, could be at work when 
representatives, along with others who would legislate on our behalf, are unable to rely on some 
essential truth about the human condition’.  Baker, Gideon, Revisiting the Concept of 
Representation, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2006, pp. 155-172, p. 157. 
45 Bigo, Didier, and, R. B. J. Walker, Political Sociology and the Problem of the International, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, pp. 725-6
46 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 204
47 Bourdieu, Pierre, Social Space and Symbolic Power, Sociological Theory, p. 22.  See also, 
Brubaker, Rogers, and, Cooper, Frederick, Beyond “identity”, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 
1, 2000, pp. 1-47, pp. 15-16  
48 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 209-10
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they are capable of establishing meaning across social  space most  effectively
when the symbolic violence wielded by ‘those who utter them’ is not perceived
as  such.   It  is  through  such  misrecognition  that  specific  discourses  and
classificatory  schemas  are  constituted  legitimately  across  the  field.   Like  all
forms  of  domination,  then,  the  exercise  of  symbolic  power  entails  a  tacit
‘complicity’  on  behalf  of  those  who  are  subject  to  it.49  What  distinguishes
symbolic  power  is  that  it  is  not  recognised  as  power,  and  so  is  largely
unquestioned.50  How this  power is  accumulated  will  be  discussed  in  a  later
section of this chapter.  
    When discourses  constitutive  of  the  social  world are  established through
symbolic  power and are historically  sedimented  across  a  particular  field  they
become  doxa.   Bourdieu  used  this  term,  originally  deployed  in  classical
philosophy,  to  denote  ‘common  sense’  ways  of  speaking  about  and
understanding the social world.  Doxa is in this sense that which is taken for
granted.51  The logics of intelligibility which are inscribed in a specific discourse,
and which permit certain thoughts and actions, are for the most part subscribed to
and reiterated unthinkingly within the framework of doxa.52  This is why it is so
powerful  and  effective  socially.   Doxa is  that  system  of  knowledge  and
classification which, having been established historically through the struggles of
differently  positioned  agents,  ‘is  forgotten  as  history’  and as  the  outcome of
specific battles.53  The constitutive frames of discourse that is  doxa are largely
assumed to be natural.
49 Ibid., p. 170
50 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations, International Political Sociology, p. 304
51 Ibid.
52 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 132-3
53 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice, p. 56
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    Even still, despite the extensive effectiveness of doxa, it remains unstable and
fundamentally contestable.  The power of discourse, as will be discussed in the
next section, is primarily located in the objective position of those who utter it,
and this is far from being stable.54  In addition to being subject to revolt  and
resistance from other positions in social space, it is subject to the complexity and
fluidity of history.  The field does not exist in isolation, but is entangled with
other fields and indeterminable forces.  A social space is not an impenetrable
construct that is rigidly determined.  Its exterior limits are soft and permeable,
and they may be forcefully breached by external agents with potentially radical
consequences  to  established  meanings  of  social  reality.55  Owing  to  the
contingency of history and its constant motion, possibilities may arise within a
field that were once foreclosed or marginal.  Legitimacy, of course, may be lost
as well as won, so opening the established orthodoxy of the field to challenges
that were temporarily unimaginable.  As Didier Bigo states, the ‘dynamism of
fields is the rule, stability is the exception’.56
    Moreover, for all its performative force,  doxa cannot be spread uniformly
across social space.  Doxa may work to establish a particular definition of social
reality as the “universal” meaning of the field, so subordinating and symbolically
effacing  multiple  points  of  view,  with  the  tacit  complicity  of  those  who are
subject  to  this  power.   Yet,  it  does  not  eliminate  this  difference.   Rather,  it
dominates it, subordinating a plurality of perspectives to its own.  As such, the
field  is  hierarchical,  but  it  nonetheless  remains  what  Michael  Shapiro  calls
‘fractal’.  It continues to operate as a ‘historically effected amalgam of diverse
54 Leander, Anna, The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
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life worlds’.57  It is partly for this reason that struggles to define the social world
remain ongoing and only temporarily settled through doxa.  When differences in
viewpoint  are  ensnared  in  relations  of  power  they  may  become  a  source  of
discord and antagonism, which manifest as struggles to resist domination and so
change social reality.  As this difference is fundamentally ineradicable, despite
its subordination in relations of power, the potential for conflict is therefore ever
present.58  Doxa  cannot be a total  system. Consequently,  there will always be
those in the field who have an interest in ‘perpetuating’ extant relations of power,
and those who have an interest in ‘subverting’ such relations and ‘modifying’ the
classifications which constitute legitimate discourse.59  In a broad sense, this is
what is at stake in the field: ongoing battles for domination.    
    Furthermore,  the  understanding  of  power  as  a  relation  indicates  that  the
prospect of resistance is always available in the field, however constrained this
might  be.   In  a  similar  fashion  to  Michel  Foucault,  Bourdieu  contends  that
relations  of  power  cannot  ‘operate  without  implying,  activating  resistance’.60
This is because, to speak in Foucauldian terms for a moment, a relation of power
entails a practice through which certain ‘individuals try to direct and control the
conduct of others’; which means, therefore, that the other of this relation is ‘a
person who acts’.61  It is this ‘capacity to act’ on behalf of those who are subject
to power that enables the possibility of resistance and ongoing contestation in the
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Bourdieusian field.62  Indeed, if agents were deprived of this capacity to act, if
they were deprived of this ability to set certain oppositional ‘forces in motion’,
then one could no longer speak in terms of power.  What would exist instead
would  be  an  absolute  condition,  which  for  reasons  discussed  above  is
impermissible to this conceptual lense.63  Such an impossible condition would
negate  power  as  there  would  be  no  relativity  for  it  to  be  exercised  through.
Domination  would  be  rendered  obsolete  due  to  the  absence  of  partiality  and
contradiction  
    Consequently,  by speaking in  terms  of  relations  of  power and legitimate
domination, Bourdieu conceives of the social world as being pregnant with the
possibility of these relations being opposed and subverted.64  Therefore, along
with the ongoing temporality of the field and its fractal nature, relations of power
generate specific and ordinarily conflicting interests in social space and enable
the limited pursuit of those interests by agents.  This is why there are ongoing
struggles.
    The metaphor used by Bourdieu so as to capture all these related points was
the “game”.  This analogy is useful as it brings to mind competition ‘between
persons to reach some goal or goals’.65  Further, it  suggests the possibility of
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change  and agents  being  able  to  act  and  strategise  so  as  to  ‘maximize  their
positions’.66  What is more, a “game” is played in accordance with certain rules,
which indicates that it is not a neutral exchange between those involved, but one
that has certain boundaries and limits of permissible thought and action.  
    It is on this issue of “rules” that Bourdieu’s metaphor of the “game” has been
most  criticised.   Critics  have  read  it  as  imposing  fixed  constraints  on  those
involved, or even as implying causal laws that force persons ‘to do this or that’.
Although it is perhaps understandable why this metaphor has been read in this
way,  given  that  ordinary  games  are  usually  rule  bound  endeavours,  it  is
nevertheless the case that the social logics which guide action in the field can be
disrupted.67  They are  ‘in  constant  (potential)  change’  because of  the  agent’s
capacity to act and reflect.68  What the “game” should be read as implying is that
this action and reflexivity remains structured.      
Structured Struggles: Context, Habitus and Capital 
For Bourdieu: ‘The categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that
is, essentially,  the words, the names which construct social reality as much as
they express it, are the stake par excellence of the political struggle, which is a
struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division’ on the social
world.69  As this statement makes clear, political struggle for Bourdieu is to a
large extent about ‘will and representation’.  When uttered successfully, specific
discourses are constitutive of the social world; they bring into being particular
66 Maton, Karl, Habitus, in, Grenfell, Michael (ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, Acumen, 
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versions of social reality and establish particular categories of practice, in terms
of thought and action.70  The struggle to maintain a particular vision of the social
world  is  to  a  large  extent  determined  by the  efficacious  reiteration  of  extant
discourses and categories of practice; and struggles to modify or transform the
social world are to a large extent determined by the disruption of such efficacious
practices  and by the  extent  to  which  they  are  effectively  re-presented.   It  is
because  such  practices  are  without  essential  foundations  and  are  delimited
through  relations  of  power,  that  the  possibility  of  their  subversion  and
reconstruction is immutably upheld.
    However, in visualising the social world in this way, Bourdieu is not for one
instance suggesting that agents can ‘construct anything anyhow, either in theory
or in practice’.71  The field is a temporal-spatial construct and as such it ‘will
come with a history’,72 with agents being positioned in a ‘web of constraining
relations’.73  The field is structured, and in more ways than one.  
    For a start, for an agent to utter effective discourse and so constitutively enact
that which is named, that agent must adhere to context and what Foucauldian
scholars might call the ‘test of reality’.74  What an agent does, furthermore, in
terms of their performance of words and other deeds, is shaped by what Bourdieu
called  habitus:  the  proposition  that  a  structural  homology  exists  between  an
agent’s position in the field and the position an agent takes.75  What is more, in
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order to speak effectively an agent must have the power to do so, and this is
located in  the objective structure of the field,  in  what  Bourdieu termed more
specifically forms of capital.  The capital accumulated by a specific agent is done
so through prior struggles, which can be mobilised and invested in contemporary
and future struggles.76  What Bourdieu termed ‘cultural capital’ is of particular
relevance to this study, and so too is ‘symbolic capital’.  However, the process
and politics of symbolic capital will be examined in the next section.        
    The performativity of language is shaped by context in Bourdieu’s view.  So
that  a speech act  is  uttered felicitously it  must  conform to the ‘conditions  of
felicity’.77  This does not mean that context imposes strict rules that the speaking
agent must obey so as to invest discourse with a performative power.  Rather, it
simply means that one does not have  carte blanche to  effectively say what one
likes.   Words  are  uttered  in  historically  rich,  meaningful  and  dense
circumstances,  which  are  structured  by  diverse  and  sometimes  powerful
classificatory  frameworks  that  have  crystallised  to  greater  or  lesser  extents.78
These cannot be fundamentally broken by transgressive codes and ‘stand alone’
endeavours.79  Political entrepreneurs may be able in specific contexts to force
certain ‘people to understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments
in  a  certain  way’,  so  reconstructing  categories  of  practice  with  potentially
transformative  effects.80  But  this  process  is  not  unlimited,  and  so  as  to  be
effective, their political language must be in some way grounded ‘in reality’.81
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    In any case, the words and other forms of action undertaken by these political
entrepreneurs, or for that matter any other agent, will not be unlimited even prior
to their performance.  From a Bourdieusian perspective, the position of an agent
in social space – their temporal-spatial trajectory – will structure their position-
taking – their  socially  constructed stances and their  struggles  for domination.
That is to say, Bourdieu proposes a structural homology between one’s position
in the field and the position one takes.   He calls this relation habitus.
    Habitus  is  a fundamental  component  of Bourdieu’s field theory.   In fact,
habitus and  field  operate  in  relation  to  one  another  and  cannot  be  deployed
separately.  They are mutually generative in the sense that: an agent’s position in
the field and its temporal-spatial trajectory will result in that agent possessing
certain  dispositions;  these dispositions  will  shape that  agent’s  performance in
social  space;  which  will  contribute  to  the  reproduction  or  transformation  (in
varying degrees) of the social  matrix  of the field.82  As such,  habitus is both
produced by and produces the social world.   It is the ‘embodied history’83 of the
agent as well as history in the making.84  
    Owing  to  this  mutuality,  Bourdieu  typically  referred  to  habitus as  the
‘practical sense’ of the agent.  This sense of the social world will guide the action
of an agent, and at the same time this sense is and remains ‘socially founded’.
What  this  means  is  that  from  a  Bourdieusian  standpoint  there  is  no  such
possibility as pure choice and absolutely conscious decision.  Individuals are not
formed and nor do they operate in a vacuum.85  Nor can individuals’ teleport
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themselves beyond temporal  and spatial  limits,  as this would amount to what
Didier Bigo calls a ‘god move’, resurrecting the possibility of a fully autonomous
and  transcendental  subject.86  Specifically,  habitus was  developed  so  as  to
collapse what Bourdieu thought was an artificial  opposition between structure
and agency (an intellectual interest, incidentally, shaped by the intellectual milieu
of mid-twentieth century France), and it is in this manner that this concept should
be understood.  The field is a collective social structure constituted through the
actions  of  individual  agents:  and  the  actions  of  these  individual  agents  are
structured by the field.  Habitus is the mediation of this relation.87
    The concept of  habitus is not without its critics of course, and on this issue
Bourdieu is frequently accused of being a structuralist and imposing structural
determinisms  on the  agent  that  shackle  any chance  of  agency.   The relation
between field and  habitus is  seen as  being mutually  generative,  but  for  such
critics this relation is one that is totally governed by the field.   For example,
Judith Butler  contends that ‘the field,  often figured as preexisting or a social
given, does not alter by virtue of the  habitus, but the  habitus always and only
alters by virtue of the demands put upon it by the “objectivity” of the field’.  She
further contends that in being driven ‘to avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism and
idealism’, Bourdieu is guilty of going too far in the other direction, with the field
emerging, as a result, ‘as an unalterable positivity’.88  Such an argument seriously
misconstrues Bourdieu’s notion of habitus.    
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    As suggested, there is no freely choosing and autonomous individual who
operates  beyond  the  boundaries  of  specific  social  and  historical  contexts  in
Bourdieu’s  view of  the  social  world.   Therefore,  if  this  is  what  is  meant  by
agency then Bourdieu is  certainly guilty of denying it.   This does not mean,
though, that in proposing  habitus Bourdieu is reducing the agent to a passive
automaton manifesting, through mechanical determination, the objective force of
the field, as figures like Butler contend.89  The agent is certainly structured, but
this structuring is incomplete and like the field is unstable, fractal, and ongoing.90
The agent  is  a  complex  and disintegrated  bodily  system,  which  continuously
incorporates  diverse  and  often  contradictory  social  elements  through  its
positioning in and exposure to multiple trajectories and limits.91  The field itself
is often incorporative of various sub-fields which are themselves incorporative of
specific  logics  and  points  of  view  and  which  can  be  transposed  to  diverse
settings.92  As a structured individual, the agent is never fully constituted and its
habitus is likewise ongoing and ‘split’.  Moreover, it is through such fissures that
the possibility of limited decisions and reflexivity emerge.  The gaps prevent the
structure  from being so  restrictive  as  to  prohibit  creativity  altogether.93  One
cannot avoid habitus as it is the ‘active presence’ of one’s incorporated history,94
which  generates  a  complex  ‘system  of  dispositions’  which  orient  one’s
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engagement  in  the  field.95  Yet,  it  is  not  a  structural  straightjacket  and  was
certainly not conceived as such by Bourdieu.
    For example, as Bourdieu states, habitus ‘governs practice, not along the path
of mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and limits initially set on
its  inventions’.   An  individual’s  habitus permits  ‘regulated  improvisations’,96
which means that he or she ‘makes choices’, but does not ‘choose the principle
of these choices’.97  It is in this structured sense, then, that the agency of the
individual is retained through the notion of habitus.  It is certainly true that ‘free
will’ and absolute decision are denied to the individual from this perspective.98
    On top of being structured and unfree to totally determine the words and other
deeds they perform, an agent also lacks an absolute ability to enunciate discourse
effectively.  This point has been already made in relation to context.  However, it
extends to the objective structure of the field and the relative position of the
agent, which shape the resources an agent may ‘mobilize in order to play’ the
“game” and struggle for the control of symbolic power.99 
    In this regard, Bourdieusian thought may be considered as being against what
is sometimes called idealist constructivism, which often implies that an agent can
voluntarily construct the social world in any way they so desire.100  (It seems to
be largely for this reason, furthermore, as will be analysed in chapter two of this
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study, that important questions regarding the new stances adopted by agents in
certain  settings  are  often  inadequately  addressed  by  idealist  constructivist
research101).  In addition, Bourdieu’s approach to the social efficacy of words and
other deeds must be regarded in opposition to those accounts of performativity
that view the effectiveness of discourse as being ‘found in discourse itself’.102
For Bourdieu, in contrast, the power of discourse is to be found in the objective
position  of  those  who  articulate  it.   As  such,  the  more  power  one  has
accumulated  in  objective  position,  the  more  chance  one  has  of  having  their
particular version of social reality recognised as legitimate across social space.
The more chance they have, therefore, of legitimacy imposing their vision on the
social  world.   Of  course,  given  that  the  field  contingently  evolves  around
struggles  for  domination,  it  is  likely  that  the  power  to  produce  discourse
effectively will be unevenly distributed across social space at any one time.       
    The  relation  between  performative  discourse  and  objective  structure  in
Bourdieu’s account has been subjected to considerable criticism.  Specifically,
and in a similar fashion to his notion of habitus, it has been denounced for being
overly structuralist and leaving little – if any – scope for human agency.  It has
been seen as blunting the ‘radicalism’ of Bourdieu’s constitutive  approach to
discourse, as the dependency of performativity on objective position and, more
specifically,  unevenly  distributed  resources,  is  regarded  by  certain  critics  as
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privileging  already  power  sites  and  institutions.   It  has  been  considered  as
prohibiting the prospect of these powerful positions being actively subverted.103  
    Judith Butler, for example, argues that Bourdieu ‘tends to assume that the
subject who utters the performative is positioned on a map of social power in a
fairly fixed way’.  Whether discourse ‘will or will not work’ performatively is
dependent,  she  further  contends,  ‘on  whether  the  subject  who  performs  the
utterance is already authorized to make it work by the positions of social power it
occupies’.   For  Butler,  this  understanding of  performativity  renders  language
‘epiphenomenal’.   She  in  fact  accuses  Bourdieu  of  ‘rehabilitating  the
base/superstructure model’ of orthodox Marxism.104  In her view, singular acts
undertaken without ‘prior authorisation’ may start an ‘insurrectionary process of
overthrowing’ established symbolic order.105
    Such criticisms are once again somewhat misconstrued.  Without doubt the
agent  is  temporarily  and  spatially  limited  in  terms  of  what  it  can  do  in
Bourdieusian understandings of the social world.  Yet, these limits should not be
taken to imply fixity and rigidity to the symbolic and objective ordering of social
space.  As discussed in the last section, battles for domination are ongoing and
never settled once and for all  in the field;  and relations of power necessarily
imply resistance and struggles against domination, with agents always possessing
some degree of freedom to act.  The objective relations between positions that
configure the matrix of the field at any one time are likely to privilege certain
agents over others in terms of their ability to utter effective discourse, but these
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relations are not ‘eternal’.106  The resources to wage contest are distributed across
social space like a ‘balance sheet of what has been won in previous battles and
can be invested in subsequent battles’, and this balance sheet is liable to change
due to it being entangled with complex historical processes, exterior forces, and
internal disputes over its relative worth and distribution.107  It is simply wrong to
suggest  that  the  Bourdieusian  field  is  a  fixed  cartography,  as  its  objective
morphology remains temporal, with the relative value of its resources being open
and contested.108
    Therefore, struggles in the field incorporate what Bourdieu calls a ‘double
game’.109  On the one hand, they entail struggles to impose a particular vision on
social space and have it recognised as socially legitimate beyond the point of its
initial utterance.  On the other hand, they entail battles over ‘the principles of
hierarchization’ for the particular resources agents possess.110  Struggles ‘aimed
at inflating or deflating the value’ of specific types of resources are ongoing in
the field.111  What is more, Bourdieu hypothesises that agents engaged in such
struggles have a tendency to place the specific resources they possess ‘at the top
of the hierarchy of the principles of hierarchization’.112  They try to ‘impose a
principle  of  hierarchization  most  favorable  (sic)  to  their  own  products’  (a
proposition  which  has  clear  implication  for  the  strategic  moves  deployed  by
agents in their  bids for legitimate domination,  and which is a hypothesis  that
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appears to be verified by this research).113  Because of this double game, mostly
ignored by figures like Butler, the field cannot be envisioned as a static map in
which the power to speak effective discourse is always already fully determined.
Relations  of  power  means  that  hierarchies  are  not  determined  in  and  of
themselves, and this relationality applies to both symbolic and objective spheres. 
    The term used by Bourdieu in order to capture these objective resources, or
‘species  of power’,  was forms of  capital.114  While  this  phrase highlights  his
fondness for economistic terminology, it should not be taken to mean that the
resources mobilised by agents so as to contest social space are reducible to an
economic dimension.  Material power is certainly important for Bourdieu, and
clearly economic capital may be converted into symbolic power, or simply used
to coerce and control the actions of others.  Nevertheless, capital can take on
disparate forms in Bourdieu’s conceptual universe, and crucially each of these
variegated forms of capital  is potentially convertible into another,115 including
symbolic  capital,  which is  the resource that  enables  those who possess it  the
power to impose a ‘vision of legitimate divisions’ on social space.116
    This interconvertibility of capital is important as it highlights once again the
amorphous nature of relations of power that structure the field at a given moment
in time.  It shows their potential for redistribution and reacquisition in one form
or another, as well as pointing to the possibility of new principles of hierarchy
being brought into being through changing contexts and ongoing battles.   As
symbolic capital is the most significant form of capital – especially in the context
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of political  struggle – it is perhaps unsurprising that it  is the most difficult to
acquire.   However,  before  moving  to  examine  this  process  another  form of
capital  that  is  vital  to  this  research  will  be  delineated.   This  form  is  what
Bourdieu called cultural capital.     
    Cultural  capital  is  acquirable  in  two varieties,  which  are  not  necessarily
mutually exclusive.  At one level, this kind of capital is captured in the cultivated
dispositions  embodied  by  certain  agents:  the  refined  tastes  and  sophisticated
schemas of appreciation and understanding, which are acquired over time and
typically with much personal investment, and which allow various individuals to
appropriate “cultural goods” and even challenge their meaning.  At another level,
this species of capital is less an embodied set of cultivated dispositions, and more
an institutional authority bestowed on certain individuals through the acquisition
of,  for  example,  academic  qualifications.117  This  institutionalised  form  of
cultural  capital  is  effective  as an ‘officially  recognised’ competence that  – to
varying  degrees  and  not  in  all  circumstances  –  ‘show[s]  forth  and  secure[s]
belief’ in the specific authority of those who wield it.118
    While both of these forms of cultural capital are primarily accumulated and
consecrated in the field of culture, their mobilisation and authoritative effect are
not necessarily limited to this domain.  At certain moments in time, such capital
may  be  forcefully  transposed  beyond  the  sphere  in  which  it  was  primarily
accumulated  and  invested  in  battles  for  the  control  of  legitimate  discourse.
Knowledge,  therefore,  is  not  only  what  is  at  stake  in  the  field,  in  terms  of
discourse  and  classification.   It  is  also,  in  its  cultivated  and institutionalised
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forms, a potentially powerful resource in struggles to alter objective structure.
The  extent  to  which  this  process  can  be  conducted  effectively  in  a  field  is
dependent on the extent to which such capital is converted into symbolic power.
This conversion is far from easy and is never guaranteed.119
The Political Work of Symbolic Power: Politics as Will and Representation
The process of accumulating symbolic power is very specific for Bourdieu and is
necessary to political  struggle in  his  view.  In order  to  have one’s discourse
‘perceived  and  recognised  as  legitimate’,  and  thus  to  be  in  a  position  to
legitimately generalise one’s definition of social reality across social space, one
must ‘win positions’.120  Agents engaged in such struggles in the field must win
over others ‘to their side’ so as to legitimately re-present the social world in their
own particular terms.121  As this contest takes place within historically produced
frameworks  of  power,  in  which  multiple  viewpoints  and  competing  interests
persist,  the  process  of  legitimate  constitution  requires  ‘political  work’.122
Disparate  wills  and  competing  trajectories  have  to  be  engaged  with  and
reconstructed  as  a  generalised  political  agent.   One has  to  make  a  ‘practical
group’, which itself is articulated and mobilised in relation to an “other” point in
social space.123  As a result of the uneven structure of social space, there will
invariably those positions in the field which are more able to undertake this task
at a specific point in time.  It is such agents who have to impose themselves as
119 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Forms of Capital, in, Richardson, John G. (ed.), Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp. 249-50
120 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 181
121 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, p. 12
122 Ibid., pp. 7-8
123 Ibid, p. 8
72
legitimate spokespersons on others, thus constituting a collective political subject
mobilised for a particular action.124
    Such a process of collective subject formation, it ought to be stressed, never
occurs automatically in Bourdieu’s view.125  It entails work and organisation.126
Moreover,  this  movement from particular  wills  to the general will of a given
social  ensemble  is  not  a  benign  process  of  communication  in  which  agents
“discover” an underlying homogeneity of vision and interest between them.127  It
is a process of production in which, through engagement and reconstruction, a
particular point of view is generalised over others and momentarily constituted as
a “universal” standpoint.  This engagement, in order to be temporarily successful,
requires symbolic violence and the re-presentation of disparate singularities as an
overarching “whole”.128  In this regard, Bourdieu’s conception of politics as ‘will
and representation’ is opposed to ideas contained within post-representationalist
and deliberative theories on collective subject formation.129  These perspectives
can in fact be criticised from a Bourdieusian standpoint on the grounds that, as
discourses, they efface important possibilities for political change. 
    Symbolic power is crucial to political struggle.  Its acquisition affords those
agents who are interested in modifying extant social relations ‘the possibility of
changing the social world by changing the representation of this world’.130  As
this power is  intrinsic in Bourdieu’s opinion to the legitimate construction of
124 Ibid., pp. 14-15
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social  space,  and  the  imposition  of  meaning  beyond  a  particular  point  of
enunciation, it is unsurprising that it is by far the most difficult form of capital to
accumulate.  This is not only because such struggles in the field take place in
contexts that are already structured in a particular way, and that are likely to have
agents who are interested in maintaining extant relations of power.  It is also
because  the  plurality  of  the  field,  in  terms  of  its  multiple  trajectories  and
standpoints, is likely to make it the site of a broad array of competing principles
and interests  which have to be won over.131  The field is  hierarchical  and so
objectively  certain  agents  are  better  placed  than  others  to  acquire  symbolic
capital.   Nevertheless,  this  process  does  not  occur  automatically.   It  always
requires political work.
    Broadly speaking, political work is a process of accumulation and change.  It
is the specific practices engaged in by certain agents that enable them to acquire
symbolic  capital;  and  it  is  a  practice  that  affords  those  who  successfully
undertake it the ‘power to make groups’, which given the inherent plurality of the
field  necessitates  a  degree  of  reconstitution  and  displacement.   What  these
practices are precisely will vary depending on the particular  case in question.
However, for Bourdieu, they require that certain agents confront the ineradicable
differences which are both immanent to and potentially constitutive of the field;
and  further,  they  require  that  these  agents  struggle  to  re-present  such
particularities  as  a  collective  political  subject.   Political  work  is  the  process
through which the transitioning from particular wills to a mobilised general will
occurs – though it ought to be emphasised that this process is never guaranteed in
advance of such confrontation and may never be affected.  What it entails is that,
131 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
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somehow, certain agents impose themselves as legitimate representatives ‘upon
those who, by recognising themselves in these plenipotentiaries, by recognising
them  as  endowed  with  the  full  power  to  speak  and  act  in  their  name’,  are
legitimately represented and so constitutively enacted as a ‘practical group’.132
As the social distinctiveness of this practical group requires a relation of alterity,
its  collective  stance  and  vision  of  the  social  world  will  be  articulated  in
opposition to a specified “other”.  This collective agency is necessary for the
possibility of social change and transformation in Bourdieu’s view.133
    The  winning  of  positions  which  is  affected  through  socially  efficacious
political  work  is  therefore  constitutive  of  a  mobilised  collective  agent.   As
implied  above,  however,  this  consecration  of  a  collective  subject  is  not  a
generalised agent comprising the ‘will of all’.  It is not, as Bourdieu contends,
‘the mere summation of individual wills’.134  Rather, this subject is effectively
new; it is produced through  symbolic violence in the sense that its collectivity
emerges through the subordination of disparate trajectories and partial anterior
elements to a particular point of view that now stands in for the “whole”.  This
move, moreover, is effectively established through the complicity of those who
are subjected to this symbolic violence.   In short,  they are won over.135  This
collectivity  is  not  an  effect  of  an  underlying  sameness  ‘deduced  from  the
structure’ and generated teleologically through obscure causal force.  Nor is it a
“common good” which is waiting to be found.  The collective subject that is
deemed  vital  to  the  prospect  of  political  change in  Bourdieusian  accounts  is
produced historically in struggles between differently positioned agents.  It is the
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momentary  and  unstable  outcomes  of  such  contests  that  determine  the
constitution and particular forms of collective action that are mobilised against a
specified “other”.136  In this regard, one may argue that difference is the condition
of possibility for Bourdieu’s notion of politics as will and representation.
    On this issue of legitimate representation as the reconstitution of disparate and
unstable singularities as a practical group, Bourdieu is very much at odds with
critical theories such as post-representationalism and deliberative democracy.137
Indeed,  post-representationalist  accounts  agree  with  Bourdieusian  thought  in
viewing the practice of representation as a necessarily violent process in which a
collective  subject  is  constitutively  enacted  through  ‘the  subordination  of
differences to an overarching particularity’.138  Yet they strongly disagree with
the  Bourdieusian  insistence  that  such  practices  of  representation  are  both
unavoidable  and  politically  dangerous  to  avoid.   For  certain  post-
representationalist theorists it is not only normatively desirable to move beyond
representation, it is also politically possible, and in some accounts considered a
really existing potential.139
    In  this  view  a  collective  political  subject  ought  to  emerge  not  through
symbolic violence, but through the ongoing ‘interaction and collaboration among
singular constituents themselves’.140  Such a process of collective formation is
seen to be possible theoretically through so-called ‘smooth spaces’, which are
envisioned in these accounts as horizontal networks in which everyone present
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has an unmediated voice.141  These horizontal zones are considered as permitting
the  direct  and  equal  exchange  of  idiosyncratic  viewpoints,  which  can  be
expressed  within  such  collective  structures  without  active  reconstruction  and
subordination to identity.142  In this regard, a collective political subject is said to
emerge  in  which  individual  differences  are  socially  present as  singular  parts
within a ‘general struggle’.143  They function as a ‘polyphonic swarm’.144    
    For some scholars who subscribe to these aspects of post-representationalist
theory,  this  “general  struggle”  is  deemed  to  be  actually  immanent  in  the
contemporary  structure  of  global  capitalism,  or  what  is  otherwise  varyingly
called  ‘Power’,  ‘neoliberalism’,145 or  ‘imperial  power’  in  such writings.146  A
post-representationalist mode of politics is thus a very real possibility in these
accounts, with ‘smooth space’ being perceived as emerging automatically from
‘lived experience’,  and as an outcome of a structural logic of “Power” which
‘prefigures  the  creative  bonds  and  alliances’  that  will  ultimately  lead  to  its
downfall.147  This  logic  of  “Power”  is  considered  by certain  theorists  of  this
persuasion  as  one  that  ‘prefigures  also  the  advance  of  an  “absolute
democracy”’.148  Therefore,  quite  explicitly  (and with  not  a  little  irony),  ‘the
millions of people subject to’ “Power” are represented in post-representationalist
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perspectives  as  being  oriented  already against  a  certain  structure  and  for  a
particular vision of the future.149  They are deemed present and in motion.
    The criticism of representation as a violent process is certainly important, and
in  this  sense  the  post-representationalist  standpoints  looked  at  above  make
valuable contributions to this issue.  However, their assumptions regarding the
possibility of an actual post-representational politics and the real existence of a
“general  struggle”  that  is  moving  inexorably  towards  a  final  point  are
problematic; discursively, they seem to efface important political questions.  
    The same point can be made in relation to theories of deliberative democracy;
which  likewise  assume  a  horizontal  –  or  neutral  –  space  of  communicative
exchange  in  which  equal  citizens  engage in  rational  debate  so  as  to  reach  a
consensus on what is ‘practically necessary in the interest of all’.150  A general
agreement on what qualifies as the “common good”, which is established through
‘finding a common voice’ in a particular society,  is the process and object of
democracy  according  to  dominant  themes  in  deliberative  theory.151  The
consensus reached in this regard is ‘moral’ because it is presumed that everyone
involved  has  an  ‘equal  voice’  and  therefore  is  able  to  communicate  just  as
effectively  as  anyone  else.152  Therefore,  whatever  general  agreement  that  is
reached  through  deliberation  will  necessarily  result  from the  ‘force  of  better
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argument’.153  In this sense, consensus on the “common good” and what is in the
interest of all is a ‘shared understanding’ that is authentically present.154  It is not
partiality dominating and operating as the synecdoche of all.155
    In  a  similar  fashion  to  post-representation,  then,  theories  of  deliberative
democracy tend to presume ‘an underlying homogeneity of interests’ within a
given social framework.156  It is the accessing of this ‘common ground’ that is
sought through the practice of deliberation; which suggests, as Lisa Wedeen has
argued,  that  generality  is  ‘always  already  there’.157  The  constitution  of  a
collective  stance  in  this  regard  is  not  created  through  political  work  in  the
Bourdieusian sense, but through a process of discovery in which those involved
in the deliberative practice find and come to agree on what they ‘all share’.158
This  is  an  understanding  of  political  action  that,  again  like  post-
representationalist perspectives, inscribes a teleology within the fabric of extant
social relations.  It prefigures a ‘prior unity’ within a particular social structure
and  then  configures  the  object  of  making  present  this  unity  the  outcome  of
rational  exchange  between  equal  citizens.159  There  is  in  this  sense  a  linear
progression inscribed within such conduct, which will proceed inexorably owing
to the pure rationality of argumentation in  the deliberative sphere.   From the
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Bourdieusian  standpoint  used  in  this  study,  this  perspective  too  seems  to
symbolically efface important political questions.
    These include, for a start,  the critical  question of resistance and opposing
extant  relations  of  power.   By prefiguring  social  space  either  as  a  “smooth”
arena,  or as one in which pure rationality  will  necessarily prevail,  both post-
representation and deliberation tend to ignore issues of hierarchy and of directly
confronting  relatively  powerful  positions.   By  implication,  furthermore,  such
conceptualisations  of  social  space  obscure  significant  questions  of  political
strategy and organisation.  As the scholar Alexandros Kioupkiolis has argued in
relation  to  post-representationalist  perspectives  specifically,  the  imposition  of
horizontal networks on the social world, along with the automaticity with which
they are invested, results in making what matters politically ‘already on hand’.  It
therefore ‘obviates the need’ for active intervention against dominant sites and
structures  of  power.160  Similarly,  for  those  who  are  critical  of  deliberative
approaches to democracy,  the presumption of a neutral  sphere in which equal
citizens  converse freely with one another in order to  reach agreement  on the
“common  good”,  is  not  only  likely  to  thwart  what  Lyn  Sanders  calls  an
‘egalitarian concern’,161 it is also likely to bypass politics generally by reducing
its practice to acts of moral persuasion.162  The logics implicit  and explicit  in
aspects  of  post-representation  and  deliberation  effectively  deny  the  political
“game”.   There  is  only  ever  expanding  “smooth  space”,  which  is  propelled
forward  by  the  structure  of  “Power”;  and  there  is  only  reasonable
160 Kioupkiolis, Alexandros, Radicalizing Democracy, Constellations, pp. 143-7
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162 Kohn, Margaret, Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative 
Democracy, Constellations, pp. 423-4
80
communication, which given its pure morality is likely to ‘benefit those already
in power’.163
    At a more micro-political level, the logics inscribed within post-representation
and  deliberation  appear  to  efface  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  actively
engendering  a  mobilised  collective  subject.   As  noted,  the  politics  of
representation in Bourdieusian thought is considered a constitutive process.  To
legitimately represent and so make a ‘practical group’ the spokesperson must win
over disparate positions through imposing a particular viewpoint on others.  This
political work is not a unidirectional process, of course, and it entails a relation of
confrontation  with diverse perspectives  and interests.164  But  it  is  one that  is
essential  to the Bourdieusian standpoint as political  change is  affected in this
view through collective action in specific circumstances.165  The possibility of
such politics, therefore, is derived from the ontological impossibility of a fully
formed  and  unified  field.166  It  is  only  through  there  being  an  ineradicable
difference  in  the  field  that  particular  positions  can  be  transcended  and
transformed.  Without such difference the points of contention and antagonism
are removed and so too is the possibility of their re-presentation as a collective
historical form.  A “generality” can only come into being in this view through the
legitimate domination of difference, and if there is no difference over which to
enact this relation of power, then the political process is stymied.167                
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    It is precisely the effacement of such difference and possibilities of political
transcendence  that  seems  to  occur  through  the  discursive  logics  enacted  in
certain  elements  of post-representationalist  and deliberative  theories.   In both
perspectives,  as shown,  a  generality  is  said to  pre-exist  political  engagement,
whether this is through the presence of a general struggle generated and set in
motion  by  the  structure  of  global  capitalism,  or  whether  this  is  through  the
momentarily  obscured  presence  of  an  underlying  sameness  that  will  be
uncovered through rational debate.  What such conceptions of social space do, it
would appear, is impose a prior unity on a given temporal-spatial  framework,
which  not  only  ‘obviates  the  need  for’  what  Iris  Marion  Young  calls  ‘self-
transcendence’,168 but also symbolically eliminates the very conditions required
for Bourdieu’s transition from the plural to the “universal”.169  
    So in this regard, the effects of representationalist and deliberative discourse
may be considered stifling politically.   They deny the need and possibility of
agents  struggling  to  generalise  particular  visions  across  social  space  as  they
prefigure its unity as always present and in motion.  This presentist logic renders
political work in the Bourdieusian sense somewhat unthinkable as it masks the
ontology of others on which to legitimately impose relations of power.  From a
Bourdieusian  standpoint,  this  masking  of  difference  may  be  regarded  as  a
practice  of  symbolic  violence,  and  when  it  is  coupled  with  a  language  of
absolutes  and  authenticity,  as  is  the  case  with  certain  elements  of  post-
representation and deliberation, its debilitating effects on political struggle would
seem to have an implicitly dogmatic quality.170 The Bourdieusian conception of
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politics  as  will  and  representation  at  least  makes  possible  the  struggle  to
generalise  and temporarily transcend partial  viewpoints;  it  makes  possible the
formation of  a collective political  subject and with it  the possibility of social
transformation.   It  does  this  moreover  without  effacing  the  difficulties  and
inherent antinomies entailed in this task.171  Symbolic power requires the winning
of positions.  Yet the relations of power through which disparate wills are re-
presented and practical groups are forged remain unstable and open to dispute.  
The Transnational Political Field 
As this study argues, the intellectuals who are constructing the discourse of one-
state  are  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  legitimate  domination  of  the  Palestinian
political field.  This struggle is in part launched from the position of diaspora.
Therefore,  such  agents  are  struggling  in  a  political  field  that  is  relatively
autonomous and is dispersed across state borders.172  This may be thought of as a
“transnational political field”.  The key distinction of transnational social space is
this hybrid structure.  While it is relatively autonomous, the transnational field is
at  the  same  time  ‘partially  embedded’  in  other  fields  of  power,  which  are
ordinarily  national  states.173  The  agents  who  constitute  and  (re)produce  the
transnational  field  through  their  actions  are  therefore  doubly positioned.
Unsurprisingly,  from a Bourdieusian perspective  this  has implications  for the
stances they adopt and the resources they mobilise in order to play the “game”.  
    So to a large extent a transnational field is like any other.  It is historically
produced in the action of human agents and contingently evolves around battles
171 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Mystery of the Ministry: From Particular Wills to the General Will, 
Constellations, pp. 41-3
172 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, p. 5
173 Adamson, Fiona B., Mobilizing for the transformation of home: political identities and 
transnational practices, in, Al-Ali, Nadje, and, Khoser, Khalid (eds.), New Approaches to 
Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home, p. 159 
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to define the social world through the control of legitimate discourse.  As Rogers
Brubaker argues, a transnational political field is the site 
of  differentiated  and  competitive  positions  or  stances adopted  by
different  organisations,  parties,  movements,  or  individual  political
entrepreneurs,  each seeking to “represent” the [community]  to its own
putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking
to monopolise the legitimate representation of the group.174
Therefore,  despite  being  dispersed  across  ‘several  political  entities’175,  a
transnational political field retains its relative autonomy as this is what enables
particular interests at stake to emerge and to be contingently fought over.  
    In contrast to conventional studies of transnationalism and diaspora politics,
the transnational field does not posit the stark and usually definitive distinction of
inside and outside (which does not meant that such distinctions cannot ‘be upheld
as a significant differentiating principle in the game of political positioning’176).
Rather,  everybody  is  inside  the  “game”  and  this  will  be  characterised  by
contested relations of domination and subordination, conservation and resistance.
As Fiona Adamson contends, transnational social space is ‘open to contestation,
mobilization and/or capture by political entrepreneurs’.177
    What distinguishes a transnational political field from its more conventional
counterpart is its structure.  This is ‘perennially hybrid’, with relative autonomy
being  partially  situated  within  other  fields  of  power,  usually  national  states.
174 Brubaker, Rogers, quoted in, ibid.
175 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, p. 745
176 Ibid., p. 760
177 Adamson, Fiona B., Mobilizing for the transformation of home: political identities and 
transnational practices, in, Al-Ali, Nadje, and, Khoser, Khalid (eds.), New Approaches to 
Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home, p. 159
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Furthermore,  this  double  structure  has  implications  for  both  symbolic  and
objective dimensions of social space.178        
    The state, of course, is a powerful institution which typically has both the
material and symbolic resources to legitimately impose ‘what is what and who is
who’ on those who are subject to its authority.179  It is ordinarily able to exert
considerable force in shaping ‘structures of perception and cognition across the
society’ it dominates.  In this sense the state is ‘incorporated in its citizens’ and,
perhaps to a lesser extent,  in those individuals who are positioned within the
political  boundaries of its  control.   According to the Bourdieusian standpoint,
such incorporation and ‘minds of state’ will generate dispositions that orient the
stances  of  agents  subjected  to  this  structuring.   This  process  is  complex and
indeterminable, yet one cannot escape habitus.180  However, the key point here is
that for those agents who are doubly positioned in a national field of power and a
transnational social space, the discourses and dispositions that are generated in
the former will structure the stances that are adopted in the latter. 
    Moreover,  the  objective  resources  which  permit  such  doubly  positioned
individuals  to speak with some degree of effectiveness  in transnational  social
space may have been acquired in a national meta-field.   That is, their objective
position in the transnational political field may be in part determined by their
objective position in a national field of power.  So to give an example close to
this  study,  a  national  state-sanctioned  ‘university  certification’  may  be  an
institutionalised form of cultural  capital  that can be mobilised and invested in
178 Vauchez, Antoine, Interstitial Power in Fields of Limited Statehood: Introducing a “Weak 
Field” Approach to the Study of Transnational Settings, International Political Sociology, pp. 
341-2
179 Brubaker, Rogers, and, Cooper, Frederick, Beyond “identity”, Theory and Society, p. 15
180 Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, Inter- and Transnational Fields of Power: On a Field Trip with 
Bourdieu, International Political Sociology, p. 328
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battles  for  domination  at  the  transnational  level.181  What  these  objective
resources are exactly will not be fixed and will vary depending on the specific
context. 
This chapter  has therefore detailed the main theoretical  approach used in this
study.  It is now time to apply this framework to the analysis of the discourse of
one-state and those predominantly diaspora intellectuals who produce it.  This
will begin with an examination of this discourse as a classificatory framework,
with Chapter Two seeking to determine what the function of is discourse is in
Palestinian politics and what specifically explains its content.
181 Vauchez, Antoine, Interstitial Power in Fields of Limited Statehood: Introducing a “Weak 
Field” Approach to the Study of Transnational Settings, International Political Sociology, p. 341
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Chapter Two: Defining the Palestinian Field: Contesting Two-States,
Calling for One
The  dominant  position  in  the  Palestinian  political  field  is  the  “pragmatist”
perspective,  which,  broadly  speaking,  has  been  historically  at  odds  with
“maximalist” standpoints premised on the total liberation of Palestine.  Official
political discourse in this arena defines the goal of a negotiated two-state solution
to the conflict  with Israel,  and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital,  as the ‘supreme
goal of the national liberation cause’.1  Despite profound differences over what
its  actual  implementation  would  entail,  this  position  is  also  the  dominant
perspective  for  resolving  the  conflict  in  international  politics  –  with  the
international Quartet declaring its support for ‘a permanent two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ in 20032 –  and within official Israeli politics –
albeit  with  major  qualifications.3  The  orthodox  agenda  in  both  local  and
international  politics  is  therefore  a  negotiated  two-state  solution  to  the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.    
    This position is in crisis, however.   During the 1990s ‘conventional wisdom’
could assume that it was ‘just a matter of time’ before a two-state solution was
1 Palestinian National Authority, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, 
Program of the Thirteenth Government, August 2009, pp. 3-5.   In 2006, all the leading 
Palestinian political factions – including those operating outside the PLO framework – signed the
National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners.  This classified the aim of the Palestinian 
struggle as being to establish an ‘independent state with al-Quds al-Shareef [Holy Jerusalem] as 
its capital on all territories occupied in 1967’. Barghouti, Marwan (Fateh), al-Natsheh, Sheik 
Abdul Khaleq (Hamas), al-Sa’di, Sheik Bassam (Islamic Jihad), Mallouh, Abdul Rahim (PFLP), 
and, Badarneh, Mustafa, (DFLP), National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners, May 26, 
2006, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/CE3ABE1B2E1502B58525717A006194CD, 
accessed 06/09/2012 
2 Quartet Mediators – the United Nations, European Union, United States, and Russia, The 
Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East, 30 April, 2003, 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/29897
83.stm, accessed 31/08/2012 
3 Netanyahu, Benjamin, “Full text of Netanyahu’s foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan, Haaretz, 14 
June, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-
policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.216%2C, accessed 31/08/2012  
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realised, and that it was ‘virtually inevitable’ that a Palestinian state would be
established.  At present this is no longer the case and the doxa of the two-state
approach has become ‘very much open to question’.4
    It is within this context that certain Palestinian intellectuals have formed and
publicly transmitted a discourse espousing a one-state solution to this conflict.
Indeed, as noted in the introduction, debate on this conflict has to a large extent
polarised  around  a  ‘two-state  versus  one-state  solution’  dichotomy  and  this
bifurcation  has  come  about  in  no  small  measure  as  a  result  of  the  critical
intervention of these intellectuals.5  What, though, is the function of the discourse
of one-state in Palestinian politics?  Is it simply a practical reaction to the crisis
afflicting the two-state approach, as existing scholarship on this issue tends to
suggest?6  Or does it encompass a considerably richer stance and framework?
This  chapter  argues  that  this  discourse  should  be  conceived  as  a  competing
definition  of  the Palestinian  political  field,  one that  is  socially  constructed in
relation  to  and against  the dominant  “pragmatist”  perspective.   In contrast  to
“pragmatism”, with its emphasis on realism, negotiations and compromise, the
discourse of one-state classifies the conflict and the Palestinian struggle in terms
of settler  colonialism,  confrontation,  and anti-colonial  resistance.   What  is  at
stake, in short, is a competition over knowledge of the social world, which has
implications for permissible political action.
4 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, pp. 150-
206
5 Roy, Sara, quoted, in, Le More, Anne, Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a 
Palestinian state, International Affairs, p. 998; Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out: An 
Everyday Occupation, p. xxvi (Author’s Note)
6 See for example: Hermann, Tamar, The bi-national idea in Israel/Palestine: past and present, 
Nations and Nationalism, pp. 381-401; Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the 
Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, pp. 206-7; Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-State Solution Dead?, 
Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, p. 39; and, Sussman, Gary, The 
Challenge to the Two-state Solution, Middle East Report, pp. 11-12
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    A further question addressed in this chapter is, how is this counter-knowledge
formed?  That is, what explains its specific content?  To be sure such a question
is  partly  answered  by  the  relation  between  the  one-state  stance  and
“pragmatism”, as noted above.  Yet other factors are pertinent, as a Bourdieusian
perspective makes clear.  The words and other deeds of Israel throughout the
course of the peace process have certainly shaped the content of the one-state
perspective.   Yet  how these  have  been  interpreted  is  to  a  significant  extent
oriented by the  habitus of these intellectuals – as Palestinians and as cultural
elites  positioned  within  a  predominantly  postcolonial  epistemological
framework. These dispositions furthermore contribute to the specific vision of a
one-state  solution  articulated  by  these  individuals,  which  is  concomitantly
structured by the transnationality of the political field and the largely diasporic
position from which it is enunciated.  Strategic calculation is not absent from the
equation, however, and the words constitutive of this discourse are selected in
part because they are considered to have political resonance across international
and national domains.  
    A less  explicit  and more  general  suggestion made in  this  chapter  is  that
Bourdieu’s structuralist constructivism provides a fruitful approach for dealing
with  a  specific  problem  in  constructivist  research.   Idealist  constructivist
approaches have been able to demonstrate in a number of different contexts that
new ideas  and political  stances  ‘often  emerge  in  response to  dramatic  policy
shocks, failures, and crises’.7  This insight is certainly supported by the discourse
of one-state, as will be shown.  What these approaches have been less adept at
explaining, as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink contend, is ‘the content of
7 Finnemore, Martha, and, Sikkink, Kathryn, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
in International Relations and Comparative Politics, American Review of Political Science, p. 406
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new models that are adopted’.8  A Bourdieusian emphasis on relations, structural
homologies, and reflexivity, it is suggested here, proves useful in this regard.      
    The structure of this chapter will follow the argument outlined above, with the
exception  that  it  will  start  by  providing  a  historical  reconstruction  of  the
Palestinian  political  field.   Like  all  histories  the  one  provided  here  will  be
selective.   It will focus only on those issues considered relevant to the actual
objects of this research.9  After this an analysis of the counter-knowledge of a
one-state solution will be undertaken, which will be followed by an explication
of its specific content.      
The Palestinian Political Field: A History
When the PLO officially adopted the two-state solution approach as the strategic
goal  of  the  national  movement  in  November  1988,  it  defined  the  goal  of  a
Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its
capital as ‘the natural climax of a … struggle that started more than seventy years
ago’.10  This claim evinces the relations of power in the Palestinian political field
at this time.  Far from being “natural” the adoption of the two-state approach
marked the triumph of a particular vision of Palestine over other perspectives.
Since its inception in the late 1960s, the political field has been broadly divided
between “maximalist” positions on the one hand and “pragmatist” positions on
the other.  As Yezid Sayigh states, this was the ‘main historic faultline within the
Palestinian national movement’.11  The settling of this contest in favour of the
8 Ibid.
9 Madsen, Mikael Rask, Reflexivity and the Construction of the International Object: The Case of
Human Rights, International Political Sociology, p. 268
10 Palestine National Council, “Political Communiqué”, Algiers, 15 November 1988, Documents 
and Source Material, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, Winter 1989,  pp. 172-228, pp.
216-17
11 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011 (1997), p. 22
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“pragmatists” in the late 1980s resulted in a restructuring of Palestinian political
discourse and practice.  This was especially the case following the signing of the
Oslo Accords by the PLO and Israel in 1993, which led to the establishment of
the  PA  and  the  consecration  of  a  Palestinian  discourse  that  centred  on  the
teleology  of  state  and  political  compromise,  at  the  expense  of  a  previous
symbolic  order  defined  through the  icons  of  revolution  and resistance.12  As
noted, however, this position is currently in turmoil; and while this has clearly
benefited Hamas, which has risen to be a key player in Palestinian politics, its
preeminence is far from being assured.13  Thus, the Palestinian political field is at
present in a state of pronounced flux and instability.
    When the Palestinian national field was established in the late 1960s, the main
political  contests  between  it  various  positions  were  waged  within  the
“maximalist” framework of armed struggle and the total liberation of Palestine.14
Guerrilla factions dominated the national movement at this stage.  By 1969 they
had  wrested  control  of  the  PLO  from  Arab  states,  which  had  dominated
Palestinian  politics  since  the  nakba  and  the  loss  of  Palestine  in  1948-49,
transforming it into a relatively autonomous social space.    Israel’s emphatic
victory in the June 1967 War – which resulted in it occupying the West Bank,
Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem – was the major factor that enabled this process to
12 Moughrabi, Fouad, Zureik, Elia, Hassassian, Manuel, Haidar, and, Aziz, Haidar, Palestinians 
on the Peace Process, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, Autumn 1991, pp. 36-53
13 Sayigh, Yezid, Inducing a Failed State in Palestine, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp.
7-39, p. 19
14 The situating of the genesis of the Palestinian political field at this point in time is not meant to 
suggest that there was no distinctly Palestinian politics prior to the late 1960s.    Such a claim 
would be ludicrous.  What is being suggested, rather, is that Palestinian politics prior to this point
was conducted in arenas that were constituted and dominated by external forces – whether the 
Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate for Palestine, or, after al nakba and the loss of Palestine in 
1948, Arab states.  For more details see: Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage: The Story of the 
Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, pp. 31-139; Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search 
for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, pp. 1-242.  For an opposing view see: 
Hilal, Jamil, Problematizing Democracy in Palestine, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, 
and Middle East, Vol. 23, No. 1&2, 2003, pp. 163-172, p. 163      
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occur as it discredited both Arab states and the incumbent PLO leadership and so
provided the opportunity for other agents to claim a preeminent political role.
This was done most effectively by the guerrilla faction Fateh, which emerged
during this period as the key player in Palestinian politics.  In this phase of the
Palestinian struggle the epicentre of the political field was positioned in exile.
This would only decisively change following the outbreak of the first Palestinian
intifada in December 1987.       
    Armed struggle was the main source of political legitimacy at this stage, and
was  instrumental  in  mobilising  Palestinians  on  a  mass  scale,  as  well  as  in
providing the space needed in order for this process to be carried out.15  It also
functioned  as  a  principle  of  distinction;  bringing  into  being  a  ‘militant’16
Palestinian collective subject and a revolutionary ‘imagined community’.17  
    Differences of course existed in the Palestinian arena, particularly over how
armed  struggle  ought  to  be  fought  and  what  liberation  specifically  entailed.
Fateh, for example, tended to articulate a straightforwardly nationalist and non-
ideological conception of armed struggle and during this period subscribed to a
vision of liberation that sought to establish a secular democratic state in all of
Mandate  Palestine  for  ‘Jews,  Christians  and  Muslims’.   Groups  such  as  the
PFLP,  in  contrast,  espoused a  distinctly  Marxist-Leninist  notion  of  liberation
war.  They visualised it as taking place within a ‘deeper process of social and
economic change’ that would involve ‘particular classes and political alliances’.
The PFLP was also initially ambivalent about the secular democratic state idea,
15 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993, pp. 174-218 
16 Rasheed, Mohammad, towards a democratic state in Palestine: the Palestinian revolution and 
the Jews vis-à-vis the democratic, non-sectarian society of the future, PLO Research Centre, 
Beirut-Lebanon, November 1970, p. 8 
17 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 174-218.  See also, Anderson, 
Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 
London, New York, 1989 (1983), pp. 14-16 
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publicly espousing it in some instances while in others regarding it ‘as a betrayal
of  the  Arab  nation  as  a  whole’  and  as  a  concept  that  ‘threatened  to  leave
Palestine in the hands of Zionism and colonialism’.18  Nonetheless, despite such
differences,  the  overarching  assumptions  of  the  “maximalist”  framework
remained largely unchallenged during this period of the Palestinian struggle.19  
    This trajectory began to change in the early 1970s, however.  At this point a
“pragmatist”  dynamic  prioritising  state-building  and  diplomatic  compromise
with  Israel  began  to  emerge  more  forcefully.   This  was  driven  primarily  by
Fateh, though factions such as the DFLP also played a significant role.20  With its
straightforwardly nationalist agenda and desire ‘for sovereign status and juridical
recognition’, Fateh was strongly disposed to situating the struggle within ‘statist
political structures’.21  To a significant extent, therefore, the “pragmatist” drive in
the Palestinian arena encapsulated its own political tendencies and interests.  
    The PLO’s scaling back of political objectives and gradual shift towards a
compromise solution with Israel was further shaped by regional trends.  These
included, most importantly, the growing raison d’État  of Arab states following
their defeat to Israel in the June 1967 War.22  In one form or another, Palestinian
guerrillas  had  envisaged  a  significant  military  role  for  Arab  states  in  the
liberation war.  Therefore, with their explicit departure from the stance of total
liberation – signified most clearly by their refusal to intervene in the PLO-Jordan
18 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 196-237
19 This is not to say that different points of view to the “maximalist” framework were totally 
absent, of course.  These certainly did exist, but were largely subordinated at this stage.  See, for 
example Gresh, Alain, The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian 
State (revised and updated edition) (translated by A. M. Berrett), Zed Books Ltd, London and 
New Jersey, 1988 (1983), pp. 59-76.    
20 Ibid., pp. 99-140.  See also, Cobban, Helena, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People,
Power and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992 (1984), p. 154
21 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 174-218. 
22 Brynen, Rex, Palestine and the Arab State System: Permeability, State Consolidation and the 
Intifada, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 595-621, 
pp. 602-4
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War in September 1970, by Egypt and Syria’s limited diplomatic objectives in
the October 1973 War, and by the agreement of a bilateral peace between Egypt
and Israel in 1978 – many PLO operatives began to question the practicality of
the “maximalist” standpoint.  In turn, this led to them according greater weight to
a compromise approach.23     
    Moreover, it was around this time that Palestinians in the occupied territories
started to play a more prominent role in the national movement.24  This sector of
the Palestinian  people tended to favour a pragmatic  approach and the aim of
establishing  an  independent  state,  as  this  agenda  met  with  their  immediate
aspiration of ending the occupation.  From the early 1970s onwards, pro-PLO
elites from this constituency sought to influence PLO policy in this direction.25
The  outbreak  of  the  first  Palestinian  intifada  in  the  occupied  territories  in
December 1987 proved crucial in enabling “pragmatists” in the Palestinian arena
to impose their domination on the political field.  It allowed figures such as Yasir
Arafat to win the ‘diplomatic mandate [they] had sought for so long’.26  
    Though this victory contributed further to the rising political preeminence of
Palestinians in the occupied territories, the “pragmatist” stance still managed to
gain considerable support among Palestinians in exile – despite this constituency
having most to lose from the diplomatic strategy.  This was mainly due to the
vagaries  of exile  and the frequently violent  relations  Palestinians  experienced
with Arab states and societies.  For many Palestinians in exile, the bitterness of
this  experience  contributed  to  a  growing  sense  ‘of  the  need  to  establish  a
23 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 243-333; Cobban, Helena, The 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics, p. 53; Khalidi, Rashid, 
Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2010 (1997), pp. 200-1 
24 Parsons, Nigel, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, pp. 29-31
25 Gresh, Alain, The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State, pp. 
133-6
26 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 624
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sovereign authority on national soil’.27  They too were thus inclined towards the
policy of a negotiated two-state solution.  
    Even still, this process of change was far from being smooth.  PLO politics
throughout  this  period  was dominated  by an  intense  and often  bitter  internal
debate  ‘about  the  historic  nature  and  purpose  of  the  Palestinian  national
movement’.28  The reorientation of PLO strategy towards a compromise solution
was officially  initiated  in  June  1974,  through the  political  programme of  the
twelfth Palestine National Council (PNC).29  This session of the PNC effectively
brought the “maximalist” and “pragmatist” positions ‘into direct conflict’ with
one another.30  In response to the programme adopted at  this PNC, the PFLP
withdrew its membership from the PLO’s executive committee, and, along with a
number  of  other  factions,  established  a  Rejection  Front  (RF)  to  oppose
“capitulationist”  trends  in  the  Palestinian  arena.31  Specifically,  the  RF  was
against ‘deviationist trends’ that sought to entice ‘Palestinians to participate in
liquidationist  settlements’.32  As PFLP leader George Habash explained at the
time: 
27 Sayigh, Yezid, Struggle within, Struggle without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 
1982, International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 247-271, pp. 248-68; Hilal, Jamil, 
Problematizing Democracy in Palestine, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and Middle 
East, p. 164
28 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 332-3
29 Rather than calling for the total liberation of Palestine, the political programme of the twelfth 
PNC ambiguously called for the ‘liberation of Palestinian land’ and prioritised the establishment 
of a ‘people’s national, independent and fighting authority on every part of the Palestinian land 
that is liberated’.  The programme also stated that the ‘PLO will struggle by every means’ to 
fulfil its political objectives, which hinted at the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the 
conflict, as opposed to a military solution accomplished through armed struggle.  Gresh, Alain, 
The PLO, The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State, pp. 167-71         
30 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, pp. 323-3
31 The full title of the RF was the Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Solutions.
In addition to the PFLP, it comprised the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the Palestinian Popular Struggle 
Front (PPSF).
32 Quoted in, Cobban, Helena, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 149
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two contradictory political lines exist within the PLO ….  One political
line says the only way open for the resistance movement is to enter into
the  framework  of  the  political  solution  and  to  struggle  within  this
framework to achieve whatever is possible.  On the other hand, there is
another  line  that  believes  in  the  continuity  of  the  revolution  and in
staying away from political settlements.33
Support for the “maximalist” standpoint existed within Palestinian social space
throughout this period.34  Yet by the late 1980s this battle had been effectively
settled in favour of the “pragmatists” – with the PLO being able to legitimately
claim,  as  noted  above,  that  a  negotiated  two-solution  to  the  conflict  was the
‘natural climax’ of the Palestinian struggle.35  The dominance of this position
became entrenched still further after the signing of the Oslo Accords by the PLO
and Israel in 1993. 
    The signing of this agreement inaugurated the Oslo peace process, and led to
the return from exile to the occupied territories of the core political leadership,
bureaucracy, and military institutions of the PLO, transforming them into the PA.
The quasi-state apparatus of the PA would quickly be expanded to incorporate
disparate  sectors  of  West  Bank and Gazan society,  granting  various agents  a
stake in the diplomatic and institution building process, and thus ameliorating
potential  sources of resistance to  such measures.   The PA was dominated by
Fateh, with its members exercising a virtual monopoly over its key posts and
institutions.36
33 Habash,  George,  Interviewed  in  Al-Hadaf,  Beirut,  August  3,  1974,  Document  and  Source
Material:  Arab  Documents  on  Palestine  and  the  Arab-Israeli  Conflict,  Journal  of  Palestine
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn, 1974, pp 189-205, p. 201
34 Cobban, Helena, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 62-3; Gresh, Alain, The PLO, 
The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State, pp. 146-9; Khalidi, Rashid, The 
Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, pp. 194-5  
35 Palestine National Council, “Political Communiqué”, Algiers, 15 November 1988, Documents 
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    Although the Oslo agreements never once stated that the aim of negotiations
between Palestinians and Israel was a two-state solution to the conflict,37 they
were broadly seen as confirming the evolution of the PLO, under the leadership
of Fateh, ‘from a liberation movement to a para-state that would eventually lead
the  Palestinians  to  full-fledged  statehood  and  independence’.38  For  many
intellectuals  writing  at  the  time,  the  PLO’s engagement  in  the  peace  process
consecrated a ‘new Palestinian discourse’.  This had been in formation since the
early 1970s, and differed ‘radically from the previous discourse associated with
the rise of the Palestine resistance movement in the 1960s’.39  Now, however, it
effectively  ‘displaced’  the  “maximalist”  perspective  from  the  field  of
contention.40  What emerged instead was a symbolic order defined in terms of
realism and political compromise, and that focused almost solely on the teleology
of state.
    According to the terms of this new discursive framework, Palestinians were
‘less ideological’ and ‘more pragmatic’; they were less confrontational and ‘more
willing to accommodate themselves to new realities’; and they showed greater
awareness  of  ‘the  need  to  discard  the  old  rhetoric’  and  pursue  ‘realizable
objectives’.41  Within  this  framework,  the  legitimate  political  conduct  for
37 For example, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) – the main document signed between the 
PLO and Israel – certainly stated that the aim of negotiations between the principal parties was to 
‘achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement’.  However, the specific outcome of 
‘permanent status negotiations’, as these were called, was left open except for the proviso that 
they would ‘cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of 
common interest’. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 
September 1993, 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/16827
27.stm, accessed 02/06/2010  
38 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, p. 150
39 Moughrabi, Fouad, Zureik, Elia, Hassassian, Manuel, Haidar, and, Aziz, Haidar, Palestinians 
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engaging Israel became the practice of negotiations, rather than resistance.  The
war had ended,42 and the era of ‘the guerrilla groups based in exile’ was over.  A
new phase had begun ‘in which the centre of national politics, primary social
constituency, and statist institutions were based in one and the same location, the
occupied territories’.43  The recently created institutions of the PA advanced the
dominant narrative of state, eliding difference in the Palestinian arena by pushing
the militant symbols of armed struggle and revolution to the margins.44  
    In school  textbooks developed under the PA, for example,  Palestine  was
defined through ‘flags, institutions, and unity’, and emerged as an unproblematic
and natural  entity possessing all  the accoutrements  of state.   The symbols  of
‘struggle, revolution, and liberation’, which had ‘dominated Palestinian national
expression for a generation’, hardly featured at all in these official texts.45  The
PA’s security forces were valorised as a symbol of the emerging state’s power,
with the gun ‘no longer  celebrated  as  the liberator  of  the captive  nation,  but
rather as instruments of order’.46  The “pragmatist” position had by this point in
time been largely established as doxa, with it being widely taken for granted that
negotiations leading to the creation of an independent Palestinian state would be
concluded in due course.47       
    Nevertheless, this narrative has lost a considerable degree of social efficacy
and the inevitability recognised in this position has become increasingly open to
42 Allen, Lori, Palestinians Debate “Polite” Resistance to Occupation, Middle East Report, Vol. 
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dispute.  Even though figures such as Yasir Arafat used to claim that the PA’s
autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip amounted to sovereignty, Israel has
continued to exercise a system of control over the occupied territories and the
Palestinians living there throughout the peace process.  Control over security,
trade, travel,  land use, and access to natural resources (especially water), was
firmly retained in Israel’s hands under the terms of the Oslo agreements.48  What
is  more,  Israel  has  continued  to  build  Jewish  settlements  in  the  occupied
territories.  Between 1991 and 2009 the number of Jewish settlers in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem rose from 243,000 to 510,648.49  Accompanying this
process of colonization  has been the construction of an extensive network of
Israeli-only roads and security infrastructure – including, since 2002, the building
of  a  “security  barrier”  that  runs  through  significant  parts  of  the  West  Bank.
These ‘physical obstacles’ and ‘extensive “no-go” areas’ for Palestinians have
fragmented the occupied territories into a series of non-contiguous enclaves, and
have  severely  hampered  Palestinian  movement  and  economic  development.50
Living  conditions  for  Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories  have  generally
deteriorated  since  1993,  added  to  which  has  been  a  lack  of  any  meaningful
advancement in the diplomatic process.51
   The outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000 was largely
due  to  these  conditions,  as  well  as  the  growing  disillusionment  among
Palestinians  with  the  diplomatic  strategy  of  the  PLO,  and  their  mounting
48 Sayigh, Yezid, Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt, Survival, p. 55; Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron 
Cage, pp. 200-6
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disaffection with the corruption and institutional mismanagement of PA elites.
Violence  was  perpetrated  from  both  sides  during  the  course  of  the  second
intifada,  but  Israel’s  response  was  especially  brutal.   This  included  its
redeployment in areas of the West Bank its military had vacated as part of the
Oslo agreements, and its deliberate destruction of PA institutions and physical
infrastructure.52  As Laleh Khalili has argued, one of the consequences of Israel’s
reinvasion of the West Bank and devastating assault on PA institutions, was to
weaken the legitimacy of the narrative of state promoted by the latter;  as she
maintains,  it  brought  into sharp relief  the extent  to  which the PA quasi-state
remained ‘subject  to  the policies  of  Israel’.53  The symbolic  authority  of  this
narrative has continued to decline; and while efforts have been made to restart
the peace process since the second intifada – most notably the Quartet sponsored
Road Map in 2003 and the Minneapolis Conference in 2008 – it is effectively
moribund.  In 2010, direct negotiations between the two sides officially broke
down.
    For some analysts,  the post-Oslo Accords period has been defined by the
‘ongoing  slow-motion  collapse  … of  the  post-1948  phase  of  the  Palestinian
national movement’.54  While this assessment is of course retrospective, and it is
unlikely that it would have been made prior to the start of the second intifada, it
nevertheless appears to have a large degree of validity.  
    The signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PA effectively
marginalised the PLO in Palestinian politics and at present it barely operates.55
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Historic  opposition  factions  such  as  the  PFLP and  the  DFLP were  similarly
sidelined by the commencement of the Oslo peace process, and they had been, in
any case, severely wounded both financially and ideologically by the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.56  As the principal faction driving
the diplomatic  strategy and promising a successful conclusion of negotiations
with  Israel,  Fateh  has  suffered  a  sharp  decline  in  its  political  credibility  and
domestic  support owing to its  ‘patent  inability’  to deliver  on this  front.57  Its
organisational  disarray  and  increasing  incoherency  as  a  political  movement,
along with the well documented corruption of many of its senior members, has
detracted still further from its internal standing.  Indeed, as commentators such as
Nathan Brown contend, without a serious process of renewal Fateh is likely to
‘continue its slow fade from the scene’.58
    Rather than being interested in affecting such a process of renewal, however,
Fateh and for that matter political elites generally in the Palestinian arena seem to
be more concerned at present with entrenching the established order as opposed
to moving beyond it.  This appears to be due in part to their practical sense of
raison  d’être and  historical  conviction  that  a  satisfactory  settlement  to  the
conflict with Israel can be achieved within the current diplomatic framework and
strategy.59  Despite  the  weakening  of  the  “pragmatist”  position  within  this
context, Palestinian political elites continue to assert that the establishment of an
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independent state within the framework of a negotiated two-state solution to the
conflict is ‘inevitable’.60  
    In addition, this interest in maintaining the established order seems to partly
derive from the significant  political  and economic  benefits  which these elites
derive  from  the  status  quo  in  Palestine-Israel.61  For  this  reason,  as  certain
scholars have suggested, there is little incentive for them to try and engage in a
process  of  reconstitution  and  strategic  reformulation  in  the  Palestinian  arena,
however constrained this option might be.  Indeed, given the crisis of legitimacy
in this  context,  such a process  seems to be perceived by political  elites  as  a
‘strategic threat’ to their current standing in the political field.62  The growing
authoritarianism of the PA regime, along with its recent attempts at reforming
and improving its public services in the West Bank, appear to symptomatic of an
interest  in  perpetuating  the  extant  order  and  escaping  important  political
questions.63
    This  decline  of  the  historic  leadership  and institutions  of  the  Palestinian
national movement has enabled Hamas to assert itself as a major player in the
political field.  Founded in the late 1980s as a distinctly Palestinian offshoot of
the Muslim Brotherhood,  Hamas’  rise  to  prominence  was demonstrated  most
egregiously by its  triumph in the 2006 Palestinian  Legislative Council  (PLC)
elections.   Its  political  ascendancy  was  highlighted  still  further  by  its
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involvement in a military confrontation with Fateh in June 2007 which led to it
seizing control of PA institutions in the Gaza Strip.  This brief war between rival
Palestinian  factions  effectively  split  the  PA  in  two,  with  Hamas  assuming
governance  responsibilities  in  the  Gaza  Strip,  and  with  Fateh  dominating
presidential and security institutions in the West Bank (the PA government in the
West  Bank  continues  to  be  led  by  a  technocratic  administration  which  was
headed  until  recently  by  Salam Fayyad,  and  which  is  headed  now by Rami
Hamdallah).  This division persists into the present.  
    Regional trends within the context of the “Arab spring” have added to the
sense that Hamas is poised to legitimately dominate the political field and that
Fateh is on the wrong side of history.64  The dynamic of Islamist  ascendancy
shown most clearly by the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
suggests the emergence of a regional order more favourable to Hamas’ political
position.65  According to certain analysts, Hamas leaders, especially those based
in  the  Gaza  Strip,  are  convinced  that  the  ‘rising  Islamist  tide  in  Egypt  and
elsewhere [will] lift their boat’,66 and that the ‘Palestinian future is theirs’.67  For
some Hamas operatives this is considered as being simply a matter of time.68 
    This view, however, appears to be once again premature.  To be sure the
struggles within the context  of the “Arab spring” appear  to point towards an
Islamist trajectory across the region.  Yet such struggles remain highly fluid and
are far from being settled.  Moreover, Islamist domination does not necessarily
64 International Crisis Group, Light at the End of their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab Uprisings, 
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translate into straightforward gains for Hamas and indeed it may bring some of
its internal contradictions into sharper focus.69  In recent years the organisation
has  been  increasingly  straddling  the  divide  between  militant  resistance
movement and ‘credible governing authority’.70  Its political thought and practice
has been oriented at one and the same time towards armed struggle and total
liberation: and towards ‘pragmatism and the Palestinian “mainstream”’.71  The
“Arab Spring” has seen it remove its political headquarters from Syria amidst an
ongoing rebellion there against the Bashar al-Assad regime, which has resulted in
it  shifting  its  regional  orbit  away from the so-called  “axis of resistance”  and
towards  status  quo  actors  such  as  Egypt,  Jordan,  Qatar  and  Turkey.72
Furthermore, those Islamist governments that have risen across the region have
displayed a strong interest  in developing ‘economic and security ties with the
United States and the European Union’, which suggests that they will ‘expect
Hamas to moderate its stance in return for their political and material support’.73
This point includes the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
    Even still, despite this regional reorientation Hamas retains its ties to “axis of
resistance”  states  –  most  notably  Iran  –  and  it  has  far  from  abandoned  its
resistance stance.74  Therefore, it is fair to say that its internal tensions remain
ongoing and that Hamas too lacks a clear strategic vision.75  Moreover, given
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these  contradictions  and  competing  local  and  regional  demands,  its  seems
unlikely that Hamas will be in a position any time soon to formulate an unified
stance that incorporates a specific agenda and political programme, whatever this
might be.  The growing authoritarianism of its governing practices in the Gaza
Strip and its increasing disregard for public opinion there appears to be largely
symptomatic of this strategic impasse.76 
    Thus, while the Palestinian political field has undergone significant changes
since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, it remains mired in a condition
of liminality and pronounced uncertainty.  There is a major crisis of legitimacy at
this time and it is within this context that certain Palestinian intellectuals have
intervened more forcefully in the political field with a discourse espousing a one-
state solution to the conflict.  As the next section will argue, this discourse should
be conceived as a competing definition of the Palestinian political field that is
articulated in opposition to the dominant “pragmatist” perspective.  
Counter-Knowledge: Contesting the “Pragmatist” Perspective
‘Knowledge of the social world’, states Pierre Bourdieu, ‘and, more precisely,
the categories that make it possible, are the stakes par excellence of the political
struggle’.77  This insight would not be lost on proponents of a one-state solution;
intellectuals  who are  contesting  the dominant  “pragmatist”  perspective  in  the
Palestinian  political  field  with  an  alternative  definition  of  social  reality.
Specifically, they contest the structuring effects of “pragmatist” discourse and its
foreclosing of conceptual horizons in Palestinian and international arenas, as well
as its categorisation of the conflict as a border dispute between two equivalent
76 Brown, Nathan J., Gaza Five Years On: Hamas Settles In, The Carnegie Papers
77 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 236
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national  movements  that  can be only resolved through a negotiated  two-state
solution.   In the counter-knowledge of these intellectuals,  the Palestinians are
engaged  in  an  existential  war,  and  more  specifically,  a  battle  against  settler
colonialism.   This  is  so  despite the  peace  process,  which  in  their  view  has
advanced  the  Zionist  settler  colonial  project  in  Mandate  Palestine.   Indeed,
according to the version of social  reality constructed in the discourse of one-
state,  “pragmatism” is complicit  in this particular relation of domination.   As
such,  negotiations  and  territorial  compromise  are  considered  futile  and  the
Palestinian  struggle  should  be  concerned  with  anti-colonial  resistance  and
decolonization.
    Discourse, in Bourdieu’s view, may operate as a structuring structure.  When
recognised  as  legitimate  particular  utterances  will  structure  social  reality,
permitting certain courses of action and limiting the possibility of others.78  In
analysing this specific instance of discursive contestation, it is important to be
aware that the intellectuals who are promoting a one-state solution are conscious
of the limits imposed on the Palestinian political field by “pragmatist” discourse.
While many of these individuals at one stage considered ‘historic compromise’
as  ‘necessary’,79 and  thus  to  some  extent  embodied  the  assumptions  of
“pragmatism”, they now perceive this standpoint to be an oppressive framework;
or to put it in Bourdieusian language, they now see its symbolic violence.  
    The ‘Middle East peace process industry’,  states Ali Abunimah, ‘seeks to
define the limits of permissible discussion about political outcomes’.80  In Joseph
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12 
80 Abunimah, Ali, Can Palestine be partitioned? Taking the discussion back to basics, The 
Electronic Intifada, 20 June, 2011, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/can-palestine-
be-partitioned-taking-discussion-back-basics, accessed 06/09/2012  
106
Massad’s words, the boundaries of “pragmatist” discourse work to ‘ensure that
no  other  strategy  is  pursued’  and  to  prevent  ‘other  visions  from  being
contemplated’.81  Edward  Said  commented  that  his  writings  against  official
political discourse were frequently denounced by his opponents as showing ‘a
utopian lack of pragmatism and realism’82; he implied that this was intended to
foreclose political  debate by dismissing  his  views as politically  detached and
puerile83 – even though, as he also stated, they have ‘proved to be correct’.84  The
foreclosing effects of orthodox discourse are therefore perceived by advocates of
the one-state approach.
    In  making  this  point  it  is  necessary  to  understand  precisely  what  this
structuring effect is, or rather, how it is interpreted by the intellectuals who are
contesting it.  Leaving aside at present the competing value each position invests
in this framework of knowledge, it is clear that both supporters and critics of the
“pragmatist”  perspective  see the structure it  enacts  in broadly the same way.
Writing for the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP), an organisation that
is largely supportive of the official Palestinian standpoint, Husssein Ibish states
that the triumph of the two-state perspective on both a local and international
level has ‘fundamentally transformed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a zero-
sum equation to what can and should be a win-win dynamic’.85  ‘The framework
of  a  two-state  solution’,  he  continues,  ‘has  made  it  possible  to  support  the
Palestinians’  aspiration  to  freedom without  being  anti-Israeli,  and  to  call  for
81 Massad, Joseph A., The compulsion to partition, Al Jazeera English, 06 August, 2012, 
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Israel’s  right  to  security  and  normality  without  being  anti-Palestinian’.86  To
borrow  Menachem  Klein’s  sharp  description  of  this  “pragmatist”  view,  the
‘proposed  two-state  solution  transformed  an  existential  struggle  between  two
sides negating each other into a border conflict’.87  Moreover, as Ibish’s language
makes clear, Zionism is placed on the same level as Palestinian nationalism in
this  discursive  framework.   The  two  are  considered  legitimate  national
movements  or  at  least  social  constructions  that  should  not  be  fundamentally
opposed.
    A further effect of “pragmatist” discourse is, as discussed above, to foreclose
conceptual  horizons  in  the  Palestinian  arena  and  limit  the  possibility  of
alternative political struggles.  In the 1990s it was widely taken for granted that
the  trajectory  of  the  conflict  was  steadily  heading  towards  the  telos  of  a
negotiated two-state solution and independent Palestinian statehood.88  What this
foreclosure specifically entails in the present context of crisis and the questioning
of this position, however, is less a guarantee of its realisation – though this still
persists – and more the construction of a stark choice between statehood and
permanent  war.   To cite  the words of former West Bank PA Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad, ‘peace cannot be attained unless our people gain their national
rights as defined by international resolutions including their right to live freely
and  decently  in  an  independent  state  [emphasis  added]’.89  The  same  rigid
dichotomy  is  apparent  in  statements  from  groups  such  as  the  ATFP  which
declare that a ‘permanent peace in the Middle East … can only be achieved by a
86 Ibid., p. 7
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historic compromise based on a two-state solution [emphasis]’.90  Beyond the
Palestinian political field, this dichotomy is also created at the international level
when powerful figures like US President Barack Obama assert that: ‘everyone
knows [that] a lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples’.91  Efforts to
reassert the doxa of the two-state approach seem to be performed through such
utterances.    
    For proponents of a one-state solution, the version of social reality produced
by “pragmatist”  discourse  is  understood in  a  very  similar  way to  those  who
support this standpoint.  Its framing effects are conceived from this perspective
as indicating that: as partition of Mandate Palestine into two states is ‘accepted
by both sides’, resolving ‘this conflict should simply be a matter of devising a
well-designed  internationally  supported  negotiation  process’  leading  to  this
outcome.92  From  the  point  of  view  of  these  intellectuals,  the  classificatory
schemas constitutive of “pragmatist”  discourse construct the conflict  as being
‘one of competing nationalisms’93; they produce a conflict that is simply about
‘contesting one nationalism with another’,94 which has lines of antagonism that
‘coincide  with  the  lines  of  June  4,  1967’.95  Furthermore,  this  system  of
knowledge – ‘encompassing national leaders, international officials, academics,
advocates,  media  and non-governmental  organizations’  –  is  seen by one-state
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http://www.americantaskforce.org/position/our_mission, accessed 10/10/2012
91 Obama, Barack, Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, State 
Department, Washington D.C., May 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa, accessed 06/09/2012
92 Rouhana, Nadim N., The Colonial Condition: Is Partition Possible in Palestine?, Jadal, Issue 
10, June 2011, pp. 1-5 pp. 2-3
93 Massad, Joseph A., The Intellectual Life of Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33,
No. 3, Special Issue in Honor of Edward W. Said, Spring 2004, pp. 7-22, p. 16
94 Makdisi, Saree, “Intellectual Warfare” and the Question of Palestine, in, Bisharat, George, and,
Doumani, Beshara, Open Forum: Strategizing Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 82
95 This date refers to the pre-June 1967 War borders between Israel and what are now the 
occupied territories.  This line is commonly referred to as the “Green Line”.   Abunimah, Ali, It’s
not just the occupation, The Electronic Intifada, 7 June 2007, 
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article7012.shtml, accessed 10/10/2010 
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proponents  as  enforcing  the view ‘that  the partition  of  historic  Palestine  into
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian states is the only possible solution to an otherwise
intractable conflict’.96  The idea that ‘the ultimate goal of the Palestinian struggle
for the last hundred years has been to have a state’ is also perceived from this
standpoint as having been firmly established through “pragmatist” discourse (this
issue will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter).97
    The major difference between these two positions of course is that from the
perspective  of  intellectuals  who  are  calling  for  a  one-state  solution  the
“pragmatist”  stance  is  wrong.   While  they  recognise  the  latter’s  structuring
effects in the same terms as the agents of “pragmatism”, they recognise these
terms as imposing a false lense through which to envision the conflict and the
Palestinian struggle.  In their view, the framework enacted through “pragmatist”
discourse mystifies the “true” reality of these social configurations.  As such, it
should be contested and should be contested by them.  
    According to these agents, a political role of the intellectual is ‘to think new
thoughts  and  open  lines  of  reflection  that  convention  and  orthodoxy  have
closed’.98  Part  of  their  task  includes  producing  an  ‘alternative  view’  that
provides ‘another way of looking not just at the present and past, but at the future
as  well’.99  In  this  regard,  these  individuals  subscribe  to  and  reproduce  a
longstanding  image  of  the  critical  intellectual  as  someone  who  confronts
conventional wisdom.100
96 Abunimah, Ali, A Curious Case of Exceptionalism: Non-partitionist Approaches to Ethnic 
Conflict Regulation and the Question of Palestine, Ethnopolitics, p. 431
97 Bishara, Azmi, The Pitfalls of a US-Israeli Vision of a Palestinian State, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, Winter 2006, pp. 56-63, p. 59
98 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 259
99 Ibid., p. xx (introduction to first edition)
100 Hart, Janet, Reading the Radical Subject: Gramsci, Glinos, and Paralanguages of the Modern 
Nation, in, Grigor Suny, Ronald, and, Kennedy, Michael D. (eds.), Intellectuals and the 
Articulation of the Nation, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999, pp. 171-204, p. 
176 
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    In adopting this role, those who call for a one-state solution contend that the
reality of the conflict is not defined by a win-win dynamic but by a dynamic of
‘oppressor and oppressed’.101  The conflict is not a border dispute.  Rather, the
‘exclusive  focus  on  the  occupation  serves  increasingly  to  obscure  that  the
conflict  in Palestine is at its core a colonial  struggle’.102  This struggle, more
specifically,  is  ‘between  a  settler-colonizing  nationalism  and  anti-colonial
nationalism’ and therefore it is not a struggle between two equivalent national
movements.103  As  such,  the  choice  facing  Palestinians  is  not  statehood  or
permanent  war, but ‘liberation or oblivion’.104  The conflict  is  existential;  the
struggle is a matter of existence.    
    On  this  matter,  it  is  important  to  elaborate  on  the  category  of  settler
colonialism invoked by these critical  intellectuals.   Colonialism is  a  complex
social formation and one cannot deal with its multifarious aspects here.  In broad
terms,  nonetheless,  it  is  permissible  to  classify  it  as  a  system of  domination
which  relies  on  material  force  and  the  production  of  ‘colonial  epistemic
differences’.  Frameworks of knowledge constitutive of the European project of
modernity  are  intrinsic  to  the  establishment  and  reproduction  of  colonial
relations.  This is because they not only deny “Progress” and “Enlightenment” to
those persons who are positioned outside their epistemological boundaries, but in
so doing they produce desubjectified and inferior “others” who are thus open to
negation.  Within this relation of power, the subjectivity of the colonised “other”
is constructed in the exteriority of colonial discourse.  It is an ‘outside created
101 Barghouti, Omar, Re-Imagining Palestine: Self-determination, Ethical De-colonization, and 
Equality, The One Democratic State Group, July 29, 2009, http://www.odsg.org/co/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=1438:re-imagining-palestine-self-determination-ethical-
de-colonization-and-equality1&catid=27:one-state&Itemid=41, accessed 06/11/2009
102 Abunimah, Ali, It’s not just the occupation, The Electronic Intifada
103 Massad, Joseph A., The Intellectual Life of Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 16
104 Qumsiyeh, Mazin, Palestine in relativity, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 962, 27 August-
2September, 2009, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/962/op151.htm, accessed 06/11/2009 
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from the  inside’  –  that  is,  from inside  the  boundaries  of  modernity.105  The
colonial  subject  is  therefore  an  object  in  this  relation.106  This  relation,
furthermore, is racialized in colonial formations; the epistemological categories
of  modernity  –  “rationalism”,  “progress”,  “secularism”,  etc.  –  are  essentially
white  and  European:  their  constitutive  “other”  –  “irrationalism”,
“backwardness”, “superstition”, etc. – are essentially not.  Epistemic differences
are at the same time racialized differences in the colonial system.107                 
    Negation is a central aspect of settler colonialism and knowledge is intricately
related to this process.  However, what makes settler colonialism distinct as a
form of colonialism is that its negatory logic is more specifically an eliminatory
logic.  Settler colonialism is driven by the logic of elimination.  It is, as Patrick
Wolfe argues, a ‘land-centred project that coordinates a comprehensive range of
agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view
to  eliminating  Indigenous  societies’.108  The  “native”  is  ‘superfluous’  in  this
relation.  This figure operates neither as a constitutive “other” to the figure of the
modern settler, nor does it function as an object from which to extract surplus
value.109  The destruction of indigenous societies and their replacement by a new
settler configuration is the object of this eliminatory logic.  Settler colonialism
‘destroys to replace’.110
105 Mignolo, Walter D., and, Tlostanova, Madina V., Theorizing from the Borders: Shifting to 
Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 
2006, pp. 205-221, pp. 205-7.  See also, Said, Edward W., Orientalism, Penguin Books, London, 
2003 (1978), pp. 21-27
106 Young, Robert J. C., Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
Oxford, 2001, pp. 4-10
107 Mignolo, Walter D., and, Tlostanova, Madina V., Theorizing from the Borders: Shifting to 
Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory, p. 210
108 Wolfe, Patrick, Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native, Journal of Genocide 
Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 387-409, p. 393
109 Wolfe, Patrick, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and
Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Cassell, London and New York, 1999, pp. 1-3
110 Wolfe, Patrick, Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native, Journal of Genocide 
Research, p. 388
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    The methods of elimination  deployed  by settler  colonial  formations,  it  is
significant  to  note,  are  far  from  being  singular,  unchanging  and  lacking  in
innovation.  Genocide, for example, may be one approach used, as in the case of
Native Americans, but practices of elimination may also include programmes of
assimilation, mass expulsion, and reconstituted human geographies.  So, while
settler colonialism desires the elimination of the “native”, this goal does not have
to be realised through any particular route.111
    Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that settler colonialism ‘is a structure
and not an event’.  As social configurations, settler colonial societies are likely to
be nuanced and pluralized.  Nevertheless, their logic of destroying and replacing
the  “native”  is  an  organising  principle  and  not  a  discrete  occurrence  which
happens  once  and  is  then  superseded.   The  impulse  to  eliminate  is  not
determined, for example, by the outcome of elections; it is, as Wolfe remarks,
‘relatively impervious  to  regime change’.   The logic  of settler  colonialism is
ongoing so long as its structure remains in place.  Therefore, it is only through
displacing  this  structure  that  the  logic  of  settler  colonialism  can  itself  be
eradicated.112
    Proponents of a one-state solution are not the only persons to have applied the
category of settler colonialism to the Zionist movement and Israel.  Wolfe does
so, and so do others.113  Within the context of Palestinian political thought there
is a substantial history of depicting the Zionist movement and the Israeli state in
these terms.  In the 1960s, for instance, prominent intellectuals such as Fayez
Sayegh contended that,  
111 Ibid., pp. 388-402
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., pp. 388-404 
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although it was not until 1948 that the Zionist aim was at last fulfilled,
through the forcible expulsion of the majority of Palestinian Arabs from
their homeland, the objective of de-Arabizing Palestine (as a requirement
of Zionizing that country) had been entertained by the Zionist movement
since its inception.        
Sayegh  further  argued  that  the  ‘motto  of  the  race-supremacist  Zionist  settler
regime  in  Palestine  was  racial  elimination’,  and  that  this  was  a  ‘congenital,
essential,  and permanent’  feature of Israeli  state and society.114  In his earlier
critical writings, Edward Said framed the reconstruction of Palestine as ‘the State
of Israel in 1948’ as ‘a feat unparalleled in the history of settler colonialism’.115
    What is crucial about the present context, however, is that those who promote
a  one-state  solution  are  deploying  the  category  of  settler  colonialism against
“pragmatism” as well as Zionism and Israel.  The point is that the conflict has not
been ‘fundamentally transformed’, as those who utter the “pragmatist” standpoint
assert.116  The Palestinians ‘are being persecuted by Israel as its natives’.117  The
logic  of  elimination  that  drove  the  Zionist  movement  and  Israel  in  the  past
continues to drive them in the present.  This process has not been ruptured and
displaced by the onset of the peace process and the establishment of diplomatic
ties between the PLO and Israel.
    Thus, in this counterview, settler colonialism persists and the nakba is not ‘a
discrete event that took place and ended in 1948’, but a process that ‘continues to
destroy Palestine and the Palestinians’.  As Joseph Massad contends: ‘I hold that
the Nakba is a historical epoch that is 127 years old and is ongoing.  The year
1881 is the date when Jewish colonization of Palestine started and, as everyone
114 Sayegh, Fayez A., Zionist Colonialism in Palestine, Research Centre of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, Beirut, September 1965, pp. 21-7
115 Said, Edward W., Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims, Social Text, No. 1, Winter 
1979, pp. 7-58, pp. 8-10
116 Ibish, Hussein, What’s wrong with the One-State Agenda? Why Ending the Occupation and 
Peace with Israel is still the Palestinian National Goal, p. 6
117 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 145
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knows, it has never ended [emphasis added]’.118  The phrase “everyone knows” is
certainly revealing in that it appropriates the language of orthodox discourse and
so challenges the legitimacy of its utterances; it gives a strong indication of the
type of battle that is taking place between these different points of view.  The
knowledge formed and disseminated by these intellectuals defines the conflict in
terms of historical continuity and positions “pragmatism” within the boundaries
of Israel’s ‘colonial structure’.119
    Indeed, according to such writings, Israel is responsible for a remarkable feat
of innovation in the annals of settler colonial movements.  Though it continues to
eliminate Palestine and the Palestinians, it has managed to do so through paving
‘a diplomatic route for the erasure’ of territory and bodies.120  The Oslo peace
process  is  considered  from this  standpoint  as  extending  Zionism’s  historical
treatment of the Palestinians, which certainly has cast them as inferior to Jews –
or ‘moderns’121 in Theodor Herzl’s parlance – and which, as a consequence of
this disavowal, has been able to deny their political existence.122  This treatment
has  been  clearly  altered  with  the  start  of  the  Oslo  peace  process,  as  Israel
recognised the ‘PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people’ within this
context and so ceased denying the existence outright.123  Yet, even still, for these
intellectuals the reality of the conflict has not been fundamentally transformed;
118 At the time of writing the figure is 132 years old.  Massad, Joseph A., Resisting the Nakba, 
The Electronic Intifada, 16 May 2008, http://electronicintifada.net/content/resisting-nakba/7518, 
accessed 26/08/2009
119 Massad, Joseph A., The compulsion to partition, Al Jazeera English
120 Aruri, Naseer, US Policy and Palestine: Oslo, the Intifada and erasure, Race & Class, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, 2011, pp. 3-20, pp. 5-6
121 Herzl, Theodor, The Jewish State, p. 45, available at, 
http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf, accessed 24/10/2012
122 For example, former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir declared in 1969 that ‘there is no such 
thing as a Palestinian people’.  Meir, Golda, quoted in, Jamal, Amal, The Palestinians in the 
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Autumn 2000, pp. 36-51, p. 36




Israel has maintained its disavowal of Palestinian political subjectivity through
refusing to recognise it as being equal to that of Jews and its conduct during the
peace process is framed in the discourse of one-state as being symptomatic of
this ongoing denial.124
    The recognition granted to the PLO by Israel is recast in this discourse as
stemming  from  tactical  reassessment  and  opportunism.   Israeli  leaders  are
portrayed as realising that they are no longer able to ‘expel all Palestinians’ from
the territory of Mandate Palestine, which has resulted in them adjusting tactics so
as to cede the day-to-day administration of the Palestinian people to their formal
representative, while allowing Israel to retain overarching control of the land.125
This  is  what  the  peace  process  is  principally  about  in  this  version  of  social
reality:  through  a  combination  of  territorial  expansion  and  diplomacy,
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are being spatially sequestered into
sub-sovereign  Bantustans  which  will  be  governed  by the  PA.126  This  is  the
“solution” that Israel is trying to impose upon the Palestinians, according to this
perspective, and it has been able to make considerable advances in this direction
owing to the ready acquiescence of the historic Palestinian leadership (a point
that will discussed in more detail at later stages of this work).127  If Israel had
124 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 58 
125 Massad, Joseph A., Resisting the Nakba, The Electronic Intifada
126 The word “Bantustan” refers to the segregated “black homelands” that were established under 
the Apartheid regime in South Africa.  There were ten created in all during the Apartheid period, 
and these comprised less than 13.7 percent of South Africa’s total land mass.  As Mona Younis 
argues the Bantustan programme was central to ‘the apartheid strategy of “separate 
development”’, in that it enabled the ‘social and political exclusion of Africans’, while allowing 
their ‘controlled economic inclusion’.  Younis, Mona H., Liberation and Democratization: The 
South African and Palestinian National Movements, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
London, 2000, pp.80-1.  For certain scholars who see Israel in settler colonial terms it is this last 
point on economic inclusion that renders the Bantustan analogy misplaced in the occupied 
territories.  Palestinians located in these territories have ‘become more and more dispensable’ to 
Israel economically over the Oslo period and as a result the non-contiguous enclaves in which 
they are positioned have become more like ‘reservations’.  Wolfe, Patrick, Settler colonialism 
and the elimination of the native, Journal of Genocide Research, p. 404         
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genuinely recognised ‘the Palestinian people as a nation’,128 so these intellectuals
contend,  then  it  would  not  be  engaged  in  such  practices  and  nor  would  it
continue to reduce the existence of Palestinians in the occupied territories  ‘to
penury’.129  It is in this view battling to ‘place all those [Palestinians] it cannot
expel inside an apartheid wall that it will call a Palestinian state’;130 and these
Bantustans will amount to no more than 14 per cent of the territory of Mandate
Palestine.131
    The recognition accorded to the PLO by Israel is also recast in this discourse
as  being  consistent  with  its  longstanding  settler  colonial  practices,  in  that  it
affected the social magic of erasing the majority of Palestinians from the newly
constituted symbolic order of the peace process.  Accordingly, the discourse of
the  peace  process  reduced  ‘the  Palestinian  people  to  one-third  of  their  total
number’, and this was because it limited the category of “the Palestinian people”
to  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.132  As  these  intellectuals
contend, the discursive framework inaugurated through the Oslo Accords made
no  mention  whatsoever  of  the  Palestinian  minority  in  Israel  and  the  issues
confronting them as Arab citizens of state that is officially defined as Jewish;133
and nor did it afford much significance to the issue of Palestinian refugees and
their right of return following their forced exodus from the territory that became
struggle, Middle East Critique, p. 28
128 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, pp. 58-9
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Israel in 1948.134  Indeed, as Ghada Karmi argues, the positioning of Palestinian
refugees as a permanent status issue within the framework of the peace process
effectively reduced a central component of the Palestinian national struggle to ‘a
bargaining  chip  in  the  negotiations  with  Israel’.135  As  she  continues,  the
discourse of the peace process effectively worked to erase ‘Palestinian history
before 1967’ and make Israel seem as if it ‘had always been a natural part of the
landscape’.136  This is a central critique of the peace process within the discourse
of  one-state,  and  it  is  one  that  reproduces  a  relatively  longstanding  trope  in
“maximalist” assaults on “pragmatism”.137  For these intellectuals, the discourse
of the peace process has produced the ‘de-Palestinianization’ of the vast majority
of the Palestinian people.  They have been eliminated symbolically.138  
    So, from this point of view, the Zionist movement has succeeded in colonising
history as well as land, and this triumph has been achieved through the peace
process.139  If not reversed, the political effects of this discursive conquest are:
the permanent second-class citizenship of Palestinian minority in Israel, who as
Arab citizens  of a Jewish state are confronted with a range of discriminatory
measures;  and  the  permanent  dispossession  and exile  of  Palestinian  refugees
(along with  the  Bantustanisation  of  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank and Gaza
134 Internationally the Palestinian refugees’ right of return is enshrined in United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 194, which states that: ‘refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and to live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to 
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible’.  See Khalidi, Rashid,
Observations on the Right of Return, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No.1, Winter 1992, 
pp. 29-40, for a nuanced engagement with the centrality of the right of return ‘to the Palestinian 
national narrative’.     
135 Karmi, Ghada, Married to Another Man: Israel’s Dilemma in Palestine, p. 183
136 Ibid., p. 5
137 For example, in the 1970s figures such as George Habash used to contend that the 
“pragmatist” approach entailed accepting that ‘the end of the aggression of 1967 should come at 
the price of confirming the aggression of 1948’.  Habash, George, quoted in, Sayigh, Yezid, 
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138 Massad, Joseph A., Resisting the Nakba, The Electronic Intifada
139 Eid, Haidar, The Zionist-Palestinian Conflict: An Alternative Story, Nebula, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
September 2008, pp. 122-139, p. 123 
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Strip).140  In contrast to “pragmatism”, the conflict is defined in the discourse of
one-state as ‘the colonisation of Palestine and the resistance to it’.141  However,
as  the  historic  Palestinian  leadership  is  considered  as  acquiescing  in  Israel’s
settler colonial project, it is unlikely that in its current form and constitution it
will be able to resist and reverse this process of conquest.  Therefore, what has
occurred through the Oslo peace process more specifically in the eyes of these
intellectuals  is  Palestinian  assimilation.   Israel  sought  to  advance  its  settler
colonial project through the tactic of assimilating the Palestinian leadership to its
point of view, and through the terms of the peace process it has succeeded in
doing  this.142  In  his  early  criticisms  of  the  Oslo  framework,  Edward  Said
classified  this  reconstruction  as  the  ‘internalizing  of  the  colonizer’s
perspective’.143  This is exactly the stance that the discourse of one-state takes in
relation to the discourse of “pragmatism” and those who produce it. 
    Consequently,  in  this  version  of  the  social  world,  the  articulation  of
“pragmatism”  in  the  Palestinian  political  field  effectively  equates  to  the
promotion of Zionism.  As is often the case, Joseph Massad sums up this position
most cogently: 
On the pragmatic side, the arguments run as follows: it is pragmatic for
Palestinians  to  give  up  their  right  of  return;  it  is  pragmatic  for
Palestinians to accept to live in a Jewish supremacist state as third class
citizens; it is pragmatic for Palestinians to live in Israeli-controlled and
besieged bantustans rather than opt for independence; and it is pragmatic
for Israel to remain a Jewish supremacist state.144                              
140 The One State Declaration  
141 Massad, Joseph A., The compulsion to partition, Al Jazeera English
142 Eid, Haidar, The Zionist-Palestinian Conflict: An Alternative Story, Nebula, p. 135
143 Said, Edward W., The Pen and the Sword: Conversations with David Barsamian, AK Press, 
Edinburgh, 1994, p. 151
144 Massad, Joseph A., On Zionism and Jewish Supremacy, New Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 
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The  “pragmatist”  standpoint  is  defined  as  a  Zionist-Israeli  position  in  the
discourse of one-state and as will be shown in the next chapter this classification
is part of a struggle for legitimate domination of the Palestinian political field.
The relation between these two points is a relation of power, and proponents of a
one-state solution are seeking to transform social reality.  In their version of the
social world it is telling that the category of struggle invoked is ‘non-pragmatist
anti-colonial strategy’.145  What this strategy actually entails from their point of
view, and what its political implications are, will be the object of later analysis.
For now it  is  important  to  specify that  the relation  between the “pragmatist”
standpoint and the one-state perspective is one of competing definitions of the
conflict and the Palestinian struggle.
    Of course, knowledge of the social world has implications for permissible
action.  It is what categories of knowledge do that is crucial from a performative
perspective.   That  Palestinians  should  engage  in  non-pragmatist  anti-colonial
struggle  is,  to  a  significant  extent,  a  logical  extension  of  the  discursive
formulation apparent in the discourse of one-state.  As Nadim Rouhana states:
‘Whether we conceptualize the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians as
a case of settler  colonialism or a  clash between two national  movements  has
direct implications for the type of solution one envisions as being possible’.146
Because Zionism is defined as a settler colonial movement from this standpoint,
it  is  conceived as being structurally  incapable  of  diplomatic  compromise  and
conceding  “native”  political  rights  and  subjectivity.   Thus,  the  only  option
available  to Palestinians  in this representation of social  reality is to resist  the
145 Massad, Joseph A., The compulsion to partition, Al Jazeera English
146 Rouhana, Nadim N., The Colonial Condition: Is Partition Possible in Palestine?, Jadal, p. 1
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settler colonial project and reverse it.   Again, it  is worthwhile quoting Joseph
Massad on this point:
all European colonial settler projects in Asia and Africa have been seen –
willingly or reluctantly – by most observers in the past half century, as
reversible.  Indeed their reversibility is the only successful strategy to end
the  violence  that  their  projects  constantly  engender,  especially  as  the
colonial settler project is predicated from its inception to its very end on
an unending process of violence without which it would cease to exist
[emphasis added].147            
                         
    Thus, while advocates of a one-state solution are often criticised for being
utopian  (and there  are  certainly elements  within  their  discursive  practice  that
point towards a utopian politics, as will be shown), their own reconceptualisation
of the conflict  in fact suggests that it  is they who are being practical.   In the
words of one of its producers, their knowledge of the social world is a matter of
‘realpolitik’.148  As Israel’s  structural  logic  of  ‘colonial  settlement  and ethnic
cleansing … precludes territorial compromise’, the “pragmatist” position is ‘an
exercise in futility’.149  What is therefore required from the one-state position is
confrontation,  and  not  accommodation;  resistance,  and  not  negotiations.
Decolonization through a one-state solution needs to be ‘forcefully imposed upon
the attention of the Jewish community’ in Mandate Palestine.150  This statement
is  the logical  consequence  of  the discourse  of  one-state’s  construction  of  the
conflict and the Palestinian struggle, and it is clearly opposed to the “pragmatist”
framework.  From this point of view, force is usually conceptualised as a ‘battle
of ideas’.151  This issue, however, will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.  
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148 Personal interview with Ghada Karmi, London, 15 February, 2010
149 Aruri, Naseer, US Policy and Palestine: Oslo, the Intifada and erasure, Race & Class, p. 11
150 Ghanem, As’ad, One problem, one solution,  Al-Ahram Weekly,  Issue No. 387, 23-29 July,
1998, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/1948/387_ghnm.htm, accessed  27/01/2009
151 Abunimah, Ali, One Country: A Bold Proposal to end the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, p. 191
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The Content of Counter-Knowledge
‘The  question  of  legitimacy  arises’,  Bourdieu  contends,  ‘from  the  very
possibility  of  this  questioning,  from  [a]  break  with  the  doxa  that  takes  the
ordinary order for granted’.152  Many of the intellectuals who call for a single
state in Mandate Palestine previously supported the two-state approach, albeit
ambivalently.   In their prior opinion, ‘such a solution – while it did not mean
justice for Palestinians – would nevertheless be a path to peace’.153  This view
has now changed and the crisis of legitimacy that has been increasingly affecting
the two-state position since the start of the second Palestinian  intifada in 2000
has contributed to this shift in perspective.  Without this crisis it seems unlikely
that  these  intellectuals  would  have  reoriented  their  conceptualisation  of  the
conflict and the Palestinian struggle.  In their version of social reality, the ‘one
big idea that was supposed to save us – the Palestinian state – lies in tatters’. 154
This is why they insist on the need for ‘a new vision, a new voice, [and] a new
truth’ in the Palestinian arena.155  They are clearly trying to provide this in the
form of the discourse of one-state.
    While  the  crisis  of  the  two-state  framework  has  enabled  such
reconceptualisations to take place,  it  does not explain the precise form of the
counter-knowledge constructed by these intellectuals.  It is quite commonplace at
present to read warnings that a two-state solution to the conflict is fast becoming
unfeasible  and  that  this  approach  is  in  crisis.   Yet  most  organisations  and
individuals making these assertions do not advocate a one-state solution.  In the
152 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, 242
153 Abunimah, Ali, One Country: A Bold Proposal to end the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, p. 11
154 Ibid., p. 183
155 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 28
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main  such  warnings  are  accompanied  by  calls  for  a  more  effective
implementation of the two-state paradigm rather than its complete overthrow.156
Therefore there is a need to explain the content of the discourse of one-state.
Why is its position-taking what it is?  This question moreover is addressed to a
specific problem in constructivist research, which has often proved inadequate in
determining the content of new stances that are adopted in the midst of political
crisis.157  From a  Bourdieusian  perspective  it  is  argued  here  that  the  stance
adopted by these intellectuals in terms of its content is principally explained by
their relation to Israel’s actions during the course of the peace process and their
structural position in the field.  An additional argument of this section is that
reflexivity and strategic calculation shape their position-taking.
    The  content  of  the  discourse  of  one-state  is  formed  in  relation  to  the
“pragmatist” perspective in that it is opposed to this stance and therefore acquires
some of its social distinctiveness by being what it is not.  Further, the adoption of
a “maximalist” perspective by these intellectuals – that is, one that is in some
fashion  premised  on  the  liberation  of  Mandate  Palestine  in  its  entirety  –  is
explained by Israel’s actions over the last two decades.  These have included the
continued colonization and settlement of Palestinian land, as detailed previously,
and a refusal  to  cede equal  political  rights  and subjectivity  to  Palestinians.158
156 International Crisis Group, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Palestinians and the End of the 
Peace Process, Middle East Report, pp. 29-37
157 Finnemore, Martha, and, Sikkink, Kathryn, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science,
p. 406
158 For example, the 1997 Beilen-Eitan Agreement: National Agreement Regarding the 
Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians articulates the official Israeli 
position on what a future peace agreement with the Palestinians will entail.  This document states 
that there ‘will be no return to the 1967 borders’ and that the ‘majority of settlers will live on 
their settlement under Israeli sovereignty’.  It asserts that the ‘Jordan Valley’ in the West Bank 
‘will be a special security zone and Israeli army forces will be posted along the Jordan’.  
‘Jerusalem … will be a single unified city within sovereign Israel’ and the ‘right of the State of 
Israel to prevent they entry of Palestinian refugees into its sovereign territory will be recognized’.
Further, it states that any ‘Palestinian entity’ established through negotiations ‘will be 
demilitarized and it will have no army’ and that, within these ‘limits’, it may be ‘regarded as an 
123
Moreover, official Israeli discourse has remained firm in its denial of Palestinian
perspectives and historical narratives, to the extent that the issue of Palestinian
refugees is reduced to a depoliticised ‘humanitarian problem’ in the visions of
peace promulgated from this standpoint, and the history and political concerns of
the Palestinian minority in Israel remain absent altogether.159  So the main point
here is that the words used in the discourse of one-state have not been plucked
out of thin air; they have been formed in relation to the material and discursive
practices of Israel during the peace process and in this sense they are grounded in
reality.  They are not a result of an implacable hostility to Zionism and Israel,
despite what some Orientalist-inspired scholars on this topic might think.160       
    More specifically, the actions of Israel throughout this period have altered the
perceptions of these intellectuals  because they have brought into question the
notion of political and territorial compromise.  It is worthwhile remembering that
for Palestinians  generally the adoption of the two-state  strategy was – as the
language of this study suggests – a pragmatic decision.  To paraphrase Hussein
Agha and Robert Malley, it was made with the head and not with the heart.  It
enlarged autonomy’ or ‘as a state’.  Beilen, Yossi, and, Eitan, Michael, Beilen-Eitan Agreement: 
National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the 
Palestinians, 26 January 1997, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/bei-eit_eng.htm, accessed 
30/10/2012.  Current Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, effectively reiterated this 
vision word for word in his so-called “Bar Ilan Speech” made in June 2009.  This speech is 
considered significant in that it called for ‘a real peace agreement’ in which a ‘demilitarized 
Palestinian state’ would coexist ‘side by side with the Jewish state’.  Yet Netanyahu’s vision of a 
two-state solution contained all the limitations on Palestinian statehood that were envisioned in 
the Beilen-Eitan Agreement document, along with a more explicit assertion that Palestinians offer
a ‘public, binding and sincere … recognition of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish 
people’.  Such a public and official recognition by Palestinians would entail a negation of their 
own national narrative, and especially the right of return.  So it would seem that the official 
Israeli position and representation of the conflict continues to deny Palestinian rights and history. 
Netanyahu, Benjamin, Full text of Netanyahu’s foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan, Haaretz.  For 
more details see: International Crisis Group, Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a 
New Strategy, Middle East Report, p. 7; Le More, Anne, Killing with kindness: funding the 
demise of a Palestinian state, International Affairs, 987-91; Jamal, Amal, The Palestinians in the 
Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership, Journal of Palestine Studies,  pp. 36-51         
159 See, for example, Netanyahu, Benjamin, Full text of Netanyahu’s foreign policy speech at Bar 
Ilan, Haaretz
160 Karsh, Efraim, A Trojan Horse? A Response to “The Case for Binationalism”, Boston Review;
Morris, Benny, One-State, Two-State: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict, pp. 1-2
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was not a move that accorded moral legitimacy to the State of Israel, but rather
was one that recognised its fait accompli.  This does not mean of course that the
goal of an independent state was insignificant to Palestinians.  Yet the ‘national
cause’ of statehood was nevertheless premised on the major historical sacrifice of
conceding the vast majority of a homeland that they consider rightfully theirs.161
Thus, for this historic compromise to be met with further territorial expropriation
and a continuing denial of history is to render it somewhat pointless.
    This  is  certainly  the  logic  deployed  by these  intellectuals  in  response  to
Israel’s  actions.   They consider the major Palestinian offer of compromise as
having been rejected  by Israel  and this  has  made them extremely bitter.   As
Susan Abulhawa and Ramzy Baroud state:
In  the  1990s,  we [Palestinians]  supported  the  Oslo  Accords  two-state
solution  even  though  it  would  have  returned  to  us  only  22% of  our
historic  homeland.   But  Israel  repeatedly  squandered  our  generosity,
confiscating more Palestinian land to increase Jewish-only colonies and
Jewish-only roads.  What remains to us now is less than 14% of Historic
Palestine, all of it as isolated Bantustans, shrinking ghettos, walls, fences,
checkpoints  with  surly  soldiers,  and  the  perpetual  encroachment  of
expanding illegal Israeli colonies.162        
    
As  Ramzy  Baroud states  elsewhere,  the  Palestinians’  diplomatic  strategy has
been ‘ridiculed and rejected’ by Israel.163  
161 Agha, Hussein, and, Malley, Robert, Obama and the Middle East, New York Review of Books, 
June 11, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jun/11/obama-and-the-middle-
east/?pagination=false, accessed 06/11/2012.  See also: Malley, Robert, and, Agha, Hussein, The 
Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 1, Autumn 2001, pp. 62-85, p. 70; and, Khalidi, Rashid, Observations on the Right of Return,
Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 29-40 
162 Abulhawa, Susan, and, Baroud, Ramzy, Palestine/Israel: A Single State, With Liberty And 
Justice For All, Countercurrents




    This perception,  which as noted is  not  groundless,  has contributed  to the
specific paradigm shift from “pragmatism” to “maximalism” made by most of
these intellectuals.  As advocates of a one-state solution contend,  ‘[t]he benefits
of 18 years of negotiations with Israel has been not only more Jewish colonial
settlement  and  more  massacres  and  more  confiscation  of  land,  but  also  the
destruction  of  the  Palestinian  national  movement’.   As  such,  a  ‘whole  new
generation  of  Palestinian  and  Arab  intellectuals  …  now  understand  that
negotiations with Israel have only served to intensify the occupation and will
only serve to do so in the future’.164  For these critics, Israel’s actions have made
the  ‘futility’  of  the  diplomatic  process  ‘painfully  apparent’.165  They  have
therefore made these intellectuals think differently in that they are perceived as
showing that the Palestinians’ historic political and territorial compromise is ‘not
enough for Israel’;166 and if this major historical compromise is not enough then
it  becomes  permissible  to  think  in  terms  of  “maximalism”  once  more.167  It
becomes permissible to think that Palestinian rights and aspirations ‘can only be
realised through Israeli defeat [emphasis added]’.168      
    Nevertheless, a focus on Israel’s actions during the peace process leaves a lot
of aspects within the discourse of one-state unanswered.  Israel’s conduct during
this period may account for why these intellectuals have abandoned their support
for “pragmatism” and have adopted a “maximalist” stance.  Yet in itself it does
164 Massad, Joseph A., Israel’s right to defend itself,  The Electronic Intifada, 20 January, 2009,
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/printer10221.shtml, accessed 12/02/2009  
165 Abulhawa, Susan, and, Baroud, Ramzy, Palestine/Israel: A Single State, With Liberty And 
Justice For All, Countercurrents
166 Makdisi, Saree, The Palestinian people betrayed, Los Angeles Times, February 13, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/13/opinion/la-oe-makdisi-israelis-palestinians-20110127, 
accessed 06/09/2012
167 Aruri, Naseer A., US Policy and a Single State in Palestine/Israel, The Arab World 
Geographer, p. 133 
168 Bishara, Azmi, Scandal in the raw, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 968, 15-21 October, 2009, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2009/968/op.5.htm, accessed 25/02/2010
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not illustrate  why these individuals  have viewed it  through the framework of
settler colonialism by these individuals, nor does it explain the type of one-state
solution  that  they envision.   Here,  it  is  argued,  the Bourdieusian  concepts  of
habitus and reflexivity are pertinent.      
    To be sure there are many different interpretations of Israel’s actions during
the course of the peace process.  Menachem Klein, to give one example, deploys
a  Realist  framework  to  comprehend  Israel’s  conduct  during  this  period.   He
argues that Israel is ‘using the tool of territorial expansion to impose its border
on the future Palestinian state’ and that this is not driven by an eliminatory logic
but by balance of power politics.169  Many would agree with this assessment and
many would offer alternative explanations.170  These, however, cannot be dealt
with here. 
    For the Palestinian intellectuals who are constructing the discourse of one-
state,  though, it  is  specifically  settler  colonialism that  has determined Israel’s
actions.  Where does this view come from?  To a large extent, it comes from the
particularity of the Palestinian national movement and the Palestinian political
field.  There is, as mentioned previously, a historicity of convention within these
arenas that frames Zionism and Israel as settler colonial formations.  While such
views were effectively marginalised in the late 1980s, and certainly in the early
1990s, they are an historically pertinent element within the fractal system that is
Palestinian social space.
    After the  nakba,  for instance,  when the national movement was primarily
articulated  through  the  frames  of  Arab  nationalism,171 Palestinian  political
169 Klein, Menachem, One State in the Holy Land: A Dream of a Nightmare?, The International 
Spectator, p. 5
170 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, p. 206.  See also Jamal, Amal, The Palestinians in the Israeli 
Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership, Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 48-9.    
171 For more detail see Baumgarten, Helga, The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 
1948-2005, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, Summer 2005, pp. 25-48, pp. 27-31
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thought  was  heavily  imbued  with  constructions  of  Zionism  and  Israel  as
eliminatory  and  territorially  expansionist  forces  that  had  to  be  challenged
outright.   Influential  Arab thinkers  at  this  time,  such as  Constantine  Zurayk,
defined the aims of Zionism as being to ‘annihilate the people [of Palestine] and
replace  them by another’.172  Such views were incorporated  into the  political
stance of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) – the main Palestinian political
organisation  during  this  period  –  with  its  members  declaring  that  Zionism
possessed ‘an aggressive and expansionist nature’,173 and that Israel sought ‘the
usurpation  of  the  Arab  land,  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Arab  people’.174  For
intellectuals like Zurayk,  and organisations like the ANM, these qualities and
ambitions were deemed essential to Zionism and the Israeli state and therefore
the presence of these social formations in Palestine had to be entirely eradicated.
From  this  perspective,  Israel  had  to  be  confronted  with  a  counterforce  of
‘vengeance’,175 and this typically meant, as Walid Kazziha explains, that ‘there
was no other choice for the Arabs except to meet the Zionist challenge on the
same terms laid down by the Jews: expulsion or extermination’.176
    ‘[V]endetta’ nationalism, as it was later called by Fateh representatives, was
dropped by the Palestinian national movement as its main platform in the late
1960s and early 1970s and was replaced by what was termed a ‘humanitarian’,
‘progressive’, and ‘democratic’ approach to liberation.177  With the establishment
172 Zurayk, Constantine (1948), quoted in, Kazziha, Walid, W., Revolutionary Transformations in
the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism, Charles Knight & 
Company Ltd., London and Tonbridge, 1975, p. 4
173 Anonymous ANM text (1957), quoted in, Ibid., p. 50
174 Darwaza, Hakam (1958), quoted in, Ibid., p. 51
175 Baumgarten, Helga, The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, Summer 2005, pp. 25-48, p. 28
176 Kazziha, Walid, W., Revolutionary Transformations in the Arab World: Habash and his 
Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism, pp. 53-4
177 Rasheed, Mohammad, towards a democratic state in Palestine: the Palestinian revolution and
the Jews vis-à-vis the democratic, non-sectarian society of the future, pp. 7-8
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of the Palestinian  political  field came a reconstruction  of Palestinian political
discourse.  The creation of a democratic  state  in all  of Mandate Palestine,  in
which  ‘Arabs  and  (Israeli)  Jews  [would]  live  without  any  discrimination
whatsoever’, was adopted as the strategic objective of the PLO.178  While this
stance was not without its contradictions,179 the main Palestinian factions at this
time did seek to  distance themselves  and the nascent  political  field from the
vengeful conceptions of liberation produced by groups such as the ANM (and
indeed the PLO before its  takeover  by Palestinian  guerrillas).180  These same
factions,  however,  persisted  with  the  representation  of  Zionism and Israel  as
settler colonial formations.181  
    For example, Nayef Hawatemah, leader of the DFLP, described Israel during
this period as ‘an essentially Zionist state … with chauvinist and expansionist
ambitions … [and] organic links to colonialism’.182  ‘That Israel constitutes a
colonialist expansionist presence at the expense of Arab land and its owners is
not a matter for discussion’, states an important PFLP publication from 1969,
178 Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), A Democratic Solution to 
the Palestine Question, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed 
Palestinian Resistance Movement, Palestine Books, No. 27, PLO Research Center, Beirut-
Lebanon, December 1969, p. 173
179 Gresh, Alain, The PLO, The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State, pp. 
33-52; Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, p. 237
180 For example, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), A Democratic 
Solution to the Palestine Question, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the 
Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, pp. 173-4; Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, The Political, Organizational and Military Report for the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed 
Palestinian Resistance Movement, pp. 181-225; Rasheed, Mohammad, towards a democratic 
state in Palestine: the Palestinian revolution and the Jews vis-à-vis the democratic, non-
sectarian society of the future, p. 8.  Also see: Gresh, Alain, The PLO, The Struggle Within: 
Towards an Independent Palestinian State, pp. 33-52    
181 It is important to stress, however, that, in contrast to the ANM, factions within the Palestinian 
political field did draw a careful distinction ‘between Judaism and Zionism’ and emphasised that 
the ‘Palestinian liberation movement [was] not racist or hostile to the Jews’ or aimed ‘at the 
Jewish people’.  Arafat, Yasir, Speech at the UN, 13 November, 1974, in, Lukacs, Yehuda (ed.), 
Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1984, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 
174; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, The Political, Organizational and Military 
Report for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), Basic 
Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 224
182 Hawatemah, Nayef, A Democratic Solution for the Palestine Problem, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), 
Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 177
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perhaps showing how sedimented such views were in the Palestinian arena at this
stage.183  The Palestinian National Charter classified the Zionist  movement as
being ‘racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its
aims’.184  Furthermore, in his address to the UN General Assembly in 1974, PLO
chairman  Yasir  Arafat  categorised  Zionism  and  Israel  in  terms  of  ‘settler
colonialism and racial discrimination’.185  Thus, representational practices of this
sort were highly prominent.
    Of course, the trajectory of the Palestinian political field began to change in
the  early  1970s,  with  “pragmatism”  gradually  emerging  as  the  dominant
perspective from this time onwards.  With its emphasis on political and territorial
compromise,  the “pragmatist”  standpoint clearly envisions the possibility of a
negotiated two-state solution to the conflict.  Therefore, it discounts many of the
claims advanced by “maximalist” standpoints regarding the nature of Zionism
and the  Israeli  state.   In  contrast  to  “maximalist”  perspectives,  “pragmatism”
does not see Israel as essentially aggressive, expansionist, and engaged in ‘a life-
or-death  struggle’.186  Although  the  “maximalist”  position  eventually  lost  the
battle  with “pragmatism” and so was subordinated in the Palestinian political
field, it  did not disappear entirely.   Moreover, much of the discursive contest
waged  against  “pragmatism”  by  “maximalist”  figures  centred  on  its
misunderstanding of the fundamental conflict with Zionism.  So, for example,
the RF was set up in 1974 not only to counter what it is saw as deviationist trends
in the political field, but also to counter the specific view that Zionism would
183 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine, 
Information Department, Amman, 1969, p. 78
184 PLO, The Palestinian National Charter, in, Kadi, Leila S. (ed.), Basic Political Documents of 
the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 140
185 Arafat, Yasir, Speech at the UN, 13 November, 1974, in, Lukacs, Yehuda (ed.), Documents on
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 170 
186 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine, pp. 
17-18
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‘evacuate … land without a political [and] military struggle that compels it to do
so’.187  From this perspective force was necessary and diplomatic exchange was
futile. 
    The  language  used  in  the  discourse  of  one-state  therefore  has  strong
antecedents  in  the  historical  structure  of  Palestinian  social  space.   More
specifically, the intellectuals who construct this discourse are embedded in these
antecedents, albeit ambivalently and in complex ways.  While many of those who
advocate a one-state solution at one stage reckoned that Palestinians ‘needed to
make  a  historical  compromise’,188 they  accompanied  such  sentiments  with
statements explaining their ‘bitterness resulting from the loss of the PLO’s old
goal, that is the establishment of secular democracy in Palestine’.189  At times a
critical engagement with the “maximalist” past is undertaken in the discourse of
one-state (which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter), but this
element of the Palestinian struggle is nevertheless valorised from this perspective
and  taken  as  the  original  meaning  of  Palestine  –  its  ‘venerable  tradition’,190
‘nodal point’,191 and ‘genuine’ objective.192  The ‘revolutionary intelligentsia’193
and ‘revolutionary principles’194 of the past are crucial themes in this discourse,
and  contribute  to  the  (re)articulation  of  these  ideas in  the  present  discursive
formation.  This necessarily includes the conception of Israel as a settler colonial
187 Habash, George, quoted in, Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 336-7
188 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995, Vintage, London, 
1995, p. 152
189 Ibid., pp. 186-7
190 Tutunji, Jenab, and, Khaldi, Kamal, A binational state in Palestine: the rational choice for 
Palestinians and the moral choice for Israelis, International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, 1997, pp. 31-
58, p. 38
191 Khalidi, Ahmad Samih, ‘Thanks, but no thanks’, The Guardian, Thursday December 13 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/dec/13/usa.israel/print, accessed 23/11/2008 
192 Bishara, Azmi, The Pitfalls of a US-Israeli Vision of a Palestinian State, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, p. 59 
193 Massad, Joseph A., Reducing the Palestinians, The Electronic Intifada




construct as the revolutionary ideas of Palestinian history only acquire ‘meaning
relationally’,195 with the presence of  the Zionist  “other”  and the thought  of a
social universe in which ‘there will be no “native” and “settler”’.196  As Edward
Said explains, 
Palestinians were not only the opponents and victims of Zionism, they
also represented an alternative: This was what they embodied in fighting
for the idea of Palestine, a non-exclusivist, secular, democratic, tolerant,
and  generally  progressive  ideology,  not  about  colonizing  and
dispossessing people but about liberating them [emphasis added].197    
    The positioning of these intellectuals within this historical trajectory disposes
them toward a vision of Zionism and Israel as settler  colonial  configurations.
Furthermore,  their  habitus as  Palestinians,  which  incorporates  a  particular
meaning  of  Palestine  as  not (Zionist)  settler  colonialism,  points  toward  an
additional  explanation  for  the  content  of  their  counter-knowledge.   Their
knowledge is embedded in particular texts and understandings of the Palestinian
struggle.  Before elaborating on this point, however, it is important to mention
that their critique of settler colonialism also stems from their embodied history as
intellectuals.  
    On display in the discourse of one-state is a rich and eclectic  intellectual
heritage,  which includes  liberal  ideas as well  as more critical  figures such as
Amilcar  Cabral,  Aimé  Césaire,  Frantz  Fanon,  Michel  Foucault,  Antonio
Gramsci,  George  Lukacs,  Karl  Marx,  and  others.198  Overall,  however,  it  is
possible to discern a postcolonial standpoint as the key intellectual lense through
195 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 177 
196 Makdisi, Saree, For a Secular Democratic State, The Nation
197 Said, Edward W., The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
Determination 1969-1994, Chatto & Windus, London, 1994, p. xix (Introduction)
198 See, for instance, Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia: A Fanonian Reading of 
the Intellectual Landscape in Post-Oslo Palestine, Nebula, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 96-106
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which  this  discourse  is  produced.   This  is  perhaps  unsurprising  given  that
Edward  Said  is  widely  considered  a  principal  founder  of  the  postcolonial
tradition, and was not only the most prominent intellectual to speak out in favour
of  a  one-state  solution,  but  was  and  remains  a  major  influence  on  those
intellectuals  around  him who  are  advocating  this  approach.   Postcolonialism
itself remains irreducible to a single point and is informed by an eclectic range of
epistemological perspectives. It is on the grounds of this intellectual diversity (or
incoherency)  that  it  is  often  criticised.199  Nevertheless,  a  central  claim  of
postcolonial  studies  is  that  colonial  relations  persist  into  the  present.200
Therefore,  embedded in this  standpoint,  it  seems that  many of those who are
advocating a one-state approach are intellectually inclined to see colonialism in
Palestine-Israel, which is not the same as saying that this view has no grounding
in the actual practices of Zionism and the Israeli state, but only that the world can
be expressed in different ways and that there appears to be no escape from the
subjective  gaze.   The  intellectual  position  of  those  who  call  for  a  one-state
solution, and the dispositions it generates, additionally account for the content of
their discourse.
    Returning to the issue of the specific meaning of Palestine, it is important to
acknowledge that the solution envisioned in the discourse of one-state is of a
certain type.  Although the conditions of possibility for combating Israel in this
discourse permit a “maximalist” confrontation and an existential conflict, these
possibilities  are not necessarily clear  cut  in terms of delineating an imagined
future.  It was shown that groups such as the ANM, which subscribed to similar
199 Slater, David, Post-colonial questions for global times, Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1998, pp. 647-678, p. 655
200 Gregory, Derek, Gregory, Derek, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, 
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004, pp. 7-9
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views  on  the  necessity  of  confronting  Zionism and  Israel  outright,  primarily
understood  the  liberation  of  Palestine  through  the  notion  of  vengeance.
Romantic  and fascistic  themes of ‘blood, iron,  and fire’  were also prominent
features in its stance.201  Hamas’ vision of liberation, as described in its founding
charter,  visualises  the  establishment  of  a  single  state  in  Mandate  Palestine
‘[u]nder the shadow of Islam’ in which ‘members of the three religions: Islam,
Christianity  and  Judaism  [would]  coexist  in  safety  and  security’.202  For
proponents  of  a  one-state  solution,  in  contrast,  the struggle for  ‘liberation’  is
premised on ‘universal principles of peace, equality, justice and human rights’.203
In  their  view,  a  one-state  solution  is  ‘a  vision  of  a  country  founded  on
democratic,  inclusive and egalitarian principles’.  ‘The constitution and actual
practices of such a state would address the rights and needs of all its citizens’; 204
and providing that they ‘shed their colonial character and privileges’, Israeli Jews
will be ‘equal citizens and full partners in building and developing a new shared
society,  free  from all  colonial  subjugation  and  discrimination’.205  Thus,  the
discourse of one-state is a rather distinct “maximalist” framework.
    This distinction stems in part from different understandings of what Palestine
means.  As suggested already, the language used in the discourse of one-state is
201 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, p. 73
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very  much  embedded  in  particular  historical  texts  and  conceptions  of  the
Palestinian struggle.  Edward Said is not alone in thinking about Palestine as an
inclusive  ideology.   In  his  1974 speech to  the  UN General  Assembly,  Yasir
Arafat declared that ‘when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of
tomorrow we  include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who
choose to live with us in peace and without discrimination [emphasis added]’.206
Such  prior  utterances  are  cited  in  the  discourse  of  one-state  and  shape  its
viewpoint.  Indeed, proponents of this view state that their calls for a one-state
solution  derive  ‘directly  from  the traditional  conception  of  Palestinian  self-
determination [emphasis added]’.207  This tradition definitely refers to the PLO’s
democratic state idea from the late 1960s and early 1970s and even more broadly
Palestine  is  invested  from  this  perspective  with  ‘a  kind  of  universality’;  its
meaning  is  not  limited  to  a  singular  point;  rather  it  ‘wriggles  free  of  one
confining  label  or  another’  and  encompasses  the  ‘intersection  of  many
communities  and  cultures’.   ‘Palestinians  represent  the  plural’  and  this
signification  stretches  back  centuries  and  even  millennia  according  to  this
standpoint.208  With so much staked on  this identification of Palestine and the
Palestinian struggle in the discourse of one-state, it becomes unintelligible for its
proponents  to  consider  liberation  as  the  enactment  of  revenge  or  the
establishment of an ethnic state.  What Palestine means in their view, and their
positioning within certain historical definitions, shapes the precise language used
206 Arafat, Yasir, Speech at the UN, 13 November, 1974, in, Lukacs, Yehuda (ed.), Documents on
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 180
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208 Said, Edward W., The Pen and the Sword: Conversations with David Barsamian, pp. 26-61   
135
in  the formation  of their  counter-knowledge.   It  orients  them towards certain
trajectories and visions of the future.
    The position of these intellectuals in the Palestinian political field is not the
only  factor  structuring  the  specific  content  of  their  position-taking.   In
Bourdieusian thought the political field is often depicted as a meta-field in which
different sub-fields are embedded.209  At the same time as being a part of the
meta-field  of  Palestinian  politics,  these  intellectuals  are  positioned  within  a
cultural  field  and this  once again  has  consequences  for  the  type  of  one-state
solution that they envision.  
    A postcolonial perspective is a strong feature of the intellectual  habitus of
those cultural elites who are advocating a single state in Palestine-Israel.  This
embodied history generates a more precise interest in what Saree Makdisi calls
the  ‘anti-colonial  humanism  of  liberation’.210  Edward  Said  is  especially
important in this respect, not only because he wrote extensively on the issue of
anti-colonial liberation in his contributions to the field of postcolonial studies,
but because these works and their intellectual genealogy structured his stance on
Palestine.211  This  genealogy  includes,  most  crucially,  Frantz  Fanon,  whose
concept of liberation, or rather certain aspects of it, is heavily incorporated into
Said’s own position on this topic.  Fanon’s notion of liberation found its fullest
expression in his last book, The Wretched of the Earth,212 which as Said himself
states is ‘a hybrid work – part essay, part imaginative story, part philosophical
analysis, part psychological case history, part nationalist allegory, part visionary
209 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics, in, Wacquant, 
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transcendence of history’.213  What Said focuses upon in particular, however, is
an element of Fanon’s dialecticism. 
    Liberation for Fanon meant transcending colonialism and what he saw as the
Manichean logic of settler and native214 and bringing humanity ‘up to a different
level  [emphasis  added]’.215  Specifically,  the  goal  of  liberation  was
‘humanism’;216 and this  was to  be attained not  through imitating  Europe,  nor
through an interstitial synthesis of binary logics, but through a process of radical
transformation in which new human beings are created – or ‘set afoot’ in Fanon’s
terms.217  The  newness of  this  humanity  emerged  in  its  truly universal
consciousness  and  outlook,  which  would  enable  universalism,  a  condition
constituted  and  reproduced  according  to  Fanon  through  the  recognition  and
acceptance of ‘the reciprocal relativism of different cultures, once the colonial
state is irreversibly excluded’.218  This move towards humanism was essential for
liberation, Fanon contended, as otherwise the process of decolonization would
remain  determined  by  the  Manichean  logic  of  colonialism  and  so  would  be
driven by ‘[r]acialism and hatred and resentment’.   The hierarchal systems of
violence  and  separation  would  remain  ‘intact  during  the  period  of
decolonization’, only now they would ‘wear a black face, or an Arab one’.219
    Fanon went to great lengths to specify the actual moves required in order to
realise  this  humanistic  point,  frankly acknowledging  that  such a  process  was
extremely difficult with success being far from assured.  For Said, though, it is
mainly Fanon’s notion of liberation as humanism in the abstract that has been
213 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, p. 326
214 Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 29-34
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absorbed into his intellectual and political stance.220  In Culture and Imperialism,
Said  speaks  in  detail  about  this  aspect  of  Fanon’s  concept  of  liberation,
understanding his intent as being to ‘bind the European as well  as the native
together  in  a  new  non-adversarial  community  of  awareness  and  anti-
imperialism’.  To transcend history in Said’s Fanonist reading of liberation is to
set in motion ‘a new and inclusive conception of history’, which is to struggle for
a new political subject.221  It is precisely this disposition, forged in part in the
cultural  setting  of  postcolonial  studies,  which  has  been  more  concertedly
transposed by Said to the political context of Palestine since the start of the peace
process.  Writing in this specific and more unstable political context, when he
was transitioning from an orientation  towards  “pragmatism” to an orientation
towards liberation, it is telling that Said declared that the ‘time for a new politics
–  indeed  for  a  new  human  being  –  has  come’.222  This  outlook  was  later
articulated more forcefully as the struggle for ‘a common humanity asserted in a
binational state’.223
    Liberation as humanism – or, more accurately, as a universality of difference –
is not limited to Said in the construction of the counter-knowledge of a one-state
solution.  The common humanity sought by Said is inclusive of particularity, as
the last quotation makes clear, and as other proponents of a single state contend
this is the key ‘lesson’ that Said learnt from Fanon.224  Owing to the profound
influence Said has on other intellectuals producing the discourse of one-state it is
fair  to  say that  this  is  a lesson that  they learnt  too – even if  only indirectly.
Moreover, many of these intellectuals are themselves positioned in the cultural
220 This author would like to thank Bashir Abu-Manneh for bringing his attention to this point.
221 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, pp. 323-31
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223 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 51
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field  of  postcolonial  studies  and  have  an  intimate  relationship  with  Fanon’s
work, as shown by the degree to which he is cited and deployed in the formation
of their counter-discourse.225  
    For example, the ‘humanist alternative’ is how Saree Makdisi defines a one-
state solution, following Said, following Fanon; and this entails the negation of
‘the  traumatic  encounter  between  colonizer  and  colonized,  occupier  and
occupied, self and other’ through the ‘affirmation of unity rather than division,
sharing rather than denial’.226  Difference will  persist  once the ‘exclusive and
exclusionary state’ is transcended in Palestine-Israel, according to the aims of
this  vision,  but  through  ‘cooperation’  not  contradiction,227 ‘mutuality’228 not
‘narrow nationalism’229, and through a ‘pluralistic existence’230 and a common
life ‘together’.231
   Thus, cultural field and political position have become somewhat enmeshed in
this instance, resulting in a discursive formation that is structured, to a significant
extent,  by the anti-colonial  liberationist  discourse of Frantz Fanon.  This is  a
further factor explaining why the content of the discourse of one-state is what it
is: a “maximalist” vision infused with a notion of ‘universal humanism’.232
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    Structural  homologies  do  not  stop  here,  however.   It  is  also  the  case  –
concomitantly – that the position of these intellectuals in a  transnational field
shapes their political stance.    
    The history of the Palestinian political field is one of transnationality.   Its
genesis occurred in a condition of exile, with Palestinian guerrillas in particular
driving this process forward and carving out a relatively autonomous social space
across multiple  state  borders.   The  exilic  condition  experienced  by  the  vast
majority of Palestinians stemmed of course from the creation of Israel in 1948,
which resulted in their dispossession and forced dispersal across the Arab world
and elsewhere.  Though the centre of gravity of the Palestinian political field has
shifted to the occupied territories – as a result of the first intifada and especially
the signing of the Oslo Accords – most Palestinians continue to live outside the
geographical  boundaries  of  Mandate  Palestine.   Due  to  this  repositioning
‘political  decisions  now  emanate  from  inside  Palestine’  and  those  on  the
“outside”  have  become heavily  marginalised  politically.233  Nevertheless,  this
relation  of  power  is  contested,  and  as  Sari  Hanafi  argues  this  sector  of  the
Palestinian community still ‘seeks a decision-making role’.234  The meta-field of
Palestinian politics thus retains its transnationality, albeit in ways different to the
past.
    The  Palestinian  intellectuals  who are  advocating  a  one-state  solution  are
largely positioned outside the geographic boundaries of Mandate Palestine, with
their physical location being mainly in either North America or Europe.  Their
233 Peteet, Julie, Problematizing a Palestinian Diaspora, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 39, 2007, pp. 627-646, p. 638.  See also, Tamari, Salim, Bourgeois Nostalgia and 
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political conduct in this regard is therefore transnational and more exactly still
can  be  considered  diasporic:  it  is  performed  across  state  borders;  is  actively
oriented  to  a  putative  “homeland”;  and contributes  to  the  (re)formation  of  a
distinct transnational community.235  As a stance, diaspora is typically envisioned
through the notion of ‘hybridity’, which denotes not ‘the admixture of pre-given
identities or essences’, but an ‘enunciation [that] resists totalization’.236  In less
abstract  terms,  the  practice  of  diaspora  is  considered  as  operating  in
contradistinction  to  the  homogenising  logic  of  the  nation-state.237  Diasporic
agents  are  often  regarded  as  prefiguring  a  postnational  future  dominated  by
‘nonexclusive practices of community, politics, and cultural difference’.238  It is
such  possibilities  that  are  often  conceived  as  being  prescribed  within  the
practices of diaspora.  
    While this perspective is overly simplistic (for reasons that will be discussed in
the next chapter), it is nonetheless true that the position of diaspora proscribes
singularly exclusive practices and generates orientations towards multiplicity and
the formation of hybrid subjectivities.239  This aspect of diaspora is incorporated
in the discourse of one-state and shows why certain historical texts and political
stances are appealing to those who are responsible for its production.  After all,
as Julie Peteet contends, the standpoint of the PLO’s democratic state idea ‘was
the “outside”, and it reflected a modern, cosmopolitan conceptualization of place,
235 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 5-6
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polity and identity’.240  The reiteration  of  this  “outside” point  of view in the
discourse of one-state is thus shaped by the largely diasporic position from which
it is uttered, as its proponents assert their inability ‘to love a country’241 and their
distaste for an ‘unidimensional identity embodied by a homogenized, nationalist
state’.242  They  further  assert  their  predilection  for  ‘transnational  rather  than
national’243 and  celebrate  trends  such  as  globalisation  as  a  process  of
‘pluralism’244 that is supplanting the ‘dying ideology of separation’.245  As Saree
Makdisi affirms: 
My interest  in  Palestine  … [is]  not  motivated  simply  by  a  sense  of
belonging to the people, for my sense of belonging – to any group or
people – has always been rather complicated.  My mother is Palestinian;
but  my  father  is  Lebanese.   I  was  born  in  Washington;  so  I  am an
American, in addition to being Lebanese and Palestinian ….  I have, in
short,  become  far  too  used  to  being  an  outsider  to  feel  entirely
comfortable  as  an  “insider”  identifying  completely  with  any group or
nation ….  What draws me to Palestine, then, is neither nationalism or
patriotism, but my sense of justice.246    
Though it is justice that is prioritised by Makdisi as the motivation for his more
forceful  intervention  into  the  political  field,  one  cannot  escape  the  strikingly
diasporic  position  that  informs  this  stance.   Hybridity  as  multiplicity  and  a
resistance to totalization is present in this text and is constitutive of the broader
one-state perspective. A single state in Palestine-Israel is envisioned from this
standpoint as being for ‘all people in the diversity of their identities’.247  
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    The  predominantly  diasporic  position  from  which  this  perspective  is
enunciated may also further account for the strong presence of figures like Fanon
in the discourse of one-state.  As a theorist of anti-colonial liberation, Fanon is
read  from  this  point  of  view  primarily  for  his  notion  of  humanism  as  a
universality of difference.  His vision of liberation is reproduced in this discourse
–  often  via  Edward Said  –  as  a  struggle  for  coexistence  that  is  inclusive  of
difference and at the same time is concerned with realising a common humanity.
Although these intellectuals may have read Fanon critically, there is no avoiding
the fact that the element of his liberation that they focus upon is homologous
with their diasporic position.  In Bourdieusian understandings of the social world
the particular  stances  adopted  by agents  are  neither  random nor  are  they the
product  of  pure  choice.   For  figures  such  as  Said,  Fanon’s  anti-colonial
liberationist discourse is described as being ‘postnationalist’ and ‘transnational’,
which demonstrates  its  appeal  to these intellectuals  as well  as the structuring
effect of diaspora on the content of their discursive practice.248
    By being  positioned  in  a  transnational  social  space,  the  agents  who are
producing the discourse of one-state are situated in national fields of power other
than  the  distinctly  Palestinian  one.   Transnational  fields  may  be  relatively
autonomous, but they still function across and are partially embedded in more
consolidated national states.  This  double positioning of these intellectuals has
consequences for their discursive stance.  
    As many of those who are advocating this approach are located in states from
North America or Europe, often as formal citizens of these entities, it is perhaps
unsurprising that  the official  discourse of such national  fields  structures  their
text.  The use of the term ‘one nation’ to describe the object of a single state in
248 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, pp. 323-5
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Palestine-Israel clearly has a specific resonance in both US and British contexts,
and for the former in particular is a reproduction of official state discourse.249
This too applies to the definition of a one-state solution as a struggle for ‘liberty
and justice for all’.250  For some of those who utter this stance the US state is
cited as a direct source of inspiration for Palestine-Israel.  Such figures declare
that ‘we [Americans] can model the virtues of a vibrant, multicultural  society
based  on  equal  rights  [emphasis  added]’.251  Others  promote  ‘constitutional
liberalism with its conception of individuals – whatever their race, religion, or
ethnicity – as equal, rights-bearing members of a single political society’ as the
basis for a one-state solution, and refer to the US as a ‘model to emulate’.252  So
the  content  of  this  discourse  bears  the  imprint  of  the  national states  that  its
producers are embedded in and undertake their transnational activism from.
    This last  point should not be overstated,  however.  While their  stance on
Palestine-Israel is  shaped by their  political  subjectivity  as citizens  of national
states such as the USA (though of course not exclusively), there seems to be a
reflexive element to the appearance of official state discourse in their position-
taking.  In Bourdieu’s opinion, one cannot escape their  habitus.  Nonetheless,
given the fractal nature of embodied history  habitus it is an orienting structure
rather  than  a  determining  structure.   There  is  room  for  creativity  and
inventiveness  as  well  as  strategic  calculation,  albeit  within  contingent  limits.
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The reiteration of official state discourse in the discourse of one-state, especially
from the USA, serves a strategic function.  
    To be sure the specific language of anti-colonialism, universalism, equality,
citizenship,  inclusion,  and  plurality  that  is  constitutive  of  this  discourse  is
sincerely held by its producers as it is a mobilisation of their own particular point
of view into the Palestinian political field.  Yet it is also uttered in this way –
with pertinent themes lifted from US state institutions – owing to the assessment
that such language will ‘be met with greater sympathy and support in the United
States’.253  To capture ‘the moral high ground’ is the immediate objective for
Palestinians,  according  to  this  position,254 especially  in  the  US  as  ‘it  is  the
world’s only superpower’ and gives extensive support to Israel.255  The language
used in the discourse of one-state reflects this strategy and so is shaped by it.  
    It is for a similar reason that the struggle against apartheid in South Africa is
so frequently invoked in the discourse of one-state.  The settler colonial reality
ascribed  to  Palestine-Israel  from  this  perspective  is  seen  as  being  akin  to
apartheid in South Africa,  if not exactly like it.   As a number of critics have
pointed out, there are crucial differences between the two cases and strategically
the comparison between apartheid  South Africa and Palestine-Israel  is  highly
problematic if not fundamentally flawed.256  Nevertheless, even if proponents of
a one-state solution are misguided in drawing exact parallels between Israel and
apartheid South Africa, given the near universal opprobrium meted out to the
latter by the international community,  it is clear that if Israel was legitimately
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classified  in  these  terms  then  Palestinians  would  be  constituted  in  a  morally
superior position.  This potential outcome is recognised as such by figures like
former  Israeli  Prime  Minister,  Ehud  Olmert,  when  they  state  that  ‘they
[proponents of a one-state solution] want to change the essence of the conflict
from an Algerian paradigm to a South African one.  From a struggle against
“occupation”,  in  their  parlance,  to  a  struggle for  one-man-one-vote’.   Olmert
goes so far as to suggest that this form of struggle is ‘ultimately a much more
powerful  one’.257  Therefore,  the content  of the discourse of one-state is  also
shaped by strategic  calculations  on  the  need to  confront  Israel  in  ‘the  moral
dimension’.258  This is why Israel is so frequently and so uncritically compared to
apartheid South Africa in this discourse.  
    The struggle against apartheid in South Africa is additionally invoked in this
discourse  on  such  a  scale  so  as  to  suggest  the  possibility  of  success.   This
perspective contends that the South African example shows that  ‘people with
fundamentally  incompatible  views  of  history,  locked for  centuries  in  a  bitter
conflict  of  unfathomable  misery  and  suffering,  could  emerge  in  peaceful
reconciliation’.259  Even if committed ‘Zionists from across the political spectrum
will  resist  the  move  toward  the  one-state  solution  in  the  way that  privileged
groups have always historically resisted the erosion of their  privileges’, states
Saree Makdisi, the ‘resistance, even the violent resistance, of privileged groups
did not stop South Africa abandoning  apartheid’.260  Indeed, according to this
standpoint, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa ‘attests to the potency
257 Olmert, Ehud, quoted in, Landau, David, Maximum Jews, minimum Palestinians, Haaretz, 
November 13, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/general/maximum-jews-minimum-palestinians-
1.105562, accessed 15/11/2012
258 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 197
259 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 135
260 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. 290
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and potential of this type of’ contest.261  It is clear, therefore, that the prevalence
of South Africa in the discourse of one-state is due to a further strategic function:
it is meant  to denote the realism of a one-state solution by situating it in the
‘realm of  the  possible’.262  South Africa signifies  what  can  be done and this
message of possibility is directed primarily at Palestinians, though Israeli Jews
and the international community are included in this relation as well.263
    Thus, the content of the discourse of one-state is shaped by the relation of
those  who  produce  it  with  the  words  and  deeds  of  the  Israeli  state.   It  is
structured by the specific habitus of these individuals as Palestinians, as cultural
elites, and as diasporic agents.  Moreover, within these unstable and contingent
limits there is a degree of reflexivity and strategic calculation taking place which
delimits what is being uttered in this counter-discourse.  The content of the new
stance that these agents have adopted in the context of political crisis is not the
result of structural causality or pure choice.  Rather it is an articulation of their
particular point of view in social  space which they are mobilising against the
dominant “pragmatist” perspective.  What is at stake is knowledge of the social
world  and the  counter-vision  being produced by these intellectuals  is  formed
through the relations in which they engage and through the complex history that
they  embody.   Strategising  is  important,  and  it  is  performed  within  these
constraints.
261 Barghouti, Omar, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, 
Haymarket Books, Chicago, Illinois, 2011, p. 103
262 Benford, Robert D., and, Snow, David A., Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639, p. 620
263 Tarazi, Michael, Why not two peoples, one state?, The One Democratic State Group, Friday 





The  vision  of  a  one-state  solution  uttered  by  these  critical  intellectuals  is
therefore a competing definition of social reality that is articulated in opposition
to the dominant position in the Palestinian political field.  The discourse of one-
state is a competing framework of knowledge that has assumptions and outlines
of permissible political action that are radically distinct from those constitutive of
the dominant “pragmatist” perspective.  In this respect, existing scholarship on
this  topic  is  wrong.   To  insist  that  this  discourse  is  primarily  a  pragmatic
response to material conditions in the occupied territories is to grossly simplify
and misconstrue this issue.264  
    These intellectuals certainly consider ongoing Jewish settlement expansion as
a threat to the viability of Palestinian statehood and as such a two-state solution
to the conflict  (though they are not alone in this regard).   Yet their  stance is
considerably  more  profound  than  a  pragmatic  reaction  to  these  material
obstacles.   Their stance rejects the dominant discursive framework within this
context as being fundamentally flawed and on the grounds that it imposes a false
lense  through  which  to  view  the  reality  of  the  conflict  and  the  Palestinian
struggle.  It is not that an independent Palestinian state and a two-state solution
have been rendered passé by Israel’s ongoing territorial expansion, although this
issue is clearly important.  Rather, it is that such objects were never permissible
in the first place given the existential confrontation and settler colonial reality
Palestinians face.   The challenge to the two-state approach launched by these
intellectuals  is  thus  aimed  at  its  epistemological  assumptions  and  political
264 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 206-7; Hermann, Tamar, The bi-national idea in 
Israel/Palestine: past and present, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 381-401; Sussman, Gary, The 
Challenge to the Two-state Solution, Middle East Report, pp. 11-12; and, Sussman, Gary, Is the 
Two-State Solution Dead?, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, p. 39
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effects.  Therefore, it is not primarily concerned with convincing people that it is
too late for the two-state solution.
    This last point ties into a criticism that is made of those who construct the
discourse  of  one-state,  which  is  probably  best  captured  by  Rashid  Khalidi’s
assertion that ‘what one politician has done … another can undo’.265  That is, they
are criticised for assuming a linearity to the progression of Israel’s settlement
project in the occupied territories, which results in the discounting of practices
aimed at its reversal.  What the scholars and analysts who make this criticism
mean is that ‘there is always doubt about the political future’ and so calls for a
one-state solution divert  ‘the focus of activism and advocacy’  away from the
more plausible and internationally legitimate goal of  ending the occupation and
establishing a Palestinian state.  Such critics in fact accuse proponents of a one-
state  solution  of  being politically  irresponsible  and diluting  ‘the strength and
energy of the campaign to end the occupation’.  It is on this campaign that they
ought to expound their political energies and not on the ‘politically implausible’
single state approach.266
    While it is correct for these critics to forefront the political difficulties of the
single state approach – an issue which as later stages of this work will show is
specifically denied by these intellectuals – it is somewhat inaccurate for them to
lambast its advocates for adopting a linear approach to the temporality of Israel’s
occupation.   This is because, as this chapter  has demonstrated,  such a charge
does  not  apply  to  the  principal  issue  at  stake  in  the  practice  of  discursive
contention performed by these intellectuals.  What is at stake in this particular
265 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, p. 214
266 Ibish, Hussein, What’s wrong with the One-State Agenda? Why Ending the Occupation and 
Peace with Israel is still the Palestinian National Goal, pp. 30-40.  See also Chomsky, Noam, 
Advocacy and Realism, Znet
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instance  is  a  contest  over  the  determination  of  legitimate  knowledge  in  the
Palestinian political field.  To be sure these intellectuals occupy a subordinate
position, but by focusing on temporality and insisting on the need to support the
established  agenda,  their  critics  seem to  have  missed  the  implications  of  the
radical reconceptualisation of the political field that they are engaged in.  The
epistemological  boundaries  that  constitute  and  structure  the  stance  of  these
intellectuals  invoke  a  temporality  of  historical  continuity  and  conditions  of
possibility that proscribe the type of politics inscribed in the two-state agenda.
Linear  progression  is  absent  and  consequently  so  too  are  the  political
implications that are said to stem from this.  It is perhaps fair to conclude that
such critics miss pivotal aspects of the discourse of one-state because they are to
varying degrees embroiled in the battle over legitimate knowledge taking place
in  this  arena.   This  is  why they insist  on  modes  of  practice  that  are  utterly
incompatible with the definition of social reality produced by these intellectuals.
    The  Bourdieusian  lense  used  in  this  study  has  of  course  helped  in  the
conceptualisation  of  the  discourse  of  one-state  as  a  practice  of  counter-
knowledge.  This is mainly due to its ontological assumptions, which prioritises a
practice of theoretical  ordering in  which conflict,  competing  perspectives  and
relations of power are accorded a primary significance in social life.  For all its
merits, however, it is important to emphasise that the Bourdieusian lense is far
from exhaustive.  While it certainly sheds light on what are considered here to be
some of the key aspects of the discourse of one-state, the present configuration of
the Palestinian political  field, and indeed the relation between knowledge and
politics generally, it no doubt casts shadows over other elements.  The arguments
made  here  are  therefore  fundamentally  limited  and  necessarily  skewed  in  a
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certain  direction.   Nevertheless,  the  Bourdieusian  lense  seems  to  be  a  useful
conceptual  framework  for  analysing  social  change  and  comprehending  the
articulation of new discursive practices.267        
    The fruitfulness of the Bourdieusian approach would appear to extend to the
issue  of  accounting  for  the  ‘content  of  new  stances  that  are  adopted’.   As
mentioned,  this  question  has  often  been  neglected  in  idealist  constructivist
research – a consequence perhaps of the latent voluntarism that is often found in
such analyses.  Though such research has been adept at showing how political
crises frequently result in the articulation of ‘new conceptions on which to base
new policies’,268 it has been less adept at explaining how such conceptions are
formed, with them being overly subjectivised and detached from the structural
conditions of their  production.269  This certainly cannot be said of Bourdieu’s
structuralist constructivist framework, which makes a priority out of analysing
‘together’ the position and the position-taking of agents.270
    In regards to the discourse of one-state more specifically, another problem in
the scholarly literature on this issue is that the advocacy of this position is largely
taken to be a natural response to the crisis afflicting the two-state perspective.  It
seems  to  be  assumed  that  a  problem  with  the  two-state  paradigm  will
automatically lead to a promotion of a one-state paradigm.  This clearly makes
no sense and not only does the imposition of such causation mask a number of
key points concerning the specific formation of this counter-knowledge, it also
267 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 240-1
268 Finnemore, Martha, and, Sikkink, Kathryn, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, American Review of Political 
Science, p. 406
269 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 226-34
270 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu, 
Sociological Theory, p. 40
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unwittingly repeats one of the main discursive strategies of these intellectuals:
that there is no alternative to the one-state approach.  As certain analysts have
suggested,  there  clearly  are  other  possibilities  beyond  the  two-state-one-state
dichotomy, though none of them of course are inevitable.271      
    With its  emphasis  on relations,  structural homologies,  and reflexivity,  the
Bourdieusian  lense  seems  to  provide  a  propitious  conceptual  “toolbox”  for
analysing the general and the particular concerns raised here.  Crisis has certainly
contributed  to  the  formation  of  the  discourse  of  one-state,  and  its  particular
content has been socially constructed in relation to the dominant “pragmatist”
perspective and what is perceived as being the settler colonial essence of political
Zionism.  The words and deeds of the Israeli state have likewise contributed to
the utterances constitutive of the discourse of one-state, especially as its official
language does continue to deny the political subjectivity of Palestinians, and its
concrete practices continue to dispossess them of territory.   Indeed, within the
context of the peace process,  it  is  Israel’s  nonrecognition (or rather truncated
recognition) of Palestinians as a political community, along with its continuing
policies  of  dispossession,  that  have  made  these  intellectuals  question  the
assumptions  on  which  the  “pragmatist”  paradigm is  based.   To a  significant
extent such actions have made these intellectuals abandon the notion of political-
territorial  compromise  as  a  whole,  which  therefore  explains  why  they  have
adopted a “maximalist” stance and not a more “moderate” agenda. 
    Yet the interpretation of Israel’s actions during this period is not a neutral
endeavour,  and inescapably  it  is  guided  by the  incorporated  history  of  these
271 For example, see: Mossberg, Mathias, One Land, Two States? Parallel States as an Example of
“Out of the Box” Thinking on Israel/Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 39-45; Grinberg, 
Lev, The Israeli-Palestinian Union: The “1-2-7 States” Vision of the Future, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, pp. 46-53.
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agents, their temporal-spatial trajectories in multiple fields.  In this regard, this
chapter has identified two fields as being key: the national and the cultural.  The
embodied  history  of  these  agents  as  Palestinians is  certainly  generative  of
dispositions  which  are  inclined  to  see  Zionism and  Israel  as  settler  colonial
configurations.   These  are  not  absolute,  but  are  ongoing  and  fractal.
Nevertheless, there is a long and important historical process within this context
that  has  repeatedly  classified  Zionism  and  Israel  in  such  terms  and  which
structure the articulation of the discourse of one-state.  Indeed, the historic battles
within this  political  arena  have been largely waged around this  classificatory
point, and while “pragmatism” was clearly victorious, its crisis has enabled these
intellectuals  to  reopen  this  central  schism.   So  in  this  sense  the  historical
complexity  of  Palestinian  social  space  has  oriented  the  stance  of  these
intellectuals which has contributed to the (re)structuring of the field.  The process
is ongoing but it is nonetheless constrained.
    Reinforcing this point of view is the position of these agents in a cultural field,
by which is  meant  their  embodied history as – for want of a better  phrase –
postcolonial intellectuals.  This should not be overstated given that intellectually
the one-state perspective is quite eclectic.  Yet it is clear that a postcolonial lense
– which has as its starting point the assumption that colonial relations persist into
the present – is an important conceptual framework used by these intellectuals in
their  interpretation  of  Zionism  and  the  political  conduct  of  Israel.   This
positioning  within the  cultural  sphere  does  not  distort  “reality”.   Nor does  it
necessarily  undermine  the  validity  of  what  these  intellectuals  are  contending.
After all, ‘[e]veryone uses theories’, whether consciously or unconsciously, and
such divergent ‘ideas about how the world works’ can result in radically different
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understandings of what is ostensibly the same issue.272  The point here, rather, is
that intellectually these agents are embedded in a tradition which disposes them
towards construing certain relations of domination and subordination in terms of
coloniality.  This is likewise a factor in explaining the content of their critical
conceptualisation.
    The precise vision of a one-state solution uttered by these intellectuals is
similarly explicated by structural homologies in multiple fields.  It is certainly
not inevitable that it has been articulated in the way that it has, as shown in this
chapter,  and again  this  study has  identified  the  position  of  these  agents  in  a
national  and  a  cultural  field  as  being  key  to  accounting  for  this  stance.   In
addition,  the  position  of  these  individuals  in  a  transnational  field  is  deemed
important.  
    Nationally,  these  agents  are  embedded  in  and  structured  by  antecedent
trajectories  and  social  constructions  of  Palestinianess which  point  towards
multiplicity  and  universality.   Their  stance  is  constrained  by  such  historical
understandings of what it means to be Palestinian.  Culturally,  the vision of a
one-state solution is guided by intellectual genealogies inclusive of Frantz Fanon
and  in  particular  his  notion  of  anti-colonial  liberation  as  a  dialectical
transcendence  of  colonialism  through  the  production  of  humanism.   For
proponents  of  a  one-state  solution,  their  position  in  the  cultural  field  of
postcolonial studies has exposed them such conceptions of liberation which are
then transposed to  the  specific  political  context  of  Palestine.   This  is  not  an
absolute decision, but a product of their prior incorporation of such humanistic
principles in their bodily trajectories.  Transnationally, the diasporic position of
272 Walt, Stephen M., International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Foreign Policy, No. 
110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, Spring 1998, pp. 29-46, p. 29
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these  individuals  generates  distaste  for  exclusive  political  formations  and
specifically  the  nationalist  ideal  of  a  homogenous  nation-state.   It  is  for  this
practical  reason  as  well  that  their  stance  is  inclusive  of  a  strong  orientation
towards  heterogeneity  and  a  universality  of  difference.   In  short,  there  is  a
structural homology between their  position in social  space and their  position-
taking.  The Bourdieusian insistence on ‘looking at the structural homologies of
position  taking  and  objective  positions’  seems  to  be  a  fruitful  approach  for
explaining the content of new stances that are adopted.273  
    The diasporic position of these agents and the hybrid subjectivity it generates
further  accounts  for  the  reiteration  of  official  “hostland”  language  in  their
counter-discourse.  However, the use of such utterances appears more crucially
to  display  a  reflexive  element  in  the  production  of  this  discourse,  with  the
repetition of sentences from the US Pledge of Allegiance,  for example,  being
calculated to have a strategically advantageous outcome for Palestinians.  This
point similarly applies to the repetition of terminology used in the South African
anti-apartheid struggle, such as ‘one person-one vote’ and indeed the application
of  the  word  ‘apartheid’  to  Israeli  practices.274  While  these  agents  genuinely
regard  Israel  as  an  apartheid  state  similar  if  not  identical  to  apartheid  South
Africa, which as noted is problematic, such words are at the same time used in
the  discourse  of  one-state  so  as  to  make  the  Palestinian  struggle  morally
compelling to international audiences, especially in the US.  Furthermore,  the
anti-apartheid  example  is  invoked  so  as  to  situate  the  object  of  a  one-state
solution in the boundaries of the possible.  So here too a reflexive element is
involved.
273 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
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    Thus, the Bourdieusian framework includes a range of thinking tools that can
be mobilised in order to explain why the content of a new political stance is what
it is.  Specifically, these centre on relations, positions and reflexivity, which as
this  chapter  has  shown are  all  pertinent  in  varying degrees  to  explaining  the
precise formation of the counter-knowledge of a one-state solution.  Its content is
not determined voluntarily, nor is it determined causally as response to the crisis
afflicting the two-state paradigm.  The next chapter focuses more specifically on
the  struggle  to  legitimately  impose  this  counter-knowledge  on  the  field  of
Palestinian politics.
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Chapter Three: Legitimate Domination: Intellectuals, Diaspora, and the
Discourse of One-State
Why do intellectuals engage in struggle in the political field?  Though there is a
long and complicated history of intellectuals intervening in politics, this line of
questioning  is  seldom  undertaken.   Scholarly  literature  on  intellectuals  and
politics is dominated by what Jerome Karabel calls a moralist  tradition which
focuses on what  intellectuals  ought to  do politically,  as  opposed to  the more
analytical question of why they act politically.1  This literature is replete with
descriptions of ‘intellectuals as persons playing a particular role in society,  as
advisers to or critics of power, shapers of values,  legtimators of social  order,
guardians  of  morality,  self-appointed  defenders  of  the  nation’.2  Intellectuals
‘should constantly disturb, [and] should bear witness to the misery of the world’,
stated the late Vaclav Havel.3  The task of the intellectual is ‘to change the world
through  rational  means’,  remarked  Karl  Mannheim.4  According  to  a  recent
study, an intellectual is someone ‘who applies intellectual activities for a whole
community’.5  For Edward Said, in a definition that is particularly pertinent to
this study, an intellectual ought to speak the ‘truth to power’.6    
    A further trait within the moralist literature on intellectuals – as suggested by
the above examples – is that they should somehow be oppositional or at least not
1 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 205
2 Verdery, Katherine, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceasescu’s Romania, p. 15
3 Havel, Vaclav, Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala, Vintage Books, 
New York, 1991, p. 167
4 Mannheim, Karl, The Sociology of Intellectuals (translated by Dick Pels), Theory, Culture & 
Society, Vol. 10, 1993, pp. 69-80, p. 69
5 Stina Lyon, E, What Influence? Public Intellectuals, the State and Civil Society, in, Fleck, 
Christian, Hess, Andreas, and Stina Lyon, E (eds.), Intellectuals and their Publics: Perspectives 
from the Social Sciences, Ashgate, Surrey, 2009, p. 70
6 Said, Edward W., Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, Panteon Books, 
New York, 1994, p. 102
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fear  risking  ‘the  ire  of  the  established  authorities’.7  This  view  is  clearly
problematic given that people who consider themselves intellectuals,  and who
are recognised as such, have worked on the side of established authorities – as
government advisors, policy experts, or as proponents of maintaining a certain
mode of life.   This  issue ties into wider debates  on who is  an “intellectual”,
which  as  figures  like  Zygmunt  Bauman  have  contended,  and  as  this  study
suggests, are ultimately bound up with relations of power and the production of
authoritative  discourse.8  As  Robert  Michels  noted  as  early  as  1937,  for
intellectuals in ‘the polities of any period, the parties of revolution, of continuity
and  of  reaction  have  all  been  in  their  hands’.9  Many  of  the  Palestinian
intellectuals under examination in this chapter had been previously supportive of
the Palestinian political leadership.  They are now explicitly opposed to it in its
current  form.   Indeed,  this  is  the  problem  with  defining  an  intellectual  as
someone who is necessarily oppositional: it takes as a given what needs to be
explained.10
    Given  that  Bourdieu  ascribed  such  centrality  to  knowledge  in  political
struggle, it is unsurprising that he wrote a fair amount on intellectuals.  In his
view, such agents were the holders of cultural capital par excellence;11 and while
he professed his support for the figure of the ‘critical intellectual’ as an agent of
change,  he  nevertheless  engaged  with  this  figure  reflexively  and  often
ruthlessly.12  For Bourdieu, intellectuals typically occupy a curious position in the
7 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 205
8 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity and 
Intellectuals, pp. 8-9
9 Michels, Robert, Intellectuals, in, Seligman, Edwin R. A. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences (Vol. 8), Macmillan, New York, 1937, p. 119 
10 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 207
11 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 79
12 Bourdieu, Pierre, Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time (translated by 
Richard Nice), Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001 (1998), p. 8.  Shusterman, Richard, Introduction: 
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field of power.   On the one hand, their  position is  rich with cultural  capital,
which results in them being a part of the cultural elite in a given social formation.
On the other hand, their position is in most instances directly estranged from the
dominant sites of political power, which are ordinarily dominated by economic
and political elites – the professionals of politics.  In an attempt to capture this
somewhat paradoxical position, Bourdieu described intellectuals as a ‘dominated
fraction of the dominant class’.13  It is in the realm of culture that intellectuals
can most plausibly make claims to legitimate domination; and the cultural sphere
is ordinarily subordinated to those of economics and politics.14  
    However, despite this typically subordinate position, intellectuals remain ‘a
potentially competing elite’ in the field of power.  In certain historical conditions
they have ‘both the inclination and the capacity to mount a challenge to the elites
that preside over the political and economic domains’.  What these conditions are
precisely will vary from case to case, but a broad hypothesis in this respect is that
intellectuals will most rigorously contest different elites during periods of crisis
and weakened authority.  They do this, moreover, in order to claim power, or to
put  it  in  Bourdieusian  terminology,  so  as  to  occupy a  position  of  legitimate
domination in a particular meta-field.15
    The role  of crisis  in  shaping the discourse of one-state  has been already
suggested in the last chapter,  and this point will be developed further here in
relation to the speakers of this discourse and their struggle with other positions in
the Palestinian political field.  Why they are engaged in this struggle is primarily
explained by power, so this chapter contends.  They are struggling for a position
Bourdieu as Philosopher, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, pp. 1-13 
pp. 11-12
13 Bourdieu, Pierre, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (translated by 
Matthew Adamson), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 145 
14 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 208
15 Ibid., pp. 208-12
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of legitimate domination in the field of Palestinian politics.  This does not mean
that their intervention is reducible to power and the process of maximizing their
position  in  the  political  field.   Other  factors  are  also  pertinent,  such  as  a
commitment  to  Palestinian  rights  and  justice  and  a  sense  of  obligation  as
intellectuals to speak out on behalf of those who are oppressed.  Nevertheless,
power is central and while commitment and norms of obligation are important,
they do not operate at the expense of self-interest and are in fact secondary to it.
The intellectuals who are uttering the discourse of one-state occupy positions that
are invested with considerable cultural capital.  It is precisely this form of capital
that they are mobilising so as to contest other elite positions in the Palestinian
political field.  In addition, they attempt to augment this move by claiming to
legitimately represent and speak for the Palestinian people.    
    That this engagement in political struggle is taking place within a transnational
field  is  significant  and  likewise  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  legitimate
domination.  The position of diaspora is generally considered as being a ‘fecund
space’ for the construction of potentially competing discourses.16   As Benedict
Anderson remarks, it is a position that is often ‘radically unaccountable’, lacking
the constraints of the putative “homeland”, however extraordinary or quotidian
these might be.17  The practice of diaspora politics has been facilitated in recent
year  by advances  in  global  communication  technologies,  which have enabled
connections  and  the  rapid  transference  of  knowledge  across  disparate  state
borders.18  So-called “hostland” contexts are also important in this respect, as will
16 Sorenson, John, Essence and Continuity in the Construction of Nationhood: Transformations of
Identity in Ethiopia and its Diaspora, Diaspora, Vol. 2, No.2, Fall 1992, pp. 201-228, p. 201
17 Anderson, Benedict, Exodus, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 314-327, p. 327
18 Appadurai, Arjun, Disjunture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, Public Culture, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 1-24, p. 15; Tölölyan, Khachig, Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless 
Power in the Transnational Moment, Diaspora, p. 22
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be discussed below.19  For agents who are already the ‘sometime occupants of a
site that is privileged in forming and transmitting discourses’,20 diaspora is an
additional resource that can be mobilised so as to contest different positions in a
transnational  field  and  advance  particular  points  of  view.21  The  resources
accumulated by diasporic agents in a  national field of power can be similarly
utilised in this regard.
    While the position of diaspora might  be privileged in certain ways in the
production of counter-discourses, this in itself does not reveal why such practices
are undertaken.  Too often it is assumed that diasporic practices are motivated by
opposition to exclusive political formations and in particular the homogenising
logic of the nation state.22  To be sure a predilection for hybridity is a crucial
feature of diasporic conduct (as the last chapter demonstrated), but when seen
from a Bourdieusian perspective such conduct remains embedded in a  distinct
transnational  space  where  conflict  and  competition  are  ineradicable.   The
position  of  diaspora  is  part  of  the  social  structure  that  constitutes  the
(transnational)  field  and  this  matrix  of  objective  relations  between  positions
remains  one that  is  immersed  in  hierarchy.   Certain  scholars  have envisaged
practices of diaspora as practices of citizenship, which are not only concerned
with  making  claims  to  belong  and  participate  in  a  singular  transnational
community,23 but are concerned with contesting the fluid boundaries of inside
19 Waldinger, Roger, and, Fitzgerald, David, Transnationalism in Question, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 109, No. 5, March 2004, pp. 1177-1195, p. 1192
20 Verdery, Katherine, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceasescu’s Romania, p. 15
21 Radhakrishan, Rajagopalan, Diasporic Mediation: Between Home and Location, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 1996, p. 173
22 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 8-9
23 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 745-7
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and  outside,  domination  and  subordination.24  In  this  sense,  the  oppositional
political practices of diaspora are less motivated by the object of a postnational
future,  and are more  about  determining one’s  relative  position  in  a  relatively
exclusive social formation.  The paradox of diaspora is that, politically, its agents
are often disposed toward a hybrid vision of the social world, but are seeking to
impose this vision on a separate space.25
    This  is  precisely  the  argument  made  in  this  chapter  in  relation  to  the
predominantly  diasporic  intellectuals  producing  the  discourse  of  one-state.
While the content of their counter-knowledge incorporates the hybridity of their
diasporic  position,  their  intervention  into  the  Palestinian  political  field  is
primarily motivated by resistance to subordination and the goal of legitimately
imposing their particular point of view on this social structure.  That is to say, as
predominantly diasporic agents, they are struggling for a position of legitimate
domination  in  a transnational  field.   So as  to  maximize  their  position  in  this
regard  these  agents  seek  to  hierarchize  diaspora  in  relation  to  the  occupied
territories and other Palestinian points, classifying the former in contrast to the
latter  as  a  propitious  spot  for  the  conduct  of  politics  and  therefore  for  the
performance  of  citizenship.26  The  cultural  property of  these  agents  as
intellectuals is once again important in this respect but as a practice of diaspora
their  struggle in the Palestinian political  field is best explicated as a battle  to
deconstruct  and reconstruct  boundaries  of inside and outside,  domination  and
subordination.
24 Bauböck, Rainer, Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism, International 
Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 700-723, pp. 719-20
25 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 5-7
26 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 168
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    This chapter begins by examining the crisis of authority in the political field
and how it has been framed by these cultural elites as an opportunity for their
intervention  in  Palestinian  politics.   It  then  moves  on  to  analysing  why this
intervention has taken place, focusing on commitment, norms of obligation and
the mobilisation of cultural capital.  The next section looks at the transnational
and more specifically diasporic aspect of the discourse of one-state, focusing on
relations of subordination and resistance as well as on practices of citizenship as
struggles  of  hierarchization.   Finally,  the  last  two  sections  will  look  at  the
considerable discursive work undertaken by these oppositional  intellectuals  in
order  to  discredit  dominant  elites  and narratives  in  the  political  field  and  so
socially  construct  themselves  as  legitimate  spokespersons  for  the  Palestinian
people and cause.     
The Crisis of Political Elites: An Opportunity for Whom? 
There is a general perception among Palestinians that the peace process has been
a disaster.27  The core objective of the PLO since at least the late 1980s has been
to establish an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
with East Jerusalem as its capital through a negotiated compromise with Israel.
While the PLO’s participation in the Oslo peace process and the creation of the
PA were broadly perceived as an important step towards this (for many people,
inevitable) goal, the latter has been so far unfulfilled and this strategy is now
widely regarded as  having failed.   The crisis  of the two-state  solution  is  not
simply the failure of an idea or a conceptual framework, however.  It is also a
crisis  for  those  who utter  this  perspective  in  the  Palestinian  field  and whose
political  legitimacy was to  a  large  extent  staked on realising  the  object  of  a
27 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 149-50
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negotiated  two-state  solution  to  the  conflict.28  The  authority  of  the  historic
Palestinian leadership, embodied by PLO elites and since June 2007 PA elites
based solely in the West Bank, has been severely undermined as a result of its
inability to advance even minimal Palestinian national interests.  It was partly for
this reason that Hamas was victorious in the 2006 PLC election, at the expense of
the historically dominant Fateh.29  
    The impasse stemming from the failure of the two-state approach is  doubly
recognised  by  proponents  of  a  one-state  solution  as  a  failure  of  Palestinian
political elites.  They are not alone in this regard, but what is interesting here is
how this impasse and crisis of political authority is represented from their point
of view.  It is not only that the crisis of the two-state solution requires what was
discussed in the last chapter as ‘a new vision, a new voice, [and] a new truth’,
which of course is the one-state solution.30  It is also that this “new” phase in the
Palestinian  struggle  requires  a  different  category  of  person  to  lead  it,
subordinating  discredited  political  elites  as  well  as  sclerotic  and  reactionary
opposition groups.  This person is “the intellectual”, and the crisis of political
authority  in  the  Palestinian  arena  is  constructed  from  this  perspective  as  an
opening for the political intervention of certain cultural elites.  It is this opening
that has enabled their more forthright engagement in political struggle.
    According to  those who utter  the  discourse of  one-state,  ‘the Palestinian
national movement has become a failed national movement’.  This is because ‘it
has been unable to achieve the objectives it set for itself’.31  What is more, the
absence of an independent Palestinian state and a negotiated settlement to the
28 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, p. 660
29 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 149-50
30 Said, Edward. W, From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 28
31 Ghanem, As‘ad, Cooperation Instead of Separation: The One-State Solution to Promote Israeli-
Palestinian Peace, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economic and Culture, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
2007, pp. 13-19, p. 15
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conflict  with  Israel  has  been  combined  with  ongoing  occupation  and  further
colonization of Palestinian land by Jewish settlers.  This condition, along with
other forms of structural violence inflicted on Palestinians, has resulted in the
‘failure of the [Palestinian] authority that brought [the peace process] about’.32
Palestinian political elites are seen as being so inefficacious politically from this
perspective that they are represented as ‘irrelevant to the future of the Palestinian
people as a whole’.33  Owing to the crisis of the two-state solution, their position
within  the  Palestinian  political  field  has  been severely weakened in  the  eyes
those who are calling for a one-state solution.
    Due to this policy failure on behalf of political elites in the Palestinian field,
the Palestinian struggle is portrayed by those producing the discourse of one-
state as having entered a period ‘of profound uncertainty and risk’.34  Again, this
is hardly a unique category of perception among Palestinians at this moment in
time.35  But what differentiates the position-taking of these intellectuals in this
context is the type of response to this crisis that they delineate.  While one phase
of struggle draws to a close and ends in disaster another phase is being opened
up.  The liminality of the Palestinian field is depicted from this perspective as
providing a ‘tantalizing opportunity’.36  
    At one level, the opportunity envisioned here is immediately restricted in this
discourse to a particular point of view and interpretation of social reality.  That
is,  the  counter-knowledge  of  a  one-state  solution.   Indeed,  though  these
32 Katamesh, Ahmad, Approach to the Single Democratic State: Two Separate and Interlocked 
Communities (translated by Nadia Ali Hamad), Munif Al-Barghouti Cultural Centre, Supported 
by Health Work Committees, pp. 34-69
33 Makdisi, Saree, Good Riddance, Abbas, Foreign Policy, November 6, 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/06/good_riddance_abbas, accessed 09/11/2009 
34 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 183
35 See, for example, Khalidi, Raja, and, Sobhi, Samour, Neoliberalism as Liberation: The 
Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement, Journal of 
Palestine Studies, pp. 16-17
36 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 183
165
intellectuals are struggling in a certain sense to prise open conceptual horizons in
the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict, their discursive practices work at the
same time to foreclose other possibilities besides a single state.  This is in their
construction of the social world the “only alternative”.  But at another level one
may ask: for whom exactly is this crisis an opportunity?   The answer to this
question in the discourse of one-state is very specific: intellectuals; or rather a
certain category of intellectual, one who is disentangled from dominant sites of
political power and is committed to ‘the truth unadorned’.37
    It is worthwhile mentioning here that, in performing their engagement in the
political  field,  the  cultural  elites  who are  advocating  a  one-state  solution  are
presenting themselves as a particular kind of intellectual.   Their action in this
regard is  designated  in  their  texts  as  being part  of  ‘a  historic  role  played by
people of conscience in the international community of scholars and intellectuals
who have shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice’.38  In a process of
self-definition, proponents of a one-state solution describe proponents of a one-
state solution as ‘people who care, people who are more interested in the truth
and in justice than in going with the flow of mainstream opinion or with the
political  dictates of established authorities’.39  Their interest lies principally in
“truth” and “justice”, according to their own words, and this is detached from
boundaries  of  convention  and  dominant  political  positions.40  To  be  an
intellectual  is  to engage in criticism,  figures from this perspective argue;  and
what this means is that intellectuals are people with certain rational capacities
37 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 283
38 Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), About the 
Campaign, http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=868, accessed 11/10/2011.  While the PACBI
does not officially promote a one-state solution, intellectuals advocating this approach dominate 
its Advisory Board, Founding Committee, and Steering Committee.
39 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, p. xxvi (Author’s Note)
40 Ibid.
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who are not afraid to ‘raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and
dogma (rather than to produce them), [and] to be someone who cannot be easily
co-opted by governments or corporations’.41  In formulating the discourse of one-
state, it is precisely this sort of agent that advocates of this approach claim to be.
    Therefore, when this position states that the crisis of political authority in the
Palestinian  arena  has  resulted  in  circumstances  that  are  ‘especially  ripe  for
debate,  discussion,  and  genuine  process  enacted  by  independent  intellectuals
[emphasis added]’,42 it is claiming a central role for a certain type of person.  Yet,
it is also clear that this person cannot be any intellectual, broadly conceived, but
must  be,  as  the  word  “independent”  suggests,  a  figure  who  embodies  the
principles of intellectual praxis supposedly embodied by those who are making
this  representation.  In  other  words,  the  crisis  of  political  authority  in  the
Palestinian  field  is  perceived  and  represented  as  enabling  their  political
intervention.  
    As this position further contends, ‘because the Palestinian and Arab leadership
is  too  powerless  and  morally  bankrupt  … [i]t is  left to  a  small  number  of
intellectuals and visionaries to articulate a  new theory of coexistence which, in
the current impasse, might offer a way out of the quandary [emphasis added]’.43
Such statements give a strong indication of the position desired by proponents of
a one-state solution.  At this critical juncture in Palestinian politics, it is they who
are claiming to be essential for the future.  Their self-appointed task is to show
Palestinians (and Israelis) that an alternative exists to the ‘vacuum’ created by the
crisis of the two-state position, and this role is classified as ‘vital’.44  In addition,
41 Said, Edward W., Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, p. 11
42 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 124
43 Ibid., p. 204 
44 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, pp. 183-4
167
this standpoint asserts that this role cannot be performed as ‘an idle intellectual
exercise’45 or through a practice of ‘armchair intellectualism’, and so is presented
as an explicitly political function.46  Within the context of crisis and acute policy
failure by traditional political elites, these intellectuals are attempting to affirm
their presence inside the political sphere.  They are trying to do this, in an initial
sense,  by  framing  the  crisis  as  necessitating  their  engagement  in  political
struggle.
    Moreover, according to this perspective, this “vacuum” cannot be filled by
other oppositional agents within the Palestinian political field.  It is telling that
this  discourse  is  largely  silent  towards  historic  opposition  factions  in  the
Palestinian national movement, such as the PFLP and DFLP, which suggests that
they are considered insignificant.   When they do make an appearance in this
discourse it is mainly in a negative light.  Specifically, they are disparaged for
being ‘complicit in a structure of politics that led to Oslo’47 and for adopting the
highly conservative stance of ‘perpetual opposition’, which has compounded the
disastrous  status  quo  in  Palestinian  politics.48  The  history  of  rejectionism
associated with factions like the PFLP is also denigrated from this standpoint.  It
is depicted as being symptomatic of a proclivity to abstain from politics, rather
than to work for actual political alternatives.49  As this position declares, such
factions can do ‘absolutely nothing to advance [the Palestinian] cause’.50
45 Ibid., p. 184
46 Barghouti, Omar, Re-Imagining Palestine: Self-determination, Ethical De-colonization, and 
Equality, The One Democratic State Group
47 Usher, Graham, Bantustanisation or bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara, Race & 
Class, p. 47
48 Bishara, Azmi, Toothless counsel, Al-Ahram Weekly, 28 May-3June 2009, Issue No. 949, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/949/op1.htm, accessed 24/11/2009
49 Usher, Graham, Bantustanisation or bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara, Race & 
Class, pp. 45-8
50 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 62
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    Hamas fairs little better in this discourse, although its language of liberation,
return  and  resistance  is  cited  as  a  positive  aspect  of  its  stance.51  Overall,
however, it too is dismissed from this perspective as an agent capable of leading
Palestinians  out  of  the current  impasse  and fashioning a  better  future.   As a
resistance movement, Hamas’ commitment to armed struggle is considered futile
against a state as strong militarily as Israel.   Its militant posture and at times
indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians are also seen as tactically puerile,
playing into hands of Israel  by enabling it  to reiterate  an already sedimented
discourse of Palestinian “terrorism” and reproduce a Palestinian “other” in terms
of  barbarity.52  Discursively,  its  Islamist  perspective  is  represented  as  being
abhorrent to the majority of Palestinians,  who in this  view are predominantly
secular in their outlook,53 and is considered as foreclosing the possibility of it
formulating a ‘democratic alternative that would offer a choice to Israelis’.54  The
one-state  position  contends  that  Hamas’  Islamism  is  a  nativist  inversion  of
Zionism, which highlights once again its Fanonist inclination.55  Therefore, it is
incapable of moving beyond ‘some version of the status quo’.56  Furthermore,
Hamas is increasingly viewed from this perspective as adopting a “pragmatist”
stance, which means of course that it  cannot possibly be an effective political
agent.57
51 For instance, Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. 272
52 Bishara, Azmi, Channeling the resistance, New Democracy World, July 9, 2006, 
http://www.newdemocracyworld.org/old/War/Bishara.htm, accessed 07/01/2011 
53 Makdisi, Saree, Good Riddance, Abbas, Foreign Policy 
54 Bishara, Azmi, Separation or unity, Al-Ahram Weekly, 27 March – 2 April 2008, Issue No. 890,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/890/op1.htm, accessed 25/02/2010   
55 Massad, Joseph, Palestinians and the Limits of Racialized Discourse, Social Text, No. 34, 1993,
pp. 94-114, p. 109
56 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. 311
57 Eid, Haidar, Tough questions for Hamas, The Electronic Intifada, 2 November 2010, 
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11605.shtml, 07/01/2011
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     The effect of these representational practices is quite specific.  In the context
of crisis and depleted political authority for established elites such expressions
work to reinforce the idea that the opening for political change made available by
these circumstances is  only open for certain cultural elites; it is they alone who
are able to use this opportunity to good effect, with other positions (within the
framework of this discourse at least) being excluded from this potentiality.  The
crisis of the two-state solution and political authority in the Palestinian arena has
been perceived by the agents who a calling for a one-state solution, and has been
not only understood as enabling their intervention into the political sphere, but
has been actively framed as requiring this form of conduct on their behalf.  The
historical condition of crisis has permitted their struggle for a central position in
the political sphere.   
Mobilising Cultural Capital: Or, the Political Indispensability of Knowledge
The conditions  of political  failure in the Palestinian context  have enabled the
counter-intervention  of  certain  intellectuals,  but  these  do  not  in  themselves
explain why these figures are acting in this way.  Failure has only provided an
opening for this sort of conduct, which, to a certain extent, has been seized upon
by these individuals.  Politically speaking, intellectuals ‘constitute themselves as
intellectuals (a separate group, with qualities, responsibilities and tasks all of its
own) only in the activity of critique’.  They emerge in the process of criticising
‘the officially sanctioned order’.58  Why they do this, though, is an intriguing
question. 
58 Bauman, Zygmunt, Love in Adversity: On the State and the Intellectuals, and the State of the 
Intellectuals, Thesis Eleven, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 81-104, p. 84.  See also, Giesen, Bernhard, 
Intellectuals and Politics, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2011, pp. 291-301, p. 298
170
   At  one  level,  the  action  of  those  calling  for  a  one-state  solution  can  be
explained by an interest  in subverting and transforming the established social
order in Palestine-Israel.  ‘Intellectuals’, argues Michael Kennedy, ‘are prone to
write  powerful critiques of what  is,  implying what ought to be’,59 and this  is
certainly  a  factor  accounting  for  the  discourse  of  one-state.   Its  proponents
interpret the present structure in Palestine-Israel as incredibly unjust and wrong
for  Palestinians,  and  they  are  struggling  in  order  to  try  and  change  this
configuration.  In addition, and as mentioned previously, their self-definition as
intellectuals is quite distinct and incorporates a sense of political responsibility
and obligation  to  speak out  against  injustice  and in  favour  of  those who are
oppressed.   This  sense  of  obligation  stems  from  prior  constructions  of
intellectuals and their political role, and is an important factor explaining their
counter-intervention.60  What  is  more,  many  of  these  intellectuals  embody  a
history of political activism (both in relation to Palestine and other issues) and
this would seem to complement their practical sense as a certain form of cultural
agent who is mobilising knowledge for the benefit of the oppressed.  
    At a more dominant level, this study would suggest, the contentious action of
these intellectuals is driven by a bid for power in the Palestinian political field.
Despite  proclamations  of  disinterest  and  detachment,  intellectuals  remain
embedded  in  structures  of  hierarchy,  and while  they may seek to  undermine
established orders in the name of broader values and constituencies, such moves
often  underlie  ‘their  own  claims  to  power’.61  The  discourse  of  one-state
59 Kennedy, Michael, The ironies of intellectuals on the road to power, or not, in, Rereading The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, p. 27
60 Scholars such as Francesca Polletta and Jasper James argue generally that ‘norms of obligation’
may be an important factor explaining contentious action.  Polletta, Francesca, and, Jasper, James
M., Collective Identity and Social Movements, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 
283-305, p. 290
61 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 205-
10
171
incorporates a particular point of view, and those who utter it are struggling to
impose  it  upon the  Palestinian  political  field  through acquiring  a  position  of
legitimate domination.  Thus, what is at stake is not only the question of what the
Palestinian political field means, but  who legitimately determines this process.
Who speaks for Palestine?  Those who are producing the discourse of one-state
are trying to make themselves the answer to this question.  They try to do this
primarily  through  mobilising  their  cultural  capital  and  asserting  the  political
indispensability of the knowledge  they possess.62  It is through possessing this
resource that they stake their claim to legitimate authority and this is mobilised in
relation to political elites and “other” intellectuals in the Palestinian arena who
do not and cannot on their own possess this knowledge.  
    Historically, intellectuals have intervened in politics in the declared interest of
the oppressed.63  It is certainly true that those who are advocating a one-state
solution consider themselves to be acting in the interest of the Palestinian people,
and this partly explains their engagement in political struggle.  From their point
of view, the prevailing order in Palestine-Israel works against Palestinian rights
and therefore  perpetuates  historical  injustices.   The  ‘essence  of  the  Palestine
problem is injustice’,64 and rather than alleviate this problem, the terms of the
peace  process  have  entrenched  it  still  further  by  marginalising  Palestinian
refugees  and the  Palestinian  minority  in  Israel,  and by spatially  sequestering
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip into sub-sovereign enclaves in the
context of continuing Israeli occupation and settler colonization.  Proponents of a
one-state  solution  are  engaging  in  political  struggle  because  they  want  ‘to
62 Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, 
Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3 
63 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 173
64 Personal interview with Ghada Karmi, 15 February 2010, London
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mobilize for the rights of the Palestinians’ and eradicate injustices that continue
to  be  inflicted  upon  them.65  A  one-state  solution  is  promoted  from  this
perspective  as  a  framework  in  which  the  rights  of  all Palestinians  can  be
fulfilled.66  Therefore,  for  these  intellectuals,  their  struggle  for  a  one-state
solution is motivated by a desire to overturn the prevailing order for the benefit
of the ‘entire Palestinian people’.67  To a significant extent, it is this (assumed)
common interest that drives them.
    This conduct is also specifically related to their position as intellectuals.  This
position assumes that an intellectual is someone who has a specific political role;
therefore, in order to be an intellectual one must act accordingly.  The practical
sense of these agents is embedded multifariously in prior constructions of “the
intellectual” associated with figures such as Julien Benda, Amilcar Cabral, Frantz
Fanon, Antonio Gramsci, and George Lukacs, and these textual orientations are
generative of their contentious practice.68  
    For example, Saree Makdisi speaks of his political engagement in terms of a
‘refusal to remain silent in the face of injustice’ and an ‘unwillingness to just go
on  living  …  life  …  and  enjoying  the  privileges  of  a  tenured  university
professor’.69  ‘When the intellectual’s society reaches a historical cross roads’,
states  Haidar  Eid  paraphrasing  George  Lukacs,  ‘the  intellectual  should  be
involved  in  the  whole  socio-political  process  and  leave  his  ivory  tower’.70
65 Palestine Solidarity Conference, Stuttgart Declaration, Stuttgart, 26-28 November 2010, 
available at http://senderfreiespalaestina.de/sign.htm, accessed 10/06/2013
66 The One State Declaration
67 Hilal, Jamil, Palestinian Answers in the Arab Spring, Al-Shabaka Policy Brief, Al-Shabaka: 
The Palestinian Policy Network, May 2011, http://al-
shabaka.org/sites/default/files/policybrief/en/palestinian-answers-arab-spring/palestinian-
answers-arab-spring.pdf, accessed 17/05/2011, p. 2
68 See, for instance, Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia: A Fanonian Reading of 
the Intellectual Landscape in Post-Oslo Palestine, Nebula, pp. 96-106; Said, Edward W., Peace 
and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995, Vintage, London, 1995, pp. 195-7
69 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. xxvi
70 Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia: A Fanonian Reading of the Intellectual 
Landscape in Post-Oslo Palestine, Nebula, p. 100
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Similarly,  Omar  Barghouti  asserts  that  ‘in  contexts  of  colonial  oppression,
intellectuals … cannot be just – or mere – intellectuals in the abstract sense; they
cannot but be immersed in some form or another of activism’ and be ‘organically
engage[d]  in  effective,  collective  emancipatory  processes  aimed  at  reaching
justice’.71 The  possibility  of  even  restricted  choice  is  effaced  from  such
formulations and the idea that an intellectual should and must act politically in
circumstances  like those prevailing in Palestine  is  a powerful  schema forcing
those who are advocating a one-state solution to act.   
    In this  respect,  Edward Said is once again highly significant.   Before his
untimely death in 2003, Said was the most prominent individual to promote a
one-state solution and separately he spent considerable time constructing his own
particular  image of  the  intellectual  agent.   This  too  built  on and internalised
certain conceptual antecedents.  For Said, the main task of the intellectual is to be
a ‘disturber of the status quo’.72  The intellectual’s ‘raison d’être is to represent
all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug’73
and they perform this function through ‘speaking the truth to power’.74  Though
there are a number of problems with this formulation (which will be discussed at
later stages of this essay), Said’s notion of intellectuals and their proper function
not only contributed to his engagement in the Palestinian political field, it also
forced others to act.  The principle of “speaking the truth to power”, as produced
by Said, is nearly ubiquitous in the discourse of one-state and proponents of this
agenda directly relate their actual conduct in this regard to this understanding of
“the intellectual’s” political role.
71 Barghouti, Omar, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, 
p. 104 
72 Said, Edward W., Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, p. x
73 Ibid., p. 11
74 Ibid., p. 102
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    It is ‘Said’s memorable words [emphasis added]’ that are cited by advocates of
the  one-state  approach  as  a  precursor  to  their  political  action,  with  their
discursive practices in this regard being defined by such agents as ‘an attempt to
speak truth to power’.75  ‘[T]he 11 million Palestinians living under occupation,
apartheid and as stateless refugees are living the truth’76 and as a result ‘one of
the first  duties of activists is to speak truth to power [emphasis added]’.77  It is
these norms of obligation and political responsibility as intellectuals – stemming
principally  from  Saidian  formulations  –  that  are  the  most  pertinent  textual
constructs determining the oppositional intervention of these particular agents.
Words have a performativity in certain circumstances and when uttered by an
authorised speaker; and this efficacy can set specific forces in motion.  This has
happened in the Palestinian  arena in  relation  to those who are producing the
discourse of one-state; Said’s words on the role of intellectuals have a particular
efficacy for these agents owing to the impasse in the Palestinian struggle and the
authority they recognise in his position; and this has made them act.  As Saree
Makdisi, a nephew of Said, states: ‘my uncle Edward … showed me the way’.78
    More broadly, many of those who are adopting the one-state stance embody a
history of  political  activism.   This  trajectory includes  participation  in  various
organisations and activist networks which focus on Palestine, but it also includes
engagement with wider issues such as human rights.  Some of those who are
promoting this solution have been in the past formal members of the Palestinian
75 Barghouti, Omar, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, 
p. 34 
76 Karkar, Sonja, Talking Palestine to power, The Electronic Intifada, 12 April 2010, 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/talking-palestine-power/8776, accessed 18/10/2010
77 Cronin, David, Interview: Mazin Qumsiyeh on popular resistance and breaking the spell of 
fear, The Electronic Intifada, 16 June, 2011, http://electronicintifada.net/content/interview-
mazin-qumsiyeh-popular-resistance-and-breaking-spell-fear/10086, accessed 13/07/2011
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national  movement,  positioned  within  PLO  institutions.79  Although  this
embodied history of political activism does not make their action in promoting a
single state  in  Palestine-Israel  inevitable,  it  does suggest  a disposition among
these agents for becoming politically engaged and speaking out on issues they
perceive as unjust.  Such predilections, as certain theorists have contended, can
often  be  vital  in  shaping a  persons  decision  to  act.80  Scholars  writing  more
specifically  on  the  issue  of  intellectuals  and politics  have  also  argued  that  a
personal repertoire of political engagement can make it more likely that cultural
elites  re-enact  such  conduct.81  For  advocates  of  a  one-state  solution,  their
embodied  history  of  activism  would  seem  to  complement  their  predominant
understanding of themselves in this context as intellectuals who have a duty to
speak the “truth” and confront established positions.      
    This emphasis on “truth”, moreover, implies a more precise conception of
what intellectuals do in politics.  When intellectuals intervene on the side of the
oppressed in a given historical context, they frequently do so in terms of using
their knowledge, and the authority attached to this virtue, in order to advance the
79 For example, figures including Naseer Aruri, Mazin Qumsiyeh, Ali Abunimah, Salman Abu
Sitta, Nadim Rouhana, As‘ad Ghanem, and Omar Barghouti, among others,  have been or are
involved  with  organizations  or  activist  networks  like  Amnesty  International,  Human  Rights
Watch,  the  Arab  Organization  for  Human  Rights,  Al-Awda  –  the  Palestine  Right  to  Return
Coalition,  Academics  for  Justice  (AFJ),  the  Electronic  Intifada,  the  Arab  American  Action
Network (AAAN), the National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel, the
Mada Al-Carmel – Arab Centre for Applied Social Research, Adalah – the Legal Centre for Arab
Minority Rights in Israel, the Palestinian Return Centre, the Independent Palestinian Commission
for the Protection of Citizen Rights, and the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign.
Aruri, Abu Sitta, Edward Said, Ghada Karmi, Michael Tarazi, Jamil Hilal, and Ahmad Qatamesh
have been formal participants in the Palestinian national movement, either as members of the
PNC, formal advisors to the PLO, or as associates to factions such as the DFLP and PFLP. Up
until  2007,  Azmi  Bishara  was  a  member  of  the  Israeli  Knesset  as  head  of  the  National
Democratic Assembly (NDA), a party that has as its main aim the transformation of Israel from a
Jewish state to a “state of all its citizens”.  Prior to his co-founding of the NDA in the early
1990s, he was a member of the Israeli communist party, RAKAH.   
80 Polletta, Francesca, and, Jasper, James. M, Collective Identity and Social Movements, Annual 
Review of Sociology, p. 284
81 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 214
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interests of those who are downtrodden.82  Zygmunt Bauman refers to this trait as
a discourse of ‘service and self-sacrifice’.  It is the properties possessed by the
intellectual  specifically  that  ought  to  be put in  the services  of  the oppressed.
Their  knowledge,  ‘beyond the  reach of  all  those who are not  [intellectuals]’,
should be instrumentalized politically – but not for themselves.83  As proponents
of a one-state solution declare,  their  position in the cultural  field has enabled
them ‘to understand politics  better’  than those who are  not positioned in this
sphere.84  They possess ‘a thorough enough understanding of [the Palestinian]
people and their cause … to write and speak about them in public’,85 and are in a
‘position  to  reach  people  who  are  willing  to  listen [emphasis  added]’,  and
therefore they ‘must try to do so’.86  It is their special qualities as intellectuals
that can render a service to subaltern Palestinians.  To put them into such use is
thus essential,  with their actions stemming in part from this practical sense of
their own utility to a broader political ensemble.    
    But  as  Bauman  further  contends,  a  ‘relationship  of  domination’  is  often
concealed  by  the  intellectual  discourse  of  service  and  self-sacrifice.87  The
authoritative  knowledge that  intellectuals  profess  to  put  in  the  service  of  the
oppressed is at the same time the principal resource through which their bid for
power  in  a  particular  social  configuration  is  mobilised.   Those  who  are
articulating the discourse of one-state certainly have an interest in advancing the
rights of Palestinians.  They are also actively engaged in pursuing this interest
because  of  specific  understandings  of  their  political  role  as  intellectuals  and
82 Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
Gordon, Colin (ed.), The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1980, pp. 126-33
83 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 13
84 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 143
85 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. xxiv
86 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 375 
87 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 13
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because of their history of activism and the political utility they recognise and
invest in knowledge cultivated in the field of culture.   Nevertheless,  it  is the
knowledge that they claim to have privileged access to in particular that they
deem essential to the Palestinian struggle, and this point is asserted in relation to
political  elites  and  “other”  intellectuals  in  the  Palestinian  political  field.
Considerable work is undertaken in this discourse so as to elevate their embodied
cultural  capital  to  a  position  of  political  indispensability  and  therefore
preeminence over other points in social space.  Their counter-intervention in the
Palestinian  political  field  is  primarily  explained  as  a  bid for  power and it  is
through the resource of cultural capital, and its elevation above other points, that
their struggle for legitimate domination is principally carried out.
    Cultural  capital  of  course takes  different  forms  in Bourdieu’s  theoretical
schema.   On the one hand, it  may be accumulated through the possession of
official  qualifications  and  academic  certificates,  which  concentrate  an
institutionalised authority in the position of the speaker,  a competence that  is
‘officially  recognized’.88  On the  other  hand,  cultural  capital  is  possessed  as
‘incorporated  dispositions’,  a  set  of  cultivated  schemes  for  ‘appreciation  and
understanding’.89  The intellectuals who are calling for a one-state solution are
quite rich in both the institutionalised and incorporated forms of cultural capital.
Many  of  them  hold  advanced  degrees  from  some  of  the  most  prestigious
universities in the world and continue to be positioned as professional academics
in  such  institutions.90  As  public speakers,  moreover,  many  of  them  are
88 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Forms of Capital, in, Richardson, John G. (ed.), Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education, p. 251
89 Brubaker, Rogers, Rethinking Classical Theory: The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu, 
Theory and Society, pp. 757-8
90 These include, among others: Columbia University, Georgetown University, Harvard 
University, Oxford University, Princeton University, University of California Berkeley, 
University of California Los Angeles, University of Cambridge, University of London, and Yale 
University.  
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recognised,  and  at  times  vilified,  for  being  ‘intellectual  superstar[s]’  whose
bodies  incorporate  sophisticated  cultural  dispositions  beyond  their  immediate
field of institutional expertise.91  In their struggle for legitimate domination it is
mainly this last form of cultural capital that proponents of a one-state solution are
mobilising  and  seeking  to  impose  at  the  centre  of  the  Palestinian  political
universe.
    The one-state perspective contends that as a framework of knowledge the
“pragmatist”  position  was  destined  to  failure.   Other  factors  may  have
contributed  to  the  severity  of  this  failure,  but  ultimately  the  epistemological
assumptions constitutive of the “pragmatist” viewpoint are fundamentally flawed
and therefore its prescriptions for resolving the conflict are – and always were –
mistaken.   Above  all  else,  then,  the  crisis  afflicting  the  Palestinian  national
movement, as represented in the discourse of one-state, stems from a failure of
knowledge  and  more  specifically  a  lack  of  competence  among  the  higher
echelons  of the political  field.   By uttering  the  “pragmatist”  perspective,  and
indeed by participating in the peace process, political elites have demonstrated
that  they  are  unable  to  appreciate  and  understand  ‘the  nature  of  the  Israeli
context’.92  This  is  defined by these intellectuals  primarily in  terms of settler
colonialism.  
    ‘In  order  to  have  understood  this  context’,  these  critics  continue,  ‘the
Palestinian leadership would have had to study Israel carefully, [and] understand
the dynamics of its political and ideological commitments’.93  It has not done so,
as implied by this statement, and this is because expertise has been ‘excluded
91 Ruthven, Malise, Edward Said, The Guardian, Friday 26 September, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/sep/26/guardianobituaries.highereducation, accessed 
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92 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, pp. 152-3
93 Ibid.
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from the  decision-making  process’.94  Indeed,  as  this  counter-position  further
contends, ‘knowledge, information, and consent’ have been subordinated in the
Palestinian arena to a vulgar interpretation of power, practiced by political elites,
that centres on ‘brute force and policemen’.95  The domination of “pragmatist”
discourse  has  been  especially  calamitous  for  the  Palestinian  struggle  as  its
epistemological assumptions are wrong; and they are wrong because those who
have produced them are  incompetent  and lack the sophistication  required  ‘to
speak rationally  of what  is  really before [Palestinians]  as a  people [emphasis
added]’.   As the  discourse of  one-state  asserts,  this  task ‘falls  once again  to
intellectuals and men and women of conscience’.96
    While the original sin of mistaken assumptions and superficial analysis has
resulted  in  the  crisis  of  the  Palestinian  national  movement,  it  has  been
compounded by the political  leadership’s  inability  to  learn.   The leadership’s
reiteration  of  “pragmatist”  discourse and practice,  even in  the midst  of  acute
policy failure and crisis, is represented in the discourse of one-state as proving
that  it  is  ‘incapable of  re-examining the  past  with all  its  errors,  pitfalls,  and
misconceptions [emphasis added]’.97  It is framed in this discourse as showing
that political elites are ‘unable to realise’ that “pragmatism” has failed and that
‘they are not even capable of imagining’ an alternative to it.98  It shows that ‘the
Palestinian leadership … can[not] think beyond the two-state solution’, which,
given  that  this  agenda  is  considered  an  impossibility  within  this  discursive
94 Qumsiyeh, Mazin B., Sharing the Land of Canaan: Human Rights and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Struggle, pp. 161-2 
95 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 56
96 Ibid., p. 50
97 Aruri, Naseer, H., Towards a Pluralistic Existence in Palestine/Israel, in, Aruri, Naseer, H., 
and, Shuraydi, Muhammad, A.(eds.), Revising Culture Reinventing Peace: the Influence of 
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framework,  makes  this  a  problem  of  considerable  proportion  and  political
significance.99   
    This inability of political elites to reflect on their mistakes is important as it is
contrasted in this discourse with those proponents of a one-state solution who
had previously occupied a “pragmatist” standpoint: these figures have possessed
the  cultural  wherewithal  to  reappraise  their  initial  assumptions  and make  the
necessary changes.  As Joseph Massad states:  ‘Given that the last ten years [of
the  peace  process]  have  demonstrated  the  utter  failure  of  such  tactics  and
strategy, one would think that the PA and its corrupt coterie of consultants would
cease and desist from pursuing such a losing course of action’.100  That they have
not done so is due to ‘the stupidity of the Palestinian leadership’.101  It is due to
their  lack of ‘intelligence,  imagination and political  skill’;102 it  is  due to their
being ‘incompetent’103 and ‘mad’104, which has prevented them from being able
to comprehend ‘the fiction  of US-brokered negotiations’  and so formulate  an
alternative  strategy.105  The  absence  of  cultivated  knowledge  among  political
elites  is  framed  in  this  discourse  as  having  disastrous  consequences  for  the
Palestinian  struggle:  ‘Having one  of  the  most  gullible  leaderships  in  modern
99 Karmi, Ghada, Palestinians need a one-state solution, The Guardian, Thursday 20 September, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/20/one-state-solution-palestinians-
israel, accessed 03/04.2013
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history while facing one of the most potent and ruthless of enemies has been a
lethal combination for the Palestinian people’.106
    The  ineptitude  of  political  elites  is  further  demonstrated,  this  position
contends,  in  the  minutiae  of  the  peace  process  and  in  particular  the  Oslo
agreements.  In signing these agreements, the political leadership did not entirely
foresee the ‘damage’ it ‘inflicted’ on the Palestinian national movement.107  As
discussed  in  the  last  chapter,  the  discourse  of  the  peace  process  effectively
worked to assimilate the dominant Palestinian position to a Zionist point of view,
allowing Israel to ‘continue the occupation with Palestinian consent’,108 while
displacing Palestinian refugees to the margins of this discursive formation and
effacing the Palestinian minority in Israel from it altogether.  To a large extent,
political  elites  did  not  foresee  this  damage  because  they  were  unable  to
understand  and  appreciate  what  they  were  signing  in  the  form  of  the  Oslo
agreements.  According to the one-state perspective, Israel was able to impose an
agreement  so  favourable  to  the  Zionist  project  on  the  Palestinian  leadership
because, 
Arafat and Abbas and their assistants at Oslo had no intimate or specialist
knowledge  of  cartography,  water  aquifers,  international  law,  or  the
Geneva  Conventions;  and  at  best  a  very  unsteady  command  of  the
English language, in which they were negotiating and signing documents.
The Israeli negotiators, in contrast, are depicted in this discourse as being rich in
specialist knowledge and being acutely aware of its relation to political objective.
106 Aruri, Naseer, Diagnosis and Key Questions, Abu-Manneh, Bashir, Abunimah, Ali, Aruri, 
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It  is  this  factor  too  that  allowed  Israel  to  orchestrate  an  agreement  with
Palestinian representatives on such favourable terms.109
    The Palestinian leadership is also criticised in this discourse for doing ‘an
abysmal job’ representing the Palestinian struggle on the international stage.  The
figures who advocate a one-state solution chastise political elites for being inept
at  ‘explaining  how  Palestinian  demands  are  entirely  in  keeping  with  the
requirements of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
various United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and
so on’.  The failure of political elites in this regard is portrayed as stemming,
once again, from an absence of crucial skills.  Such agents have been unable ‘to
express [Palestinian] intentions and aims – and above all their conformity to the
demands  of  international  law  –  to  a  global  media  market,  in  that  market’s
primary  language  of  communication,  English’.   This  absence  is  especially
damaging as Palestinians ‘lack other means (economic leverage, military power,
diplomatic clout)’ through which to advance their struggle.  As such, ‘language is
virtually  the  only  device  left  to  them’,  which  makes  the  representational
deficiencies of the leadership ‘all the more debilitating’.110  Political  elites are
effectively  framed  in  this  discourse  as  nullifying,  through  their  own
incompetence,  the  one  area  in  which  Palestinians  might  realistically  secure
political gains.  Their lack of knowledge and competence therefore emerges in
this discourse as a problem of paramount importance.
    Furthermore, the version of social reality constructed in the discourse of one-
state is uttered in relation to “other” intellectuals in the Palestinian political field.
“Pragmatist” intellectuals are on the receiving end of this discourse’s critique and
109 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. 81
110 Ibid., pp. 88-9 
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are similarly portrayed as lacking cultural acumen and competence.  According
to  this  critique,  it  is  because  such intellectuals  have  ‘suspended their  critical
faculties’  that  they  continue  to  align  themselves  with  dominant  political
discourse and institutions in the Palestinian arena.111  It is due to ‘[i]gnorance and
laziness’  that  such  intellectuals  subscribe  to  and  reiterate  the  classificatory
schemas  of  “pragmatism”;112 and  this  is  why,  moreover,  they  remain  utterly
‘credulous’ when confronted with ongoing Zionist  discourse and practice that
reveals the impossibility of meaningful political  and territorial  compromise in
Mandate Palestine.113
    Importantly,  the  absence  of  a  critical  disposition  among  “pragmatist”
intellectuals  is  further  portrayed in the discourse of one-state  as disqualifying
them from any role in providing an ‘alternative future’ for Palestinians.114  These
intellectuals  are  not  only  represented  in  this  discourse  as  bearing  major
responsibility for the crisis afflicting the Palestinian national movement,115 but
owing to their cultural malaise and inertia are classified as being trapped in a
“false”  reality  from  which  they  cannot  escape.116  This  classification  works,
within the framework of this discourse,  to promote the irrelevance of “other”
intellectuals  to  the  future  of  the  Palestinian  struggle.   They  are  defined  as
irrelevant and this is because proponents of a one-state solution are seeking to
assert their relevance.117  If intellectuals are constituted in critique, it is because
111 Massad, Joseph, The Intellectual Life of Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33, 
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this process distinguishes them from what they are criticising.  Those who utter
the discourse of one-state therefore emerge in their definition of social reality as
culturally superior agents, whose knowledge and dynamism will allow them to
provide an alternative vision for advancing the Palestinian struggle and moving it
beyond the current impasse.
    As this last point suggests, the centrality of knowledge in the discourse of one-
state’s critique of “other” elites in the Palestinian political field is embedded in
relations of power.  Whether intentional or not, any construction of social reality
which links an acute crisis to the absence of a specific form of knowledge will
have the effect of placing those who possess this  knowledge in a preeminent
position.   To a significant  extent,  this sort  of discursive strategy is typical  of
intellectuals  in  politics.   Their  ‘domination  depends’,  as  Zygmunt  Bauman
argues, on their ability to produce the ‘indispensability of the kind of knowledge
they control’.118  The discourse of one-state asserts that the crisis in Palestinian
politics  stems  not  only  from  a  lack  of  understanding,  but  from  a  lack  of
competence and ability to understand within the higher stratum of the political
field.  Consequently, what Palestinians ‘need is…to understand what is going on,
in order that  [they]  can know how to bring the conflict  to a just  and lasting
resolution  [emphasis  added]’.119  What  is  ‘needed  at  the  moment’  is  ‘a  new
beginning,  away  from the  follies  of  leaders’.120  As  those  who  produce  this
discourse assert, it is they ‘who see the reality and its complexities’.121  It is they
who have been proven ‘correct’ by the impasse in negotiations and the crisis of
118 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 20
119 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. 269
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“pragmatism”.122  It is they who possess the ‘critical faculties’ to understand what
is ‘realistic’ and how to take the Palestinians forward.123  As such it is they who
are politically indispensable.          
    Therefore, as this position contends, ‘the Palestinian people should be led now
by modern, well-educated people for whom the values of citizenship are central
to their vision [emphasis added]’.124  The use of the word ‘now’ is telling in that
it reiterates the view – highlighted in this section – that Palestinians so far have
not  been  led  by  modern,  well-educated  people.   However,  given  that  the
discourse of one-state is primarily articulated by intellectuals – a term generally
associated  with  modern,  well-educated  people  –  and  is  a  vision  in  which
citizenship  holds  a  central  place,  the  word  ‘now’  also  indicates  what  these
intellectuals  are doing in enunciating this  critique:  they are making a bid for
power  over  Palestinian  social  space,  and  it  is  this  struggle  for  legitimate
domination  that  principally  explains  their  more  forceful  engagement  in  the
political field. 
Claiming Discourse for the “Outside”
The legitimate domination sought after by those who are calling for a one-state
solution  is  further  related  to  the diasporic  position from which their  counter-
knowledge is predominantly enunciated.  It is certainly true that this position has
shaped  the  stance  of  these  intellectuals,  with  the  necessary  heterogeneity  of
diaspora  being  incorporated  into  the  counter-knowledge  of  their  critical
engagement.   Nevertheless,  this discourse is uttered in a  distinct transnational
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field and so is embedded in relations of power as well as in competing definitions
of  a  particular  social  universe.   Why do diasporic  agents  engage in  political
struggle across a distinct social space?  What, from the point of view of diaspora,
is the discourse of one-state about?  This study argues that the main answer to
these questions is power – both in the sense of resisting subordination and in the
sense  of  legitimately  acquiring  what  John  Sorenson  calls  ‘the  control  of
discourse’.125
    In recent studies of transnational  politics  scholars have begun to envision
practices of diaspora as practices of citizenship.  What this means precisely is
that diaspora is not only a form of politics that takes place across state borders,
but that  it  is  also concerned with contesting the contingent  limits  of political
boundaries and subjectivities.126 Who is a citizen is thus an important question
from  this  perspective,  and  one  that  cannot  necessarily  be  answered  by  an
individual’s formal status in a single juridical-political entity.127  The formation
of a citizen is not, in any case, ‘a benign and innocuous process’, as Engin Isin
points  out.   Boundaries  of  inside  and  outside  are  produced  in  and  through
relations  of  power,  which  delimit  political  subjectivities  of  belonging  and
exclusion, possession and lack.  What one is, or claims to be, is thus inseparable
from  what  constitutes  citizenship  and  its  performance:  the  properties  which
enable one to make judgements and take part in determining the “common” good
and  which  are  beyond  the  limits  of  “others”.128  These  properties  and  the
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boundaries they enact are not fixed, and as with any other category of practice,
the determinants of citizenship are historically contingent and contested.  
    Within  transnational  settings,  and  within  diaspora  politics  in  particular,
boundaries of inside and outside are often crucial.  The use of a Bourdieusian
lense, however, enables one to see the distinction between “inside” and “outside”
not only as a marker of physical location, but more importantly as a relationship
of  hierarchy  that  is  potentially  antagonistic.   Everybody  is  inside the  field,
whether  this  relatively  autonomous  social  space  is  local,  transnational,  or
international.  Yet, the relative positions constitutive of this structure are only
contingently configured horizontally.  In Palestinian politics, the repositioning of
the centre of gravity from exile to the occupied territories was expedited by the
first Palestinian intifada, and consecrated by the signing of the Oslo Accords and
the  establishment  of  the  PA.   What  this  repositioning  led  to,  though,  was  a
severing of the Palestinian body politic, with Palestinians outside the occupied
territories being formally positioned outside the political process.129
    For proponents of a one-state solution, this process of exclusion has been
bitterly received.  Their counter-intervention is to a large extent motivated by
resistance  to  their  subordination  outside  the  boundaries  of  formal  Palestinian
politics,  and is  driven by the object of not only reasserting their  membership
inside  the  Palestinian  polity,  but  of  legitimately  reconstructing  what  “inside”
means.  As diaspora intellectuals, they are claiming rights and obligations as part
of the Palestinian  political  community,  and this  includes  a claim to symbolic
129 Nabulsi, Karma, Popular Sovereignty, Collective Rights, Participation and Crafting Durable 
Solutions for Palestinian Refugees, BADIL Expert Forum, Seminar 1, The Role of International 
Law in Peacemaking and Crafting Durable Solutions for Refugees, Ghent University/Department
of Third World Studies, May 2003, p. 9
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authority.  It is once again the battle for legitimate domination that explains their
conduct as diaspora intellectuals engaging in political struggle.
    A key feature  of  the  Bourdieusian  field  is  that  its  agents  accept  that  its
particular interests at stake are worth competing over.  They recognise that the
“game” is ‘worth playing’, and without this contest the field would cease to exist.
This  recognition  may be  only tacit,  however,  and as  Bourdieu  argues  agents
within a particular social configuration may participate in such struggles because
the possibility of not doing so is temporally unimaginable.130  Their conduct in
this regard is taken for granted and is assumed to be inevitable.  This feature
extends to the transnational political field and for those diasporic agents who are
constructing the discourse of one-state it is certainly relevant.  Their participation
in  Palestinian  politics  is  largely  undertaken  on  the  assumption  that  ‘being
Palestinian  is  a  full  time  occupation’  and  therefore  for  them  to  slide  into
indifference  and  political  apathy  in  this  transnational  context  is  simply  ‘not
possible’.131  They have no ‘choice’ in this matter.132  The prospect of them not
‘tak[ing]  part  in  what’s  going  on’  in  this  context  appears  to  be  largely
inconceivable to their mode of thought.133
    Of  course,  there  are  good  historical  and  sociological  reasons  for  this
assumption,  and  it  has  not  emerged  from  nowhere.   To  begin  with,  the
Palestinian  struggle for (even pragmatic)  justice  and (even minimal)  rights  is
ongoing and for those who are producing the counter-knowledge of a one-state
solution this is grounds enough for them to be politically involved.  
130 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 179-80
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132 Said, Edward W., The Pen and the Sword: Conversations with David Barsamian, p. 164
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   Furthermore, the manner in which these individuals perceive their dispersal
from the Palestinian homeland is a significant factor.  As discussed previously,
dispersal  across  state  borders  is  a  core  aspect  of  diaspora,  as  is  an  active
orientation  to  a  putative  “homeland”,  and  an  engagement  in  practices  which
contribute to the production of a discrete transnational community.  For scholars
such as Rogers Brubaker it is this last point that is especially important, as it
allows the expression of a diaspora as a distinct social formation.134  Participation
in diasporic  practices  is  therefore  not  inevitable  for  dispersed peoples  in  this
view, as diaspora is ‘a process and an aspiration’ as opposed to ‘a sociological
fact’.135  One contention  in  the literature  on diaspora is  that  individuals  who
perceive their dispersal to be involuntary are more likely to engage in diasporic
practices and form a particularly salient connection to the putative “homeland”
and the wider transnational community.  Violent dispersals are important in this
respect owing to the profound trauma that they inflict upon those who experience
them.136
    The phrase al nakba refers to the loss of Palestine in 1948 as well as to the
violent dispersal of the vast majority of Palestinians from this territory by Zionist
forces.  As a semiotic device it also signifies a continuing process of loss and
dispossession,  an  ongoing  trauma  and  catastrophe.   As  both  an  event  and  a
process,  al  nakba has  unquestionably  had  a  formative  effect  on  Palestinian
national  consciousness,  and  historically  it  has  been  represented  in  important
national  documents  as  a  state  of  exception  that  will  be  only  ended  through
struggle  and a  ‘return’  to  the  homeland,  so  that  ‘normal  life’  can  resume.137
134 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 5-6
135 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
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Though the  trauma of  al  nakba sometimes  appears  solely as  a  psychological
shock in historiography on Palestine, it does have a material dimension, as after
1948 most Palestinians in exile lived in highly oppressive environments, making
the  ‘return  to  Palestine  an  urgent  necessity’.138  This  point  should  not  be
overstated,  however, as for many Palestinians,  as well as for diasporic agents
generally,  the  notion  of  return  signifies  the  possibility  of  ‘healing’  and
overcoming  subjectivities  of  loss,  rather  than  an  actual  step.139  Moreover,  it
conveys  a  legitimate  stake  in  the  politics  of  the  “homeland”  –  even  if  such
conduct  is  performed  from afar  –  while  transmitting  memories  of  the  initial
loss.140
    The diasporic subjectivities which emerge in the discourse of one-state are
likewise constituted around loss and return, and this suggests that the trauma of
the  Palestinian  dispersal  is  a  major  factor  accounting  for  the  unthinking
investment in the politics of the homeland and the transnational community that
those who produce this position undertake.  Within the writings of these diaspora
intellectuals al nakba is categorised as a loss of ‘human dignity’ and an event and
a  process  that  has  inflicted ‘the  special wound  of  victimization  [emphasis
added]’ on them and other Palestinians.141  It is framed in terms of an ‘ineffable
collective  loss  and  grief’,  which  has  produced  a  ‘deep  vow’142 and  a
138 Sayigh, Rosemary, The Palestinians: from peasants to revolutionaries, Zed Books, London, 
2007 (1979), p.  159
139 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
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140 Incidentally, this is a further factor explaining why the reduction of the right of return to a final
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east-crisis-who-caused-palestinian-diaspora/4898, accessed 29/04/2010
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‘determination’ to return among Palestinians that is ‘sacred’.143  What is more,
the prospect of being able to ‘go home’ is construed as enabling the healing of
this wound, as it ‘will have’ the effect of ending ‘the bitterest conflict of all’.144
The promise of redemption through overturning a political subjectivity of loss is
thus  a  powerful  scheme  in  the  discourse  of  one-state,  and  whether  it  works
figuratively or is sought literally,  it orients the action of those who produce it
toward the Palestinian homeland and political community.  Such a stance is to a
significant extent typical of those agents who produce diasporic practice.  
    Another  factor which may contribute to the engagement  of individuals  in
diasporic  practices  is  the  conditions  in  the  national  states  in  which  they  are
embedded.  Transnational political fields are peculiar in the sense that they are
both a relatively autonomous social space and one that overlaps with (ordinarily)
more institutionalised national fields of power.  Resources available in the latter
may  certainly  permit  action  in  the  former;  whether  these  include  access  to
technologies that enable the rapid transference of specific discourses across state
borders;  or,  as  in  the  case  of  those  agents  under  analysis  here,  official
qualifications  and institutionalised  positions  which affect  authorised  discourse
beyond immediate local contexts.145  National discourses and institutions which
do not foreclose political identifications beyond singular limits are also important
conditions  which  allow individuals  to  initiate  transnational  politics.146  Those
intellectuals  who  produce  the  discourse  of  one-state  tend  to  be  situated  in
143 Abu Sitta, Salman, Palestinian Right to Return: Sacred, Legal and Possible (second revised 
edition), The Palestinian Return Centre, London, May 1999, p. 43
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1047, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2011/1047/op1.htm, accessed 13/07/2011    
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341-2
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national  states  and societies  in  North America  and Europe that  permit  multi-
identificational political  practices;  or at least they are positioned in states and
societies which do not compel their putative members to assimilate to a single
subject-position.   This  point  certainly  seems  significant  to  explaining  their
adherence to the transnational field.147
    Commitment to the politics of the “homeland” and transnational community
may  further  stem  from  a  position  of  marginality  in  the  “hostland”  context.
Individuals  may  engage  in  diasporic  practices  and  (re)produce  a  distinct
transnational  social  formation  due to a sense of exclusion from the state and
society in which they are objectively positioned.148  Although most of those who
articulate the discourse of one-state are formal citizens of North American and
European states, and are individuals who occupy “successful” social positions,
political marginality and exclusion in these settings is a prominent theme in their
public texts.  Within the US context in particular, this sense of marginality as
Palestinian-  and  Arab-Americans  stems  from what  they  perceive  (with  good
reason)  as  the  hegemony  of  Zionist  discourse  in  this  arena,  which  they
additionally understand as constraining considerably the utterance of legitimate
Palestinian political discourse.149
    Moreover, many of these Palestinian intellectuals see themselves as being
positioned within “Western” contexts that are to a significant extent structured by
what Joseph Massad calls a ‘racialized discourse’.  From their point of view, this
discursive structure prohibits their “full” participation in these social frameworks
as Palestinians, as it works to constitute them as perennially non-white subjects,
147 Hanafi, Sari, Reshaping Geography: Palestinian Community Networks in Europe and the New 
Media, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, pp. 584-5
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Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2008, pp. 700-720, pp. 701-13
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whose subjectivity ranges from ‘uncivilized barbarians’  to a more ambivalent
‘white but not quite’.  To a certain extent, this view stems from the postcolonial
lense through which they conceive social reality, and more specifically from the
Fanonist gaze that they deploy.  But it should be stressed that this perspective
stems from their lived experience as well.  If it was not for the saliency of this
discursive structure, as Massad states, ‘Palestinians (myself included) … would
not face the difficulties which  we constantly do [emphasis added]’.150  More to
the  point,  this  marginality  of  Palestinian  political  utterances,  and  this
interpellation of Palestinian subjectivity into a racialized position, is disliked and
resisted by these intellectuals,  and these hierarchal  relations  in the “hostland”
context  have  had  the  consequence  of  spurring  action  and  unquestioned
commitment to the transnational field.
    Given this investment in the transnational political field, it is unsurprising that
these agents  have greeted  the  contraction  of  the formal  sphere of  Palestinian
politics to the occupied territories with much trepidation and disaffection.  The
stakes  are  indeed  high  in  this  relation  of  subordination.   To  accept  their
positioning outside the formal  boundaries of Palestinian politics  would be ‘to
commit  national  suicide’.151  It  would entail  a  ‘stripping of  political  identity’
from their bodies and from those of other Palestinians who are not situated in the
West Bank or Gaza Strip.152  With this stark language in mind, it is additionally
unsurprising that they should seek to resist this process of contraction that was
consecrated through the Oslo Accords, the establishment of the PA, and the first
PLC election.  To assert, as proponents of the one-state perspective do, that ‘I’m
150 Massad, Joseph, Palestinians and the Limits of Racialized Discourse, Social Text, pp. 100-8 
151 Massad, Joseph A., The Binational State and the Reunification of the Palestinian People, 
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Palestinian too’,153 or that ‘Palestinians everywhere, both inside and outside, are
still citizens of the Palestinian polity [emphasis added]’, is therefore an act of
resistance.154  Such language is a counterpoint to the process of exclusion being
forced upon Palestinians  outside  the  occupied  territories  by political  elites  in
agreement with Israel.  As will be discussed shortly, the invocation of citizenship
works to claim certain rights and obligations, which are articulated in a specific
manner in this discourse and in terms that a far from being banal.
    On one level, the interest of these agents in resisting their positioning outside
the boundaries of formal Palestinian politics is ideational and is derived from the
logic of the field and its ontology of difference.155  For instance, it is interesting
that the re-centring of Palestinian political gravity to the occupied territories that
occurred with the first intifada is not perceived by these individuals as a process
of exclusion.  From their perspective, at the time of the first intifada inside and
outside were not salient political boundaries in the Palestinian context, as this
uprising was one expression of  the meaning of Palestine as a ‘struggle against
racial  discrimination’  and more  specifically  Zionism.156  Though it  catapulted
Palestinians in the occupied territories to the forefront of the national movement,
the intifada’s signification, as understood by those who are calling for a one-state
solution,  was  one  they  identified  with  and  were  firmly  positioned  within.
Despite the profound changes it engendered, the  intifada, in this sense, did not
amount  to  a  stark departure.   It  represented continuity,  both discursively and
spatially.
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    The meaning of Palestine was radically altered from their perspective with the
signing of the Oslo Accords and when the PLO leadership “returned” from exile
and when the PA was established.  Due to this process, Palestine was changed
from an idea which signified a liberationist alternative to Zionism to a sign that
stood for ‘a nationalist  state  that  would mirror  Zionist  nationalism across the
border’.157  The contraction of the formal boundaries of Palestinian politics to the
occupied  territories  was  accompanied  by a  perversion  of  its  “true”  meaning,
according to this standpoint; and so, to a considerable degree, their interest in
resisting this process is a result of their desire to ‘restore Palestine’ to its rightful
place.158  That is to say, their exclusion from the formal political sphere is in part
understood as the domination of a different  vision of Palestine,  one that they
dislike and feel unaffiliated to, and one that they seek to rearticulate.  Boundaries
of  inside  and  outside  and  the  hierarchal  relations  between  these  limits  are
therefore partly determined by different visions of a particular social  universe
and their relative position in (transnational) social space.  Advocates of a one-
state solution describe themselves as being ‘actively involved in    redefining the
national agenda from the outside’, and they are engaged in such practice because
they  object  to  what  Palestine  has  become,  or  rather,  they  object  to  the
marginalisation of their own particular point of view.159
    On  another  level,  their  interest  in  resisting  their  subordination  in  the
Palestinian political field stems from its objective structure.  As embodied agents
they  have  been  materially  excluded  from  taking  part  in  formal  Palestinian
politics, which of course accounts to a large extent for the subordination of their
particular vision of Palestine in this arena (in actuality, symbolic structure and
157 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 148
158 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995, p. xxix
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objective  structure  are  typically  inseparable  in  Bourdieu’s  opinion,  and  such
levels  are  only separated  here  for  analytical  purposes160).   ‘The most  serious
assault’ on the ‘Palestinian people as a whole’ was the first PLC election in 1996,
as this  was restricted to the West Bank and Gaza Strip,  so ‘excluding … all
Palestinians outside of them from the democratic process to which they too were
entitled’.  This process had the effect of ‘creating cleavages and tensions between
segments  of Palestinian society’.161  For those who construct the discourse of
one-state specifically,  the contradictions in Palestinian society stem from their
own desire to ‘restore their ties with their homeland and its people’.162  Their
refusal  to  accept  their  objective  positioning  outside  the  boundaries  of  formal
politics  is  a  key  factor  for  their  engagement  in  political  struggle  across
transnational social space.  In order for them to take part in the formal political
sphere the objective structure of the field must change, and so they contest it.  
    Thus, from the point of view of diaspora, the discourse of one-state is about
resisting discursive and material subordination in the Palestinian political field,
and seeking the subversion and reconstruction of the established order in this
particular social space.  A one-state solution is a particular vision of Palestine
and the Palestinian struggle, one that is homologous with the specific position in
the field of those who articulate  it,  and one that has been discussed in detail
already (see chapter two).  
    In  addition,  a  one-state  solution  is  promoted  from  this  standpoint  as  a
framework of struggle that  all Palestinians can take part in, without material or
temporal discordance or disintegration.  Demonstrating that diaspora politics is
160 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 234-6
161 Nabulsi, Karma, Popular Sovereignty, Collective Rights, Participation and Crafting Durable 
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162 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 170
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not  singularly  or  even  primarily  concerned  with  hybridity  and  fashioning  a
postnational  future,  a  one-state  solution  is  advanced  by  these  diaspora
intellectuals as a platform that will enable ‘a condition of national coherence’ for
Palestinians.163  In contrast to the limits imposed upon them by the contraction of
the  formal  political  sphere  to  the  occupied  territories,  a  one-state  solution  is
marketed  as  a  ‘vision  capable  of  unifying  Palestinians  and  …  their goals
[emphasis  added]’.164  To those who produce this  vision,  it  is  this  interest  in
restructuring objective positions in the political field that further explains their
engagement in political  struggle: the object of commonality  against  partiality,
both in terms of participation and aims.  The struggle for a one-state solution is
in fact represented by these agents as the ‘only way the Palestinian people can be
reunified’.165  This  is  also  what  is  at  stake  in  the  context  of  their  counter-
intervention: the (re)formation of a homogenous space.
    Such a space is an ontological impossibility in Bourdieu’s visualisation of the
social  world,  however,  as  it  would  necessitate  absolute  reconciliation  and
harmony.166  The institution of a common framework of participation and interest
may well be a strong element driving these intellectuals into contentious action,
but this goal is neither sought benignly nor without relations of hierarchy.  The
struggle for unification is actually the struggle for their legitimate domination of
the political field; and while participation for all is sought in their vision of this
particular reality, boundaries of inside and outside remain, albeit with a different
distribution  of  resources  and symbolic  authority.   From the point  of  view of
diaspora, the question of “Who speaks for Palestine?” is perhaps better phrased
163 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 328
164 Makdisi, S, Good Riddance, Abbas, Foreign Policy
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as “Who is a citizen?” – by which is meant, who is better able to determine the
“common” interest?167  It  is the deconstruction  and reconstruction of political
boundaries and subjectivities that most accurately explains the counter-invention
of these diaspora intellectuals, though this struggle is not necessarily carried out
consciously.  They are trying to redefine what constitutes “inside”.  
    This process occurs in a similar fashion to the mobilisation of their cultural
capital that was analysed in the last section.  The ‘principles of hierarchization’,
which are an issue of contention in any given field,  include in this particular
instance  not  only  a  struggle  by  these  agents  to  legitimately  classify  the
knowledge they possess as politically indispensable, but a struggle to hierarchize
the site of diaspora as the position for the proper conduct of politics.168  As this
position  asserts,  ‘Palestinians  outside  of  historical  Palestine can  play  a
constructive role that is  impossible for those inside,  who live under the daily
pressure  of  occupation  and  dialectical  confrontation  [emphasis  added]’.169
Owing to ‘the burden of daily survival’,170 these Palestinians, along with those
positioned in refugee camps, cannot possibly counteract the ‘jejune clichés and
unthinking formulas’  that  dominate the political  field171 – at  least  this  is  how
social reality is represented in the discourse of one-state.  Diaspora, in contrast, is
hierarchized in this discourse as a site of ‘relative security’  which enables its
occupants – meaning primarily those cultural elites who construct this version of
social reality – to ‘sit down and think’.  The materiality of diaspora  as ‘time and
security’ is itself mobilised as a resource in this context that grants certain agents
167 Isin, Engin F., Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship, p. x (preface)
168 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 168
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‘the  ability  to  analyse  and  think  through  solutions’  to  the  problems  of
Palestinians as a whole.172
    It  is  the  possession  of  such  properties  that  “other”  Palestinians  lack  –
indispensable  knowledge  combined with  the  material  conditions  to  use  it
effectively – that ‘leaves the Palestinian diaspora’ as the only constituency in the
political  field  from  which  a  ‘new  leadership’  can  emerge.173  From  this
representation of social reality emerges the central claim in the discourse of one-
state:  that  ‘as  citizens’  its  proponents  ‘must  take  responsibility’  for  the
Palestinian struggle.174  One of the main texts constitutive of the discourse of
one-state is a book entitled Palestine Inside Out, written by Saree Makdisi.  The
title of this book is striking when read from the analytical perspective deployed
in this study, in that it captures precisely what is being sought after through the
political engagement of these intellectuals.  They are trying to institutionalise the
“outside” as the inside of the political field, a point from which judgements on
the “common” good can be properly undertaken by individuals who ‘know’ what
is  best  for Palestinians.175  Political  boundaries and political  subjectivities  are
intertwined and contingent, and for all the talk in this discourse of unifying the
national field, it is clear that most Palestinians are left outside its boundaries of
citizenship as a practice.
    Therefore, from the position of diaspora, the political engagement of these
intellectuals  remains  heavily  embedded  in  relations  of  power:  not  only  as  a
practice of resistance to subordination, but as a struggle for legitimate symbolic
172 Personal interview with Ghada Karmi, 15 February 2010, London
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authority.   The question of “who is a citizen?” is increasingly being seen as a
pertinent issue in the study of diasporic and transnational politics.  Yet, as this
study  shows,  in  certain  circumstances  the  more  pressing  question  might  be,
“what constitutes citizenship?” – how do particular agents in a transnational field
claim the right and duty to speak with authority and determine the “common”
good?  What properties and resources do they mobilise in this regard?  Who are
the  outsiders?   Who  lacks  the  properties  necessary  for  the  performance  of
citizenship?176
    The answers to these questions are not universally fixed and they remain open
to  contestation.   In  regards  to  the  particular  case  at  hand,  the  properties  of
cultural  wherewithal,  non-oppressive temporality,  and ontological security,  are
mobilised in relation to “others” in the transnational political field who lack such
attributes;  and it  is  the  legitimate  production  of  this  distinction  that  is  being
sought  after  by those diaspora intellectuals  who are constructing the counter-
discourse of a one-state solution; and it is this aim that primarily explains their
counter-intervention in this political arena.  Diasporic practices may stem from
losses, redemptions, and exclusions that orient action to a putative “homeland”
and maintain adherence to a transnational community.  Nevertheless, power is a
pivotal factor explaining such conduct.            
Augmenting this Claim I: Representing Palestine
If one accepts what has been said so far, then it is clear that ‘[b]y acting, agents
are shaped by the relations in which they engage’.177  The relation of distinction
176 Isin, Engin F., Citizenship in flux: The figure of the activist citizen, Subjectivity, Issue 29, 
2009, pp. 367-388, pp. 368-72
177 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, p. 236
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undertaken by those intellectuals who are calling for a one-state solution reveals
a struggle for power in the political field that centres on their claim to legitimate
symbolic  authority at  the expense of “other” positions in this  arena.   Further
proof for this struggle, this section argues, is found in the discourse of one-state’s
claim  to  legitimately  represent  the  Palestinian  people.   The  “people”  or  the
“nation”  or  the  “proletariat”  are  historically  strong  themes  in  the  discursive
practices of intellectuals in politics (though not necessarily uniquely),178 and their
claims to unity with a particular group function to constitute such figures as its
legitimate spokespersons.  Given the immanent plurality of the field, this process
of speaking for others necessarily entails symbolic violence,  and claims to be
able  to  do  so  may  be  appropriative,  assimilating  the  interests,  desires  and
identifications  of a broader ensemble (whatever  these might  be) to a singular
point  of  view.   It  is  in  this  sense  that  Bourdieu  speaks  of  the  spokesperson
creating the group, as opposed to the other way round.179
     Substance is often sought after for such claims through struggles over the
past, what Bourdieu calls ‘a retrospective reconstruction of a past adjusted to the
needs of the present’.180  This kind of action is certainly being attempted in the
discourse of one-state, as will be demonstrated in the next section.  Such claims
are often enacted, especially by those agents who occupy an elite position in the
field, through – once again – relations of distinction.  It is the relation that ‘forms
the extremities’ in a Bourdieusian understanding of the social world; meaning
that it is through a process of “othering” that temporally binds certain positions
together that the identities of agents are contingently brought into being.181  In
178 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 172-6; Karabel, Jerome, Towards a 
Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 210
179 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 204-14
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181 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 236-7
202
battles  for  domination  this  relational  practice  typically  involves  efforts  to
discredit others in a field and impose categories upon them which separate their
position  from  an  effective  political  role.   Separation  from  the  “people”  is
frequently an important element in this strategy, which at the same time is geared
towards  the  production  of  its  converse:  the  agent  as  the  synecdoche  of  the
“people”, the person who can legitimately speak for them.182 
    In addition to having deficiencies in knowledge and competence, other elites
in the Palestinian political field are represented in the discourse of one-state has
having abandoned the Palestinian people and their cause.  This representational
practice is prominent and routinely deploys vituperating language to define these
other positions.  What such language does, in the framework of this discourse at
least, is establish these other elites as outsiders, as persons who are distinct from
the “masses” because they identify with narrow interests as opposed to those of
the whole.  Of course, those intellectuals who utter these classifications claim to
have  the  resources  necessary  for  advancing  the  “common”  good  and  such
language further works to differentiate them from these other elites and position
them on the side of the “people”.  They ‘know what Palestinians need’,183 and
‘what is desired’ by them,184 and a one-state solution encapsulates these general
interests.185  Their  point  of  view is  that  of  the  “people”,  and hence  they are
legitimate representatives.  However, such claims are hardly straightforward and
unidirectional, and as they are uttered in a social space of contention, they cannot
182 Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, 
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183 Abunimah, Ali, and, Barghouti, Omar, Democracy: an existential threat?, The Guardian
184 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 167




be  separated  from struggles  for  power  and  the  monopolisation  of  legitimate
political discourse.
    The version of social reality expressed in the discourse of one-state contends
that,  since their  participation in the Oslo peace process, political  elites  in the
Palestinian  arena  have  been  acting  ‘for  personal  gain  at  the  expense  of  the
national  cause’.186  These  elites  approach  ‘matters  that  relate  to  the  general
interest from the narrowest of perspectives – that of their own vested interests’.187
The ‘Palestinian leaders’ are ‘willing … to sell out their people’s rights’; and this
is not only because they are culturally unsophisticated and unable to properly
understand the reality that they are faced with; it is also because they have ‘given
up’ and become ‘[c]onvinced that colonialism cannot be defeated’ in Palestine-
Israel.188  Capitulation  is  another  factor  which  accounts  for  this  leadership’s
adoption of the colonizer’s gaze and its  thorough assimilation of “pragmatism”
to the Zionist point of view.  They have lost the ‘will to resist’.189  As such, so
write those who produce this classification, political elites are only interested in
‘some petty managerial role within [Israel’s colonial structure] from which they
might benefit, even at the expense of their people’.190  This role includes ‘ruling
the bantustans being carved out of the occupied territories’,191 and ‘collaborating
openly with the oppressor’,192 so as to ensure the ‘subordination and conformity
of the Palestinians’ in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.193
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    So, according to the one-state perspective, it is not solely that political elites
are incapable of moving beyond the “pragmatist” framework and generating a
‘genuine’ political strategy,194 it is also that they are ‘unwilling’ to do so owing to
narrow benefits that accrue to them from the prevailing order.195  They are utterly
useless; they are ‘Palestinian Zionists’196; they are ‘working for the other side’.197
They  are  complicit  in  perpetuating  a  discursive  order  that  is  ‘producing
Palestinians as forever subjugated to Israeli apartheid and military occupation’,
and they are disinterested in change.198
    What is more, because of this loss of will, adoption of the Zionist viewpoint,
and resulting lack of interest in the “national” good, the political leadership is
represented in the discourse of one-state as having ‘zero credibility’ and as being
unable to make a ‘real claim to represent the views of Palestinians’.199  In fact,
rather  than  legitimately  representing  Palestinians,  the  surrender  attributed  to
political elites in this discourse is additionally framed as revealing their contempt
for the “masses”.   As Haidar Eid writes, it  shows that they lack ‘faith in the
power of the Palestinian people to reclaim their land and rights’.200
    For those intellectuals who are producing this counter-discourse, this issue of
political representation was one that they raised very early on in the context of
their critical engagement.  Even before they came out firmly in favour of a one-
194 Makdisi, Saree, The Palestinian people betrayed, Los Angeles Times
195 Aruri, Naseer, H., Towards a Pluralistic Existence in Palestine/Israel, in, Aruri, Naseer, H., 
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state solution, figures from this perspective were denouncing the PLO hierarchy
for signing the Oslo Accords and participating in the peace process, and thus
fully ‘shed[ding] itself of its own history and its own representativity’.201  It is
therefore an issue which is highly significant to proponents of this approach, and
the historic leadership’s signing of these accords is now consistently framed in
their  discursive output  as  the exact  moment  when it  ‘ceased to  represent  the
national  will  of  the  majority  of  Palestinians’.202  The  exact  moment  when  it
forfeited ‘control over language and discourse’, and ‘abandoned altogether the
traditional  Palestinian narratives  of self-determination and national  liberation’;
the exact moment when it acquiesced in ‘Israel’s … language and discourse’ and
so became deprived of legitimacy.203
    If  the  political  leadership  does  not  represent  the  national  will  of  the
Palestinians, or at least the majority of them, then who does?  More to the point,
what is the national will of most Palestinians?  Given the inherent instability of
the field, as well as its plurality, there can be no fixed or singular answer to these
questions.  Nevertheless, the agents who are articulating the discourse of one-
state are trying to provide such an answer, and tellingly they define their ‘own
will  as  “people”’.204  ‘Deep  inside’,  they  contend,  ‘a  huge  majority  of
Palestinians … want to see a one-state [solution]’ to the conflict.205  A one-state
solution,  as  portrayed  by  these  intellectuals,  is  classified  as  a  ‘genuine…
expression of  Palestinianism’.   It  is  ‘essentially  Palestinian’.206  As has  been
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shown,  the  position-taking  of  these  intellectuals  is  very  much  structurally
homologous with their particular position in the field, and therefore to say that
their  stance  is  the  stance  of  Palestinians  generally  risks  symbolic  violence
beyond their initial utterance.  The elision of difference in the Palestinian field
occurs  most  egregiously  in this  discourse  through  terms  such  as  ‘false
consciousness’,  which  are  applied  to  Palestinians  who  support  the  two-state
position.207  These people are considered to be holding a perspective different to
the one that they ‘should morally and rationally admit’.208  They are wrong and
irrational, and so their views can be dismissed as false.
    The language of falsity, whether uttered implicitly or explicitly, clearly implies
its opposite – truth.  “Speaking truth to power” is how proponents of a one-state
solution define their critical engagement, and as a discursive device this phrase
has had a structuring effect on their bodies, forcing them to take part in political
struggle.   Within  this  specific  context,  however,  this  phrase has  taken on an
additional significance (though not necessarily for the first time).  It is not only a
structuring structure, and a claim to know ‘what is really before [Palestinians] as
a people’209 – a privileged access to the “truth” that gives them ‘the right to tell
others, deprived of such access, what to do’.210  It also incorporates a claim to be
the true voice of the Palestinian people, uttered against those political elites who
have apparently abandoned this position and taken up with the ‘enemy’.211  So,
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what is occurring through the articulation of the discourse of one-state is not only
a struggle to discredit and delegitimise political elites in the Palestinian arena,
but through such efforts there is a struggle to legitimise speakers of this discourse
as spokespersons for Palestinians, in this framework and beyond.  Their point of
view is asserted as the Palestinian point of view, and they contest power.
    The production of “false consciousness” among Palestinians is furthermore
attributed  to  what  some  of  those  who  promote  a  one-state  solution  call  the
‘assimilated  intelligentsia’:  those  “pragmatist”  intellectuals  who,  according  to
this perspective, are cerebrally sterile and who have reneged on their  ‘national
and historical  responsibility’212 to  represent  ‘the truth’.213  Indeed,  these other
cultural elites are coloured in an almost identical shade to political elites in the
discourse  of  one-state.   Along  with  their  mental  deficiencies  and  foreclosed
conceptual  horizons,  they  are  depicted  as  being  only  able  to  ‘think  of  their
families  and bettering  themselves’.214  That  is  to  say,  they have only narrow
interests, and not those of the whole.
    The lack of a critical disposition among these other intellectuals, or rather its
discontinuation, is tied in this discourse to the narrow interests that they allegedly
pursue.  Through their positioning of themselves close to the dominant sites of
power in the political field – that is, through their role as ‘full-time advisers’ to
politicians such as the late ‘Arafat and ministers in his Authority’215 – these other
intellectuals have become ‘attuned to the exigencies of political power and the
benefits that could accrue to them from it’.  It is for this reason as well that they
212 Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia: A Fanonian Reading of the Intellectual 
Landscape in Post-Oslo Palestine, Nebula, pp. 96-8
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have traded ‘in their national liberation goals for a pro-western pragmatism’,216
giving  ‘proof  that  [they]  [have]  assimilated  the  culture  of  the  occupying
power’.217  From  this  perspective,  the  specific  benefits  that  accrue  to  these
intellectuals include being ‘paid handsomely by the PA’s new funders’.218  The
prospect  of  being  ‘invited  to  the  Brookings  Institution’  or  appearing  on ‘US
television’  are  further  private  interests  for  which  these  intellectuals  have
abandoned ‘the cause of Palestinian self-determination’ and forsaken ‘matters of
principle’.219  This is what their “pragmatism” means, as written in this discourse:
individual gain over and above the national interest.
    The representations of social reality made in the discourse of one-state are
taken to be irrefutable and positively “out there” by those who utter them.  In a
very similar fashion to its categorisations of political elites, the narrow interests
pursued by these other cultural elites are therefore cast in this discourse as a sign
of their disregard and outright disdain for the Palestinian people.  Their narrow
motivations convey a lack of ‘hope in the power of the masses’ and demonstrate
that they have zero belief in the capacity of Palestinians ‘to do something about
their own present and future history’.220  They too have capitulated, and as such
cannot  possibly  claim  to  speak  for  Palestinians,  even  if  they  could  provide
‘honest analyses’ of the situation.221
    But as those who construct this counter-discourse emphatically assert: ‘The
anti-Oslo intellectual is what the Oslo intelligentsia is NOT’.222  They are not a
216 Massad, Joseph, Political realists or comprador intelligentsia: Palestinian intellectuals and the 
national struggle, Middle East Critique, p. 32
217 Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia: A Fanonian Reading of the Intellectual 
Landscape in Post-Oslo Palestine, Nebula, p. 97
218 Massad, Joseph A., The Intellectual Life of Edward Said, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 8
219 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents, p. 38
220 Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia, Nebula, pp. 96-9
221 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 76
222 Eid, Haidar, Representations of Oslo Intelligentsia, Nebula, p. 102
209
foreclosed  cultural  agent  who  is  operating  from  the  point  of  view  of  the
oppressor.   They  are  not  a cultural  agent  who  is  interested  in  personal
aggrandizement even at the expense of a broader community.   They are  not a
cultural agent who possesses disdain for the Palestinian people and their capacity
to change the world.  It is precisely this claim to distinction that emerges in the
relational practices of these critical intellectuals.  Therefore, what separates these
intellectuals from other cultural elites in the political field is their ‘creative’223
disposition and utterance of a point of view that incorporates ‘all Palestinian’
perspectives.224  Furthermore, they are only ‘interested in the truth and in justice’
through their ‘commitment’ to the Palestinian people as a whole.225  They believe
in ‘new possibilities’ and adopt a ‘resistance approach’ which signifies their trust
in the Palestinian capacity to establish ‘an alternative future’.226  Whereas other
intellectuals are certainly separate from the Palestinian people, those who make
this classification are certainly not.  This identity with the Palestinian people is
what  is  being  claimed  in  the  discourse  of  one-state:  the  former  is  being
assimilated to the latter’s point of view through the discrediting of other elites.
    The position of economic elites is also criticised in this discourse, although it
must be said that this is far less prominent than the targeting of political  and
cultural elites, and often appears to emerge as an afterthought, or as a concern of
only a  minority  of those who construct this standpoint.227  Even still, when this
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attack does occur, it  is performed in broadly the same terms as those used to
discredit other elites in the Palestinian political field.  That is, economic elites are
defined as being solely interested in advancing their own position rather than that
of the ‘masses’.228
    The self-interestedness of these economic agents is sometimes linked in this
discourse  to  their  bourgeois  position  and  their  ‘organic’  links  to  ‘imperial
interests’229 and  the  ‘neoliberal  global  market’.230  Much  more  commonly,
however, it is portrayed as deriving from the “false” promises of “pragmatism”
and the co-option of this stratum of Palestinian society to the terms of the Oslo
framework.   It  was  mainly  due  to  this  framework,  the  one-state  position
contends, that these agents became a ‘Palestinian comprador bourgeoisie’,231 as it
enabled  them  to  forge  lucrative  ‘connections’  with  Israel,  so  making  them
interested in keeping ‘the peace process alive’,232 regardless of the effects on the
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‘aspirations  of  the  broader  community’.   They are  now only concerned  with
‘real-estate  deals’  and  ‘gated  communities’,  and  not  with  ‘liberating  human
beings’.233   It is in this sense that they have been ‘co-opted’.234  They have given
up the struggle.  
    The liberation of ‘human beings’ is of course the declared objective of the
one-state  perspective,  and  therefore  such  classifications  work  (within  the
parameters of this discourse at least) to once again position those who utter them
on the side of the “people” and not separate from them.235  If economic elites
(along with  other  elites  in  the field)  are  engaged in the (re)production  of  an
official order in which the Palestinian people are largely ‘non-existent’, then the
same  cannot  be  said  for  the  point  of  view  enunciated  by  these  critical
intellectuals.  Encompassed within their perspective are ‘the needs of the vast
majority  of  disenfranchised  people’,  and  because  these  people  are
disenfranchised,  it  is  these intellectuals  who give  voice  to  their  interests  and
desires.236  It is they who emerge within their own discursive practices as the
spokespersons for the Palestinian struggle, and indeed because their position is
representative of others, they can legitimately do this.  In studies of intellectuals
in politics this process is sometimes called ‘the creation of in- and out-groups’,
and for those who are doing so in this specific instance, the Palestinian people
are certainly on one side of this divide, and not the other.237
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    In an implicit fashion, certain scholars have pointed to the claims made by
those  Palestinian  intellectuals  who advocate  of  a  one-state  solution  and have
argued that  little  or no evidence is  provided to substantiate  them.238  Though
correct, such a criticism misses the point.  These claims are not made in the name
of academic rigour.  A Bourdieusian lense helps one to see the symbolic violence
that is affected through such claims in the discourse of one-state and to also see
the  sought  after  relations  of  power  behind  such  discursive  moves.   The
Palestinian people are absorbed into the standpoint of these intellectuals so as to
further  legitimise  a  bid  for  domination  of  the  political  field  that  has  been
analysed throughout  this  chapter.   It  is  this  struggle for power that  primarily
explains why these agents do what they do.  They can speak with authority not
only because they have privileged access to the “truth”, and because they are in a
position to perform a proper citizenship function, but also because they represent
the “people”.  They are its legitimate spokespersons. 
Augmenting this Claim II: Re-presenting Palestine
Within the discourse of one-state an effort at re-writing the Palestinian past is
underway.  From the point of view of scholarly rigour, the claims made in this
history are at times highly questionable (though this is not to say that there is
such a possibility as an absolute or impartial  history), and this questionability
will be raised at various points throughout this section.  However, the focus of
this section is not to determine whether the history being constructed by these
intellectuals  is  right  or  wrong.   Rather,  it  is  to  determine  its  effects.   The
argument presented here is that this historicization process is explicitly tied to
power, and that these intellectuals are re-presenting Palestine and the Palestinian
238 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 208-9
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struggle so as to portray their particular point of view as authentic.  It is through
the  strategy  of  (re)narrativization  that  they  seek  to  augment  their  claim  to
legitimately  speak  for  the  Palestinian  people,  historicising  their  stance  –  the
product of their particular  habitus – as the authentic Palestinian position.  Any
other  stance  or  historical  trajectory  therefore  emerges  in  this  discourse  as
inauthentic and an aberration, a departure from the “true” path.  This process of
history  writing  highlights  once  again  the  centrality  of  power  to  the  political
engagement of these intellectuals.
    For the purpose of this argument, it is worthwhile recalling that the official
narrative in the Palestinian political field centres on the teleology of state, and
this goal is often described somewhat contradictorily as an impending ‘reality’
within  the  framework  of  a  two-state  solution,  or  as  an  option  that  is  fast
dissipating along with the ‘prospect for realizing peace’.239  The efficacy of this
narrative  is  sometimes  implicitly  recognised  by  proponents  of  a  one-state
solution, as is shown by statements which proclaim, lamentably, that it ‘is as if
the ultimate goal of the Palestinian struggle for the last hundred years has been to
have a state’.240  Yet, as such statements also reveal, it is clear that proponents of
a  one-state  solution  contest  the  authority  of  this  narrative,  and of  course  the
official  positions  which  disseminate  it.   In  the  counter-history  of  these
intellectuals, the ultimate goal of the Palestinian struggle has never been ‘merely
a state [emphasis added]’.  Instead, as this position declares,  ‘the struggle for
Palestine  seeks  to  contest  an  unacceptable  system  of  ethnic  separation  and
239 Palestinian National Authority, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, 
Program of the Thirteenth Government, p. 3
240 Bishara, Azmi, The Pitfalls of a US-Israeli Vision of a Palestinian State, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, p. 59
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exclusion  with  a  vision  of  inclusion  and  cooperation’.241  This  is  what  the
struggle has always been about.
    The battle over the past undertaken by those who call for a one-state solution
seems to support a general insight: that such struggles become more acute during
transitory periods, when the old is dying and the new is ‘being born and in need
of instant antiquity’.242  This is not to say definitively that a struggle for a one-
state  solution  is  the  “newness”  that  will  replace  the  “old”  in  the  Palestinian
political field.  The future is open after all.  Rather, it is to suggest that history
becomes  considerably  less  settled  in  times  of  crisis  and  liminality,  when
struggles to see who will be next on top are in fuller flow.
    Antiquity is certainly not a misplaced word in the context of the discourse of
one-state and its effort to recast the Palestinian past and delimit its future.  In the
history on display in this discourse, as alluded to in the previous chapter,  the
struggle for Palestine as a vision of inclusion and cooperation has deep-rooted
antecedents.  ‘Throughout  thousands  of  years’,  remarks  Ahmad  Katamesh,
‘Palestine  comprised  multiple  cultures,  religions  and  social  components’.243
‘Palestine was for centuries’, writes Omar Barghouti, ‘a fertile meeting ground
for  diverse  civilizations  and  cultures,  fostering  communication,  dialogue  and
acculturation among them’.244  Ghada Karmi asserts that, 
before the mass migration of European Jews imposed their exclusivist
creed  of  Zionism  and  culturally  alien  philosophy  on  the  country,
[Palestinian  society]  had  been  a  successful  composite  of  Muslims,
241 Makdisi, Saree, “Intellectual Warfare” and the Question of Palestine, in, Bisharat, George, 
and, Doumani, Beshara, Open Forum: Strategizing Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 82
242 Ho Tai, Hue-Tam, Remembered Realms: Pierra Nora and French National History, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 3, 2001, pp. 906-22, p. 921
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Christians and Jews as well as Armenians, Circassians, Europeans and
others.245 
Susan Abulhawa and Ramzy Baroud comment that prior to ‘the establishment of
Israel, Palestine had been multi-religious and multi-cultural, Christians, Muslims
and Jews, Armenians, Greek Orthodox, to name a few, all had a place there; and
all lived in relative harmony’.246
    While  the onset  of Zionist  immigration exerted a strain on this  vision of
Palestine,  as the above examples attest,  it  was only with the establishment of
Israel and the other events of  al nakba that it ceased to exist in material form.
Up until this point Palestine continued to represent an objective alternative to the
exclusivism of Zionism, and this was best demonstrated, this version of the past
contends, in accounts of Arab ‘relations with Jews during the pre-1948 period
[that]  were  entirely  friendly’.247   Accounts  which  speak  of  ‘banal  contacts’
between the two communities in which people ‘worked together, played together,
exchanged  gifts,  and  helped  each  other’,  so  proving  that  they  were  never
‘destined to be enemies’.248  What these accounts are specifically is hard to say,
other than the personal reminisces of elder family members and friends of those
who produce this discourse.
    The  opposition  of  most  Palestinians  to  the  UN’s  1947 partition  plan  for
Palestine (which became UNGAR 181) is also (re)interpreted in this discourse as
evidence  of  their  embodiment  of  an  inclusive  and  cooperative  alternative  to
Zionist exclusivism and ethnic separation.  In this version of the past, the Zionist
movement accepted this proposal – and thus the (tactical) separation of Palestine
245 Karmi, Ghada, Married to Another Man, p. 252
246 Abulhawa, Susan, and, Baroud, Ramzy, Palestine/Israel: A Single State, With Justice and 
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248 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 5
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into  exclusive  states  –  while  the  Palestinians  rejected  such  an  outcome  and
offered instead a one-state solution to the conflict of the kind promulgated by
those who produce this discourse today.  As the Declaration of the Movement for
One Democratic State in Palestine writes:
      In 1947, the Palestinian people and their representatives, together with all
the  Arab  and  Muslim  States  members  of  the  United  Nations,
unanimously  rejected  the  partition  of  Palestine  and  called  for  all  of
Mandate Palestine between the Mediterranean sea and the Jordan River
to be established as a unitary democratic state that would prohibit any
discrimination  on the  grounds of  religion  and serve all  of  its  citizens
equally.249
    The mentioning of  ‘Arab and Muslim state  members’  of  the UN in this
passage strongly suggests that it is referring to the proposals of Subcommittee
Two of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).  Established by the
UN  and  tasked  with  finding  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  Palestine,  the
recommendations of UNSCOP’s Subcommittee One would form the basis of the
partition  plan  and  UNGAR 181.   Subcommittee  Two,  in  contrast,  made  up
almost entirely of Arab and Muslim states, proposed the creation of ‘a unitary
and  sovereign  State’  in  Mandate  Palestine  that  would  ‘guarantee  respect  for
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  without  distinction  as  to  race,  sex,
language or religion’.  In addition, it recommended that this state should have ‘a
democratic constitution’.250  So, in a broad sense, it did incorporate many of the
principles present in the contemporary demands for a one-state solution.  
249 The Movement for One Democratic State in Palestine, Declaration of the Movement for One 
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    Nevertheless, the suggestion that this proposal was organic to the Palestinian
people and their representatives is somewhat misleading.  To be sure, political
positions  did exist  within the Palestinian national  movement at  this  time that
were broadly similar to the perspective enunciated by contemporary proponents
of  a  one-state  solution,  though  these  were  largely  confined  to  the  Palestine
Communist Party (PCP) and other marginal groups on the left.251  The PCP in
any case eventually  endorsed the 1947 partition  plan in  conjunction with the
standpoint of the Soviet Union.252  The wider national movement, in contrast, led
by Jamal al-Husayni, rejected all proposals made by UNSCOP members on the
grounds that external agents did not possess the remit to determine the fate of
Palestine.253  Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile these two wildly contradictory
accounts,  except  to  say  that  the  process  of  history  writing  underway  in  the
discourse of one-state functions as what Bourdieu might call ‘a tool for rupture’.
It  confronts  the  established  order  with  ‘discarded  possibilities’,  while
substantiating  the  claims  of  counter-discourses  by  making  them  appear
authentic.254  It is not by accident that such discrepancies emerge as the past is
intricately linked to struggles for the present.
    The  nakba ended the existence of Palestine in concrete form and it brought
into full relief the underlying conflict between the Palestinians and the Zionists
(albeit one that was only resumed following the “reemergence” of the national
movement in the late 1960s).  According to this history,  ‘the conflict between
251 See, for example, Budeira, Musa, The Palestine Communist Party, 1919-1948: Arab and Jew 
in the Struggle for Internationalism, Ithaca Press, London, 1979
252 Ibid., pp. 234-8; See also, Jacobson, Abigail, Between National Liberation and Anti-Colonial 
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254 Bourdieu, Pierre, quoted in, Shapiro, Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and method, Review of 
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Zionism and the Palestinians is – and has always been – driven by the notion that
hundreds  of  years  of  cultural  heterogeneity  and  plurality  could  be  negated
overnight by the creation of a state with a single … identity’.255  Following the
loss of 1948 and the decimation of their society, it is precisely this heterogeneous
and  pluralistic  vision  of  Palestine  that  Palestinians  have  been  struggling  to
reconstitute in structural form: this is the essence of their ongoing confrontation
with Zionism and in the end they will ‘prevail’.256
    Although this version of the conflict and the Palestinian trajectory incorporates
a degree of nostalgia and a desire to return to a beautified past, it is only on the
margins of this discourse that such sentiments exist.257  For the most part, this
narrative is essential and revolutionary.  The Palestinians embody a struggle to
transform the present, not to restore the past.  Their goal is liberation.  As writers
of this perspective write,  ‘from the very beginning … [Palestinians] were not
interested in another separatist nationalism’.
We were not  interested  in  just  another  nationalism,  resisting  theirs  in
order to have ours, that we were going to be the mirror image of them.
That  just  as they had Zionism we would have Zionism too,  except  it
would be Palestinian.  But rather … we were … an alternative in which
the discriminations made on the basis of race and religion and national
origin would be transcended by something we called liberation.258
This is what the Palestinian struggle was and is about, and this is what the PLO
embodied when it  was captured by Palestinian activists  in the late 1960s and
reconstituted  as  a  relatively  autonomous  national  space.   The  PLO  was
revolutionary,  this  position  maintains,  exactly  because it  ‘called for a  secular
255 Makdisi, Saree, End of the two-state solution, The Guardian, Monday 28 July 2008, 
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accessed 06/11/2009
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state in Palestine where Jews, Christians, and Muslims would live together in
equality’.259  What made the Palestinian perspective revolutionary was its desire
to include difference. 
    As discussed in  the  last  chapter,  there are  textual  antecedents  within  the
Palestinian political field that contain this inclusive impulse and it is far from
being unique to the figures who promote a one-state solution.  Their discourse is
incorporative of these prior utterances and it is in this sense that their position is
historically structured.  Nevertheless, the reiterative quality of the discourse of
one-state is neither exact nor all encompassing and inevitably much is left out of
the historical reconstruction carried out by its producers.  The authenticity they
claim for their vision of revolutionary struggle is in fact revealed through their
silence and disavowal of crucial historical elements within the field; and once
more this is tied to the present.
    For instance, though dominant positions with the Palestinian arena certainly
envisaged a ‘non-sectarian Palestine’ as the object of their political action, during
the  “maximalist”  phase  of  the  national  struggle  this  goal  was  explicitly
articulated through militancy and armed resistance.  The democratic solution, as
this  approach  was  sometimes  called,  was  ‘organically  linked’  to  armed
struggle,260 and was unequivocally a ‘militant standpoint’.261  The quintessential
Palestinian agent of this period was ‘the revolutionary who bears arms’ and this
was contrasted with the figure of the ‘refugee’ or the ‘second-class citizen’,262
and the lived experiences of ‘misery, humiliation and despair’.  The taking up of
259 Qumsiyeh, Mazin, B. Sharing the Land of Canaan, p. 153
260 PFLP, Palestine: Towards a Democratic Solution, PFLP Information Department, 1970, p. 22
261 Rasheed, Mohammad, towards a democratic state in Palestine: the Palestinian revolution and
the Jews vis-à-vis the democratic, non-sectarian society of the future, p. 8
262 Quoted in, Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, p. 195
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arms  created  a  ‘new  sense  of  pride  and  dignity’,263 and  as  a  discourse  and
practice armed struggle played a pivotal role in the imagining of the Palestinian
community, as well as in establishing its relative autonomy.264  In this context,
armed struggle and revolution were as much concerned with rejecting reality as
they were with transforming it in pursuit of specific outcomes.265
    The discourse of one-state is either silent on this aspect of the Palestinian
struggle  or  consciously  disavows  it,  valorising  instead  those  “revolutionary”
principles that its producers embody and reassert as  the meaning of Palestine.
Armed struggle is criticised from this perspective as an ill-thought-out strategy
that  had the deleterious  effect  of  undermining the revolutionary ideals  of  the
national movement, submerging them under military violence and so mystifying
the Palestinian  compulsion  for  inclusion  and coexistence  against  exclusion.266
On other occasions the role of armed struggle is less bellicosely downplayed,
with ‘the history of Palestinian resistance’ being classified as ‘overwhelmingly
nonviolent’.267  The effect of this silence, critique and reemphasis seems to be to
delineate the ‘indispensable role of civil resistance’ in the contemporary era;268 to
construct a ‘truth [that] leaves only the power of mind and education to do the
job that armies have been unable to accomplish for over half a century’.269  The
nature  of  the  conflict  precludes  a  diplomatic  outcome,  but  according  to  this
version of the past there ‘can be no military solution’ either,270 and so, as this
263 Rasheed, Mohammad, towards a democratic state in Palestine: the Palestinian revolution and
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position declares, the focus should be on ‘cultural struggle’.271  The diminution of
armed struggle and militancy in this perspective is tied to the assertion of cultural
capital and the bid for power of these intellectuals.
    The Palestinians are urged to ‘rediscover and reconstruct their democratic
secular  state  framework’  in  the  discourse  of  one-state.272  As  this  language
suggests, this authentic position is seen to have been hidden from view in this
account, and indeed this is the one of the central turning points in the counter-
narrative promulgated in these texts.  The PLO’s decision to adopt the political
programme of the twelfth PNC in 1974 is re-presented in this narrative as a point
of departure; and tellingly this is not only a departure from the “true” path of
liberation,  but from the primacy of the Palestinian diaspora and the majority.
The elite discourse of “pragmatism” began to take hold at this stage and this was
accompanied by a reorientation within the political field towards other elites in
the  occupied  territories.   Though  it  was  only  with  the  signing  of  the  Oslo
Accords that the political  action of the “people” was fully ‘replaced with the
action of the elites’, the seeds for this betrayal were planted in the mid-1970s, the
point of aberration.273  
    As this discourse asserts: ‘Whereas between 1964 and 1974, the PLO had
tilted more towards the diaspora in its programme for liberation, from the mid-
1970s, pressure from the emerging pro-PLO Palestinian  elite in the West Bank
and Gaza to accept a two-state solution began to bear fruit [emphasis added]’.274
When read in the broader framework of this discursive practice, it is clear that
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such statements implicitly tie the authentic Palestinian view to the position of
diaspora.  It  was the diaspora ‘which produced Arafat in the first  place’,  this
standpoint writes, before his gradual corruption and repositioning as the head of
the PA.275
    The “purity” of diasporic perspectives on the “homeland” and transnational
community – and by implication the “impurity” of other perspectives (usually
those emanating from within the “homeland”) – is a theme prevalent in studies of
diaspora, and such claims are hardly limited to the Palestinian intellectuals who
are calling for a one-state solution.  This theme is linked to the peculiarities of
diaspora as a site, as diasporic practices tend to be radically detached from the
actual “homeland” and broader community and so the connections they forge are
often  highly  idealised.276  For  those  diaspora  intellectuals  who  produce  this
counter-narrative,  the  aberration  of  “pragmatism”  became  more  and  more
harmful to the national movement the closer its agents got to the institution of
their  rule  in  the  occupied  territories.   Whereas  in  the  narrative  of  state
promulgated by official  positions in the political field the signing of the Oslo
Accords is conveyed as the crossing of an ‘important threshold toward the final
goal of statehood’, it is portrayed in this counter-narrative as the marginalisation
of the “people” and the “true” goal of liberation.277  Rather than a liberationist
alternative  to  Zionism,  under  the  force  of  political  elites  and  their  narrow
interests, the national movement was hijacked and reconstituted as its ‘mimic’.278
    According to this perspective,  though, the ‘language of national liberation
from the 1960s and 1970s’ is starting to resurface, and this is because symbolic
275 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 345 
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authority is shifting from ‘the occupied territories … to those Palestinians living
… in the global diaspora’ – to those people, that is, who make this claim.279  The
Palestinians  are  ‘a  people  who  are  finally  demanding  to  speak  in  their  own
voices, to tell their own story, [and] to define themselves for the world’, and this
is because these intellectuals speak and narrate and define.  No longer are the
Palestinians ‘a people whose voice has been muted’, as when these intellectuals
speak so too do the “people”,  and this voice is authentic,  unbroken from the
period of revolution and beyond.  The dark years of “pragmatism” are coming to
an  end,  with  all  its  falsehoods,  symbolic  violence,  and  betrayals.   With  the
“people” at the helm the struggle for liberation will resume and the revolution
will continue.  Those who construct this narrative define the Palestinian people: 
We are a people who stand firmly on moral ground, demanding basic
human rights and freedom ….  Ours is a demand for inclusion,  while
theirs is for exclusion.  Ours is for the diverse, multi-religious society that
Palestine had always been before the declaration of Israel ….  Ours is a
claim based on history [emphasis added].280
The one-state solution is thus historicized as the Palestinian perspective by those
who advocate it, and when they proclaim that they have put this approach ‘on the
world’s agenda’,281 they also mean that the Palestinian people are beginning ‘to
hold  the  reins  of  their  own  destiny’  once  again.282  This  is  because  these
intellectuals are struggling for this hold, this position of preeminence, and the
authority to define and keep on defining; and historical legitimacy is a strategy
for augmenting this claim.
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    This is not to suggest for one moment of course that these agents do not have a
genuine  concern  for  advancing the  Palestinian  cause and for  giving  voice  to
Palestinian people, who have been undoubtedly marginalised politically due to
the stagnation and decline of their national institutions, as well as the growing
authoritarianism of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip PA governments.  But the
point is that when these agents claim to be representing the “people” and their
authentic  cause,  they  set  themselves  up  as  transparent  interlocutors,  merely
vocalising what the “masses” really think and want and what they have always
wanted.  ‘The Palestinians are very much united on how they see their goals,
their history and their politics’, this position contends.283  But is this really the
case?  An uncritical look at the discourse of one-state would certainly suggest so,
and this is often the problem with the intellectual as spokesperson: they assume
themselves  to  be  someone  whom they  are  not  –  disinterested,  scientific  and
without prejudice; thus making the positions they articulate universal, instead of
particular  and bearing the heavy imprints  of their  own interests,  incorporated
dispositions,  tastes  and  preferences.284  What  this  means  for  politics  will  be
discussed in the next chapter.
    It is important to be clear here, however, and stress that a stark bifurcation
between Palestinians in the occupied territories and the position of diaspora is not
being drawn in this discourse and its narrative of liberation.  These Palestinians
may be seen as more susceptible  to  the discourse of “pragmatism” – and on
occasion proponents of a one-state solution empathise with this disposition – but
this  perspective  insists  that  they  too  are  ultimately  inclined  to  a  liberationist
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confrontation with Zionism and pluralism.285  It is the elites who have usurped
the Palestinian struggle and set it on a course that is contrary to the wishes of the
“masses”.   An  independent  state  ‘never inspired  the  Palestinian  collective
[emphasis added]’,286 and so it follows that such a goal was never the ‘natural
climax’  of  their  struggle.287  It  was  imposed  upon them autocratically,  ‘from
above’,288 and without reference to history or subjectivity.289  This is how the
Palestinians came to be silenced.    
    For this act of usurpation to occur, so this narrative continues, the political
leadership must have had a very tenuous grasp of reality and commitment to the
people  from  the  outset.   It  was  these  factors  as  well  that  allowed  it  to  be
corrupted  so  easily  along  the  path  to  self-rule  in  the  ‘vassal’  PA  regime.290
Although this discourse pays some attention to contextual dynamics that shaped
the PLO’s decision to adopt of more “pragmatic” stance in the mid-1970s, this
repositioning is primarily framed in terms of incompetence and estrangement.
The 1974 PNC marked  the  moment  when political  elites  started  to  ‘naively’
believe that a historic compromise could be reached with Israel,291 setting it on
route  for  the  present  day  inertia  –  a  leadership  who  is  ‘incompetent  and
witless’292 and  who lacks  ‘the  means’  to  progress  indisputable  goals.293  The
decision to set the national struggle on a more “pragmatic” trajectory is further
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(re)framed  in  this  discourse  as  showing  that  political  elites  were  only  ever
superficially Palestinian.  What the leadership ‘never seems to have understood’,
this position asserts, ‘is that we [i.e. the Palestinians] are and have always been a
movement standing for, symbolizing, and getting support as the embodiment of
principles of justice and liberation [emphasis added]’.  In the counter-narrative of
liberation, it is the latent separation of the leadership from the people that has
caused it to stray so far from the “true” path and then lose it totally through
‘covert maneuvering (sic) in the halls of Western power’.294  This is the opposite
of what those who call for a one-state solution are doing: they are continuing the
authentic struggle and so are uttering a legitimate standpoint.
    There is, then, a process of history writing underway in the discourse of one-
state  which  challenges  the  official  narrative  in  the  political  field  and  which
constitutes the agents who produce it in a trajectory of continuity and legitimacy.
When these agents speak and define the Palestinian people they are not wrong in
proclaiming that the Palestinian people are speaking and defining themselves –
not wrong, that is,  according to the terms that  they deploy and historicize as
authentic.   They are one in this re-presentation of the past, and therefore it is
perfectly valid for these intellectuals to claim the mantle of legitimate discourse
and so determine what the people want, and so contest those positions which
proclaim otherwise.  This oneness extends to the type of capital  mobilised by
these agents, and their classification of the present Palestinian condition.  It is
also  an  oneness  that  clearly  denies  the  plurality  of  the  field,  and  which  is
consequently effacing Palestinian difference in both its symbolic and objective
forms.  This act of symbolic violence has strong consequences for the possibility
of these agents converting their critical thought into an actual political agenda, as
294 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, pp. 386-7
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the next chapter will show.  Nevertheless, its performance is explicitly linked to
power and the struggle to impose a legitimate position on the Palestinian political
field  against the orthodox standpoint.  History is interwoven with relations of
domination and resistance, through its reconstruction.                    
                
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown that the factors explaining why intellectuals engage in
political struggle may be complex and irreducible to a single point.  To be sure
such agents  tend to  occupy positions that  are  rich in  the resource of cultural
capital.295  Moreover,  these  may  be  mobilised  in  order  to  play  the  “game”.
Nevertheless, action of this sort remains embedded in particular contexts and is
thus constrained and enabled by certain temporal-spatial boundaries.  
    The analysis conducted above seems to support a general hypothesis in the
literature on intellectuals in politics: that such agents are more likely to take a
more  overtly  political  stance  and  challenge  established  order  in  historical
conditions  of  crises  and  pronounced  uncertainty.296  This  is  not  a  causal
proposition or even one that is relatively straightforward.  As this chapter has
shown, the crisis in established authority within the Palestinian political field has
been perceived and constructed by certain cultural elites as an opportunity for
their political engagement.  Such a crisis may be objective in the sense that the
political  legitimacy  of  the  historic  Palestinian  leadership  has  declined
considerably  in  recent  years  owing  to  its  policy  failures.   Yet  this  objective
reconfiguration of the field still requires that a challenge is initiated.  So what
295 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 79
296 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 208-
12. 
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this chapter has suggested is that while it is by no means inevitable that a crisis in
established political  authority will lead to a more rigorous challenge from the
cultural field, it may certainly enable this form of oppositional practice.
    Even still, this observation does not reveal much in terms of why such an
oppositional political engagement is undertaken.  Why do intellectuals intervene
in the political field?  An interest in changing the social world for the “better”
and for the benefit of a wider social constituency has proven to be an important
factor contributing to the political intervention of those figures analysed in this
study.  They understandably consider the present structure in Palestine-Israel as
being incredibly unjust and oppressive to Palestinians generally and as such they
desire to transform this particular reality.  What drives them, then, is the object of
justice and national liberation and more specifically in their view the dispelling
of settler colonialism and the establishment of a humanistic state.  It is for these
objects that they have become more forcefully engaged politically,  though the
vulnerability  of  political  elites  has  certainly  enabled  this  to  happen.   This  is
hardly a startling revelation given that historically the figure of “the intellectual”
has frequently displayed a compulsion to publicly oppose  what is in terms of
what ought to be.297  Indeed, some scholars go so far as to argue that such a
practice is ‘the constitutive function of the intelligentsia’.298  Nevertheless, as this
chapter has suggested, normative agendas remain a pertinent factor explaining
the oppositional intervention of intellectuals.
    In this regard it is also important to consider the issue of role.  The question of
“what is the role of intellectuals in politics” may be a classic, but it is one that
297 Kennedy, Michael, The ironies of intellectuals on the road to power, or not, in, Rereading The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, p. 27
298 Talshir, Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models of Theory/Praxis, Critical 
Review of Social and Political Philosophy, p. 211
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has been consciously avoided in this study (or at least it is one that has been
avoided in the moralist sense of trying to define what an intellectual ought to do).
This is because to focus solely on such definitional debates is not very helpful in
determining why intellectuals engage in oppositional political  practices;299 and
further because it seems somewhat problematic philosophically and politically to
try and delineate how a certain person ought to behave and fix this criteria for all
times and all places.  What about specific historical and social contexts?  What
about  important  political  questions  of  power  and  strategy?   To  think  only
abstractly about what intellectuals ought to do politically would appear to risk
dogmatism and a potential blindness to prevailing conditions and possibilities.300
It would seem to go against some of the important constitutive criteria of critical
theory, which laudably has a concern with the ‘actual and the possible’ in a given
social  framework.301  Although  critical  theory  is  explicitly  normative  in  its
interest in changing the world, this interest is not necessarily ensconced in an
idealised and implicitly rigid conception of the intellectual’s political role.  In
fact  it  would  appear  to  be  more  concerned  with  the  political  aspect  of  this
question rather than the intellectual part.
    However,  in  a  certain  fashion,  role  remains  important  to  the  study  of
intellectuals in politics, as this chapter has demonstrated.  A practical sense of
obligation and political responsibility  as intellectuals to speak out and confront
injustice  and  oppression  may  indeed  determine  oppositional  action.   The
individuals analysed in this study are positioned within specific understandings
of the intellectual’s political role, which are recognised as authoritative and to a
299 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 205-
7
300 Kioupkiolis, Alexandros, Radicalizing Democracy, Constellations, p. 147
301 Comstock, Donald E., A Method for Critical Research, in, Martin, Michael, and, McIntyre, 
Lee C., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and, London, England, 1994, pp. 626-7
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large extent appear to be internalised or at least taken for granted.  To be a ‘real
intellectual’ one  must act accordingly, and for these individuals this is taken to
require their political engagement – especially when politicians are perceived to
have failed – through a practice of “speaking truth to power”.302  This is what
intellectuals do and so they do it.  Such prior cognitive schemes and historically
generated dispositions force them to act and to be engaged in a precise mode of
political struggle.  As “real” intellectuals they cannot operate in the cultural field
alone.  In order to fulfil a practical sense of role and (re)produce themselves as a
recognisable form of intellectual subject they have to perform a specific function.
This is a further factor explaining why they do what they do in the political field.
So it is perhaps in this more structuring sense that the issue of role should be
integrated into the study of intellectuals in politics.
    However, for all the interest in alleviating injustice and transforming social
reality,  along with the structuring effects of role in making these agents move
beyond the cultural sphere, it is cultural acumen and their ‘relative monopoly of
complex knowledge’ that they are deploying in the field of politics.303 As critical
scholarship on this issue has suggested, it is such knowledge that intellectuals
frequently proclaim to be putting in the services of subaltern positions, on the
assumption  that  it  has  a  political  utility  in  terms  of  comprehension  and
delineating what is wrong and what is right with a particular situation.   What
such proclamations often disguise, however, through the language of disinterest
and sacrifice, is the self-interest of the intellectual figure.304  Their knowledge is
302 Said, Edward W., Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, pp. 7-102
303 Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, 
Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3
304 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 13; Kennedy, Michael, The ironies of 
intellectuals on the road to power, or not, in, Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class 
Power, Theory and Society, p. 27
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the  resource  they  deploy  so  as  to  ‘legitimize  aspirations  to  power’.305  In
Bourdieusian terminology,  it is the capital  of institutionalised competence and
cultivated dispositions which are invested in battles for legitimate domination of
the field.  This study supports these insights and shows that intellectuals are far
from being above or somehow separate from the field of power – as is often
proclaimed  through  the  discourse  of  disinterest  and  detachment  –  but  are
interested in capturing and imposing their own point of view upon it.  
    In this particular instance, it is the resource of cultural capital that has been
mobilised  in  order  to  play  the  “game”  and  specifically  this  has  entailed  the
strategic move of classifying the Palestinian political impasse as a problem of
competence and requisite  knowledge.  This definition of social  reality clearly
works to place those who possess such resources in an indispensable political
position and ‘at the top of the hierarchy of the principles of hierarchization’; and
it  is  such resources that  these intellectuals  claim to possess in  abundance,  in
contrast to “other” elite points in Palestinian social space.306  Their engagement
in political struggle is therefore explained as a bid for power; it is an interest in
legitimate  domination  of  the  field  that  accounts  for  their  more  forceful
intervention in politics.
    Struggles over the principles of hierarchization do not stop there, however, and
the ‘double game’ that Bourdieu talks about in his conception of social space
extends in this particular instance to the transnational field.307  As a diasporic
practice, the articulation of the discourse of one-state is certainly a competing
definition of the Palestinian political field, and its imposition on this relatively
305 Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, 
Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3
306 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 168
307 Ibid., pp. 180-1
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autonomous social  sphere is ensnared in relations  of power,  and in particular
battles over the meaning and delimitation of “inside” and “outside”.  Citizenship
is a concept that has been previously introduced into the study of transnational
politics.   But  what  the Bourdieusian  framework enables,  and what  this  study
shows, is a conceptualisation of citizenship in this setting that is less concerned
with  boundaries  of  political  membership  –  formal  or  otherwise  –  and  more
concerned with  demarcating  the properties  essential  to  a  “proper”  citizenship
function.  That is to say, in keeping with understandings of citizenship deployed
in different contexts, the concept is envisioned here at the transnational level less
as a status and more as a specific practice; one that requires for its specificity that
agents  be  capable  of  performing  certain  actions.308  What  these  actions  are
precisely are historically contested.
    In  contrast  to  “other”  Palestinian  points  in  social  space,  these  diaspora
intellectuals claim to possess properties that allow them to be effective political
subjects.  This socially constructed binary of possession and lack is a central
theme in the genealogy of citizenship, as Engin Isin has shown, and it is directly
tied to the production of political boundaries of inside and outside, domination
and  subordination.309  Specifically  it  is  diaspora  that  is  hierarchized  in  this
instance as a temporal-spatial materiality which affords those who are positioned
within it the time and security to be properly political (combined with privileged
knowledge of course).  For Palestinians positioned outside this point in social
space,  they  are  produced  in  this  discourse  as  lacking  such  temporal-spatial
properties and are therefore produced as political outsiders.  This is clearly not
done maliciously, but it does suggest a struggle taking place across transnational
308 Isin, Engin F., Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship, pp. ix(preface)-37
309 Ibid.
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social  space  to  deconstruct  and  reconstruct  extant  relations  of  power  in  the
Palestinian  context.   Power  and  the  control  of  legitimate  discourse  are  thus
central to explicating the political engagement of these diaspora intellectuals.  
    More generally, this study has shown that the conceptualisation of diasporic
practices as practices of citizenship need not be limited to claims to belong to a
particular transnational community.  Such practices may be heavily implicated in
relations  of  power.   Furthermore,  this  emphasis  on relations  of  power  at  the
transnational  level  may  perhaps  address  a  central  paradox  in  the  study  of
diaspora politics: namely that diasporic stances are typically infused with visions
of hybridity and nonexclusivity, but are principally performed in exclusive social
formations.310  The focus on relations of power enables one to see this paradox as
an  outcome  of  the  (transnational)  field  and  the  struggles  it  generates  to
legitimately impose a particular point of view on social space.  In this sense this
paradox is at least understandable, though this point is made here only tentatively
and with much circumspection.
    Finally, the struggle for power launched by these intellectuals is further shown
through their  claim to  legitimately  represent  and speak for  Palestine  and the
Palestinian  people.   Much creative  discursive work is  carried out  in  order  to
assert this claim and the identity that these intellectuals proclaim to share with
the “people” is produced in their discourse through a relation of distinction from
“other” elites and a process of (re)narrating the past.  They are the privileged
voice of the “people” representing authentic  Palestinian  demands.   This is  of
course tied to their interest in gaining legitimate control of determining political
discourse  in  the  Palestinian  field,  and  it  is  certainly  not  unheard  of  for
310 Brubaker, Rogers, The “diaspora” diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, p. 6; Turner, Simon, 
The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its diaspora, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, p. 745
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intellectuals (and indeed other social categories) to claim to speak for a wider
social ensemble in pursuit of such aims.311  The interesting point here about such
discursive  moves,  however,  is  that  while  there  clearly  might  be  words
constitutive  of  the  discourse  of  one-state  that  resonate  with  Palestinians
generally, the people are in effect symbolically effaced in this discourse through
their assimilation to the standpoint of these intellectuals.  The vision of a one-
state  solution incorporates  a  particular  point  of view and its  generalisation  to
other points in the field in advance of ‘political  work’ is  an act  of symbolic
violence.312  It denies the plurality immanent to the field; and as the next chapter
will argue it denies the possibility of anything but a heavily circumscribed form
of politics being engaged in by these intellectuals.
311 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 210; 
Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 65
312 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, pp. 7-8
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Chapter Four: Modes of Criticality: The Contingent Political Limits of the
Discourse of One-State
The  possibility  of  resistance  is  implied  by  the  notion  of  a  field  constituted
through relations of power.  Without this relational aspect power would not be
power at all  but an absolute condition in which the social  world is fixed and
settled outright.  An individual’s ‘capacity to act’ is a necessary feature of the
field and while this capacity is inevitably constrained to varying degrees by the
temporal-spatial structure of social space, even those positions which are heavily
subordinated have a freedom to initiate certain oppositional forces.1  The social
world is ongoing and unstable and this is because of the relative freedom of the
agent and the partiality of domination.   What people do in the field is  never
determined in advance.  Nonetheless, it is shaped by their relative position in
social space and the relations of power in which they are implicated.
    If these ontological assumptions indicate why conflict and struggle are rife in
social  space, they reveal little about the exact modes of resistance individuals
deploy  against  political  orthodoxy  and  established  order.   The  arguments  of
previous chapters are that proponents of a one-state solution are contesting the
domination of “pragmatism” in the Palestinian political field and are trying to
impose  as legitimately dominant  their  own position on social  space.   This is
primarily how their discursive practice should be understood and why they are
engaged in political struggle.  Specifically, it is through the resources of cultural
capital and temporal-spatial security that these agents are making their bid for
power in the field, augmented by a claim to represent the authentic demands of
the “people”.  Yet in seeking this relation of power how exactly are they trying to
1 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, p. 239
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exercise  it?   As  noted  in  Chapter  One,  Michel  Foucault  regards  relations  of
power as the ‘strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct
of others’.2  Those who construct the discourse of one-state have so far practiced
a strategy of resistance which centres,  in their  own words, on ‘impacting the
present Palestinian leadership … [through] the loudness of their voice’.3  How is
that they are engaged in such a form of political practice and not otherwise?
    This question seems pertinent given that different modes of political action are
proposed by these individuals, with great weight being attached to the object of
converting  their  ‘ideal’  of  a  one-state  solution  ‘into  a  concrete  political
movement’.4  They in fact contend that ‘the gap between our position and our
goal can only be narrowed if we can have an organised movement of the millions
of  Palestinians  united  in  a  common platform [emphasis  added]’.5  Therefore,
given the significance they invest in organising a political movement comprising
the mass of the Palestinian people, how come they continue to perform action
along the lines specified above?  What prevents them from engaging in this other
mode of conduct,  which it  should be noted is similar to Bourdieu’s notion of
political work?      
    One does not want to appear naïve in asking these sorts of question.  It is
clearly a colossally difficult task to engage in such a form of conduct, one that
cannot be carried out overnight, and one that might not ever materialise despite
the  best  efforts  of  those  who attempt  it.   But  so  what?   If  difficulty  was  a
2 Foucault, Michel, The Subject and Power, in, Dreyfus, Herbert L., and, Rabinow, Paul (eds.), 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Second Edition, With an Afterword 
by and Interview with Michel Foucault, pp. 219-20
3 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Journal, p. 71
4 Ibid., p. 56
5 Nabulsi, Karma, Popular Sovereignty and Justice, Conference on the One State for 
Palestine/Israel: A Country for All its Citizens, University of Massachusetts, 28 and 29 March, 
2009.  A video recording of the conference sessions is available at 
http://www.arabichour.org/One-state-Conference.htm, accessed 03/10/2011 
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sufficient reason for not trying to convert abstract critical thought into an actual
historical position then those who are interested in changing the social world, or
a particular aspect of it, may as well give up now.  Within their own discursive
output,  proponents  of  a  one-state  solution  acknowledge  that  such  a  task  is
‘difficult’  and  especially  so  at  this  present  ‘juncture’.6  Yet  they  also
acknowledge that ‘difficult’ is not the same as ‘insurmountable’ and as such it
would  seem analytically  spurious  to  a  priori dismiss  the  possibility  of  their
attempting  this  mode  of  critical  engagement,  irrespective  of  their  structural
subordination.7
    Moreover,  it  would seem that  the questions posed here have a  particular
resonance  within  the  Palestinian  political  field  in  its  present  configuration.
Unsurprisingly, those intellectuals who construct the discourse of one-state are
not alone in perceiving that the Palestinian national movement is undergoing a
significant process of change, characterised mainly by the collapse of its historic
leadership,  institutions  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  discursive  frameworks.   In
addition,  they are not alone in  identifying  a pressing need for Palestinians  to
‘become  a  unified  political  community  on  the  basis  of  a  clear  agenda  and
effective strategies’, so as to confront and try and reverse ‘their suffering as a
dispossessed and oppressed people’.   Commenting  on the  national  movement
generally,  Beshara  Doumani  remarks  that  the  calls  in  this  regard  have  been
‘numerous’ and perhaps can be seen as ‘a crucial first step’.8
    However,  while  those  who  articulate  the  discourse  of  one-state  tend  to
categorise  the  current  Palestinian  impasse  in  terms  of  liminality  and
6 Aruri, Naseer H., The incidental fruit of Oslo, Al-Ahram Weekly
7 Elmusa, Sharif S., Searching for a solution, in, Hilal, Jamil (ed.), Where Now for Palestine: The
Demise of the Two-State Solution, p. 220
8 Doumani, Beshara, Palestine versus the Palestinians? The Iron Laws and the Ironies of a People 
Denied, Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 56-61
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(re)emergence,  there  are  others  who  are  less  positive  in  their  outlook.   As
Doumani argues, the Palestinians are at a ‘watershed moment’ and though this is
filled with ‘potential opportunities’ it is at the same time filled with ‘very real
dangers’.  For those who do not subscribe to a positivist  epistemology and a
definitive  horizon  it  is  unconscionable  to  think  that  ‘the  salvation  of  the
Palestinians’  is  assured.9  From  a  Bourdieusian  perspective  there  are  only
ongoing and indeterminable struggles to preserve or modify extant relations of
power, which returns one to the question of how exactly change is sought and
resistance is operationalized.
    Proponents of a one-state solution are, as noted, trying to impact the conduct
of the ‘present Palestinian leadership … [through] the loudness of their voice’.10
This is a strategy that has been recognised and remarked upon by critics of their
approach,  with  figures  like  Bashir  Abu-Manneh  commenting  that  such
proponents  seem  to  think  that  they  can  win  support  for  their  position  by
‘shout[ing] hard and long enough’.  Abu-Manneh goes further and argues that
this  mode  of  conduct  ‘smacks  of  discursive  strategies  not  real  ones’  and  is
‘utopian’.11  This mode of operation needs to be explained, however, as it is not
inevitable.  
    The argument  of this  chapter  is  that  this  strategy stems from the bid for
symbolic power enacted by these intellectuals through their articulation of the
discourse of one-state.  The precise nature of this bid results in the contingent
establishment  of  boundaries  beyond  which  these  agents  temporarily  cannot
move.  These conditions of possibility/impossibility therefore prevent them from
9 Ibid., pp. 59-61
10 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Journal, p. 71
11 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New 
Politics
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trying to proselytise their position in the political field in a manner that is ‘real’12
(to  borrow  Abu-Manneh’s  phrase)  or  ‘concrete’13 (to  use  their  own).   Such
boundaries mark the limits of their political engagement.  
    These limits are enacted in two ways.  Firstly, the mobilisation of their cultural
capital results in a critical practice infused with an excessive idealism and focus
on epistemology, which affects a reduction of political transformation to ideas,
“truth” and consciousness; it is from such knowledge and correct philosophical
interpretation that all else will follow.  Secondly, their claim to unity with the
“people”  results  in  a  symbolic  effacement  of difference  in  the political  field,
thereby  denying  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  political  engagement  and
reconstruction through a process of winning positions and generalising particular
wills into a mobilised collective subject.  Beyond the elite sphere, collective will
is  always  already present  in  this  representation  of  social  reality  and as  such
cannot be practically made.  This is why politics for these agents is limited to
principled critique directed at “other” elites.
    The argument made here finally enables a response to the overarching research
question  posed at  the  beginning  of  this  study.   That  is:  what  role  can these
particular  intellectuals  play  in  converting  their  critical  thought  into  an  actual
political agenda?  The answer suggested here is that the specific practice of their
critical  thought has reached its  limits  and consequently they can play no role
beyond that which they are already engaged in.  This is all they can do given the
effects produced by their discursive intervention into the political field.  As such,
it seems reasonable to suggest that these critical intellectuals are an implicitly
conservative and heavily restricted agent for change.  
12 Ibid.
13 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Journal, p. 71
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    Of course, given that this role is determined partially and contingently by
structural position and the effects of creative discursive work, any conclusions
drawn are temporary and heavily qualified.  The discourse of one-state and those
who utter it are not a total and fixed system, and the arguments made here are the
result  of  a  partial  reading using a  specific  conceptual  lense.   The hegemonic
frames  constitutive  of  this  position-taking  and their  reiteration  may  delineate
heavily  circumscribed  conditions  of  possibility/impossibility  for  political
struggle, which derive from the bid for power launched by these intellectuals.
Yet in order to stress that this position is not a totality or a fixity, but is ongoing
and fluid,  a final  section in  this  chapter  will  briefly  detail  slippages  from its
dominant stance that point towards more open political possibilities.  These are
uttered infrequently and are heavily subordinated in this discourse.  Nonetheless,
from a Bourdieusian perspective, they have less restrictive political effects than
their hegemonic counterparts.        
The Reduction of Politics to Ideas
‘The field of power’, states Loïc Waquant, ‘is precisely [the] arena where holders
of  the  various  kinds  of  capital  compete  over  which  of  them will  prevail’.14
Through problematising the crisis of the two-state framework as an absence of
credible knowledge in the Palestinian arena, those who produce the discourse of
one-state are trying to produce themselves and the capital at their disposal as the
solution.   It  is  their  privileged access to “truth”,  stemming mainly from their
cultural  sophistication  and  advanced  qualifications,  that  makes  them
indispensable  to  the  Palestinian  struggle.   What  this  claim  seems  to  do  to
14 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Foreword, in, Bourdieu, Pierre, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the 
Field of Power (translated by Lauretta C. Clough), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996,  pp. ix-xxii, p. 
xi
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questions of political change, however, is reduce them to abstract principles and
normative frameworks, resulting in patterns of resistance which prioritise ideas,
epistemological excavations, and necessary – if sometimes painful – maturations
of  thought  and  action.   It  is  not  by  chance  that  the  official  domination  of
“pragmatism” is framed as ‘nauseating’15 in this discourse owing to its insistence
on politics as the ‘art of the possible’16, which is considered as being directly
‘opposed to idealism’17 and the ‘special position’ that these intellectuals claim to
occupy.18  It  is  not  by  chance,  moreover,  that  their  critical  practice  remains
abstract, as their position and bid for power orients them to a politics in which
ideas rule the world.
    The ‘truth unadorned’, as noted previously, is what these intellectuals claim to
be interested in.19  They are ‘interested in the truth and in justice’, with a specific
reference to the Palestinians.20  Their  political  engagement,  so they state,  is a
moral struggle based on ‘universal principles’, and it is this morality that has
been lacking from the discourse of “pragmatism”.21  Above all else, according to
this counter-discourse, the crisis that has befallen the Palestinians is due to this
lack,  with  the  national  cause  being  hijacked  by  philosophically  inert  and
unscrupulous elites.  
    The epistemology on which this criticism is based assumes metaphysics of
right and wrong, good and bad.  It is the privileged access to this metaphysical
foundation  that  these  intellectuals  claim to  possess,  which  according  to  their
diagnosis makes them politically vital.   Palestinians generally are taken in the
15 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 72
16 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 105
17 Massad, Joseph A., On Zionism and Jewish Supremacy, New Politics, p. 89
18 Talshir, Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models of Theory/Praxis, Critical 
Review of Social and Political Philosophy, p. 220
19 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 283
20 Makdisi, Saree, Palestine Inside Out, p. xxvi (Author’s Note) 
21 Boston Declaration on the One State
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discourse of one-state to embody these transcendental principles, even if they are
not fully conscious of them yet.   Consequently,  once the inherent injustice of
Israel’s  ‘racial  and  colonial  privileges’  is  recognised,22 and  ‘it  becomes  fully
apparent’ to Palestinians (as well as others) that “pragmatism” is wrong,23 then
‘everything will fall into place’.24  A one-state solution ‘is inevitable’,25 and this
is because ‘History suggests that no version of ethnic privilege can ultimately
persist’.26
    The inessentiality of truth is a staple feature of the Bourdieusian field.  In this
sense, it bears a strong resemblances to poststructuralist accounts which speak of
historical ‘regimes of truth’, and ‘struggles over those truths’.27  Truth in this
regard  is  inextricably  interwoven  with  partiality  and  relations  of  power,  the
utterance  of  particular  discourses  and  efforts  to  have  them  recognised  as
legitimate across certain social arenas.  As an effect of power, discourses also
produce certain effects, and these are likewise partial,  in that they temporally
delimit what is intelligible and performable, albeit unstably.  The discourse of
one-state, like any other discourse, is constitutive of limits, even if these only
work on those  who recognise  its  authority,  and even if  this  recognition  only
extends  to  those  agents  who  are  responsible  for  its  utterance.   Though  their
metaphysical claims are utterly impermissible from a Bourdieusian standpoint, it
is doubtless the case that  the notion of essential truth is invested with supreme
22 Massad, Joseph, Palestine state … of mind, Transcript of Empire episode, Al-Jazeera English, 
Thursday, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2011/11/2011119114243850152.html, accessed 
30/05/2013 
23 Bishara, Azmi, Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process, in, Giacaman, George, and, 
Lønning, Dag J. (eds.), After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems, pp. 223-4
24 Massad, Joseph, Palestine state … of mind, Transcript of Empire episode, Al-Jazeera English
25 Karmi, Ghada, The future is one nation, The Guardian
26 Bisharat, George, Israel and Palestine: A true one-state solution, The Washington Post
27 Veyne, Paul, quoted in, Jabri, Vivienne, Critical Thought and Political Agency in  Time of 
War, International Relations, p. 76
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importance by these intellectuals because it is assumed to positively exist in this
context, with its uncovering and acceptance being essential to progress.
    The bid for power in this discourse, therefore, has effects on the shape of
political conduct.  By seeking to structure social reality in such a way so that the
specific authority at their disposal is converted into symbolic capital, these agents
are establishing limits and orders of preference for action.  It is not as if practical
politics  and  actual  historical  formations  are  accorded  no  significance  in  this
discourse.  As shown already, organised and concrete movements and platforms
feature in this discourse and are framed as being essential to its vision of success.
Rather,  such practicalities,  though important,  have an importance of a second
order nature, which is necessarily imposed by the primacy invested in cultural
struggle  and  epistemological  awakening.   Organising  a  collective  political
subject  is  discussed  in  this  discourse,  but  its  manifestation  is  seen  as  being
relatively  straightforward,  comprising  ‘traditional  steps  well  known  to  all
activists’, once the idea of a one-state solution has been accepted.  The ‘main
plank of the campaign’28 for a one-state solution is thus to get ‘the idea accepted’,
and this is because when that occurs ‘the battle is mostly won’.29  The ‘concrete
grounds’ for a solution, this position declares, ‘can only come from moral vision,
and neither  from “pragmatism” nor “practicality”’.30  The inevitability  that  is
frequently  attached  to  the  realisation  of  a  one-state  solution  is  perhaps
attributable to this temporal logic, the positivistic assertion of cause and effect, x
causes y.31  
28 Karmi, Ghada, Married to Another Man, pp. 258-9
29 Personal interview with Ghada Karmi, London, 15 February, 2010
30 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 51
31 As Salman Abu Sitta remarked at a public event attended by this author, ‘by enlightening 
people’ the ‘truth will prevail’.  Abu Sitta, Salman, Mapping Palestine: for its Survival of 
Destruction?, Palestine Land Society, Central Hall, Westminster, London, 12 November, 2010
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    A ‘battle of ideas’ is what is needed, and this needs special intellectuals who
are most suited to conducting this battle of ideas.32  Organisers and activists in
this  sense  are  ‘important’,  ‘but  they  do  not  write  textbooks  for  education
systems, and they do not write the editorials in newspapers’.33  It is the circularity
of this logic that prevents any movement beyond principled critique for these
agents, contingently trapping them in a tautology of their own making.  
    The decision to make this tautology did not come down to autonomous choice,
it should be stressed.  It is derived from their position in the field.  Habitus is a
generator of dispositions that orient action in the manner of placing restrictions
on decisions.   According to  Bourdieu,  furthermore,  such dispositions  seek to
provide  themselves  with  a  ‘milieu  to  which  [they  are]  as  pre-adapted  as
possible’,  thereby reinforcing  such dispositions  ‘by  offering  the  market  most
favourable to [their] products’.34  As scholars of social movements have noticed,
agents ‘normally seek arenas where their resources and skills are comparatively
valuable’.35  It is such dispositions which decide the action of those agents who
are producing the discourse of one-state.
    The transposition of their cultural logic to the field of power, or rather their
reduction of politics to “truth” and consciousness, results in the performance and
prioritisation of action in marketplaces that are best suited to the products that
they are inclined to produce.  It is no coincidence that one of the main forums in
which  the  idea  of  a  one-state  solution,  and  so  the  “truth”  of  the  matter,  is
produced  and  disseminated  has  been  the  academic  conference  –  although,  it
32 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 191
33 Pappé, Ilan, Roundtable – Unsettling (Settler) Colonialism, Past is Present: Settler 
Colonialism in Palestine, School of Oriental and African Studies, 5 and 6 March, 2011
34 Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice, p. 61
35 Jasper, James M., A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social 
Movement Choices, Mobilization: The International Journal of Research in Social Movements, 
Protest, and Contentious Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2004, pp. 1-16, p. 5
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should  be  emphasised  that  this  specific  practice  is  only considered here in  a
cursory  fashion  as  an  outcome  and  reiteration  of  the  epistemological  and
theoretical possibilities constitutive of the discourse of one-state, and not in terms
of its actual impact, which is a matter that has been set aside by this study.  These
forums often include  quite  sophisticated  analyses  of  the situation,  undertaken
from the perspectives discussed previously in this study, and frequently result in
the production and publication of declarations which call for further ‘discussion,
research and’ – only then – ‘action to advance a unitary, democratic solution and
bring  it  to  fruition’.36  The  exaltation  of  ‘secular  education’37,  ‘research’38,
‘lectures’,39 ‘academic books’,40 ‘research’,41 and so on, as a politics of liberation
stems from the exaltation of what Zygmunt Bauman called the ‘intellectual mode
of praxis’, and the interest in acquiring or conserving the ‘enthronement’ of this
technique  in  a  particular  social  space.42  Why  fight,  so  it  would  seem,  has
consequences for how to fight, at least in this instance.
    ‘Open thinking’, then, does not necessarily point ‘beyond itself’, as Theodor
Adorno  once  remarked;43 and  while  critical  thought  is  certainly  crucial  as  a
‘solvent of  doxa’, it too imposes limits that are shaped by the conditions of its
production, and which, so it appears, are important to reflect upon (though how
36 The One State Declaration
37 Said, Edward W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 167
38 Nabulsi, Karma, The Peace Process and the Palestinians: A Road Map to Mars, International 
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March 2004, pp. 221-231, p. 231
39 Personal interview with Ghada Karmi, London, 15 February, 2010
40 Pappé, Ilan, Roundtable – Unsettling (Settler) Colonialism, Past is Present: Settler 
Colonialism in Palestine
41 Abunimah, Ali, Barghouti, Omar, Ben-Dor, Oren, Bisharat, George, Bresheeth, Haim, Chavez 
Giraldo, Pedro, Cook, Jonathan, Farsakh, Leila, Friedman, Steven, Jad, Islah, Massad, Joseph, 
Pappé, Ilan, Prieto Del Campo, Carlos, Rouhana, Nadim, Tarazi, Michael, Tilley, Virginia, 
Statement: One country, one state, 9 July 2007, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/printer7102.shtml,
accessed 25/02/2010
42 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 18
43 Adorno, Theodor, quoted in, Talshir, Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models 
of Theory/Praxis, Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, p. 218
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one does this and to what extent it is even possible cannot be discussed here).44
The  conditions  of  possibility/impossibility  inscribed  in  a  particular  critical
standpoint, and their consequences for thought and action, may even be contrary
to the forms of politicisation deemed vital in certain circumstances; preventing,
from  specific  positions,  efforts  at  their  enactment.   The  position  of  the
intellectual,  and  more  precisely  the  critical  intellectual,  seems,  when  viewed
through  the  conceptual  lense  used  here,  to  be  oriented  towards  a  latent
conservatism in political thought and action, which derives ultimately from an
interest in disinterest.45  It is for this reason that figures such as Saree Makdisi
proclaim that, ‘all the Palestinians have to do is express the reality of their own
historical and actual circumstances’.46  That is, speak the “truth” to power.
    Critical practice is clearly important.  With the crisis of the two-state solution,
as well as the authority of their position, these intellectuals have been able to
challenge established orthodoxy and prise open a discursive terrain that, not so
long ago, was heavily foreclosed and from which most Palestinians are excluded.
Yet, by promoting a critique which works to monopolise critical practice in their
hands and through their conventional mode of praxis, they have absented from
their  discourse,  in  its  present  figuration,  the  possibility  of  forging  ‘political
bonds’ with potential resisters beyond themselves.47  Of course, this might result
in a loss of authority when confronted with the plurality of the field and different
decisions.48  But to a large extent the attempted mediation of these differences is
44 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Critical Thought as a Solvent of Doxa, Constellations, pp. 97-101
45 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 78.  Also see Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of 
Practices, Practices of Power, International Political Sociology, p. 230
46 Makdisi, Saree, “Intellectual Warfare” and the Question of Palestine, in, Bisharat, George, and,
Doumani, Beshara, Open Forum: Strategizing Palestine, Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 81
47 Campbell, David, Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-structuralism, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1998, pp. 497-521, pp. 517-21
48 Talshir, Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models of Theory/Praxis, Critical 
Review of Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 219-20
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what politics is about, with some points of view triumphing more so than others.
To  deny  this  confrontation,  then,  is  to  eradicate  potential  actual  historical
formations which, though constrained, struggle to defeat excessive violence and
hopefully institute relations of power that are less violent.  This may never work.
    The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign, in which many of those
who produce the discourse of one-state are prominent, is deemed vital from this
perspective for the realisation of this approach.  But it, too, within the limits of
the discourse of one-state, appears to follow this circular logic – though, again, it
ought to be stressed that BDS is only examined here briefly and with a sole focus
on its  epistemological  and  theoretical  implications  within  the  context  of  this
discourse; questions regarding the actual impact of this activism are once more
positioned outside the purview of this research.     
    The  BDS  campaign  was  launched  in  July  2005  by  ‘representatives  of
Palestinian civil society’.  It calls upon ‘international civil society organisations
and  people  of  conscience  all  over  the  world  to  impose  broad  boycotts  and
implement divestment initiatives against Israel’.  Boycotts target those ‘products
and  companies  (Israeli  and  international)  that  profit  from  the  violation  of
Palestinian  rights’.   They  also  target  ‘Israeli  sporting,  cultural  and  academic
institutions’, as these are seen as contributing directly to ‘maintaining, defending,
or whitewashing the oppression of Palestinians’.  As the BDS movement states:
‘Divestment  means  targeting  corporations  complicit  in  the  violation  of
Palestinian rights and ensuring that the likes of university investment portfolios
and pension funds are not used to finance such companies’.  In addition, such
international organisations and people of conscience are called upon to pressure
their ‘respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel’.  This
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is  because  sanctions  are  considered  to  be  an  essential  mechanism  for
‘demonstrating disapproval of a country’s actions’.  Taken together, the aim of
these  measures  is  to  force  Israel  to  comply  with  ‘international  law  and
Palestinian rights’,49 which means: 
(1)  Ending  its  occupation  and  colonization  of  all  Arab  lands  and
dismantling  the  Wall;  (2)  Recognizing  the  fundamental  rights  of  the
Arab-Palestinian citizens  of Israel to full  equality;  and (3) Respecting,
protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194.50            
The ‘BDS campaign worldwide’ is coordinated by the BDS National Committee
(BNC),  which  was  established  in  November  2007.   According  to  the  BNC
website,  its  creation  was  necessary  due  to  the  rapid  growth  of  the  BDS
movement and the impetus for greater cohesion this generated.51  
    Though one cannot reduce the BDS movement to those figures who construct
the counter-knowledge of a one-state solution, many of them are active in it, and
this campaign features heavily in their writings.  For example, the BDS campaign
is categorised by such intellectuals as being ‘the only way to ensure the creation
of a secular, democratic state for all in historic Palestine [emphasis added]’.52
The centrality ascribed to BDS by these specific agents is consistent with their
broader discursive stance on the one-state solution and its assumptions regarding
foundational  principles  and  epistemology.   Rather  than  being  principally
concerned  with  exacting  an  economic  toll  on  Israel,  so  as  to  coerce  it  into
49 Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement, Introducing the BDS Movement, 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro, accessed 11/02/2013
50 BDS Movement, Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, 9 July 2005, available at 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/call, accessed 11/02/2013.  See this web address for the list of 
endorsements.  
51 BDS Movement, Palestinian BDS National Committee, http://www.bdsmovement.net/BNC, 
accessed 11/02/2013
52 Eid, Haidar, Sharpeville 1960, Gaza 2009, The Electronic Intifada, 22 January, 2009, 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/sharpeville-1960-gaza-2009/8013, accessed 23/11/2009 
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complying with international law and Palestinian rights, the BDS movement is
for these agents a tactic subordinated to the strategy of excavating the “truth”.
‘The most consequential achievement of the … BDS movement’, states Omar
Barghouti, has been ‘to expose the “essential nature” of Israel’s regime over the
Palestinian people as one that combines military occupation, colonization, ethnic
cleansing, and apartheid’ – what he otherwise calls ‘settler colonialism’.  This
practice of demystification is ‘all Palestinians and defenders of peace with justice
have to do’ in order to secure their goal; ‘prove beyond a doubt’ that Israel is a
settler colonial configuration, which for these critics of course is not subject to
falsification.53  Their role in this regard is thus delimited to convincing ‘Israelis
by  hitting  them on  the  head  and  putting  some  sense  into  their  head’;54 and
educating  the  Palestinian  leadership:  ‘We need to  educate  them,  we need to
encourage  them to  adopt  changes  [emphasis  added]’.55  BDS  for  these
intellectuals appears to be informed by the specific epistemological criteria that
currently determines their wider calls for a one-state solution.  
    The discourse of “truth” seems to impose teleology on the social world in
another way for many of these intellectuals, restricting action beyond principled
critique still further.  While generally the discourse of one-state assumes a causal
link  between  excavating  a  priori  foundations  and  political  realisation,  which
delimits critical practice in a certain direction, for some writing this perspective
these  a priori  foundations possess agency.  They are an active and underlying
structure catapulting history and human beings forward to a single, unitary state
in  Palestine-Israel.   In  this  regard,  the  reality  of  a  one-state  solution  –  as
53 Barghouti, Omar, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, 
pp. 11-64
54 Barghouti, Omar, Organizing for Self-Determination, Ethical De-Zionization and Resisting 
Apartheid, Conference on the One State for Palestine/Israel: A Country for All its Citizens
55 Audeh, Ida, Envisioning a better future: Activist Mazin Qumsiyeh interviewed, The Electronic 
Intifada 
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articulated by these intellectuals – is incontrovertibly immanent in the crisis of
“pragmatism”  and  the  two-state  approach.   Once  the  façade  of  a  two-state
solution has passed,  then it  is  causally  logical  in this  representation of social
reality that a single state will emerge.  But the journey to this horizon is not only
to be hastened by the practice of consciousness raising carried out by special
intellectuals, it is also to be determined by the force of “pragmatism’s” inevitable
collapse, its incompatibility with Israel’s essential policy and ‘the worsening of
the reality on the ground’.56  
    ‘When it becomes fully apparent that an independent and democratic state
occupying  every  inch  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  free  from  Israeli
settlements is not realisable’, this position contends, Palestinians ‘will then begin
to discuss the bi-national solution that will do away with the system of apartheid
that  is  anchored  in  the  realities  of  Oslo’.57  Though  the  “truth”  of  reality  is
apprehended automatically in this instance through the unfolding of such reality
itself, the effect in this discourse is still assumed to be very much the same as
when consciousness  is  given via  pedagogical  instruction:  awakening  leads  to
emancipation, the positivist principle of x causes y, which obviates the need for
the active formation of a collective political subject through the mediation and
reconstruction of different political wills; the actual struggle for domination of a
particular  point  of  view.58  “Truth”  in  this  instance  appears  to  be
counterproductive, in that it works to prevent efforts at production as an effect of
power.
56 Cocco, Michelangelo, Interview with Leila Farsakh – the Two State Solution is Dead, 
PeacePalestine, 7 July 2007, http://peacepalestine.blogspot.co.uk/2007/07/interview-with-leila-
farsakh-two-state.html, accessed 23/11/2009  
57 Bishara, Azmi, Reflections on the Realities of the Oslo Process, in, Giacaman, George, and, 
Lønning, Dag J. (eds.), After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems, pp. 223-4
58 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 233
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    Israel’s  policies  are  thus  framed  in  this  discourse,  or  at  least  in  certain
elements of it, as expediting ‘political consciousness’ among Palestinians, which
will  ‘later’  transform  into  ‘political  agenda’,  and  ultimately  into  ‘a  single,
binational,  egalitarian state for Palestinians and Jews in historical Palestine’.59
Hardly any thought is given to how this process might  work beyond abstract
stages,  and  this  is  because  critical  practice  is  reduced  in  this  account  to  the
revelation of essential “truth”, so hastening what is prefigured in a structure of
collapse.   In  most  utterances  constitutive  of  this  discourse,  countervailing
interests  in  the  field  are  denied  or  are  considered  flimsy at  best,  reduced to
misapprehension  or  moral  laxity,  though  having  overwhelmingly  deleterious
consequences.  Such a framing of social reality – which is shaped by the position
from which it is enunciated and by a struggle for power – has a specific effect on
political action.  It delineates a relation of power, a mode of conduct ‘in which
certain  actions  modify  others’,60 of  ‘the kind teachers  have  over  pupils’  as  a
strategy from which all else will necessarily follow.61  It reifies this relation, with
lessons taught  and learnt  being the key to success;  prioritising education and
moral rectitude, what is ‘right’62 and what is ‘unarguably desirable’63, over more
practical forms of politics.  The “truth” will lead to freedom in this discourse
because those who produce it claim privileged access to the “truth”.
    Interestingly,  the acquisition  of ‘political  consciousness’ is  framed in the
discourse of one-state as ‘the reunification of the Palestinian people’, as a ‘going
59 Ghanem, As’ad, Thank you for bringing us together, Haaretz, 22 October 2010, 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/thank-you-for-bringing-us-together-1.320546, 
accessed 07/01/2011
60 Foucault, Michel, The Subject and Power, in, Dreyfus, Herbert L., and, Rabinow, Paul (eds.), 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Second Edition, With an Afterword 
by and Interview with Michel Foucault, pp. 219-20
61 Bauman, Zygmunt, Love in Adversity: On the State and the Intellectuals, and the State of the 
Intellectuals, Thesis Eleven, p. 88
62 Qumsiyeh, Mazin, Sharing the Land of Canaan, p. 83
63 Karmi, Ghada, Married to Another Man, pp. 201-57
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back’,  the recovery of an essential  sameness  which is  already present.64  The
“masses” are summoned in this discourse into a position of identity with those
cultural elites who do this summoning, as shown in the last chapter, and they are
either conscious of this identity already or will be in due course owing to the
realities of their situation.  This assimilative practice has specific consequences
for political action as will be analysed shortly in the next section.  But the final
point  here  is  that  it  is  political  and  other  elites  who  are  constructed  in  this
discourse as the ‘one part’ that has deviated from the whole.65  So in seeking to
politicise  their  pedagogic function as the essential  task of politics,  a decision
structured  by  their  position  in  the  field,  these  intellectuals  are  directing  this
function solely to the Palestinian leadership – trying to impact it through ‘the
loudness of their voice’66 – because they are the agents who have deviated from
essential  Palestinian  norms.   Though political  and other  elites  are  said  to  be
acting in pursuit of their own narrow interests, this is due to their servitude to
“false” principles embedded in a psychology of capitulation.  It is they who are
subject to moral critique and necessarily so owing to the terms in which these
intellectuals perform their bid for power.  They have reached their limit and can
do  no  more.   Hence  the  exasperation:  ‘Is  the  current  Palestinian  leadership
listening?’67
Denying the Political
The aforementioned  assimilative  practice  of  these  intellectuals  has  effects  on
political action in much the same way as their discourse of “truth”.  It constitutes
64 Ghanem, As’ad, Thank you for bringing us together, Haaretz
65 Hilal, Jamil, Palestinian Answers in the Arab Spring, Al-Shabaka Policy Brief, Al-Shabaka: 
The Palestinian Policy Network, p. 2
66 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Journal, p. 71
67 Said, Edward, W., From Oslo to Iraq and the Roadmap, p. 51
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a limit  beyond which they cannot move, therefore preventing efforts aimed at
constructing a collective political subject struggling against “pragmatism” and by
extension hegemonic political Zionism.  This limit, however, should be seen as
distinct from the one discussed in the last section, even though their effects are
equivalent to one another.  The discourse of “truth” reduces politics to moral
enlightenment,  so  restricting  political  conduct  to  principled  critique.   The
subsuming  of  the  “people”  to  the  position  of  these  intellectual  removes  the
conditions  of  possibility  for  politics  as  such,  except  of  course  that  which  is
channelled towards other elites.   It might be useful to imagine these limits  as
emerging from different directions;  one arising primarily as a consequence of
structural position: the other (to be discussed in this section) arising primarily as
a consequence of the creative aspect of power struggle.   
    For those inspired by Bourdieusian thought, symbolic violence is essential to
the formation of a collective political subject.68  At the same time, the formation
of a collective political subject is crucial to the prospect of transformation, as this
can  only occur  for  Bourdieu  through –  in  all  its  contingent  and multifarious
forms – mobilised collective action enacted in specific historical circumstances.69
With this in mind, it may seem pertinent to ask: what happens when symbolic
violence is inflicted on others prior to the task of political work and efforts to
transcend  and  generalise  a  particular  position  are  undertaken?   The  answer
suggested here is: political stasis. 
    From a Bourdieusian standpoint, political work is vital, and especially so for
those agents interested in modifying the double structure of social space, because
68 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 231-4
69 Lovell, Terry, Resisting with Authority: Historical Specificity, Agency and the Performative 
Self, Theory, Culture & Society, pp. 2-10
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visions have to be imposed on others and collective subjects have to be made.
Structural immanence is a feature of the Bourdieusian field, but the immanent
singularities embodied by individuals – even if they are quite similar to other
individuals – do not come together and coalesce around a particular vision and
goal  automatically.70  There  is  a  need  for  engagement  and  reconstruction,
processes which necessarily entail relations of power owing to the ineradicable
plurality of the field.  It is disparate singularities that have to be converted into a
general stance,  according to Bourdieu; and for this collective subject to come
into being certain agents have to win positions and convert what resources they
possess  into  symbolic  power.   If  successful  –  which  of  course  cannot  be
guaranteed  in  advance  –  this  political  work  will  enable  such  agents  to
legitimately impose their vision of the social world on others and re-present them
in their own image.  Crucially, in this process, these others temporarily recognise
this  image  as  theirs,  or,  rather,  they  misrecognise  the  violence  that  they  are
subject to.  It is important to stress here that this collective subject is not what
Bourdieu called a ‘class on paper’ and a ‘theoretical’ group.  Political work is a
process of actualisation, in which a particular vision is translated into a general
category practice.71
    Étienne Balibar captures this process well when he describes it as ‘“forcing”
the incompatibilities and inventing new “universals”’.72  Indeed, force is required
precisely because difference is an ontological condition of the field and therefore
is  ineradicable.   Any  general  will  that  is  temporarily  established  will
consequently require varying degrees of elision in which whatever differences
70 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, pp. 7-15
71 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 180-232 
72 Balibar, Étienne, Europe as Borderland, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol.
27, 2009, pp. 190-215, p. 208
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exist are subordinated to an overarching whole.  The particular stands in as the
“universal” in this regard, and this is a relation of domination. 
    Significantly,  though,  it  is  exactly  this  incompatibility  and  ontology  of
difference that enables politics as a process of change and transformation.  It is
the  ‘fact  of  plurality’,  states  Chantel  Mouffe  paraphrasing  John  Rawls,  that
prevents a fully compatible whole from being established or existing already.  It
is  the  ontology  of  difference  that  keeps  open  the  prospect  of  political
reconstruction, as disparity in vision and interest are the conditions of possibility
for  remaking  “unity”.   Otherwise  unity  would  be  already  present,  whether
explicitly or implicitly.   “Unity” as a product, or indeed as a political project,
requires  difference;  it  necessitates  incompatibilities  that  have  to  be  forced
together as an effect of power, so as to create a temporary whole.73  Difference
has to be engaged and re-enacted, and this task is arduous.
    It is on such grounds that theories of post-representation and deliberation seem
to  fall  down  as  critical  standpoints,  which  they  both  claim  to  be.74  Post-
representationalist  accounts  effectively  regurgitate  an  ‘obsolete  Marxist
teleology’, which prefigures an absolute generality in a given social structure –
usually global capitalism for such theorists – that is moving inexorably against
this  structure  and  for  a  fully  constituted  presence.75  Despite  its  name  and
pretence to the contrary, post-representationalism is engaged in representational
practices,  except  that  what  it  represents  is  taken  to  be  a  ‘real’  presence  and
potential.76  The  ‘millions  of  people’  spoken  about  in  such  theoretical
formulations,  and  who  are  prefigured  in  such  texts  in  a  certain  way,  are
73 Mouffe, Chantal, The Democratic Paradox, pp. 83-136
74 Tormey, Simon, “Not in my Name”: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation, 
Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 138-154; Calhoun, Craig, Introduction: Habermas and the Public 
Sphere, in, Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 5-6
75 Kioupkiolis, Alexandros, Radicalizing Democracy, Constellations, p. 144
76 Ibid.
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realistically considered to be moving, or about to move, in a general direction.
The collective subject already exists in these texts, bound and propelled by an
underlying  structural  homogeneity.77  As  a  presupposition,  this  ontology  of
sameness works discursively to eliminate both the need and possibility of active
intervention and political reconstruction.  What is required politically, at least as
understood  from a  Bourdieusian  perspective,  is  already  in  formation  and  in
motion, or definitely will be so in due course.
    Similarly, the assumptions on which deliberative theory is based tend towards
this rather conservative delimiting of political engagement.  A consensus on the
common good is undoubtedly an aim of public deliberation in this approach, with
this  being  achieved  through  communication  and  rational  agreement  on  what
qualifies as the general interest.  Aside from the highly problematic starting point
of  assuming  that  communication  can  proceed  on  an  equal  basis  between
differently positioned agents, which is where the rationality of debate resides in
deliberative  theory,  the  notion  of  agreeing  interests  common  to  all  likewise
implies  that  this  commonality  is  immanent  to  the  arena  of  deliberation.78
Deliberation succeeds in reaching a consensus by appealing ‘to what discussants
all  share’.79  Therefore,  there is  no need for violent  transformation,  which of
course  is  a  theoretical  nicety,  but  which  as  a  discursive  framework  restricts
77 Tormey, Simon, “Not in my Name”: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation, 
Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 145-53
78 Calhoun, Craig, Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere, in, Calhoun, Craig (ed.), 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 29; Kohn, Margaret, Language, Power, and Persuasion: 
Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy, Constellations, pp. 423-4; Mouffe, Chantal, The 
Democratic Paradox, p. 83; Olson, Kevin, Democratic Inequalities: The Problem of Equal 
Citizenship in Habermas’s Democratic Theory, Constellations, p. 216; Sanders, Lynn, Against 
Deliberation, Political Theory, p. 360; Wedeen, Lisa, Concepts and commitments in the Study of 
demoracy, in, Shapiro, Ian, Smith, Rogers M., and Masoud, Tarek E. (eds.), Problems and 
Methods in the Study of Politics, p. 287; Young, Iris Marion, Communication and the Other: 
Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in, Benhabib, Seyla (ed.), Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, pp. 121-5
79 Young, Iris Marion, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in, 
Benhabib, Seyla (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, p. 
125
257
political  engagement  to the uncovering of  a  prior sameness.   Once again,  an
underlying  unity  is  posited  across  a  given  social  space  in  advance  of  its
production,  which,  if  one takes seriously the effects  of discursive formations,
results  in  a  denial  of  the  conditions  of  possibility  of  politics  as  confronting
difference with its reconstruction. 
    The discourse of one-state is similarly a critical standpoint, or at least it is so
superficially.   As  its  proponents  state,  they  are  not  interested  in  ‘idealized
abstraction’, but in ‘real’ transformation.80  To be sure, they overcome the gap
between these two points through discursive moves which reduce actual politics
to moral enlightenment, moves which are undertaken as a result of their position
in the field and their bid for power.  In this sense, these intellectuals are guilty of
replicating what Dipesh Chakrabarty identifies as ‘the left’s romance of truth’,
which in no small measure amounts to the romance of themselves.81  
    Yet,  other  issues  are  in  play  which  account  for  the  mode  of  political
engagement  performed  by  these  intellectuals,  and  the  continuing  dissonance
between  declaration  and  concrete  practice.   As  a  discourse,  the  one-state
perspective,  uttered  by  these  intellectuals,  repeats,  despite  their  isomorphic
trajectories,  much  of  the  presuppositions  constitutive  of  the  allegedly  critical
theories  of  post-representation  and deliberation.   An ontology of sameness  is
prefigured and in fact is taken to exist in their representations of the Palestinian
political field.  There is such a thing as an authentic Palestinian identity in their
writings,  which  is  present  and  which  they  are  representing.   This  claim  to
authenticity is an effect of their claim to power, as examined in the last chapter,
but  when  viewed  through  the  Bourdieusian  lense  it  has  politically  disabling
80 Makdisi, Saree, Said, Palestine, and the Humanism of Liberation, Critical Inquiry, p. 453
81 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Where is Now? Critical Inquiry, p. 461
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outcomes  similar  to  those  encountered  in  post-representationalism  and
deliberative theory.  It denies difference, or severely limits it, and so effectively
denies politics, or renders it heavily constrained.
    It should be noted that it is not unfair to use a Bourdieusian lense on these
critical  intellectuals.   Their  writings  are  littered  with utterances  regarding the
political necessity of establishing, through a ‘unifying mechanism’, a ‘common
goal  in  the  Palestinian  political  field’  –  which  clearly  for  them ought  to  be
decolonisation and liberation through a general struggle for a one-state solution.82
‘Unity and representation  are  the common goods Palestinians  must  realise  in
order  to  advance  their  cause’,  this  position  declares,  which,  as  a  statement,
clearly indicates that on some level these “goods” are recognised as being absent
in the present configuration of Palestinian politics.83  The ‘task for intellectuals
and others in a privileged position’, this position further contends, is in ‘making’
these  “goods”  an  actual  social  reality.84  So  there  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  a
homology between the Bourdieusian concerns found in the notion of political
work, and the political goals professed by those intellectuals who produce the
discourse of one-state. 
    More broadly, it is worthwhile mentioning that these agents subscribe to and
are  positioned  in  constructions  of  the  intellectual  that  are  oriented  towards
practical politics.  Strong emphasis is given in the discourse of one-state to the
passage  from  ‘vision  and  reflection’  to  ‘action’.   As  those  who  create  this
standpoint declare, without practical ‘resistance, our vision would amount to no
82 Nabulsi, Karma, Justice as the way forward, in, Hilal, Jamil (ed.), Where Now for Palestine: 
The Demise of the Two-State Solution, pp. 233-252, p. 248
83 Nabulsi, Karma, Diary, London Review of Books, Vol. 32, No. 20, 21 October, 2010, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n20/karma-nabulsi/diary, accessed 03/12/2010
84 Nabulsi, Karma, Justice as the way forward, in, Hilal, Jamil (ed.), Where Now for Palestine: 
The Demise of the Two-State Solution, p. 249
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more than arm-chair intellectualism, if not irrelevant sophistry’.85  In terms of
genealogy,  moreover,  their  intellectualism  is  incorporative  of  critical  visions
inclined towards practical engagement.  Frantz Fanon, for instance, identified a
key  political  role  for  intellectuals  in  his  theorisation  of  decolonisation  and
liberation,  stating  that  their  task  was to  assist  in  producing ‘a  new reality  in
action’.86  Similarly,  Antonio Gramsci,  another intellectual forbear included in
the discourse of one-state, famously refused to limit the praxis of intellectuals to
‘eloquence’, and instead promoted their ‘active participation in practical life’.87
The postcolonial  tradition in which many of these intellectuals are positioned,
furthermore, is consciously interested in more politically than ‘just critique’.88  It
seeks an actual contribution to the dispelling of colonial relations.89
    Even in those instances when allegiance is professed to metaphysical goals,
these  intellectuals  qualify  this  stance  by  insisting  on  their  depositing  and
embodiment in a ‘grassroots movement’.90  Edward Said, for example, was very
fond of Julien Benda’s conception of intellectuals,  and this famously asserted
that intellectuals are those persons ‘whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of
practical  aims’.91  Genealogically,  this  is  where  the  notion  of  ‘the  truth
unadorned’  largely  comes  from  in  the  discourse  of  one-state.92  Even  here,
though,  as  demonstrated  above,  this  interest  in  metaphysics  is  oriented  to  a
practical  end,  and this  is  why Said  idealised  an intellectual  as  someone  who
85 Barghouti, Omar, Re-Imagining Palestine: Self-determination, Ethical De-colonization, and 
Equality, The One Democratic State Group
86 Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 112-179
87 Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), Lawrence and Wishart, London, 2005 (1971), p. 10
88 Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, and, Owens, Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations (fourth edition), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, 
pp. 188-9
89 Gregory, Derek, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, pp. 7-9
90 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents, pp. 195-6
91 Benda, Julien, The Great Betrayal (La Trahison des Clercs) (translated by Richard Aldington), 
George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., Broadway House, Carter Lane, E.C., London, 1928, pp. 29-30
92 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 283
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operates to ‘combine Gramsci and Benda’.93  So the puzzle of stated aims and
actual practice in the actions of these intellectuals is to a large degree addressed
to their own terms of engagement.
    Yet, this puzzle remains, and it is important to note that this type of divergence
is quite frequently found in the study of intellectuals in politics.94  Thus, for those
people who are concerned with critical  political  thought,  it  seems a relatively
significant  issue.   In  regards  to  those  intellectuals  who  are  producing  the
discourse of one-state, it is clear, when using a Bourdieusian conceptual frame,
that their interests in ‘collective will’ and common goals  can only go so far.95
This is because their discursive practice symbolically effaces difference in the
Palestinian political field, or, rather, it restricts difference to divergent elites, to
be more accurate.
    As this position routinely writes, the ‘Oslo Accords served to fragment the
Palestinian  people’.96  The  language  used  in  such  statements  is  crucial  as  it
evinces the assumption of a unity prior to this  point.  The temporality of the
Palestinian  political  field  and  its  narration  from  the  standpoint  of  these
intellectuals  was  analysed  in  the  last  chapter  and  shown  to  be  problematic
historically because it effectively amounts to a strategy of legitimation for their
struggles in the present.  At the same time, it is problematic politically.   The
temporal axis of before and after is not one of dissipation in the version of social
reality constructed in the discourse of one-state.  Rather it is one of separation.
93 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents, pp. 195-6
94 Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 206
95 Erakat, Noura, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, 
Jadaliyya
96 Hilal, Jamil, Palestinian Answers in the Arab Spring, Al-Shabaka Policy Brief, Al-Shabaka: 
The Palestinian Policy Network, p. 2.  Beshara Doumani makes a very similar point in 
Abunimah, Ali, Barakat, Rans, Doumani, Beshara, Haddad, Toufic, Hilal, Jamil, al-Masri, Hani, 
Qato, Mezna, and, Youmans, Will, Achieving a Palestinian Spring, Al-Shabaka Roundtable, Al-
Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, pp. 7-8
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Whereas ‘[b]efore the “peace process” … all representatives of the Palestinians’
acted in accordance with the (foundational) premise that ‘the various interests of
the Palestinian  people were inherently compatible’,  afterwards  they did not.97
National institutions lost their ‘legitimacy and representative function’, and this
was due, as detailed previously,  to their  succumbing to “false” principles and
narrow concerns.98
    It is at this point, so to speak, that these intellectuals enter the “game” more
forcefully, using the crisis of legitimacy affecting political elites to assert their
claim to  power  and more  specifically  their  claim to represent  the Palestinian
people and their authentic voice.  What is claimed, that is to say, is that while the
Palestinian people are ‘nowhere to be found’ inside the boundaries of official
political discourse, they are certainly present within the discursive limits of the
discourse of one-state.99  
    The problem with this  claim,  however,  is  that  the Palestinian  people are
“nowhere to be found” within the boundaries of the counter-discourse of these
intellectuals either.  What is present instead is a textual construct known as the
“people” or the “masses” that is imposed upon disparate singularities in the field
without practices of engagement and re-creation.  This process and its reiteration
is a practice of representation, and given the immanent plurality of the field it
necessarily  entails  a  degree  of  appropriation  in  which  the  perspectives  and
interests of those who are represented are taken for those who represent.  What is
crucial here is not that symbolic violence has occurred (though of course this not
97 Massad, Joseph, A., The Binational State and the Reunification of the Palestinian People, 
Global Dialogue, p. 123
98 Abunimah, Ali, Toward Palestine’s “Mubarak moment”, Al-Jazeera English, 24 February 
2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011224141158174266.html, accessed 
12/08/2011
99 Nabulsi, Karma, The Peace Process and the Palestinians: A Road Map to Mars, International 
Affairs, p. 230
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something to be happy about), but rather when and how it has occurred.  The
figure of the “people” and its ‘collective political aspirations’ is not a materiality
that  has  been  produced  through  political  work,  victory  and  legitimate
reconstruction; it has been produced instead in the minds of these intellectuals
and their writings through concealment,  denial and disavowal of difference; it
has  been  created  abstractly  and  imposed  dogmatically  upon  Palestinians,  so
effacing whatever differences in visions and demands that might persist without
the prospect of contention or accountability.100
    The certainty with which these intellectuals claim to know what Palestinians
want and their insistence on possessing a monopoly on “truth” are symptomatic
of this disavowal.  So too is the varyingly implicit and explicit application of
“false  consciousness”  to  Palestinians  who are  seen  to  currently  deviate  from
essentially  common desires  and interests  (though as  mentioned the  charge of
deviation is primarily made against “other” elites”).  The effect of this disavowal
politically is to enable the thought and representation of a collective Palestinian
subject  that  is  already mobilised  and  geared  towards  specific  actions  and
objectives.  As those who write this version of social reality declare: ‘It is time
for  leaders  to  follow  the  people’s  determined  movement  toward  a  single
democratic state’.101  This assertion is certainly fanciful in that at present the idea
of  a  one-state  solution  has  no  concrete  organisational  reality  or  collectively
embodied  trajectory  beyond  these  critics  themselves.102  Yet  it  is  entirely  in
keeping with the logic of appropriation carried out in this discourse.  
100 Sabawi, Samah, September and Beyond: Who Speaks in My Name?, Al-Shabaka 
Commentary, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, September 2011, http://al-
shabaka.org/sites/default/files/alshabakacommentary_ssabawi_septemberandbeyond_sept2011.pd
f, accessed 07/10/2011, p. 1 
101 Abulhawa, Susan, and, Baroud, Ramzy, Palestine/Israel: A Single State, With Liberty And 
Justice For All, Countercurrents
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    Consequently, it is fair to argue that the discourse of one-state is in its present
figuration an elitist  position,  and doubly so.  It discursively and dogmatically
imposes  homogeneity  upon  a  multiplex  social  world:  and  this  symbolically
erases difference in the Palestinian field beyond the elite stratum.  Conflict  is
limited to this point.  Indeed, somewhat simplistically, the social world emerges
in  this  discourse  as  a  neat  bifurcation  between  ‘Osloized  classes’  and  ‘other
Palestinians’, with the conditions of possibility for political work being heavily
circumscribed as a result.  Owing to the specific symbolic violence of this stance
and its resultant decontextualisation of a particular social universe, politics in the
field,  and the  precise  relations  of  power  it  seeks  to  engender,  is  once  again
restricted to trying to modify the conduct of political and other elites by making
them ‘join other Palestinians … in the demand for a secular democratic state in
Mandate Palestine’.103  It is in this sense exactly that the discourse of one-state
may be considered utopian.  That is, through its depoliticising and essentialising
of the vast majority of Palestinian society.
    As such, it is also fair to argue, as some analysts have done so, that proponents
of a one-state solution are divorced ‘from social reality’.104  Yet the specificity of
this  separation  has  been so far  missed.   It  is  not  the  consequence of a  blind
refusal to see reality for what it is – which is usually what is meant by such
criticisms (and which in any case is a highly problematic proposition given the
inescapable partiality of perspective) – but rather is an outcome of the symbolic
moves made by these intellectuals in order to advance a position of legitimate
domination.   By discursively absorbing diffuse and disparate  positions within
Palestinian  social  space  into  their  own,  these  agents  effectively  impose  a
103 Eid, Haidar, Gaza 2009: Culture of resistance vs. defeat, The Electronic Intifada   
104 Peled, Yoav, Zionist Realities: Debating Israel-Palestine, New Left Review, p. 35
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boundary between their point and others in this particular field.  In Bourdieu’s
words, they ‘thereby draw a boundary between themselves and ordinary people’;
and this is because such others do not exist in this representation of social reality
as they are rendered the same.105  They therefore cannot be politically engaged
and potentially reconstituted  as a mobilised collective  subject  as there are  no
other points to change and to try and generalise.  
    In this instance, then, the practice of representation is not permitted to function
as a constitutive force.  It cannot work as a process of ‘making practical groups’
as  envisioned  by  Bourdieu  because  words  are  not  contested  but  coercively
imposed on pluralistic social sectors.106  What is left is a politics of representation
as recitation, in which words are spoken from a (social) text that has been already
written.107  As proponents of a one-state solution assert: ‘The only time when
conflict arose is when one part of the Palestinian people acted to address its own
immediate demands’.108  The “when” of course is the ‘original sin’109 of the Oslo
Accords and the “one part” is clearly the so-called ‘Osloized classes’.110  What
follows  from  this  presumption  of  harmony  prior  to  this  point  of  partial
discontinuity is a political logic of reintegration as a path to reunification.111  The
common goods of unity and representation that are sought after by those who
construct the discourse of one-state are not to be temporarily produced through a
political  process of generalisation.   They are to  be  found,  rather,  through the
105 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 210-11
106 Bourdieu, Pierre, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, p. 8
107 Thomassen, Lasse, Beyond Representation, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 117
108 Hilal, Jamil, Palestinian Answers in the Arab Spring, Al-Shabaka Policy Brief, Al-Shabaka: 
The Palestinian Policy Network, p. 2
109 Doumani, Beshara, in, Abunimah, Ali, Barakat, Rans, Doumani, Beshara, Haddad, Toufic, 
Hilal, Jamil, al-Masri, Hani, Qato, Mezna, and, Youmans, Will, Achieving a Palestinian Spring, 
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practice of trying to convince “wayward” political elites to return to the common
fold,112 so enabling Palestinian social space – or what these intellectuals usually
refer to as the PLO – to be ‘reconstituted as a fully representative body [emphasis
added]’.113  Though  it  is  power  that  these  agents  are  principally  after,  the
possibility for them to exercise a relation of domination is once more limited to
attempting to impact the political leadership through the proclaimed authority of
their  voice.   This is not an accident  as it  cannot be otherwise so long as the
hegemonic frames constitutive of the discourse of one-state remain intact and
reiterated.
    So although it does not appear to have been a conscious intention of those who
produce this discourse, they nevertheless enact and repeat a political logic that is
highly  reminiscent  of  that  used  in  post-representationalist  and  deliberative
theory.   The  effect  of  this,  according  to  this  particular  instance,  is  quite
debilitating politically.  With the presumption of a general struggle and a prior
unity  within  Palestinian  social  space,  the  one-state  perspective  contingently
establishes lines that its producers cannot move beyond.  Therefore, the prospect
of transcending a particular subject-position and connecting with disparate social
sectors through political work and transformation is temporarily denied in this
discursive  framework.   Theoretically,  this  is  what  certain  critics  of  post-
representationalism and deliberative democracy have argued that the discursive
112 Farsakh, Leila, Palestinians Imposing Agenda on Abbas, Al-Shabaka Policy Brief, Al-
Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, November 2012, http://al-
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frames  constitutive  of  these  approaches  will  do;  and consequently  this  study
would suggest support for these claims.114            
    This is why for all its insistence on the need to produce a mobilised collective
agent the critical practice of the discourse of one-state remains solely directed to
“other” elites and primarily the historic Palestinian leadership.  Its proponents are
trying  to  ‘pressure  the  leadership’115 through their  cultural  authority,  material
resources and representativeness, and it is in this sense that they are ‘waiting for
a new leadership to emerge’ that will implement the vision that they prescribe.116
Their  politics  amounts  to  waiting  for  the  political  leadership  to  heed  their
demands on the basis that they are already right and legitimate.117  As such they
are struggling to exercise an indirect relation of power over the field and this is
because,  contingently,  this  pattern  of  political  engagement  is  the  only  path
available to them owing to their presumed control of “truth” and possession of
universal legitimacy.  Despite their pronouncements to the contrary, the political
role of these intellectuals is temporarily rendered as one of Zygmunt Bauman’s
quintessential modernist “legislator”.118  That is, in Janet Hart’s words, they are
figures who ‘attempt to influence national policy and policymakers, but who for
the  most  part  inhabit[…]  a  [relatively]  separate  sphere  as  consultants  and
114 Laclau, Ernesto, Democracy and the Question of Power, Constellations, pp. 3-14; Thomassen, 
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Marion, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in, Benhabib, Seyla 
(ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, pp. 120-135
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tend[…]  to  avoid  direct  conversation  with  the  masses’.119  This  statement
summarises the political role of these intellectuals very well, which has not been
delineated  through  conscious  choice,  but  through  position  and a  struggle  for
symbolic power.  The dominance of the utterance “speak truth to power” perhaps
unwittingly captures this role; as does the label ‘policy advisor’, which is being
increasingly used by these intellectuals.120
    The problem with this mode of critical practice from a Bourdieusian point of
view is  not  only the category of  a  single contradiction  amidst  an underlying
homogeneity  in  Palestinian  social  space.   Nor  is  it  only  the  assumption,
stemming  from  the  structural  position  of  those  who  make  it,  that  this
contradiction  can  be  removed  through  moral  enlightenment,  which  reduces
competing  visions  and  interests  to  epistemological  falsehoods  as  opposed  to
practical realities (symbolic or material).  As mentioned previously, the historic
Palestinian  leadership  has  very  “real”  interests  in  preserving  the  present
configuration of the political field (which is not to say that they do not have very
“real” interests in modifying it as well).121  This point can be similarly applied to
Hamas, which goes some way to explaining why governing institutions within
both the West Bank and Gaza Strip are increasingly authoritarian and continue to
be  split.122  It  is  also  fair  to  say  that  many  Palestinians  have  an  interest  in
preserving  the  status  quo,  even  if  only  on  the  grounds  of  the  political
uncertainties  regarding  the  future.123  Social  reality  is  considerably  more
119 Hart, Janet, Reading the Radical Subject: Gramsci, Glinos, and Paralanguages of the Modern 
Nation, in, Grigor Suny, Ronald, and, Kennedy, Michael D. (eds.), Intellectuals and the 
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complicated  and  tangible  than  these  intellectuals  make  out,  and  from  a
Bourdieusian standpoint moral critique alone is an insufficient political strategy.
    In addition, though, the problem with this critical practice from a Bourdieusian
perspective is that its insistence on an active presence and a prior unity –  à la
post-representation and deliberation – denies the possibility of transcendence and
mobilised collective action, which means that it is limited to a singular assault on
extant institutions of political power.  This appears to make it rather impotent
politically as a potential force for change.
Subordinate Possibilities              
The discourse of one-state, of course, is not a total  system of knowledge and
before proceeding to the concluding remarks of this  chapter  a relatively brief
moment  will  be  spent  delineating  what  will  be  called  here  subordinate
possibilities.   This  study  has  principally  focused  on  what  have  been
conceptualised – using a Bourdieusian lense – as the most crucial elements of
this discourse and the position from which it is produced.  It is therefore a partial
reading and inevitably much has been left out, including as a result of temporal-
spatial constraints.  What this chapter has tried to do, however, is stress that the
political  conditions  of  possibility/impossibility  delimited  in  this  discourse
through its hegemonic frames are constructed – albeit from a specific point in
social space.  As such, they are unstable, temporal and contingent.  In short, they
are by no means fixed categories with immutable effects.  Moreover, it is the
case that slippages in language and classification occur from these hegemonic
frames within this discourse which configure Palestinian social reality in a much
more nuanced and problematised fashion.  Though these slippages are positioned
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in  a  relation  of  subordination,  they  can  be  nevertheless  conceived  from  a
Bourdieusian perspective as implicitly containing political possibilities otherwise
effaced by the utterances which dominate the constitutive and reiterative process
of this discursive formation.  These subordinate possibilities will be illustrated
below.
    In contrast to the dominant assertions which make up the discourse of one-
state  and  which  claim  that  ‘the  Palestinian  majority’  is  essentially  disposed
towards  a  one-state  solution,  there  are  passages  constitutive  of  this  text  that
challenge this line of contention.124  For example, individuals who produce and
routinely  subscribe  to  this  dominant  classification  of  social  reality  have
occasionally publicly commented that ‘we don’t have a Palestinian majority, not
even in the diaspora, for a one-state solution’.125  This should not be taken as an
annulment  of  their  alternative  convictions  and affirmations,  or  be  read  as  an
indication that such claims are uttered disingenuously.  Such ambivalences and
contradictions are consistent with the Bourdieusian conceptual approach utilised
in this study, which insists on the individual agent as a disintegrated, fractal and
ongoing bodily subject.126  A position is never fully constituted and the ambiguity
permeating the discourse of one-state, even though effective through a relation of
domination and subordination, is suggestive of a more fractal understanding of
Palestinian social space amongst those agents who construct it.  This in turn has
implications for politics as will and representation.
124 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 171
125 Karmi, Ghada, Building an International Movement to Promote the One State Solution, 
Conference on the One State for Palestine/Israel: A Country for All its Citizens, University of 
Massachusetts, 28 and 29 March, 2009.  A video recording of the conference sessions is available
at http://www.arabichour.org/One-state-Conference.htm, accessed 03/10/2011
126 Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power, International Political Sociology, pp. 242-3; Shapiro, Michael J., Bourdieu, the state and 
method, Review of International Political Economy, p. 612
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    Indeed,  it  is  perhaps  no  coincidence  that  when  ‘distinct  and  disparate
grievances  and  vested  interests  among  the  Palestinian  national  body’  are
admitted within this  representation of social  reality that a problematization of
politics as principled critique and “speaking truth to power” enters more readily
into the fray.127  On this issue the Palestinian intellectual Noura Erakat seems to
be especially prominent.  While she frequently (re)produces many of the central
attributes of the discourse of one-state, including the presumption of an already
existing  Palestinian  ‘collective  will’  and  a  politics  of  representation  which
conceives language as matching social reality as opposed to constituting it, she
does overall present a more complicated picture of the field than her intellectual
counterparts.128  This  is  again  somewhat  contradictory,  but  her  tenuous
recognition of difference as a fact does appear to result in an explicit critique of
moral engagement as a politics of liberation.  In such instances, she moves away
from the primacy of epistemology and correct philosophical interpretation that so
characterises the dominant standpoint in this discourse, and begins to prioritise
the need for active ‘mobilization … [through a] political program (sic)’.129  
    Of  course,  this  language  of  mobilisation  and  programmatic  politics  is  a
longstanding feature of the discourse of one-state, and it is by no means confined
to  Erakat’s  contributions.   Yet  what  is  important  in  her  writings  is  that  a
generalised political programme is not typically categorised as a second order or
‘trivial’ matter that will stem automatically from positivist (re)interpretations;130
127 Erakat, Noura, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, Looking 
for a Leadership with a Strategy, Al-Shabaka Roundtable, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy 
Network, 20 March 2012, http://al-shabaka.org/node/383, accessed 20/06/2012
128 Erakat, Noura, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, 
Jadaliyya
129 Ibid.
130 Qutami, Loubna, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, 
Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, Al-Shabaka Roundtable, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian 
Policy Network
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nor is it typically classified as a process that is already in motion with a logic that
is  inexorably moving towards  a one-state  solution.131  Rather  than mimic  the
overwhelming certainty of those around her,  which results  in  a  rigid faith  in
causality and a  blindness to plurality,  the texts  of Erakat  contain much more
emphasis on ‘the challenge of collective action’132 and an openness to political
questions concerning ‘who will engender this  platform, and how they will  do
it’.133  As she states, ‘the question of “what next” will continue to loom large’,
which implies a refusal to fully determine this and other political questions in
advance of ‘practice’, by which she seems to mean direct practical engagement
with others.  For Erakat, rather than a panacea from which all else will follow,
moral argument can only go so far.134
    Further, that this moral critique is principally aimed at the historic Palestinian
leadership is likewise problematised by Erakat, more so than in other utterances
constitutive of this discursive position.  The critical practice of trying to exercise
a relation of power over the leadership through a claim to superior knowledge
and representational legitimacy is not promoted by Erakat (either explicitly or
implicitly); the very possibility of modifying the conduct of established political
elites in this way is scrutinised in her writings on the premise of their entrenched
authoritarianism and ‘vested interests  based on financial  and political  benefits
accrued by the peace process industry and the state-building project’.135  She is
not alone in implying this point.  A key distinction in her stance, however, is that
131 Ghanem, As’ad, Thank you for bringing us together, Haaretz
132 Erakat, Noura, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, Looking 
for a Leadership with a Strategy, Al-Shabaka Roundtable, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy 
Network
133 Erakat, Noura, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, 
Jadaliyya
134 Ibid.
135 Erakat, Noura, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, Looking 
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such political practices and interests are not typically defined as stemming from
the Palestinian leadership being ‘unqualified’ to lead the struggle,136 or from its
ensnarement in ‘false promises of peace’.137  Nor are these practices or interests
typically categorised as resulting from a lack of ‘courage’138 and ‘will’.139  They
are in short taken to be “real”, which is not to say that they are fixed, but which
suggests that the prospect of reforming the political leadership is considerably
more problematic  than is  ordinarily inscribed in the hegemonic frames which
enact this vision.  
    When Erakat grants these objective differences in the field (which she does not
do  consistently),  the  challenge  of  confronting  obstacles  ‘impeding  collective
action’ assumes a much more materialist orientation.140  This even includes the
thought of constructing ‘some other body’ within which to ‘develop a national
liberation strategy’ against the ‘PLO’ framework.141  Again, Erakat is not alone
here,  and  others  who  construct  the  discourse  of  one-state  have  on  occasion
suggested this point.142  Yet they are far less sustained in this regard than Erakat,
whose  individual  stance,  seemingly  because  it  permits  difference  across
Palestinian social  space,  is not so idealist  or rigidly confined by a politics  of
presence.   The  more  interventionist  and  materialist  political  possibilities  she
raises in her work are to be sure highly inchoate.   Nevertheless, they at least
136 Sabawi, Samah, September and Beyond: Who Speaks in My Name?, Al-Shabaka 
Commentary, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, p. 3
137 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, p. 170
138 Qumsiyeh, Mazin, To liberate Palestine: courage, Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-26 January 2011, 
Issue No. 1032, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1032/op152.htm, accessed 13/07/2011
139 Said, Edward W., The Pen and the Sword, p. 150
140 Erakat, Noura, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, Looking 
for a Leadership with a Strategy, Al-Shabaka Roundtable, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy 
Network
141 Erakat, Noura, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, 
Jadaliyya
142 See, for example: Abunimah, Ali, Toward Palestine’s “Mubarak moment”, Al-Jazeera 
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point  in  a  political  direction  that  is  to  some  degree  consistent  with  the
Bourdieusian view of work and will and representation, and which is otherwise
effaced or at least  heavily constrained through the reiteration of the dominant
statements which establish this perspective.
    Moreover, despite being a largely individual stance, Erakat’s is not an isolated
standpoint.   The  writings  of  hers  discussed  here  are  usually  if  not  primarily
directed at other intellectuals who are producing the discourse of one-state, and
indeed intellectually these engagements evince a semblance of discord between
dominant and subordinate positions within this discourse.143  As this shows, there
are therefore differences internal to competing perspectives in the field as well as
between them and these relations are likewise ongoing.  So even though these
internal  relations  of  power  may  be  relatively  stable  for  a  time,  they  remain
intrinsically fluid and contestable.   Because of the specificity of the dominant
discursive  frames  these  intellectuals  (re)enact,  and  which  they  are  positioned
within, their political role is heavily restricted, with them being unable to move
beyond the practice of principled critique directed primarily at the Palestinian
leadership that they are already engaged in.  As this section has sought to stress,
however,  this  mode  of  critical  practice  is  not  entirely  foreclosed,  and  other
possibilities  –  albeit  heavily  subordinated  ones  –  remain.   Consequently,
whatever  conclusions  are  drawn  here  are  necessarily  contingent  and  heavily
qualified.       
                      
143 Erakat, Noura, in, Eid, Haidar, Sabawi, Samah, Qutami, Loubna, and, Erakat, Noura, Looking 
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Concluding Remarks   
As  this  chapter  has  suggested,  the  precise  language  of  power  used  in  the
discourse of one-state has effects that limit the possibilities of political action for
those  who  utter  it.   Specifically,  their  claim  to  “truth”  as  an  indispensable
political  resource  for  advancing  the  Palestinian  struggle  pushes  their  critical
conduct in an overly idealist and philosophical direction; with political change as
a result being reduced primarily to the revelation of epistemological foundations
and an exercise of moral  rectitude over “false” premises.   While it  is mainly
through the  mobilisation  of  cultural  capital  that  these  agents  more  forcefully
enter the “game”, the manner in which they invest it in battles for domination
proscribes the possibility of their engaging in a more extensive political project
beyond principled critique.  So, somewhat paradoxically, the specificity of their
bid for legitimate domination over the field works to temporarily deprive them of
the chance (however constrained) of actually exercising legitimate domination.
This is because it operates to prioritise ideas and abstract critique as a force for
transforming the social world over political work.  In this respect, therefore, their
bid for  power has  effects  which function  at  the  expense of  the  very process
Bourdieu identified as essential  for converting (cultural)  capital  into symbolic
capital.
    In addition, certain representational practices of these intellectuals have the
effect of heavily circumscribing political possibilities in terms of their mode of
critical  engagement  in  the  field.   In  much  the  same way as  the  language  of
“truth” subordinates political work to a moral struggle and so heavily forecloses
this option, the presumption of an identity with the Palestinian “masses” permits
these intellectuals  to  imagine  unity in  motion  across  social  space that  denies
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particularity and thus the prospect of its political mediation and generalisation.
The articulation of this prior unity results from the bid for symbolic authority
launched  by  these  intellectuals,  as  it  enables  them to  claim  to  be  legitimate
spokespersons  for  the  “people”  and  their  cause.   Yet,  as  this  chapter  has
demonstrated,  this  move  effectively  leads  to  a  politics  of  presence  in  which
requisite  collective  action  is  always  already  present  and  as  such  cannot  be
practically made.  For these intellectuals specifically the imposition of a prior
unity on the field, through the textual construct of an essential “people”, restricts
division in social space to the elite sphere.  It is a battle among elites that they are
engaged in and what their struggle is temporarily limited to.
    As  various  critics  of  those who produce  the  discourse  of  one-state  have
argued,  their  strategy  of  resistance  is  ‘discursive’,144 ‘abstract’145 and
‘declarative’,146 by which is meant that it is ‘not real’147 and is unaccompanied by
efforts to develop it into ‘a program (sic) of action’.148  Moreover, such critics
have contended that the one-state position is as a result ‘utopian’,149 detached
from reality150 and the product of ‘disengaged intellectuals’.151  These criticisms
are fair as descriptions of the mode of resistance practiced by these intellectuals.
They do not, however, explain how this practice is so and not otherwise, except
to occasionally suggest that  it  is simply a product of choice.152  They do not
address the divergences between the goals professed by these intellectuals and
144 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New
Politics
145 Chomsky, Noam, Advocacy and Realism, Znet
146 Peled, Yoav, Zionist Realities: Debating Israel-Palestine, New Left Review, p. 27
147 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New
Politics
148 Chomsky, Noam, Advocacy and Realism, Znet
149 Abu-Manneh, Bashir, The Question of Palestine: An Interview with Bashir Abu-Manneh, New
Politics
150 Peled, Yoav, Zionist Realities: Debating Israel-Palestine, New Left Review, p. 35
151 Chomsky, Noam, Advocacy and Realism, Znet
152 Ibid.
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the action they take; nor do they seem especially interested in the question of
how is  it  that  this  specific  form of action has been taken,  which in no small
measure  is  a  question  generated  by  the  distinct  structuralist  constructivist
framework used in this research.  Indeed, this assumes that no mode of action is
fundamentally necessary and rejects the prospect of absolute freedom to choose.
    This chapter has shown that this strategy of resistance is a consequence of the
specific way in which these intellectuals make their bid for domination over the
political  field.   The effect  of this  bid is  to  push critical  action in  an abstract
direction as philosophy is prioritised over practicality and vast areas of social
space are depoliticised resulting in a utopian vision that separates these agents
from other people.   
    What should be emphasised, however, is that this is not an outcome of pure
calculation and choice, which by implication means that the discrepancy between
the declarative practice of these intellectuals and their insistence on the need to
convert their ‘ideal’ into a ‘concrete movement’ cannot simply be reconciled by
their choosing differently.153  The manner of their bid for power and by extension
the exact mode of their critical practice is oriented by their objective position in
the field  and intellectual  habitus.   These  impose  constraints  on the  objective
resources such agents can mobilise and invest in the struggle, and at the same
time  seem to dispose  them towards  (re)producing a  mode  of  practice  that  is
consistent with their intellectual position, despite this being transposed to a more
overtly  political  context.   Such  constraints  and  dispositions  are  not
overdetermined,  so  preventing  outright  other  forms  of  conduct.   Yet,  as  the
reading in this chapter would suggest, they impose limits which orient action in a
153 Farsakh, Leila, The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian 
Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Journal, p. 56
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particular direction, to practices that these specific agents are preconditioned to
engaging in and performing with authority.
    This insight clearly has implications for the political role of these intellectuals
in the Palestinian political field, and as has been suggested above their mode of
critical practice cannot be otherwise so long as these orientations are reproduced
in  the  hegemonic  discursive  frames  they  transmit.   From  a  Bourdieusian
perspective, this would indicate that their political role is implicitly conservative
owing  to  their  structural  position  in  the  field,  along  with  the  habitus that  it
generates.  So as an agent for change their social efficacy is heavily restricted in
a directly political sense.
    The  analysis  above  would  seem  to  point  to  more  general  implications
regarding the performance of critical  thought and practice.   As Bourdieu and
other  scholars  using  his  perspective  have  argued,  objective  position  and
especially  habitus may  often  work  to  constrain  the  possibility  ‘of  effective
agency for change’, as opposed to enabling it; with this being so despite a clear
interest in the contrary.154  It is largely for this reason that Bourdieu is so insistent
on reflexivity, and not just as the restricted strategising that is always available to
agents  in  the  field,  but  also  as  the  social  scientific  and potentially  liberating
practice  that  was mentioned very briefly  at  the  start  of  Chapter  One.   If  the
objective position and dispositions of a particular agent often impose limits on
the prospect of effective critical engagement then it would appear important to
reflect on such limits as a way of moving beyond them.  As has been noted in
this  chapter,  the  critical  or  leftist  intellectual  has  been  hardly  spared  the
154 Lovell, Terry, Resisting with Authority: Historical Specificity, Agency and the Performative 
Self, Theory, Culture & Society, p. 5
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consequences of habitus,155 and the individuals analysed above are not the first to
have  transposed  an  interest  in  Truth  generated  in  the  cultural  (or  modern
scientific)  field  to  the  political  marketplace.   Nor  are  they  the  first  to  be
seemingly caught by the conservative implications of such a move.156 
    Within certain poststructuralist writings this insistence on the importance of
reflecting on limits is likewise found, albeit with a grounding in an altogether
different ontology than that implied by Bourdieu’s social scientific reflexivity.
David  Campbell,  for  example,  argues  that  what  ‘is  required  is  an  ethos  of
political  criticism  that  is  concerned  with  assumptions,  limits,  their  historical
production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them
in thought and action’.157  This proposed ethos of political criticism seems similar
to  that  of  Bourdieu’s  reflexivity,  with  a  distinction  being  that  it  is  unclear
whether  Campbell  is  explicitly  calling  for  this  ethos  to  be  practiced  by
individuals on themselves in the process of their critical  engagement.   This is
what Bourdieu considers especially significant, and as this chapter has suggested
this does not seem misguided given that it is the effects of historically produced
limits  and  assumptions  that  have  curtailed  the  critical  practice  of  certain
intellectuals, effacing the possibility of their mobilising effective agency, and so
the potential of their forging the type of relation they proclaim to desire.
    Within the broad terrain of critical theory, as was noted at the beginning of
Chapter One, Bourdieusian scholars have seen this reflexive practice as enabling
knowledge ‘of the social determinants of thought’.  In turn, this has been viewed
as being essential to ‘liberating thought from the determinisms that weigh on it’.
155 Shusterman, Richard, Introduction: Bourdieu as Philosopher, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), 
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Further, this freedom, which is sometimes configured as exogenous to the social
world  and  sometimes  is  configured  as  slightly  less  endogenous,  has  been
regarded as vital to the critical practice of ‘concretely’ reinventing a given social
universe.158  So while habitus often works to constrain the prospect of effective
resistance, this reflexive practice is often understood as being able to ameliorate
the effects of this internalised structure.
    But from where exactly is this practice of reflexivity initiated if not from
within the body of the agent?  And if this is so, how is it possible to bypass the
effects  of  habitus without resorting to metaphysical  foundations and risking a
politics of Truth and Emancipation of the sort critiqued in this chapter?  The
insights of this chapter would suggest that this sort of practice may indeed be
important, as it has shown that open thinking does not necessarily point beyond
itself.  Yet, given that Bourdieu’s position somewhat contradictorily posits that
one ‘cannot get out of [their] own sens pratique just by recognising that [they]
have one’, the questions of how this practice is undertaken and to what extent it
is even possible would appear to remain pertinent.159  As this chapter has shown,
these questions  are  not a  singularly philosophical  concern,  as they may have
significant  political  implications,  especially  in  regards  to  the  effective
performance  of  critical  thought  and  action.160  Nonetheless,  these  questions
cannot be addressed here and they would seem to be a point of departure towards
future research.
    Representation is also a key issue for Bourdieu, one that he considers essential
to political struggle given the ineradicable plurality of the field in terms of both
158 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Critical Thought as a Solvent of Doxa, Constellations, p. 97
159 Dreyfus, Hubert, Rabinow, Paul, Can there be a Science of Existential Structure and Social 
Meaning?, in, Shusterman, Richard (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, pp. 92-3
160 Jabri, Vivienne, Critical Thought and Political Agency in  Time of War, International 
Relations, p. 73
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points  of  view  and  interests.   Bourdieu  is  in  agreement  with  other  (usually
poststructuralist and even more specifically deconstructionist) standpoints which
envision representation in political terms as a potentially constitutive force, more
so than a practice of citation.161  The centrality of representation to politics for
Bourdieu is found in this creative aspect and its inherent instability.  For him in
particular, the constitutive force of words is temporarily determined by context
and the position of the speaker; and it is through particular agents being able to
legitimately impose certain categories on others that they are able to subordinate
and so re-present differences as a generalised political subject.  This process of
symbolic violence is difficult and requires political work.  Nevertheless, it is vital
to  the  prospect  of  modifying  established  order  as  this  can  only  occur  in
Bourdieu’s view through particular forms of mobilised collective action.  As a
relation of power, moreover, it is partial and therefore mutable.
    This particular  stance on representation is  rejected by alternative theories
discussed in this work; with this occurring on the normative grounds that the
violence intrinsic to representation is wrong and therefore should be avoided; and
on the grounds that a genuinely universal subject is permissible and indeed is
immanent to social structure.  For different reasons (mainly power) some of these
logics  determining  post-representationalist  and  deliberative  perspectives  are
active in determining the articulation of the discourse of one-state, as well as
delineating its effects.  Specifically these are the presumption of a unified and
substantive  presence  which  symbolically  obviates  the  possibility  of  direct
political engagement across broad sectors of social space, and which therefore
discounts the formation of a mobilised collective subject.  What this chapter has
shown to happen as a result of these presumptions is what certain critics of post-
161 Thomassen, Lasse, Beyond Representation?, Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 111-126
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representation and deliberation have theorised as happening as a consequence of
the political logics that these perspectives follow.  That is, there is an overbearing
emphasis on immanence and underlying homogeneity that is politically disabling
in  terms  of  the  varyingly  critical  agendas  that  these  standpoints  set  for
themselves.
    In addition to seeming to offer support for these theorisations, this chapter
would appear to indicate that in a social world predicated on incommensurable
differences,  stemming from individual  temporal-spatial  coordinates,  there is  a
need for a  politics  of representation as a  fought for relation of power that  is
constitutive of practical  groups.   This process inevitably contains  a degree of
symbolic violence, and therefore the question of how specifically this violence
can be ameliorated is certainly appropriate, although it does not appear to have
been addressed in any detail from the perspectives used and drawn upon in this
study.162  
    Nevertheless,  if  one  accepts  that  general  struggles  are  not  generated
automatically as an outcome of structure, and that an underlying sameness is not
essentially inscribed in a given social framework, then it becomes difficult to see
how else such collective political  subjects can be brought into being.  Again,
according to the point of view adopted in this study, this is not a trifling political
issue,  especially  for  those  who  consider  themselves  to  be  critically  oriented.
Without  someone  constitutively  ‘representing  and  articulating  a  collective
identity,  which  does  not  emerge  of  its  own … there  would  be  no  collective
agency to counter the persons and institutions that currently rule the world’.163
162 See for example, Bourdieu, Pierre, The Mystery of the Ministry: From Particular Wills to the 
General Will, Constellations, pp. 41-3;Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and 
Democratic Politics, in, Wacquant, Loïc J. D. (ed.), Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics: 
The Mystery of the Ministry, p. 21; and, Thomassen, Lasse, Beyond Representation?, 
Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 119-20
163 Thomassen, Lasse, Beyond Representation?, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 121 
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From the  Bourdieusian  standpoint,  and  certain  deconstructionist  perspectives
which are similar to it on this issue, the disparate singularities which comprise
the  fluid  matrix  of  social  space  are  individually  not  enough  to  effectively
challenge  such  extant  relations  of  power;164 and  in  this  sense,  as  Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak stated some time ago, it would seem that representation as a
constitutive force ‘has not withered away’ but is  still  vital  to the prospect of
political change.165
    Indeed, in her critique of representation as a politics of presence, which was
addressed  specifically  to  the  field  of  postcolonial  studies,  Spivak  used  the
concept of ‘epistemic violence’ which is not dissimilar to Bourdieu’s symbolic
violence.  She also warned of the dangers of (postcolonial) intellectuals assuming
their depiction of the ‘subaltern’ to be a ‘transparent’ vocalising of a substantive
presence and (inadvertently) ‘assimilating’ the figure of the subaltern into their
own  point  of  view.   She  warned  specifically  that  this  practice  risked  a
‘foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological
production’  which  consequently  would  lead  ‘to  an  essentialist,  utopian
politics’.166  Her critique,  then, would appear to have a continuing saliency in
regards  to  those  intellectuals  who produce  the  discourse  of  one-state;  and as
certain  scholars  have  contended  Spivak’s  intervention  continues  to  haunt
postcolonial and subaltern studies more generally.
    Given  that  proponents  of  a  one-state  solution  largely  operate  from  a
postcolonial perspective, it may seem appropriate to question the extent to which
the conclusions drawn in this chapter can be generalised across this standpoint,
164 Laclau, Ernesto, Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics, Critical 
Inquiry, p. 674
165 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in, Nelson, Cary, and, Grossberg, 
Lawrence (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Macmillan Education, Hampshire 
and London, 1988, pp. 275-294
166 Ibid.
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both in relation to Palestine and perhaps more broadly.  It is certainly true that
representing  the  colonial  object  and  so  transforming  such  individuals  into
‘history’s new subjects’ is a task that postcolonial critique has set for itself;167
with such a task often being expressed in terms of a movement ‘to reclaim the
power of words’.168  To be sure such an impulse is laudable insofar as colonial
discourse  constitutes  the  colonial  “other”.   Yet  it  would  still  seem that  it  is
asserted  far  too  simplistically,  without  adequate  attention  being  paid  to  the
question of for whom exactly such power is claimed, and without reflection on
the  potentially  stultifying  political  effects  engendered  by  such  critical
engagement.  
    A cursory glance at other postcolonial writings on the Palestinian struggle
would appear  to indicate  that for the most part  such questions are ignored.169
Furthermore, it still remains a feature of postcolonial discourse for the theorist to
take  his  or  her  perspectives  and  reify  them  as  ‘the  people’s  anti-imperial
epistemic responses to the colonial difference’.170  However, it is to be stressed
that such issues are only raised here tentatively and as another potential point of
departure  for  further  research.   Owing  to  temporal-spatial  constraints,  a
prolonged and more systematic engagement with these issues will have to wait
for another time.  
    Finally, it is to be recognised that the conclusions drawn here are temporal and
contingent.   This  is  not only because they are the product of a very specific
167 Young, Robert J. C., Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
Oxford, 2001, pp. 4-10
168 Gregory, Derek, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, p. xiv
169 See for example, Ibid., pp. 98-106; Ashcroft, Bill, Representation and its discontents: 
Orientalism, Islam and the Palestinian Crisis, Religion, Vol. 34, 2004, pp. 113-121; and, 
Mavroudi, Elizabeth, Imagining a Shared State in Palestine-Israel, Antipode, Vol. 42, No. 1, 
2010, pp. 152-178
170 Mignolo, Walter D., and, Tlostanova, Madina V., Theorizing from the Borders: Shifting to 
Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory, p. 208
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reading and conceptual approach, but also because the discourse of one-state and
those who produce it are not stationary and monolithic.  As the last section of this
chapter  demonstrated,  there  are  tensions  within  the  stance  adopted  by  these
intellectuals,  including  discursive  frames  and  representations  which  would
appear less restrictive in their political implications than those generated by its
dominant dispositions and hegemonic language.  Specifically, these subordinate
accounts more readily admit difference across Palestinian social space as a fact –
as opposed to a moral deviation – which appears to orient critical thought in a
more expansive direction.   The less restricted possibilities opened up by such
conceptualisations of the field are certainly inchoate at this stage.  Nonetheless,
they  do  seem  to  contain  material  and  programmatic  possibilities  that  are
otherwise  foreclosed  by  the  overwhelmingly  dominant  articulation  of  this
perspective.  
    More generally,  this appreciation of ontological plurality and the widening
effects it engenders would seem to support the view that ineradicable difference
is the condition of possibility for effective political struggle.  This condition is
necessary though it cannot be prejudged as sufficient.  There are always relations
of power, struggle, and competing interests at stake.  It only makes possible the
fight.
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Conclusion
It has been twenty years since the signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO
and  Israel.   The  framework  of  negotiations  set  in  motion  by  these  Accords
certainly led to profound changes in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
For Palestinians in particular, the initiation of the Oslo peace process was widely
conceived as marking the final act in a narrative of state.  As such, the changes
that commenced with the Oslo Accords were largely perceived as evolutionary.
Negotiations and the creation of the PA were viewed as necessary steps towards
the final  destination  of  independent  statehood and a  two-state  solution to  the
conflict.  That this endpoint would be ultimately reached was for a while taken
for granted, and even though the peace process has been effectively stalled since
late 2000, there are Palestinian politicians who continue to publicly insist that
such an outcome is inevitable.1  Officially, the object of a negotiated two-state
solution to the conflict and the establishment of an independent state on the West
Bank,  Gaza  Strip  and  East  Jerusalem  remains  the  dominant  position  in  the
Palestinian political field.
    However,  the  force  of  this  “pragmatist”  contention  has  been  severely
weakened  within  the  Palestinian  context.   This  process  has  contributed  to
furthering  specific  dynamics  in  the  political  field,  such  as  the  growing
significance  of  Hamas.   Yet  it  is  primarily  the  dynamic  of  stability  that  has
undermined the social efficacy of “pragmatist” discourse.  The Israeli occupation
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem has become entrenched over
the last two decades of the peace process, which does not amount to a departure,
1 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 150-206
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but rather marks the continuation of a process that certainly stems back to 1967
and  some  would  argue  (including  those  figures  analysed  in  this  study)
considerably earlier.  
    It was on the premise of being able to break this trajectory in the occupied
territories,  through  negotiating  a  two-state  solution  to  the  conflict,  that  the
legitimacy of the historic Palestinian leadership was largely founded.2  Its failure
to do so after nearly two decades of the Oslo peace process has therefore brought
its narrative of state into dispute along with its own position of authority in the
Palestinian political field.  There was of course opposition to “pragmatism” prior
to late 2000, but it certainly became more pronounced after this point in time,
and for those intellectuals looked at in this study, it was enunciated with a much
higher degree of regularity.
    As this study has shown, the discourse of one-state incorporates a socially
distinct  reconceptualisation  of  the  Palestinian  struggle  that  is  produced  in
opposition to the “pragmatist” standpoint.  In this regard, the articulation of this
discourse is fairly typical in that its efforts to reformulate a particular issue has
occurred in response to, and has been enabled by, policy failure and a crisis of
legitimacy for established elites.3  This discourse is not a pragmatic or purely
technical response to material obstacles – that is, ‘facts on the ground’4 – in the
occupied territories which have been perceived as making a viable Palestinian
state impossible.5  The discourse of one-state, rather, amounts to a competing
2 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle, p. 660
3 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, 242; Finnemore, Martha, and, Sikkink, 
Kathryn, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science, p. 406
4 Sussman, Gary, Is the Two-State Solution Dead?, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary 
World Affairs, p. 39
5 Hermann, Tamar, The bi-national idea in Israel/Palestine: past and present, Nations and 
Nationalism, pp. 381-401; Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage, pp. 206-7; and, Sussman, Gary, The 
Challenge to the Two-state Solution, Middle East Report, pp. 11-12
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vision of what is at stake in the Palestinian political field in relation to its conflict
with Israel (or more accurately political Zionism).  
   Within this perspective, “pragmatism” is simply wrong; and as a result the
Palestinian struggle has to be rethought and redefined.  These intellectuals are
trying to do this through their critical practice.  They promulgate a classificatory
schema which, in contrast to the dominant “pragmatist” standpoint, envisions the
Palestinian struggle as resisting and confronting Zionist settler colonialism.  The
possibility of a political-territorial compromise is denied in this version of social
reality because such a move is conceived as being antithetical to Zionism (or
rather its hegemonic political variant).  To argue, then, as other analysts on this
issue  have  done,  that  the  discourse  of  one-state  is  a  reaction  to  the  closing
window  of  opportunity  for  a  viable  two-state  solution  to  the  conflict  is  to
misconstrue this contentious practice.6  What is at stake is much more significant
than  that,  with  this  discourse  being  a  direct  challenge  to  the  dominant
conceptions  and  assumptions  regarding  what  the  conflict  and  the  Palestinian
struggle are fundamentally about.    
    Such battles over knowledge have implications in terms of what courses of
political action are permissible.  The logics of intelligibility constitutive of the
discourse  of  one-state  necessitate  confrontation  and  the  absolute  defeat  of
political  Zionism,  which  if  recognised  as  legitimate  across  Palestinian  social
space  certainly  paves  the  way for  a  very  different  type  of  struggle  than  that
inscribed in the logics of “pragmatism”.  
    This  counter-knowledge,  it  ought  to  be  stressed,  has  not  emerged  from
nowhere.  It has been shaped by Israel’s material and discursive practices in the
context of the peace process, especially its continuing settlement expansion in the
6 Ibid.
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occupied  territories  and  disavowal  of  Palestinian  political  subjectivity.   The
continuation of these practices within the context of the peace process has led
many of those who are constructing the discourse of one-state to question and
then refute the epistemological assumptions on which “pragmatism” rests.  It is
for this  reason that “pragmatism” has been reconceptualised as false by these
intellectuals and challenged as such.
    What additionally ought to be emphasised is that the content of the discourse
of one-state is to a large degree structured by the objective positions in the field
of those who utter  it.   Thus,  this  discourse may be understood not only as a
competing definition of social reality, but also as one that incorporates particular
standpoints.  The Bourdieusian framework deployed in this study has enabled
this  understanding,  especially  its  sub-concepts  of  habitus and  structural
homology.  It is a finding that is important because it shows that these critical
agents are engaged in a struggle over legitimate knowledge in the Palestinian
arena, and are also interested in remaking this social space in their own specific
image.    
    Their stance is structured by generalised historical tropes in the Palestinian
political field, particularly those enunciated and reproduced from the period of
“maximalist”  and  revolutionary  domination.   Furthermore,  their  stance  is
oriented by reflexivity  and the calculation  that  certain  words are  likely to  be
found compelling and resonate positively at local and international levels.  Yet,
the vision of a one-state solution constructed by these intellectuals is strongly
oriented  by  their  notion  of  anti-colonial  liberation,  which  has  been  largely
generated  in  the  cultural  field  of  postcolonial  studies,  and  which  they  are
transposing to the political context of Palestine-Israel.  Moreover, this vision is
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structurally homologous with the predominantly diasporic position from which it
is  enunciated.   While  their  particular  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  be
Palestinian is important in this regard, with this resulting in their ambivalent and
resigned acceptance  of the “pragmatist”  position in the past,  the anti-colonial
humanism of their  one-state stance,  as well  as its  distaste  for the nation-state
idea, is specific to their objective position in cultural and transnational fields.  So
what is clear from this study is that while these intellectuals have “resumed” a
relatively longstanding battle between “maximalist” and “pragmatist” positions
in the Palestinian political field, they have done so in ways that correspond with
their unique point in social space.  One cannot say that the discourse of one-state
is a straightforward re-articulation of an antecedent Palestinian perspective.
    However, what one can say is that the enunciation of this discourse can be
primarily explained as a bid for power over the Palestinian political field.  As this
research has demonstrated,  this bid has been initiated,  whether consciously or
not, in terms of imposing a particular vision on social space, and as a claim to
domination over the process of determining the future direction of the Palestinian
struggle.   Within  the  context  of  failure  and  political  crisis  of  established
authority, the issues at stake in the field can be conceived as revolving around the
questions  of  what  the  Palestinian  struggle  means  and  who  determines  this
classification.  For those producing the discourse of one-state, the answer to these
questions are their position-taking and their position.  In keeping with Bourdieu’s
theory  of  the  field,  a  ‘double  game’  has  been  shown  to  be  underway  in
Palestinian  social  space,  in  which  certain  intellectuals  are  challenging  the
position  of more  dominant  elites  through a struggle to reformulate  legitimate
discourse and principles of hierarchy.7  This, it may be suggested, is one of the
7 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 168-81
290
key findings of this study as it is from this point that the political limitations of
the critical practice of these intellectuals is rendered intelligible; which in turn
has enabled the generation of more general insights on the role of intellectuals in
politics  and  on  the  relation  between  the  practice  of  critical  thought  and  the
possibilities of political agency.
    The symbolic aspect of the ‘double game’ initiated by these intellectuals is of
course  their  critique  of  “pragmatism”  and  their  counter-vision  of  a  one-state
solution.  The objective aspect, by which is meant their efforts to reconstruct the
principles  of  hierarchy  in  the  Palestinian  field,  is  the  resources  they  have
mobilised so as to play the “game” and contest  established order.  The main
resource in this regard has been cultural capital, which has been asserted more
specifically in this instance as a claim to “seeing reality” and “knowing better”
than those elites who currently dominate this context.  Knowledge as a privileged
access to “truth” has been figured as politically indispensable within the version
of social  reality promulgated by these intellectuals. It is through this claim to
indispensability that their bid for power is most clearly discernible.  It is they
who are able to ‘expose reality’8 because it is they who possess the knowledge to
perceive it and inform others of what is ‘really’ going on.9  The dissemination of
their knowledge, it is assumed, will have practically transformative effects, and it
is  on  such  a  basis  that  these  intellectuals  primarily  stake  their  claim  to
domination.    
    The centrality of power to the political struggles of intellectuals is a thesis that
has  been  advanced  in  previous  scholarly  discussions  on  this  topic,  and  this
8 Karmi, Ghada, Palestinians need a one-state solution, The Guardian
9 Said, Edward W., The End of the Peace Process, p. 50
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research furthers understanding in this regard.10  What is also interesting about
the particular case looked at here is its diasporic element.  If the findings of this
research do not directly challenge some of the conventional thinking on diaspora,
they certainly expand the terms of debate.  
    From the point of view of diaspora studies, the discourse of one-state evinces
many themes that  are typical  to this  area.   Most importantly,  these include a
strong emphasis on loss and exclusion, combined with a claim to belong.  Such
themes are not groundless, and for those diasporic agents examined in this study,
they stem primarily from the particular circumstances of Palestinian history, as
well as from a profound reordering of the political field that occurred in the early
1990s.  The creation of the PA is crucial in this respect as its establishment is
perceived by those who construct the discourse of one-state as coterminous with
their  symbolic  and  objective  exclusion  from formal  Palestinian  politics.   As
demonstrated, it is this antagonism that is vital to understanding this discourse as
a diasporic practice.  
    This research indicates that claims to citizenship in a distinct transnational
community  may  be  an  important  element  constitutive  of  diasporic  practices.
‘I’m Palestinian too’, for example, is a statement that illustrates this point in this
particular instance.11  Such utterances signify disaffection with and resistance to
formal political exclusion.  Yet within this specific practice of diaspora they are
accompanied  by  efforts  to  reconstruct  boundaries  of  “inside”  and  “outside”
within the transnational field.  Though these diaspora intellectuals are certainly
aggrieved at the contraction of formal politics to those Palestinians in the West
10 Bauman, Zygmnunt, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 98-9; Karabel, Jerome, Towards a 
Theory of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, p. 210; Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and 
Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, Rereading The Intellectuals on the 
Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3
11 Abulhawa, Susan, 60 Years of Dispossession, Humiliation, Oppression, The Palestine 
Chronicle
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Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  the  practices  of  contention  enunciated  through  the
discourse  of  one-state  are  not  solely  concerned  with  expanding  this  limit  to
encompass those Palestinians positioned outside these territories.  “Inside” and
“outside”  are  not  simply  geographic  markers  in  this  particular  case,  with
diasporic agents seeking to contest and transgress the formal lines of separation.12
They  are  in  addition  unstable  political  limits  that  seek  to  draw  boundaries
between possession and lack.
    According to the utterances constitutive of the discourse of one-state, diaspora
is the political “inside” within the transnational field.  It is only from this site that
Palestinians  (and more  precisely certain  Palestinian  intellectuals)  can analyse,
evaluate, and legislate on the “common good”.  This is because it is the only site
that is relatively detached in Palestinian social space, so enabling this process of
contemplation and legislation to be carried out to the fullest extent possible.  This
assertion rests once again on the assumption that knowledge as an exposure of
“reality”  will  inevitably  lead  to  material  change,  which  stems  from  the
intellectual  position  of  those  diaspora  agents  who  disseminate  it  within
transnational social space.  In this regard, therefore, the political conduct of these
agents  as  diaspora  cannot  be  considered  separately  from  their  conduct  as
intellectuals.  
    That is to say, the diasporic position of those constructing the discourse of
one-state has encouraged the particular form of their political intervention, not
just with respect to the specific vision of a one-state solution contained within
their  discourse,  but  also  in  relation  to  the  the  precise  mode  of  political
12 Bauböck, Rainer, Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism, International 
Migration Review, pp. 719-20; Turner, Simon, The waxing and waning of the political field in 
Burundi and its diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies, pp. 745-7
293
contestation  they are  engaged in.   On this  point  about  mode  of  contestation,
however,  this  encouragement  seems  to  have  occurred  only  insofar  as  the
diasporic  position of  these agents  complements  their  position  as intellectuals.
Diaspora and its hierarchization in this version of the social world in fact works
in tandem with the privileged access to “truth” that these agents claim to possess
and have  mobilised  as  a  politics  of  liberation.   As this  research showed,  the
temporal autonomy and material security of diaspora as a sociological space are
incorporated in the political stance of these intellectuals as vital conditions for
their effective performance of analysis and theory.  Nevertheless, it remains the
case that it is the political efficacy they invest in analysis and theory,  in their
position as intellectuals,  that primarily accounts for the political  position they
take.   Diaspora  is  subordinated  to  “the  intellectual”  in  this  relation  of
complementarity.  Thus, while it would be wrong to suggest that the diasporic
position of these agents has had no influence on the kind of political position
they have adopted, in this particular instance its effect in this regard appears to
have been to  compound the intellectualist  dispositions  of  these agents  during
their  movement  into  the  (transnational)  field  of  political  struggles.   The
construction of diaspora as a 'pure spac[e] of thought' that contributes to 'exciting
possibilities  for the intellectual'  is  not  a move unique to  those producing the
discourse of one-state,  and this  relation  of complementarity  has been enacted
within general discussions on these topics.13  With respect to the politics of the
discourse of one-state, the main point here is that diaspora is a factor shaping the
struggle for the political “inside” within Palestinian politics in the sense that its
conditions  of  autonomy and security  are  taken  to  further  the  acquisition  and
13See, for example, Radhakrishnan, Rajagopalan, Diasporic Mediation: Between Home and 
Location, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 1996, p. 173
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circulation  of  emancipatory  knowledge.   From  the  point  of  view  of  this
discourse, “other” Palestinians  lack these conditions and resources and so are
severely restricted in terms of their being able to initiate an effective politics.       
    It is along these lines, then, that proponents of a one-state solution are seeking
to enact what Engin Isin calls ‘new boundaries of citizenship’.  This is a struggle
that is taking place across transnational social space, largely in response to the
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion imposed upon them by the PA regime.14
What is interesting about this struggle from the point of view of diaspora studies
is that it is not primarily articulated through theSee assertion of membership in a
particular demos, though this is clearly a part of it.  It is, rather, asserted through
a socially constructed binary of possession and lack, which, within the discourse
of one-state at least,  works to produce those who make this claim as political
subjects who are fully qualified to act politically in relation to those who are not.
The relation of force sought after and prefigured discursively in this discourse is
one in which these diaspora intellectuals are entitled to arbitrate on matters of
general political concern.  So while studies of diaspora and transnationalism have
emphasised citizenship in this setting, the findings of this research would seem to
point to a broadening of this issue to encompass dispute not just over status but
over practice as well.   “Who is a citizen?” may therefore take on a different
meaning in this context.
    “Truth”, as articulated in the discourse of one-state, includes the category of
the “people”.  This is not, it ought to be stressed, an uncommon claim within the
contentious  practices  of  intellectuals  in  politics.   Within  the  sociology  of
intellectuals there is a strong tradition of such agents assuming their interests ‘to
14 Isin, Engin. F., Who is the new citizen? Towards a Genealogy, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
1, 1997, pp. 115-132, p. 131
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be coterminous with the interests of society as a whole’.15  Often intellectuals
take for granted that their position is somehow special, with it being positioned
above  or  separate  to  narrow  concerns.16  Such  presumed  detachment  is
considered as enabling their surveying and problematising of issues confronting
society in general, which in turn allows them to formulate what Julien Benda
referred to many years ago as ‘general ideas’.17  The converse of this contention
within the sociology of intellectuals would appear to be the notion of organicity.
In this view, the intellectual is not detached but organically bound to a specific
group and is thus able to articulate its perspectives and aspirations.  As a social
category,  intellectuals  ‘emerge  from  and  serve  other  social  groups’  in  this
tradition.18
    This study has shown that both of these sociological traditions are reproduced
in the discourse of one-state.  On the one hand, the intellectuals who produce the
discourse of one-state claim to have a special  access to “truth” and a relative
detachment that enables them to determine the “common good”.  On the other
hand, they claim to be organic in that they are bound and seamlessly attached to
others in society.  The “truth” in this regard is not only a purely objective reality
mystified and obscured by partiality,  ignorance and “false” consciousness.  In
addition,  it  is  defined  in  this  discourse  as  a  lived  and  embodied  experience.
‘[T]he 11 million Palestinians living under occupation, apartheid and as stateless
refugees are living the truth’, and so in speaking “the truth to power”, this is also
what these intellectuals mean by “truth”.19  They are speaking for others – in this
case  the  Palestinian  “people”  –  whom they represent  and serve  in  so  doing.
15 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 65
16 Ibid.
17 Benda, Julien, quoted in, ibid.
18 Ibid., pp. 66-7
19 Karkar, Sonja, Talking Palestine to power, The Electronic Intifada
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Their  voice  is  the  voice  of  the  “people”  and  this  is  historicised  and  so
authenticated as such within their (re)narration of the past.  Indeed, this unity is
effectively  essentialized  within  this  discourse  and  as  a  result  is  contingently
rendered unchanging.  It is reified as a fixed principle.
    This  research  has  demonstrated  that  these  sociological  traditions  are  not
simply different approaches to the study of intellectuals, but are implicated in
social conflict and struggles for power.  This is a finding that supports Zygmunt
Bauman’s perceptive observation that ‘[d]efinitions of the intellectual … are all
self-definitions’,  which  presuppose  the  authority  to  draw  such  lines  of
demarcation, and which effectively create the category of non-intellectuals, who
within this relation of distinction at least are typically figured in a subordinate
position.20  As occupants of a distinct social position, intellectuals are certainly
different in the Bourdieusian sense that each point in social space incorporates a
particular temporal-spatial trajectory.  Intellectuals are not, however, intrinsically
special, nor are they intrinsically organic.  The mobilisation and (re)articulation
of such tropes in social space must be considered as an outcome of this distinct
social position, which historically has been excessively interested in “truth” and
generalities.21  Yet,  it  is precisely such interests  that are particularised further
through the sociological traditions invoked here, as they are cast as being beyond
the  reach  of  all  others,  either  through  their  lacking  requisite  knowledge  and
abilities, or through their inability to speak and so articulate their demands.  
    The discourse of one-state evidences these two broad (self-) definitions of the
intellectual working in tandem with one another, which stems from the rather
20 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 8-9
21 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 78.  Also see Bigo, Didier, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of 
Practices, Practices of Power, International Political Sociology, p. 230
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eclectic intellectual genealogy incorporated within this perspective – in particular
Edward  Said’s  strong  taste  for  Bendaesque  and Gramscian  notions  of  the
intellectual  – and from creative practice.22  The effect of these definitions,  as
inscribed within this discourse, is to advance the social  position of those who
make  them as  politically  indispensable  and uniquely  disposed to  legitimately
speak for others.  What they work to do, as this study has demonstrated, is secure
for  these  agents  a  preeminent  political  role  on  the  grounds  that  they  “know
better” as rational subjects  and as representatives of a wider social group.  The
sociological traditions invoked and reproduced in the discourse of one-state are
tied  to  battles  for  domination  between  differently  positioned  agents  within  a
particular field of struggles.  Definitions of the intellectual, whether as special or
organic, are tied to struggles to classify ‘the legitimate principles of division of
the field’.23  They are not descriptions which match “reality” to greater or lesser
degrees and nor are they simply normative ideals which individuals fulfil or fall
short of.24  They are inseparable from relations of power.
    The  struggle  for  power  launched  through  the  discourse  of  one-state  is
somewhat paradoxical, however, and it does raise more general questions about
the role of intellectuals in politics and the relation between the practice of critical
thought and its relation to practical possibilities.  As has been made clear in this
study, the specificity of the bid for domination in this discourse is far from being
unique to those who produce it; they initiate this struggle through the reiteration
of longstanding discourses constitutive of the sociology of intellectuals.  So in
this respect the discourse of one-state cannot be considered sui generis.  What is
22 Said, Edward W., Peace and its Discontents, pp. 195-6
23 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 242
24 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 8-9; Karabel, Jerome, Towards a Theory 
of Intellectuals and Politics, Theory and Society, pp. 205-7
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ordinarily specific to the social position occupied by intellectuals is its ‘relative
monopoly of complex knowledge’, coupled with an interest in generalities,  or
what from a Bourdieusian standpoint might be termed disinterest.25  This skews
contest in a certain direction, or at least this is how it looks from a Bourdieusian
perspective.  The form of capital that they have at their disposal, and which they
can therefore mobilise and invest in struggles for domination,  is cultural.   As
such,  they  are  typically  occupants  of  an  objective  position  that  orients  them
towards legitimising bids for power on the basis of their possession of cultivated
dispositions and academic qualifications.
    This is not fixed, of course, and a fundamental criterion of Bourdieu’s field
theory is the interconvertibility of capital and by implication the instability of the
principles of hierarchy that determine social space at a given moment in time.
Yet,  the corresponding versions of  social  reality  that  seem to stem from this
objective orientation appear  to generate  significant  limitations  on the political
role  of  intellectuals  (or,  again,  they  appear  to  do  so  from  a  Bourdieusian
perspective).  The special access to knowledge, or “truth” as it is claimed in the
discourse of one-state, is the principal resource on which intellectuals legitimise
their political  interventions.26  Such a process is only capable of working and
making sense, however, if a corresponding ontology of “truth” is said to underlie
politics and more precisely political change.  Implicit within such legitimising
strategies,  as scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty have argued in relation  to
critical  intellectuals  generally,  is  the positive assumption that people who are
‘exposed to  a  rational  elaboration  of the state  of the world’  will  start  ‘to act
rationally’.  Underpinning such battles for domination is an ‘implicit faith in the
25 Verdery, Katherine, Konrad and Szelenyi’s model of socialism, twenty-five years later, in, 
Rereading The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Theory and Society, pp. 2-3
26 Ibid.
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rational  construction  of  politics’,27 which  certainly  looks  dubious  through the
Bourdieusian lense deployed in this study, but which is logically necessary if the
primacy of “truth” is to have any social effect.
    The consequences of this logic have been shown to be politically disabling in
this particular instance, though this insight has broader implications, especially as
the ‘problem’ of “truth” is a pertinent issue the literature on critical – or ‘left’ –
intellectuals.28  As this study has suggested, this problem specifically is one of
reduction:  politics  is  effectively reduced to  a positivist  equation,  with “truth”
being rendered as the cause of emancipation.  The temporality between these two
points may not be immediate or even relatively short.  Nonetheless, the primacy
of “truth” rests on this teleological assumption, which makes enlightenment the
quintessential  political  task  and  the  “philosopher”  the  quintessential  political
agent.29  It is the tautology of this logic that seems to deprive those intellectuals
who construct  the discourse of one-state  of the possibility  of playing a more
directly  engaged  and  constitutive  political  role,  which  is  reinforced  by  their
practical sense as agents positioned in the cultural field and their disposition as a
result towards the reproduction of an ‘intellectual mode of praxis’.30  This logic,
moreover, as it is reiterated in this discourse, amounts to a particular inflection
on what is a historically sedimented and basic modernist idea.31  The problem of
“truth”, therefore, appears to be of wide significance, especially to those who are
interested in socially effective critical thought.
27 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Where is Now? Critical Inquiry, p. 461
28 Ibid; Talshir, Gayil, The Intellectual as a Political Actor?  Four Models of Theory/Praxis, 
Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, p. 219
29 Asad, Talal, Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism, in, de Vries, Hent (ed.), 
Religion: Beyond a Concept, Fordham University Press, New York, pp. 580-609, pp. 600-2
30 Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 18
31 Asad, Talal, Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism, in, de Vries, Hent (ed.), 
Religion: Beyond a Concept, pp. 600-2
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    What this study has suggested in making this insight, then, is not simply that
intellectuals  are  precisely  that,  too  intellectual,  to  play  a  socially  efficacious
political role and that consequently they ought to leave their “ivory tower” and
come down to earth so as to be more effective.  To be sure there has been a
strong tendency for intellectuals to define themselves as somehow ‘not of this
world’,32 and  to  position  themselves  as  being  closer  to  ‘the  “spirit”’  of
universality than others.33  The discourse of one-state has repeatedly performed
such tropes.  Indeed, there often has been an excoriating critique of intellectuals
on these grounds, with them being chastised for being overly rational34 and for
‘arrogantly sit[ting] in their  ivory tower’ refusing to initiate  or partake in the
‘mundane work of justice and practical devotion to a social and political cause’.35
As this research has illustrated, this type of criticism has been hurled at those
individuals  responsible  for  the  production  and  social  transmission  of  the
discourse of one-state.
    The findings of this research point instead towards a structural constraint on
the political role intellectuals can play.  In this sense, the classic debate on how
intellectuals ought to behave seems somewhat misguided and implicitly grants
them far too much freedom of manoeuvre.   As this  study has suggested,  the
objective position and habitus of intellectuals would appear to orient their critical
engagement in the field in a particular direction at the expense of other modes of
political conduct.  These ‘social determinants’ of practice, as figures such as Loïc
Wacquant  call  them,  which  include  specific  resources  and  internalised
32 Benda, Julien, The Great Betrayal, pp. 152-3
33 Pels, Dick, The Intellectual as Stranger: Studies in Spokespersonship, Routledge, London and 
New York, 2000, p. 133
34 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 81
35 Pels, Dick, The Intellectual as Stranger: Studies in Spokespersonship, p. 131
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dispositions, seem to structure the critical action of intellectuals.36  In the context
of political engagement, they incline them towards an exaltation of knowledge
and “truth”, which in turn works to temporarily subordinate important political
possibilities,  thus  limiting  what  such  agents  can  do.   It  is  in  this  respect,
furthermore,  that  intellectuals  are  considered  different  in  this  study,  but  not
special.37  They  are  structured  like  every  other  agent  in  the  field.   Yet  the
specificity of this structuring is largely determined by the particular position that
they occupy in social space.
    So what is the political role of intellectuals?  Of course any answer offered
here  is  intrinsically  limited  given  the  scope  of  analysis  and  the  particular
conceptual lense through which this issue has been approached.  Nevertheless,
the answer  suggested by this research is that “it depends”.  It depends on the
extent to which the social determinants that seem to be implicated in the position
occupied by intellectuals in the field can be mitigated.  
    The Bourdieusian response to this issue, as noted throughout this research, is
to advocate a practice of social scientific reflexivity,  which is an ethos that is
implicitly  advanced by certain  poststructuralist  theorists  as well.   To do this,
however,  as  has  been  likewise  suggested,  would  appear  to  necessitate  an
exteriority to social practice that for most of Bourdieu’s theorisations does not
exist, and which for poststructuralism certainly does not.  So how does one do
this without resorting to metaphysical  criteria  and re-enacting the relations  of
power encountered in this research, along with their disabling political effects?
How  does  one  actively  escape  the  constraining  relations  in  which  they  are
implicated and so open  possibilities for practices of effective political change?
36 Wacquant, Loïc J. D., Critical Thought as a Solvent of Doxa, Constellations, p. 97
37 Pels, Dick, Knowledge Politics and Anti-Politics: Toward a Critical Appraisal of Bourdieu’s 
Concept of Intellectual Autonomy, Theory and Society, p. 98
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To what extent is this even possible?  These questions have been shown to be
important by this study, yet their answers are far from being clear.  As such, they
seem to represent a point of departure for future research in this area.
    Therefore,  it  appears  that  the  political  role  of  intellectuals  is  structurally
constrained and limited by a strong tendency towards the practice of abstract
critique.   This is  clearly insufficient  politically according to the Bourdieusian
framework used in this study, but it is nonetheless significant, even if it does fall
far short of the dominant position that certain cultural elites appear to aspire to
through  their  battles  in  the  field.   Even  though the  political  possibilities  for
effective change are largely subordinated to a logic of enlightenment within the
one-state  discourse,  the  intellectuals  who  articulate  it  have  still  prised  open
conceptual horizons that not so long ago were heavily foreclosed.  This is not an
insignificant achievement, and while there are specific limits to what these agents
can  do  politically,  stemming  from  their  objective  position  and  intellectual
habitus, their counter-knowledge  might continue to radiate across social space
and acquire a materiality that otherwise might not have existed.38  So it is in this
rather hopeful sense that intellectuals may be considered as playing a necessary
political role.39
    A claim to unity with the “people” is also articulated in the discourse of one-
state and in this respect the particular stance of these intellectuals is presumed to
be coterminous with Palestinians generally.  Such a claim is typically advanced
in  the  social  practices  of  intellectuals  in  politics,  and is  done  so  in  order  to
legitimise their particular position in the field of struggles.  The effects of such a
38 Kurzman, Charles, and, Owens, Lynn, The Sociology of Intellectuals, American Review of 
Sociology, p. 73
39 Campbell, David, Beyond Choice: The Onto-Politics of Critique, International Relations, p. 
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claim appear to be once again problematic in terms of enabling a political role
beyond the reiteration  of abstract  critique.   This is  because the absorption of
broad  and  diverse  points  in  social  space  under  the  discursive  device  of  the
“people” results in the symbolic effacement of difference in the field and with it
the possibility  of its  engagement  and reconstruction as a mobilised collective
subject.  The presumption of a prior unity not only obviates the need for such
political work, but also temporarily denies the conditions for its initiation.  It is
because of such symbolic violence, which stems from their bid for power, that
the mode of critical  practice  performed by these intellectuals  remains  largely
abstract and socially detached.  As has been further suggested, this cannot be
otherwise so long as such symbolic violence is reiterated.
    On  top  of  contributing  to  the  scholarly  literature  on  the  sociology  of
intellectuals, this research would appear to make a contribution to a significant
debate on the politics of representation.  Again this contribution is limited insofar
as it is derived from a very specific case study and as such cannot be considered
a grand statement with unquestionable validity.   Yet the engagement that has
been carried out in this study with the politics of representation enunciated in
theories  of  post-representationalism  and  deliberative  democracy  (via  the
discourse  of  one-state  and  from  a  Bourdieusian  standpoint)  would  seem  to
generate support for certain criticisms of these perspectives, which in turn point
towards  an  underlying  conception  of  politics  in  which  incommensurable
differences are the conditions  of possibility for political  contest  and modified
relations of power.  The prefiguring of an underlying sameness within a given
social  structure and its  teleological  unfolding, whether through logics of self-
propulsion generated by the structure or through its  uncovering in  reasonable
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debate,  denies  the active  construction  of  a collective  political  subject  as  it  is
rendered always already present and in motion in such accounts of the social
world.  Such prefiguring is enacted within the discourse of one-state, and as this
study has shown, it  has essentialising and utopian political  consequences that
deny or severely limit the points of contention in the field.
     Further research is required on the issues raised in this study on the role of
intellectuals  in  politics  and the restricted possibilities  that seem to stem from
their  social  position  and  universalising  tendencies.   As  mentioned  briefly,
postcolonialism and the figure of the “postcolonial intellectual” might be a useful
avenue  for  broadening  the  scope  of  analysis  conducted  in  this  research.   A
cursory glance  at  texts  constitutive  of  this  perspective would seem to further
suggest that the findings of this research are not unique to the discourse of one-
state.  However, this point is only raised tentatively and with a view to the future.
    The one-state discourse certainly challenges the official Palestinian order, both
symbolically and objectively.   In this respect, it may be considered a counter-
discourse and a critical mode of practice.  Yet as this study has suggested, such
practices  cannot  be  detached  from the  relations  of  power  in  which  they  are
embedded,  and  indeed  the  legitimating  strategies  enacted  through  them may
work to  limit  the  prospects  of  socially  effective  political  agency.   So in  this
regard it seems vital to problematise the relation between the practice of critical
thought and the possibilities of political agency.  The critical stances adopted by
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